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Abstract
Although the public policy literature has traditionally focused on public sector agencies’ roles in
the policy implementation process, private sector managers who oversee regulatory mandates for
their organizations are also policy actors. These actors operate between multiple conflicting
field-level institutional logics that create demands that they must reconcile through their work. In
the banking sector, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), enacted in 1977, and its associated
policies are monitored by the banking regulatory agencies and implemented by the senior
managers responsible for these mandates at regulated financial institutions. Simultaneously with
their responsibility for the policy mission of the CRA, CRA officers (CROs) are business
managers who must support the commercial missions of their banks, as well as respond to the
pressures of their community contexts. This dissertation contributes to the policy implementation
literature in two ways. First, by linking the institutional logics and institutional work
perspectives, this study extends our understanding of how managers in private organizations
reconcile the demands of public policy with their market driven missions, and second, by
examining the factors that contribute to policy implementation in the field of community
reinvestment. By employing central tenets derived from the institutional logics perspective, the
dissertation recognizes how the constitutive and interconnected material (organizational
structures and practices) and symbolic (conceptualizations of market and policy demands)
elements of the institutional orders of society inform these managers’ policy work. Furthermore,
the institutional work framework recognizes the enduring nature of institutions, but also that
institutional logics can change over time as constituted by actors’ agency and the evolving
discourse and norms in the field. This micro-level focus on individual actors recognizes that
organizations are not unitary, but instead are comprised of diverse employees who reference

institutional logics in divergent ways. The second key contribution of the dissertation is its
elucidation of the primary factors that contribute to CROs’ abilities to reconcile the demands of
conflicting institutional logics, informed by the institutional work perspective. The study
illustrates how structural work (job responsibilities and organizational authority), conceptual
work (policy worldview and its intersection with race and personal identity, as well as
organizational and leadership commitment to CRA performance), operational work (community
market context) and relational work (professional identity and gender of the CRO) influenced
interpretations of CRA mandates. The most significant finding was related to the race and
ethnicity of the CRO, which influenced the conceptualizations of CRA as community
development, as opposed to compliance, as well as perceptions concerning the importance of the
CRA statute.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Private sector managers responsible for enacting public policies wear multiple hats as
they experience implementation related pressures from policy regulators, their business leaders,
and local communities. In managers’ attempts to comply with regulatory demands, they play a
multitude of potentially conflicting roles as they are simultaneously policy actors, business
managers, and community members. The external facing roles position the managers to answer
to interests that may diverge from internal organizational goals that they navigate as business
employees of for-profit organizations.
In fact, research shows that individuals and organizations from different sectors tend to
operate under divergent institutional logics, that is, the socially constructed practices, rules of
action, assumptions, beliefs, and values that are embodied in the shared identities of sectoral
actors (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lindblom, 1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton & Ocasio,
1999). Logics influence what is considered important, as well as the implicit rules and practices
that are accepted in various social scenarios (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). The focus of the institutional logics perspective is to ask how these logics affect
sensemaking and behavior of individual actors. Although actors may reference multiple
institutional logics as they navigate their daily lives—dependent on their societal or
organizational roles and responsibilities (for example, as employees of for-profit or non-profit
organizations, as citizens of various global political systems, and as family members)—field
level logics of their industries and professions exert powerful influences on work-life (Friedland
& Alford, 1991). Institutional logics drawn from the broader American social institutions of
market capitalism, bureaucracy, democracy, and family have distinct differences in their
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overarching belief systems that shape the behavior of field actors (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer,
2017; Friedland & Alford, 1991).
The private sector’s driving force is profit, framed by the market logic and the institution
of capitalism, although business leaders increasingly recognize the complexity of the profit
bottom line and necessity of thriving communities for their operations. Under a dominant market
logic, business managers focus on resources, acquisition, and profit growth (Averch & Johnson,
1962; Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Epstein et al., 2016; Friedland & Alford, 1991;
Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). Despite business
managers’ best intentions for their customers and communities, if a business is not profitable, it
will no longer be able to operate.
Public sector agencies and their employees reflect dominant beliefs—ascribed to a
bureaucratic logic—in centralized authority, standardized operations and regulatory procedures,
and measurement of service program outcomes (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017). The
bureaucratic logic centers on addressing societal issues and the public interest and is concerned
with regulating private firm externalities that may be at odds with the public interest, as well as
providing goods and services that are not adequately supplied through economic markets
(Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980; Epstein et al., 2016; Lyden, 1975; Rainey, 1983; Viscussi et al.,
2005).
Non-profit organizations and their team members may reflect logics that are more aligned
to market or bureaucratic logics, or to democratic or development logics, dependent on their
organizational structures and resource-based relationships (Knutsen, 2012). Democratic logics
center on community engagement or civic participation and concerns about equity (BridwellMitchell & Sherer, 2017; Knutsen, 2012). The development logic focuses on community
2

development and concerns such as poverty alleviation. Whereas in the market logic clients are
customers and sources of income, in the development logic clients are seen as beneficiaries and
are deserving of assistance (Battilana & Dorado, 2010).
When actors carry out work that spans institutional boundaries—whether because of
organizational form, cross-sector partnerships, or regulatory mandates—divergent institutional
logics may clash, or at other times converge over time as one sector influences the practices of
another. Public policy mandates on business have the potential to create contradictory or
conflicting pressures on the actors responsible for policy compliance. The varying interests and
actions of stakeholders internal and external to the organization can be associated with dominant
institutional logics of the various institutional orders at play. Managers responsible for enacting
policy mandates are on the direct receiving line of these pressures. Thus, the question arises, how
do they respond to the pressures of policy compliance, and what factors influence their
responses?
In this dissertation, these issues surrounding cross-sector work are illustrated through an
examination of the mandates of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; 12 U.S.C. 2901) on
regulated banks, which is one arena with the potential to create conflicting institutional demands
for the managers responsible for policy execution.1 Community development has traditionally
been the focus of community-based non-governmental organizations in conjunction with public
sector agencies; however, government increasingly has engaged the private sector to achieve
public goals (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011; Ferlie et al., 2003). One such example, and the

1

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), enacted by Congress in 1977 (12 U.S.C. 2901) and implemented by
Regulations 12 CFR parts 25, 228, 345, and 195, is intended to encourage depository institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the communities in which they operate (FFIEC, 2017).
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focus of this dissertation, is the CRA, which requires the private sector, specifically financial
depository institutions (“banks”), to lend and invest in low to moderate-income (LMI)
communities in order to be granted licenses to expand their operations (Haag, 2000; Stock &
Noreika, 2001).2 This presents a rare federal mandate on businesses for what would otherwise be
limited to voluntary corporate social responsibility or market demands.

Figure 1

Community
Reinvestment
Act and
regulatory
policies

Bank
Managers
Bank leaders,
board, and
shareholders

Community
activists &
non-profit
organizations

Institutional Demands on Bank Managers Related to CRA
Private sector organizations typically base performance incentives and rewards on
profitable product and service delivery (Banfield, 1975; Epstein et al., 2016; Khojasteh, 1993;
Rainey, 1983; Wittmer, 1991). Specifically, the economic markets private firms operate in

2

A bank [depository institution] is a financial institution licensed to receive deposits and make loans. Banks may
also provide financial services, such as wealth management, currency exchange and safe deposit boxes.
Commercial/retail banks are typically concerned with managing withdrawals and receiving deposits as well as
supplying short-term loans to individuals and small businesses. Consumers primarily use these banks for basic
checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit (CDs) and home mortgages. (Investopedia, 2017). The CRA is
applicable to all banks who carry FDIC insurance.
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purportedly provide a clear profit incentive and goal clarity for the firms’ managers to focus their
work activities (Barton, 1979; Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Lyden, 1975). Yet while
financial returns, even for community development projects (if returns are tracked at all), can be
tracked through standardized accounting procedures, social impact lacks consistent measurement
practices. Thus, measuring the impact of community development activities or the social
outcomes intended by the CRA diverges from the more dominant evaluation norms and practices
in the private sector, especially around financial measurement (as opposed to impact
measurement). Furthermore, market capitalism can be at odds with sustainable community
development strategies whose goals are to improve quality of life for all residents, for example
through environmental destruction from mass production or the growing wealth gap of capitalist
economies (Green & Haines, 2016; Hill, 2009; Radke, 1995). In the banking sector, lending to an
LMI customer generates lower returns than lending to a high-income customer. Given this, an
important question becomes, would banks still make these loans if it were not for the regulatory
mandates of the CRA?
If conflicting logics are at play when private sector managers are tasked with
implementing public sector policy goals, challenges may arise as they attempt to enact policy
requirements (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003; Donahue & Zeckhauser,
2011). For example, operationally, conflicting priorities may influence the desirability of
community development projects as compared to more profitable investments. Even if a bank
manager was committed to an LMI project investment, would she have the support of her
broader organization?
Given the potential for conflicting institutional demands across sectors, an intriguing
question is how the bankers’ interpretations and implementation of CRA policy mandates are
5

associated with institutional logics. Furthermore, how do these managers experience and respond
to the pressures created by policy mandates, and how might we explain the variation in their
responses? (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Garrow & Grusky,
2012)?
Statement of the Problem
Public policy has been defined as “deliberate action by a government to establish new
transaction patterns or institutions or to change established patterns within old institutions. Policy
formulated by a government, then, serves as a tension-generating force in society” (Smith, 1973,
p.202). When policies are implemented, pressures are experienced by actors at the receiving line,
who must try to adapt to mandated changes to practices and procedures. As elucidated by the
institutional logics perspective, these pressures are heightened when the core norms of the
regulatory body and the regulated profession diverge from each other substantially. New
institutions may emerge over time as tensions are reconciled and established procedures are
recalibrated, while others remain steadfast. This process of actor-driven institutional change and
maintenance is captured by the institutional work literature (Lawrence et al., 2011; Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006). Managers need to reconcile these pressures in their day-to-day work, and where
incongruencies arise, they can cause policy implementation to be less effective than policy
makers intended. Indeed, a number of policy studies have found that public policy often
produces less desirable outcomes than expected (Cooper et al., 1996; Edelman, 1992; Edelman et
al., 2001; Ferlie et al., 2003; Lipsky, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979; Smith, 1973).
Yet, both organizational theory and the traditional policy implementation literature tend
to focus on the organizational level of analysis in response to institutional demands, treating
organizations as unitary actors (Oliver, 1991). This underestimates the importance of the agency
6

of individual actors, specifically how actors embedded within organizations respond to the
institutional demands created by public policy while simultaneously managing internal demands
(Battilana et al., 2009; Cloutier et al., 2016; DiMaggio, 1988).
The majority of public policy work that looks at actors’ roles in policy implementation
focuses on top-down or bottom-up approaches to explain successes or failures. Top-down
failures tend to focus on improper policy design, poor planning, or lack of communication
(Matland, 1995; Montjoy & O’Toole, 1979; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Van Meter & Van
Horn, 1975). Bottom-up failures are often attributed to frontline staff and civil servants—
“street-level bureaucrats”—who are perceived to fail to carry out policy reforms as intended due
to on-the-ground conditions, lack of resources, or existing workloads and routines (Lipsky, 1980;
Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). While this policy
implementation literature is rich in insights, the shortcomings of these approaches are not only
the focus on the public sector to the exclusion of the role of private sector actors, but also that
they fail to recognize the vital boundary-spanning roles of organizational managers. These are
the actors who oversee the frontline staff, interact with policy regulators, and make crucial
decisions about how policy implementation will be carried out.
A focus on senior-level managers is largely missing in the public policy implementation
literature—the individuals who are the direct intermediaries with the regulatory agencies tasked
with implementing policy, and who are responsible for managing the teams who will carry out
the mandates (Cloutier et al., 2016). “[S]urprisingly, little attention has been given to the nature
of the ongoing work demanded of and engaged in by actors at this managerial level…even
though it is here that ambiguities in reform proposals and contradiction with preexisting
frameworks are likely to be most salient” (Cloutier et al., 2016, p.260). This focal point is crucial
7

for study, specifically understanding how managers respond to policy pressures while trying to
ensure that their job roles contribute to organizational success (Cloutier et al., 2016).
Research Questions
This study presents unanswered questions about how private actors respond to
institutional demands and work towards their firms’ goals while also meeting policy mandates.
In doing so, it poses the following research inquiries:
▪

Research Question 1 (R1): To what extent can linking the institutional logics and
institutional work perspectives illustrate the potential for conflicting institutional
demands created by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) for regulated banks, as
well as the conflict response strategies of managers who are responsible for policy
mandates? (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006; Lawrence et al., 2009; 2011; 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al.,
2012).

▪

Research Question 2 (R2): How do Community Reinvestment Act officers (CROs)3
reconcile the institutional demands created by the CRA? How are their interpretations of
policy mandates and references to institutional logics associated with (1) features of their
banks; (2) their communities; and (3) their individual attributes and background?
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier
et al., 2016; Garrow & Grusky, 2012).

3

The acronym CRO is used throughout the dissertation to refer to bankers who are responsible for compliance to the
CRA. Dependent on the bank’s organizational structure, there are various managerial positions responsible for the
CRA across different operational units, and with varying levels of seniority from manager to vice president to bank
executive. Titles also vary widely. Therefore, the term CRO is used more generally to describe a variety of working
titles. Yet all CROs in the study share core responsibilities regarding carrying out CRA mandates for their banks.
Furthermore, for the purpose of examination, banks must name a single CRO officer (Perlmeter, 2017).
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Statement of Potential Significance
Ample literature exists across sociology, management (including organizational studies),
political science, and public policy on the differences between the public and private sectors
(Appleby, 1945; Barton, 1979; Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Ferlie et al., 2003;
Malhotra et al., 2019; Viscussi et al., 2005;), and how these institutional fields and logics
influence and shape organizational behavior (Ferlie et al., 2003; Meyer, 1979; Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). Traditionally focused on the organizational level of analysis, the literature has
neglected to sufficiently consider how individual actors experience and react to these
institutional field dynamics when interpreting policy mandates that may not clearly align with
their firms’ primary missions (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Cloutier et al., 2016; Greenwood &
Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Pache & Santos, 2010; Perry & Rainey, 1988). Given
the potential for challenges in policy implementation posed by conflicting institutional logics of
the public and private sector, this is a key area for further study (Ferlie et al., 2003). The
application of the street-level bureaucracy literature (Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980;
Marinetto, 2011; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000) is of limited utility in this case, (a)
because it largely examines goal misalignments between public agencies, albeit at different
federal levels and (b) because its focus is on lower level (street-level) workers, as opposed to
managers.
In the research at hand, the focus on agents that span institutional sectors, interacting in
the process of policy reform and implementation, contributes to addressing a theoretical gap in
the literature. In doing so, the research also unites two literature streams out of the
neoinstitutional tradition, including the literature on institutional work and that on institutional
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logics, which have previously been studied mostly independently from one another (Canning &
O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the perspective applied in this work draws from multiple academic fields,
particularly the management, public administration, and public policy literatures. The business
and policy academies often operate in administrative isolation from one another with rare cross
pollination. Yet, business exists within the regulatory environment, and both business and policy
scholars would benefit from more understanding of one another’s work and theory. Furthermore,
extensive research on public sector policy implementation lends insight to our understandings of
the private sector (Ferlie et al., 2003).
This dissertation is about policy issues with broad scope and significant practical
relevance, given the wide reach of the CRA and extensive resources of the banking industry
(Dover & Lawrence, 2010). In addition to theoretical development, this research aims to offer
utility for bankers, regulators, and policy makers. David et al. (2019) argued that institutional
theorists often lose sight of the real-world impacts of institutionalization in their desire for rich
descriptions. Instead, the practical relevance of institutional theory for managers, leaders,
regulators, policy makers, and even societal outcomes should be the focus (David et al., 2019).
There is significant practical relevance in understanding how CROs manage and react to the
institutional demands of the CRA, including insights that could be used for organizational
structures, job roles and responsibilities, operating procedures, and hiring, socialization, and
training practices. It will also point to initiatives that the regulators could support, such as
training and education. Ferlie et al. (2003) posited that the development of theory across the
public and private sectors would aid researchers to utilize empirical evidence to both
conceptualize and inform policy reform. Similarly, Cloutier et al. (2016) called for policy makers
10

to have more understanding of managerial work before proposing reforms. This research may
uncover potential pathways to find common ground on CRA policy design and policy reform,
including enhancements that will ultimately improve community development and societal
outcomes.
Conceptual Framework
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a deeper understanding of the institutional
demands of public policies, as well as the contextual factors that influence the response strategies
of actors in the direct line of policy implementation. It does this via in-depth analysis of a
particular institutional research setting, community reinvestment banking. Private sector CROs
operate between multiple field-level institutional logics as they respond to the demands of the
CRA and its associated regulatory policies. They are policy actors responsible for executing
CRA mandates and managing the community development banking strategy, business managers
who must responsibly deploy resources and navigate across work priorities, and community
members who face public and social pressures in the course of their work.
Employing key principles of the institutional logics perspective, this dissertation
recognizes that each of the institutional orders in society has both material (structures and
practices) and symbolic (ideation and meaning) elements that are “intertwined and constitutive
elements of one another” as embodied by sectoral actors (Thornton et al., 2012. p.10). Within the
field of banking, philosophies around profit and market demands influence bank structures and
policies, as well as employees’ conceptual understandings and professional practices. But
because the institutional logics perspective examines the effects on micro-level processes, a
focus on individual actors recognizes that with varied backgrounds and role structures,
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institutional logics vary not only across sectoral fields, but also as they are referenced by diverse
employees of organizations and in the sensemaking of these individual actors.
As these private sector managers attempt to interpret, react to, and reconcile public policy
mandates with goals of their firms, they influence institutional maintenance or change in the
course of their work. This reconciliation of logics can be appropriately captured by the
institutional work literature. The institutional work perspective has developed our understanding
of the agency of actors in the course of institutional construction, disruption, and transformation
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011). As diverse actors work across sectors,
social norms and values may seep across field boundaries, creating new forms of hybrid logics in
place of the old. However, institutional work is recursive, thus new institutional logics are
constrained and influenced by the elements of former logics. New elements may hybridize or
graft onto the prevailing practices and existing norms of the field (Cloutier et al., 2016).
In this study, integrating the perspectives of institutional logics and institutional work
enhances our understanding of the experiences of institutional actors. The theoretical framework
recognizes both the embeddedness and power of socialized norms and practices linked to the
institutional logic of the banking field, as well as acknowledges that these logics can change over
time. Actors in the field, with their own varied backgrounds and social experiences, may
contribute to institutional change over time as they respond to the demands of public policy and
engage in institutional work. This theoretical framework and the case analysis is expected to
deepen our understanding of the broader phenomenon of agent-driven institutional change at the
intersection of competing institutional logics. Furthermore, it fills a gap in the literature with its
focus on the day-to-day discourse and actions of individual actors, specifically private sector
managers.
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Additionally, the combined institutional logics and institutional work perspective, as
employed here, builds upon the robust framework of institutional work categories proposed by
Cloutier and her colleagues. This study heeds their call for further study of managerial
institutional work in other policy settings (Cloutier et al., 2016). Their institutional work
framework—which consists of structural, conceptual, operational, and relational work—provides
an illustrative lens to examine the reconciliation strategies that actors employ when faced with
institutional demands triggered by policy mandates. Furthermore, it allows the consideration of
how the material and symbolic artifacts of institutional logics may influence these strategies. Of
particular interest are the environmental contexts of employers, communities, and managers’
individual backgrounds.
Summary of the Methodology
The research for this study took place following the CRA regulatory policy reform
proposal initiated in 2018 by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), one of the
three primary banking regulatory agencies. The banking sector has continuously called for
regulatory revisions in the decades since the passage of the CRA. In recent years, their calls for
regulatory reform regarding the implementation of the CRA have gained steam. In 2018, the
OCC, led by former Comptroller Joseph Otting (a banking executive), adopted the stance that the
regulatory framework for the CRA should be modernized. The OCC issued an Advanced Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) in September 2018 inviting public comment in advance of
final rule revisions. In response to this ANPR, CRA managers and executives at regulated banks
across the U.S. submitted 358 letters and comments to share their input on reform efforts.4

4

Additional letters were submitted by non-bank financial institutions, non-profit organizations, retirees, former
regulators, professional associations, and other individuals and private citizens
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Eighty of these letters were analyzed via discourse analysis to address R1, in order to explore the
application of the institutional logics and institutional work literatures to inform our
understanding of the conflicts in institutional demands created by the CRA for CROs.5 Discourse
analysis was employed to further develop our understanding of the discursive conflict response
strategies used to influence CRA policy. The empirical research to address R2 consisted of
thematic analysis of interview transcripts from a purposive and stratified sample of 23 of the
CROs who wrote these letters (or who represented banks who sent in letters), to further explore
in-depth their strategies to reconcile the demands of CRA policy and how these might be
influenced by features of their banks, their communities, and their individual attributes and
backgrounds.
The reform window provided an appropriate context to address the potential for
conflicting institutional demands created by CRA regulatory policies for CROs (R1). This was
primarily because first, CROs’ letters were written to regulators, evidencing discourse and
conflict response strategies at the intersection of the public and private sector (which are
expected to reflect divergent dominant institutional logics, a bureaucratic logic versus a market
logic). Presented with the prospect of regulatory reform, CROs expressed their challenges with
the pressures of regulatory policies and their desire for reform in letters to the OCC. Managers’
responses to policy pressures are affected by the institutional arena and associated rules,
practices, and values. Attempts at policy reform are thus conceived of as intentional actions to
change institutions, as elucidated by institutional work (Cloutier et al., 2016). The institutional

On September 5, 2018, the OCC issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) entitled “Reforming
the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory Framework.” The ANPR outlined the agency’s principles for
modernizing the CRA and asked 31 specific questions for the public to provide feedback on (OCC, 2018). Data
collection included 358 secondary documents, specifically CROs’ letters and comments submitted to the OCC
between September 6, 2018 and January 9, 2019. These documents were publicly available online. The letters were
analyzed via discourse analysis, but saturation of the themes was met after review of 80 of these letters.
5

14

logic perspective adds new insight to institutional work by introducing the idea that individuals
from different sectors and backgrounds tend to reference divergent sets of norms and values,
which create tensions in shared understandings. Discourse analysis was deemed the best fit
qualitative method because the intent of the written letters was to persuade regulators to reform
CRA policies in the manner desired by the letters’ authors, thus language was an important and
primary tool for persuasion.
The reform period additionally offered the opportunity to explore how CROs reconcile
the institutional demands created by the CRA, which required speaking directly with a sample of
these managers. This enabled further analysis on how their reactions—shaped by their
interpretations of policies and their references to institutional logics—are associated with
features of their banks, their community context, and their own attributes and backgrounds (R2).
As with the first research question, the experience of institutional demands was evident, as CROs
expressed their challenges with the CRA when they were invited to comment on the OCC’s
reform efforts. This provided an excellent selection pool from which to recruit participants for
primary research. To understand how CROs experience the CRA, how they reference
institutional logics and interpret policy mandates, and how their banks, communities, and
backgrounds shape their experiences and reactions, it was necessary to gain further information
from a purposive and stratified sample of bankers who wrote the letters. Qualitative interviews
with 23 CROs were conducted to discuss bankers’ experiences in-depth, as well as have the
opportunity for clarifications and follow-up questions that would not be available with other data
collection methods. The data collected for the second research question, transcriptions of the
interviews, was analyzed via thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Understanding the
norms, values, and systems of meaning for participants was a primary goal to address the
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research question, and thematic analysis can be applied flexibly to analyze all forms of
qualitative data, including research questions where patterns in meaning are sought (Braun &
Clark, 2013).
Limitations and Delimitations
As a qualitative research project that examines one field in great detail, it is important to
recognize that the findings of this study will not be broadly generalizable across time or
professional fields. Field-level institutional logics, though deeply embedded, change over time.
The material and symbolic elements of institutional logics are formative for field-level actors,
but these actors also influence institutional change. Thus, field-level logics shift over time, and
the state of the field and its norms and accepted principles may look very different in the future.
The story woven from the themes in the data from this research setting may look quite different
in an analysis of the banking industry in twenty years hence.
Lawrence et al. (2013) wrote that institutional work theory does not address the outcomes
of work efforts, yet the majority of institutional work literature has focused on the connection to
intended outcomes of institutional work. Thus, they call for more research to “uncover and
understand the messy day-to-day practices of institutional work” (p.1029). In this vein, this study
aims to analyze the daily activities and discourse that influence institutional change. The research
design here is not intended to test hypotheses, create new theory, or examine the direct outcomes
of institutional work, such as how CROs’ reform efforts are reflected in current public policies.
Rather, the focus is on the processes of reconciliation of conflicting logics, captured by
institutional work, as CROs respond to policy mandates.
Furthermore, the hybridization of logics in other professional sectors regulated by public
policies may look quite different from the banking sector. Thus, the relevancy of this qualitative
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study is in providing a deeper understanding of the processes and strategies through which agents
manage and respond to institutional demands within one field, and the influencing factors on
their sensemaking. It does not claim to provide more generalizable insights into how private
sector actors respond to institutional pressures created by public policies in other professional
fields, but complementary studies of other groups of professionals would be beneficial for further
theoretical development.
Summary
In summary, while the primary policy goal of the CRA is to strengthen community
development through private sector reinvestment and access to credit in LMI neighborhoods
(Haag, 2000), CROs must balance the commercial goals of their firms with compliance to a law
that is regularly enforced through approval processes for bank expansions (Stock & Noreika,
2001). In order to do so, private sector managers tasked with the implementation of these goals
must reconcile public policy mandates with business demands, as well as their own sensemaking of the policies, which is linked to institutional logics. In the process, they work to
influence institutional change to their advantage (Cloutier et al., 2016). While this study focuses
on a specific set of actors, the framework could be replicated in other studies that also seek to
understand how heavily regulated private sector managers respond to institutional demands
created by public policies, e.g., in the fields of transportation, energy, or health care. Ultimately,
the insights drawn are expected to aid policymakers to design community development policies,
and regulators and private sector policy actors to implement them, in a manner that will be more
effective to regulate the private sector.
This dissertation is organized into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction. The
second chapter describes the research setting. It provides more detail on the CRA and the
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regulatory context, as well as the work and responsibilities of CROs. The third chapter presents
the review of the literature, specifically tracing the development of the institutional logics and
institutional work perspectives out of the neoinstitutionalism literature, and within the broader
public policy field. This chapter will also develop the theoretical framework. The fourth chapter
covers the research design, methods, and data sources. The fifth chapter presents and discusses
the findings. It is followed by a sixth chapter which discusses the findings and the implications.
Finally, a seventh chapter offers closing thoughts, policy recommendations, and avenues for
future research.

18

Chapter Two: Research Setting
Introduction
On an online forum for bankers, a poster asked “Does anyone have a job description for
CRA compliance officer?” (Happy Traveler 2, 2010). Another poster responded: “CRA Officer:
must be fluent in bureaucratic English, patient with heavy senior management demands and light
senior management support, have a great sense of humor and good at groveling during
examinations (please bring your own knee pads)” (Len S, 2010). Despite the sarcastic tone, the
respondent’s humorous “job description” alludes to the high expectations for a Community
Reinvestment Act officer (CRO): extensive job demands and work responsibilities with limited
resources and internal support, and onerous regulatory standards and compliance exams. These
all speak to the pressures a CRO must navigate in his or her daily role. Additionally, the response
suggests the tensions between private sector CRA managers and their regulators, referring to the
regulator’s language as “bureaucratic English,” as if it were a foreign language. This is
suggestive of the conflicts in institutional logics between the private sector and the public sector,
expressing the idea that they hold such divergent understandings of their daily work that they in
essence, not only speak different languages but also conceptualize the purposes of their work
differently. At the same time, CROs also may face pressure from their communities to do more,
given the public service intent of the law and the option for community leverage via public
comment. These institutional demands and how they are experienced, as well as their historical
context, are further explored in this chapter.
The intent of this chapter is to describe the research setting. It will provide context for the
study, set the stage to describe the conflict in institutional demands faced by CROs, and discuss
the appropriateness of the theoretical framework. It does this through making two key points
19

about the history and implementation of the CRA, as well as describing the present-day material
and symbolic elements of the institutional logic of banking, including job responsibilities,
professional practices, and bank structures.
The first key historical point is that the CRA is a public sector mandate on the private
sector, passed due to significant community pressure and policy makers’ acceptance that banks
should better serve these communities. In essence, CRA—both in its original statutory form
(though less enforceable), and in the regulatory policies that have accumulated since passage to
prescribe policy implementation—entails requiring the private sector to answer to public interest.
Banks are required, via the CRA, to carry out the community development goals of the public
sector, as expressed in the law and its associated regulatory policies. The resulting mismatch in
sectoral goals can be explained through the institutional logics perspective.
The second important historical point is that although it was initially weak, CRA now
carries substantial weight, as enforcement mechanisms today include not only the risk of
negative publicity, but also the ability to deny mergers and acquisitions or bank expansions. In
short, CRA matters. The enforcement power of CRA, and thus its importance to banks,
contributes to a research setting where institutional demands are heightened, in addition to these
pressures operating across sectoral boundaries, as indicated in the first key point.
After detailing the historical background of the CRA, the chapter also describes the
typical job responsibilities of CROs and common bank structures for managing the CRA today.
This discussion is predicated on the historical context, which has significantly shaped the scope
of job responsibilities and the bank structures best suited to manage CRA compliance.
The next section will elaborate on CRA as a public sector mandate on the private sector,
before moving into the expansion of CRA regulatory mandates in the subsequent section. These
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two key points trace the development of the CRA, setting the stage for the CRA regulatory
framework as it exists today. The final section of Chapter Two will move into bank structures
and job responsibilities of CROs.
History of the Community Reinvestment Act
Public Sector Mandate on the Private Sector
If funding does not come from the government, the next logical source is from the
banking and finance industry…True empowerment comes when the members of a
community are able to help themselves, being given basic tools such as financing
to reach their goals. With more such government-facilitated but private-sector
based partnerships, society can more expediently find some lasting solutions to a
myriad of economic and social problems, bringing about a brighter future (Santiago
et al., 1998, pp. 650-651).
U.S. banking laws as early as the 1930s contained the principle that banks should serve
their local communities through fair lending (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 242). The
principle is based on the premise that U.S. financial institutions receive privileges from the
federal government, including charters to do business, special arrangements to borrow money,
and federal deposit insurance. In fact, the CRA only applies to financial institutions that carry
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) deposit insurance (OCC, n.d.). Yet, the mandate
on the banking sector to serve low-to-moderate income communities is not simply a quid pro quo
for deposit insurance. The CRA was passed during a policy window where discriminatory
lending practices by banks had been exposed, and by legislative bill sponsors who argued that
banks should be monitored not only for discrimination, but for a more intentional role in capital
access to address economic inequities. This chapter tells that story.
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The Role of Community Pressure in Congressional Action
In the years leading up to the CRA, there was widespread discontent about barriers in
access to credit and inequitable lending practices in American communities, particularly in inner
cities. Community groups were concerned about redlining—the practice of literally drawing red
lines around certain low-income and minority neighborhoods. Redlining meant that some
depository institutions were declining to make loans in certain geographic areas based on race,
housing conditions, or other factors, despite creditworthiness of individual loan applicants (Haag,
2000).6 Where financial institutions accepted community deposits, there was concern that they
were investing them elsewhere (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). This contributed to the
deterioration of low-income areas, such as inner-city urban districts (Silver, 2019).
The political climate that led to CRA arose out of grassroots organizing for community
reinvestment begun in Chicago by activists Gale Cincotta and Shel Trapp (Murphy &
Cunningham, 2003). By coordinating detached local efforts and ensuring that residents had their
voices heard, Cincotta and Trapp spurred a national movement that garnered congressional
attention to both the policy problem of neighborhood disinvestment and the role financial
institutions played. Their community organizing and activism eventually led to the passage of the
CRA during an era of significant urban development (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003).
The 1960s had seen significant demolition and displacement, driving masses of people
into public housing while condominiums, expressways, shopping malls, and corporate
headquarters were built on the cleared land. Social scientist Herbert Gans concluded that urban
renewal policies of the 1960s “benefit[ed] the developer the most, the area residents the least,

The name comes from a bank “literally or figuratively” drawing a line around certain geographies (Haag, 2000, p.
1).
6

22

and the public interest in as yet unmeasured quantity” (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 19).
This was also the era in Chicago during which famed community organizer Saul Alinsky
inspired urban residents to take direct action to form neighborhood coalitions who would take on
politicians, bankers, “slum landlords” and corporations (Murphy & Cunningham, p. 21). An
Alinsky prodigé, Tom Gaudette, was Shel Trapp’s mentor (Schutz & Miller, 2015). Fair lending
laws arose out of this context. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 was passed to prohibit
housing discrimination by race, color, sex, religion, nationality, handicap, or familial status; the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974 was passed to prohibit discrimination in credit.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) and CRA in 1977 would soon follow
(Walter, 1995, p. 62; pp. 64-65).
By 1972, Cincotta and Trapp convened the first conference of community groups to
discuss housing. Over 2000 delegates from 36 states passed a series of resolutions, and started
protests soon after (Mariano, 2003, p. 31). Cincotta and Trapp had a difficult road in front of
them due to low political efficacy of low-to-moderate income (LMI) community members and
the political clout of the other side. The political power of a target group depends on its political
resources, including if it is “large, united, easy to mobilize, wealthy, skilled, well positioned,
focused on issues of concern to it, accustomed to voting and contacting public officials, and so
on” (Schneider et al., 2014, p. 109-110). The neighborhood residents in the CRA narrative fit
very few of these attributes, except for being large in numbers. Thus, it took skillful leadership—
and the momentum of a national movement—to engage a disaffected public and create political
change through activism. But traditional channels of political participation were not enough to
gain notice; the community members had to adopt more aggressive Alinsky-style radical tactics
because of their lack of political power.
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Cincotta and Trapp formed the National Training and Information Center (NTIC) to
conduct research and coordinate organizing—as well as provide training on bank-ins—and
National People’s Action (NPA) as a network of neighborhood advocacy groups (Squires, 2003).
Community groups picketed, packed public hearings, organized sit-ins, boycotts, rent strikes,
marches, and street demonstrations to protest schools that were segregated and deteriorating, to
put pressure on banks, and to block urban renewal plans (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). The
movement began to gain national attention (Squires, 2003).
Cincotta and Trapp realized that they would need evidence of banks refusing to make
loans in certain neighborhoods for policy makers to not only take notice of the problem, but to
have tangible evidence to argue the case for policy change (Mariano, 2003). In other words,
protests would not be enough, rather, hard evidence and information needed to be supplied to
legislators. Cincotta and Trapp utilized direct action to convince officials to survey savings and
loans institutions in Chicago. This survey produced solid evidence that redlining was occurring
(Mariano, 2003). Community pressure mounted after this data was made public, resulting in a
meeting with the Illinois governor, with Chicago the epicenter of the movement. By 1974,
Illinois passed the first anti-redlining regulation nationwide (Mariano, 2003, p. 32-33).
With Cincotta’s support, and Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire leading the charge,
the Congress passed Senate Bill 1281 the following year, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA), which required commercial banks and savings institutions to disclose mortgage
lending annually. Senator Proxmire affirmed that HMDA probably would not have become law
without the research and community organizing of the NPA (Mariano, 2003). HMDA did not
have fair lending components, but the requirement that depository institutions report mortgage
lending data enabled analysis to investigate discriminatory lending (Walter, 1995). In fact,
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Cincotta later reflected that HMDA data was a key driver in the reinvestment movement’s
success. Essentially, the data showed that “the claims of disinvestment were true” (Bradford &
Cincotta, 1992, p. 240). The NPA and Cincotta and Trapp played a critical role in presenting
information to policy makers about redlining and convincing them that something needed to be
done. Community forces gained increasing power collectively, exerting pressure on policy
makers through letter writing, media appearances, and testimonies at public hearings, as well as
confronting legislators at their offices (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). They presented solutions
to the problem through action-oriented conferences and subsequently drafted legislation.
Following the earlier work with the Chicago City Council and Illinois legislature, then
the passage of the HMDA, next steps towards the CRA were developed at a September 1976
conference, “From Redlining to Reinvestment” (Mariano, 2003, p. 33). Following the
conference, Senator Proxmire introduced the first version of the CRA to the Senate. A watereddown version of the NPA’s draft of the CRA was eventually passed (Mariano, 2003).
The public campaign for community reinvestment is important because it illustrates that
neighborhood residents, with the help of community activists and organizers, played active roles
in pushing for the CRA. Cincotta and Trapp were able to draw significant attention to the need
for policy change and frame the issue around deteriorating neighborhoods and disinvestment
caused by redlining. In fact, Taylor and Silver (2003) argued that CRA activism is the primary
reason why redlining is understood at all by the American public, signifying the creation of a
powerful narrative. But the importance of community pressure was not over after the policy
victory. Later, community groups would play a major role in the implementation of the CRA and
its expansion in influence, which will be further explored later in this chapter. First, the next
section moves from community activism into Congress, where the CRA was signed into law.
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Congressional Action
Attention to the policy problem had been accomplished through community activism.
Whether or not policy makers will choose to act is a combination of many factors, including their
own beliefs, the national mood, and the information they receive from interest groups and
political parties, as well as pressure-group campaigns (Cairney & Jones, 2016; Zahariadis, 2014).
A change of political parties in government may be an instigator for such an opportunity to arise.
By the mid-1970s, Democrats were the majority party in both houses of Congress, and the
President was a Democrat (Sidney, 2005, p. 125). Thus, legislative sponsors of the CRA could
use their positions to limit controversy surrounding passage of the act. The pressure-group
campaign against redlining, as well as the national mood created by publicized findings and
exposés in the media, were also influential for legislators (Sidney, 2005).
Following the September 1976 reinvestment conference, CRA was introduced as S.406
by Senator William Proxmire in January 1977 (Mariano, 2003, p. 33; Community Reinvestment
Act, 1977). Policy concerning community reinvestment was debated as the American urban
landscape was shifting, and Northeast and Midwest metropolitan areas were declining.
Additionally, suburbanization of metro areas was accelerating. Thus, supporters framed the issue
as one of urban decline and the need to revitalize cities (Sidney, 2005). In this context, when the
NPA took the issue of reinvestment to Congress, they found sympathetic Democratic legislators
from urban areas. The rationale for burdens to be placed on banks rested on a negative and
narrative portrayal of the abuses of the financial institutions (painting them as villains), while
urban neighborhoods were situated as victims (Sidney, 2005).
Senator Proxmire, who was chair of the Senate committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, was the major collaborator with the NPA and primary spokesperson for the CRA
26

(Sidney, 2005). Due to the congressional committee system (where ranking Democrats on the
Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee supported the CRA), small sets of
legislators control certain policy arenas, and there is little visibility for complex policies such as
banking regulation (Sidney, 2005). Thus, members who specialized in this technical arena had
significant influence and control over the narrative. During debate over the CRA, ranking
Democrats limited debate on the Senate floor, and only a few senators spoke out to oppose it.
Democrats also used the rhetorical strategy of arguing that regulators would only need to make
limited changes to existing processes that the law would clarify (thus lessening the burden to a
powerful target group, financial institutions). Additionally, no funding authorization was
allocated to regulators to carry out the new law, reinforcing the idea of business as usual (Sidney,
2005). They also emphasized that the CRA would not punish (there are no explicit sanctions for
non-compliance) but would rather incentivize: Senate transcript from 1977 quoted Proxmire:
“Bankers sit right at the heart of our economic system…the record shows we have to do
something to nudge them, influence them, persuade them to invest in their community” (as cited
in Sidney, 2005, p. 127).
Congressional testimony from policy makers involved in CRA passage illustrates that
proponents of the law intended for bankers to play active roles in community development,
positing that they both had an obligation to do so and were better suited to do so than the
government. This outsourcing of responsibility through statutory mandate, rather than private
sector contracting or non-profit sector grants, is a point of tension between regulators and
bankers. It additionally increases the potential for conflict in institutional demands, as the
anticipated outcomes of the community development work are desired by the public sector, while
the work to reach these outcomes is demanded of the private sector. It is the banks’ responsibility
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to acquire the expertise and workforce to develop their communities, which may be at odds with
the primary aim of the private sector, profitability. In short, their core motivations are not the
same, from an institutional logics perspective. By delving deeper into Proxmire’s central
argument in favor of the CRA, this point is further established.
During the CRA hearings, the bill’s author, Senator Proxmire, pointed to the economic
deterioration of the nation’s cities and appealed for the problem to be addressed in part by the
private, not public sector, given their enormous financial resources: “We don’t want to solve the
problem with Government money. We couldn’t do it. We couldn’t do it with a Marshall plan for
the cities. We have to do it with the people who are there, people who understand the city, live in
the city, who know the economy…You are the people, you bankers are the people who can do
the job” (United States, 1977, p.329). This appeal espoused a belief that government spending on
community development would be less effective than addressing the challenges of LMI
populations through the traditional finance sector. Furthermore, it expressed confidence in the
banks’ expertise and local knowledge of their own communities, which would theoretically be
more in-depth and accurate than that of the bureaucrats in the central government.
CRA was ultimately passed into law as Title 12, Section 2901 of H.R. 6655, the Housing
and Community Development Act, sponsored by Representative Henry Reuss (D-WI). President
Carter signed the bill into law on October 12, 1977 (Housing and Community Development Act,
1977). The overarching purpose of the act was to require federal regulators to assess depository
institutions’ lending performance and credit access for their local communities (Stock &
Noreika, 2001). The goal was for the CRA to spur revitalization of under-served communities
and curb investment from moving to geographical financial centers and more affluent
communities (Haag, 2000). CRA was a result of both the belief that banking practices were
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contributors to community divestment and decline, and that they should be part of the solution.
Today, regulators monitor CRA-motivated activities through regular examinations of bank
performance with significant levers of penalty for banks found to be in non-compliance. This
evolution towards expanded influence is explored in the next section.
The Evolution of the Community Reinvestment Act
The second key point regarding the historical context for the CRA is that since passage,
the CRA has transformed from a broad-based directive requiring banks to pay some lip service,
with little enforcement, into a massive body of regulatory policies with real teeth. According to
Stock and Noreika (2001), in the early years after enactment, the banking industry assumed that
the CRA merely encouraged compliance. Over time, however, especially following the passage
of regulatory revisions that enhanced and clarified monitoring power, the field began to view the
law as “imposing a substantive obligation on depository institutions,” which is now enforced
regularly through performance evaluations (Stock & Noreika, 2001, p. 1). The CRA today
affirms banks’ obligation to provide equal treatment in communities where they are chartered, to
reinvest in their “home areas,” and to be regularly assessed by regulatory agencies, which look at
bank performance along these lines when considering whether or not to allow financial
institutions to expand or renew their charters (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 242).
Regulatory clout is found especially through this ability to deny expansions, merger, or
acquisition applications that are put forward by banks who do not achieve satisfactory ratings.
Additionally, public disclosure of these ratings and bank evaluations allows the community to
play an informal monitoring and enforcement role (Stock & Noreika, 2001). The following
discussion will move chronologically, as it overviews the expansion of regulatory clout, starting
with the CRA as it was originally enacted.
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Community Reinvestment Act Overview
The CRA was enacted by the United States Congress in 1977 as section 2901 of the
Housing and Community Development Act (12 U.S. Code § 2901). The statute’s purpose is to
encourage banks to expand credit access in the communities where they do business, including
for LMI areas. At the same time, they are encouraged to maintain adequate safety and soundness
checks in their lending and investments (FFIEC, 2017).
Banks are required by the law to:
“demonstrate that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the

i.

communities in which they are chartered to do business;
ii.

the convenience and needs of communities include the need for credit services as well as
deposit services; and

iii.

regulated financial institutions have continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered” (Housing and
Community Development Act, 1977).

CRA examinations are conducted by the federal agencies that supervise depository
institutions, including the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
(FFIEC, 2017). Although the statute said little about how its goals would be accomplished, it
gave the regulatory agencies the power to create an evaluation structure, which the agencies
gradually expanded in the several decades after passage (Housing and Community Development
Act, 1977; Silver, 2019).
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Initial Shortcomings of the Community Reinvestment Act
When initially passed, CRA was not as strong as activists fought for, which Sidney
(2005) attributed to the power of the banking lobby. In Cincotta’s words, “they have their
corporate jets and we have our…school buses” (Mariano, 2003, p. 28). Sidney (2005) argued that
financial institutions occupy a privileged position in political debates because they are revered as
the “critical engines of the U.S. free-market economy” (p. 125). Even so, the bank lobby did not
lead a major campaign against the bill, helping it to pass (Sidney, 2005). Certain design elements
ensured that implementation would not burden the financial sector greatly, however. In Senate
hearings, community activists had pushed for more rigor in regulator demands of banks, but in
the final version of the bill, these demands were taken out, thus the final bill was weaker than the
NPA had pressed for (Sidney, 2005). In fact, rather than focusing on the needs of blighted
neighborhoods and impoverished communities, legislators instead debated whether or not the
overhead costs and regulatory burden would be too great for financial institutions. During
debate, most legislator statements specifically referred to regulators or lenders, as opposed to the
individuals the statute was intended to benefit (Sidney, 2005). Furthermore, despite the fact that
grassroots activists had put redlining on the political agenda, testified at hearings, helped draft
the bill, and anticipated using the CRA through the public comment process on bank
applications, legislators did not even mention community organizations during the Senate debate
(Sidney, 2005). The importance of these organizations changed substantially with reforms
introduced just over a decade later.
1989 Community Reinvestment Act Reform
In 1989, the CRA was revised to require public reporting of CRA ratings on each
institution’s record in meeting its community’s credit needs and performance levels were
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introduced (Getter, 2015, p. 5). Additionally, repercussions were established for poor
performance through CRA evaluations, and community pressure was poised for greater
importance by the requirement that evaluations be made public. These reforms were critical to
the enhanced clout of CRA.
The CRA requires periodic evaluation of each institution’s record in meeting its
community’s credit needs. According to the 1989 reforms, these evaluations had to be written
and public (Haag 2000, p. 1). The information regulators consider in their evaluations when
banks are applying for “charters, mergers, acquisitions, relocations, consolidations, or
establishment of branch offices,” is to be made publicly available by financial institutions, and
then can be monitored and commented on by the public (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 243).
Haag (2000) has explained that such applications can include: (a) for a Federal bank or thrift
charter; (b) for FDIC deposit insurance; (c) to establish a new branch; (d) to relocate a branch or
home office; or (e) for mergers, acquisitions, or the purchase of assets or liabilities of a regulated
financial institution. The ability to delay or deny an institution’s application is now the primary
enforcement mechanism of the CRA. There is now a significant incentive to work with
community groups and assure regulators that access to capital and credit will be addressed for
underserved populations (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). This is because CRA has become a
gatekeeper for profit-maximizing business models, which often include opening new branches or
bank acquisitions.
Community activists have also been able to use avenues such as the media as increasingly
potent tools to publicize CRA challenges and ensure that other lenders take heed (Murphy &
Cunningham, 2003). Additionally, because local citizen groups can monitor an institution’s
public file, power is also entrusted to the community to encourage improvement on inadequate
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CRA performance (Haag 2000, p. 1). A community group can challenge a bank’s application by
filing complaints, and it can also request a public meeting or hearing on the issues raised in the
challenge. National non-profit organizations like the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition (NCRC) and NPA have continuously instigated campaigns to strengthen the CRA
since passage, including organizing hearings and submitting public comments to tell regulators
how the CRA can be improved (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003).
All of these actions can create costly delays for banks leading to a multitude of new
agreements between community partners and banks (Squires, 2003). CRA agreements between
banks and community organizations are often complex, multi-year programs that address LMI
neighborhoods’ needs, and how they can leverage the resources and expertise of both sides of the
partnership. The NCRC (2007) has found that many CRA agreements are implemented
collaboratively, often utilizing the community partner’s expertise and network with marketing,
financial counseling, and other services meant to enhance the success of the bank’s products or
services (NCRC, 2007). The nonprofit selected for partnership is likely to have an integral
mission around enhancing credit-access for the local community, and it will deploy its core
capabilities. At the same time, the bank will benefit by ensuring its products are profitable in
tandem with success-enhancing services and financial literacy training, thus ensuring
profitability. Within a little more than a decade, banks and community organizations had signed
more than 400 CRA agreements worth more than $1 trillion in community reinvestment
(Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 244). By 2007, more than $4.5 trillion in reinvestment dollars
had flowed through CRA agreements (NCRC, 2007, p. 4). According to the NCRC, 99% of this
total has been invested post-1992 (p. 5). This is indicative of the impact of the regulatory
reforms.
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In this era, the CRA was still focused primarily on lending, or “simply getting capital and
financial services into” LMI communities (Moon, 2010, p.50). It is important to point out that
when the CRA was passed in 1977, it did not mention race or gender as criteria for the lending
test. And although revisions proposed in 1994 would have required reporting on race and gender
data, these were ultimately not passed (Stock & Noreika, 2001). Nonetheless, given
socioeconomic disparities in wealth, researchers in the decade that followed 1989 CRA reforms
primarily focused on minority borrowers and discrepancies in access to financial services and
lending, for both individuals (or households) and small business lending. Many of these
academics found that home mortgage lending to LMI and minority borrowers was increasing at a
more rapid rate than for upper-income borrowers over the same time period (Avery et al.,1999;
Avery & Bostic, 1996; Campen, 1998; Evanoff & Segal, 1996; Squires, 2003). Between 1993
and 2000, single-family home mortgages to LMI borrowers rose from 19 to 29%. Loans to Black
and Hispanic households increased from 3 or 4% to 6 to 7% (NCRC, 2001, as cited in Squires,
2003, p. 1). In her review of the literature from 1990 to 2000, Haag (2000) pointed out that
studies generally showed that home mortgage lending to LMI households and minorities had
increased at higher rates than lending to other population segments (and attributed this to the
CRA and other fair lending laws), with some periods of reversal. However, although small
business lending had increased overall, it was still greater in upper-income than lower-income
communities. Furthermore, loan denial rates for Black and Hispanic-owned businesses were
much higher than for white-owned businesses (Bates, 1997; Blanchflower et al., 1998; Haag,
2000; Townes, 2008), as were mortgage loan denial rates (Canner & Passmore, 1994; Munnell et
al., 1992; Schill & Wachter, 1994). Nonetheless, the studies showed evidence that CRA was
having a positive effect overall, especially with regards to mortgage lending.
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Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
The next congressional action to affect CRA implementation was not a direct reform to
CRA, but rather was a new statute that aimed to supplement the CRA and enhance access to
capital through bolstering community lending by and through traditional financial institutions. It
did this through both the creation of a fund and encouraging partnerships between Community
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) and traditional institutions (Clinton Digital Library,
n.d., p. 1-2).7 In 1994, former President Bill Clinton, with bipartisan support, created the CDFI
Fund via the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (CDFI
Fund, 2017). CDFIs engage in activities such as training and capacity building, including
financial literacy, LMI housing projects or mortgages, small business credit, and community
facilities (Clinton Digital Library, n.d.). The fund, initially authorized at $382 million, was
developed to promote economic revitalization and community development by investing in and
assisting CDFIs (Clinton Digital Library, n.d., p. 1). It has awarded over $2 billion since its
creation (CDFI Fund, 2017). Bank investments in CDFIs have enhanced CRA ratings of banks
through indirect investment in community development, particularly because of the infusion of
bank capital into organizations whose business models and missions are to develop communities
(Clinton Digital Library, n.d.).

7

Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are mission-driven financial institutions that create
economic opportunity for individuals and small businesses, quality affordable housing, and essential community
services throughout the United States. Four types of institutions are included in the definition of a CDFI:
Community Development Banks, Community Development Credit Unions, Community Development Loan Funds
(most of which are non-profit), and Community Development Venture Capital Funds. Some, but not all, CDFIs are
certified by the CDFI Fund. Certification is often necessary in order to receive support from the CDFI Fund (OCC,
2017).
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Hagg’s (2000) survey of the literature suggested that the Riegle Act increased
opportunities for partnerships and investments in CDFIs that linked CRA compliance and a large
network of community-based organizations that had worked essentially in parallel to one another
for the previous 25 years (Haag, 2000, p. 22). Enhanced by the Riegle Act, the CRA was now
fostering cross-sector partnerships and loan consortia amongst banks, local and state
governments, and community development organizations (Haag, 2000). For example, the CRA
has spurred new investments through bank CRA commitments, such as one of the first, Citibank
investing $1 million to capitalize CDFIs (National Community Capital Association, 1997).
Because the Citibank investment was one of the earliest of its kind, the regulatory agencies
issued a joint advisory opinion on the investment in an interpretative letter from the FDIC, Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS), and FRB (FFIEC, 1997). The opinion stated that the CDFI
investment was indeed a qualified investment under the CRA investment or lending tests
(because the investment was to be eventually repaid and required interest payments).
Furthermore, Citibank would earn CRA performance evaluation credit and could claim a share of
the community development loans made by the CDFI as long as the loans benefitted the bank’s
assessment area (or a broader region) (FFIEC, 1997).
The investment and lending elements of CRA have played a progressively more
important role for community development as bank partnerships have increased in number
(Haag, 2000). Multiple authors praised the promise of partnerships with CDFIs to maximize the
potential of the CRA, noting that CDFIs are located in the communities served and develop
specialized market expertise and services that a bank often cannot provide (Avery et al.,1997;
Lento, 1994; Marsico, 1995; Santiago et al., 1998). “Each side brings resources to this
partnership. CDFIs bring knowledge of local and distressed markets, expertise in community
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development finance, and philanthropic and government resources to bear on the problems faced
by economically distressed communities and individuals. Banks bring the resources of scale, as
well as the ability to tap secondary markets and a broader network of financial services”
(Immergluck, 1998, p.1). Indeed, Santiago et al. (1998) confirmed that the major need for CDFIs
is financing, which can be provided by banks.
McLenighan and Tholin (1997) argued that LMI communities need institutions that can be
flexible on their borrowing policies, that may accept unconventional collateral, and that help
these borrowers to enhance their financial literacy and build their credit. This lender must
prioritize community development first, not “maximizing profits” (McLenighan & Tholin, 1997,
p. 3). In agreement, Avery et al. (1997) also encouraged banks to take advantage of the Clinton
revisions to the CRA by establishing new partnerships with CDFIs, Community Development
Banks (CD banks), or loan consortia to generate economies of scale in local markets. They
argued that loan demand is low in LMI neighborhoods, thus pooled resources through innovative
institutional arrangements may better serve communities (and be more profitable for banks). In a
2001 Brookings Institution article, Pinsky (2001) reported that a sample of 81 CDFIs managing
$1.8 billion in assets had provided more than $2.9 billion in financing, with only a 1.8%
cumulative loss rate, low delinquencies, and no loss of investor principle. 137,000 jobs had been
created or retained, and 121,000 affordable housing units had been built. Overall, some 550
CDFIs manage more than $6.5 billion in assets (Pinsky, 2001).
Giving further support to these types of collaborations, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office found that the higher credit risk of LMI borrowers was alleviated when
initiatives offered applicant education, technical assistance, investments in community groups
that would counsel home buyers, and lending consortia to spread risk and develop shared
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expertise (U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 1995). A quote from MacInnes
(2014) captures the sentiment of the other authors. Investment in CDFIs is “the best form of
CRA compliance for financial institutions” (MacInnes, 2014, p.588). However, only large banks
are evaluated via the investment test of the CRA, thus investment in CDFIs is more likely to be
pursued by the larger institutions than community banks.
1995 Rule Changes
In 1993, President Clinton directed the regulatory agencies to revise the regulations for
implementation of CRA in order to increase investments in LMI communities by making exams
more performance-based, to reduce the cost of the regulatory burden, and to streamline and
clarify the regulations and performance standards (Bernanke, 2007; Braunstein, 2008). The new
regulations rolled out in 1995 adopted a three-pronged performance test for large banks in
lending, investments, and services, while small banks could qualify for a simpler examination
focused on lending. For large banks, innovative approaches to addressing community
development and access to capital were encouraged and rewarded (Bernanke, 2007).
The lending test evaluates credit-access, including mortgage, small business or farm, or
consumer lending (Haag, 2000). The lending test is composed of: (a) extent of consumer and
small business lending in the bank’s assessment area; (b) geographic distribution of loans within
the assessment area as well as percentage of loans to low, moderate, middle, and upper-income
geographies; (c) characteristics of borrowers, including income class and small business
revenues; (d) community development loans (and their “complexity and innovation”); and (e)
innovative or flexible practices to address needs of LMI individuals (Stock & Noreika, 2001, p.
5). Under the service test, the institution’s system for delivering banking services—including
community development services—in its assessment area (or a broader region) is measured, as
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well as their reach and level of innovation. Community development services include, for
example, providing technical expertise such as new home buyer education or credit counseling,
or financial literacy programming in schools (Haag, 2000). Finally, under the investment test, the
institution’s ability to meet its community’s credit needs is measured through its investments or
monetary donations towards community development in the assessment area. An example of a
qualified investment would be a grant to a local organization that educates and counsels firsttime home buyers (Stock & Noreika, 2001). Other examples include investments or grants to
CDFIs or community development corporations (CDCs), to affordable housing developers, small
business investment companies, day care facilities, or to non-profit organizations serving
community development needs (Haag, 2000). The investment activity is evaluated to determine
its dollar amount, innovativeness, responsiveness to community development needs, and the
extent to which the investments are not typically made by private investors (Haag, 2000).
Because the CRA initially did not specify how to measure performance and ultimately
impact on communities, the regulatory authorities (as delegated under the CRA) began to issue
regulatory guidance beginning in 1995, including the publication of questions and answers and
interpretative letters, that detailed how institutions and their community development activities
would be evaluated with regards to meeting CRA obligations (FFIEC, 2017; Stock & Noreika,
2001). With regards to evaluating the community “impact” of an organization, most community
development practitioners mean the measurement of outcomes of completed programs or
activities. Assessments of outcomes seek to understand the positive changes in conditions that a
program brought about for communities (Immergluck, 2008). However, it is important to note
that the CRA examines banks more on their community development activities than on the
outcomes of those activities (Moon, 2010).
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CRA examinations are conducted approximately every three years (Porteous & Narain,
2008, p.102). Regulars may also conduct site visits to check on progress post-enforcement
action, to investigate complaints, or after applications are submitted for mergers or new branches
(FDIC, 2017; Walter, 1995). The regular on-site and periodic CRA examinations are individually
scored and rated as: outstanding, satisfactory (or low or high satisfactory), needs to improve, or
substantial noncompliance (Stock & Noreika, 2001; Porteous & Narain, 2008). The institution is
then given an overall CRA rating based on the independent composites; however, the individual
tests are combined with a weighted average, with the lending test weighted the most. In fact,
lending counts for 50% of the overall rating. Furthermore, small depository institutions are only
evaluated under the lending test, unless they wish to invite consideration of their investment and
service activities (Haag, 2000). The 1995 amendments to the CRA enhanced the ability of
regulators to focus on the depository institution’s real record of lending, service, and investments
in its assessment area (Haag, 2000, p. 1).
The CRA requires banks to map and specify their assessment areas and LMI
demographics (referred to as “local community delineation” in the earlier years) (Sloan et al.,
2015). CRA-related efforts are then concentrated in this area. The bank is responsible for
meeting credit needs in the communities within the assessment area, and any city or town in
which a bank operates must be included within the assessment area (also, it cannot “arbitrarily
exclude” LMI neighborhoods) (Antonakes, 2001, p. 2). Performance tests are applied in the
context of the bank’s market, in recognition of the assessment area’s socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics; lending, investment and service opportunities; the bank’s offerings
and business strategy; its capacity and constraints; and the bank’s past performance and
performance of similar banks (Haag, 2000). However, the performance context is not meant to
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be a formal needs assessment, nor are banks required to conduct them (Federal Register, 2016).
One critique of the assessment area demarcation has been that banks are able to maintain
assessment areas with primarily higher income, non-minority residents (Antonakes, 2001).
The 1995 revisions to the CRA are credited to fair lending advocates. In fact, the Federal
Reserve explicitly recognized the work of activists and the NCRC in the preamble to 1995 rule
changes. In fact, more community groups than banks commented on the proposed reforms
(Taylor & Silver, 2003, p. 170). In this vein, activists have engaged community organizations,
supportive public officials, the media, and academics to pay attention to the implementation of
the CRA, and community groups have waited for the right windows of opportunity to offer
revisions to the CRA. They have successfully kept the issue on the policy agenda, and worked
with sympathetic policy makers and bureaucrats to improve the legislation. There is a long
history of community pressure related to the CRA.
The Banking Industry Response
Although this section has illustrated the expansion of CRA regulatory clout, it is
important to note continued resistance from the banking industry against the expansion of CRA
policies. Despite reforms secured by community activists and sympathetic politicians, the
banking industry has also been able to continue lobbying against the CRA, “with muscle and
adroitness, steadily chip[ing] away at the effectiveness” (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 22).
While some financial institutions recognize that there could be profitable business in distressed
communities, most continue to resist government regulation according to Murphy and
Cunningham (2003). By 1999, the U.S. Congress significantly weakened the CRA by exempting
more than 80% of depository institutions from performance reviews by regulatory agencies when
it passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Murphy & Cunningham, 2003, p. 22; p. 243). Under the
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act, banks were able to merge with finance, insurance, and securities firms without CRA
regulation. The NCRC worked to sponsor the Community Reinvestment Modernization Act of
2001 (H.R. 865) to reverse the impact of these changes, but the bill died in committee (Murphy
& Cunningham, 2003, p. 243; Library of Congress, 2017). This back and forth illustrates the
constantly evolving nature of CRA policy pressures, and the battle between the private and
public sector regarding what the role of banks in community development should be.
Another important aspect of the CRA is who it does not apply to. CRA is only applicable
to depository institutions. Non-bank financial institutions, including many FinTech (i.e., financial
technology) companies, as well as credit unions, are not subject to the CRA (Haag, 2000; Stock &
Noreika, 2001). In 1993, D’Arista and Schlesinger warned of a parallel banking system where
many financial firms are not regulated or licensed. CRA coverage does not apply to this parallel
banking industry, which would include insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds,
independent mortgage companies, credit unions, and other non-bank finance companies (Stock &
Noreika, 2001). Independent lenders were the primary sources of subprime and questionable
mortgages in recent years, as well as a majority of redlining and discriminatory practice cases
(GAO, 2009; Taylor & Silver, 2009). FinTechs create a “unique dilemma” for the regulators as it
is unclear where their community obligations lie (Stock & Noreika, 2001, p. 3; Silver, 2017). A
primary reason that this is important to the banking industry is the competition aspect. Their
environment for attracting customers is increasingly competitive and the targeted nature of CRA
regulations may increase the pressures on banks in this business market.
Finally, it is important to point out that, though they may be averse to regulation in general
(Murphy & Cunningham, 2003), most banks see themselves as holding vital roles in economic
development in the communities where they operate. For example, Fettig (1995) argued that banks
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have engaged in community lending and investment, whether driven by their own philosophies or
the CRA. For example, James Schlosser, executive vice president of the North Dakota Bankers
Association, declared, “throughout the state, banks are providing scholarships, sponsoring
community events, organizing fundraising efforts for community causes and helping [to] revitalize
Main Street” (Fettig, 1995). This mantra of commitment to community is widespread across banks.
Overall, the expansion of CRA regulatory policies has resulted in increased pressure on
traditional depository institutions—banks—to allocate resources and human capital to comply,
and associated expansions in bank structures and CRO job responsibilities have been necessary
in order to carry out CRA mandates. Over time, this has changed the nature of the professional
field and hiring practices, especially for the largest banks. The field is less homogeneous,
employing CROs with various backgrounds and motivations for working in the banking field
(Chazdon, 1996; Dreier, 2003). These CROs may draw meaning that influences how they
approach their work from different field-level logics than traditional private sector bankers, and
through their work and responses to policy reforms, influence shifts in the dominant institutional
logics over time.
The Role of Community Reinvestment Act Officers in Policy Implementation
The managers in charge of community reinvestment and fair lending compliance have
particularly challenging roles in today’s complex banking regulatory policy environment.
Community Reinvestment Act officers (CROs) operate between multiple field-level institutional
logics and encounter institutional demands across each, given external demands of the banking
regulators and their communities, as well as internal demands of bank leaders and colleagues.
They are policy actors responsible for carrying out public interest programs, potentially clashing
with their roles as business managers who must balance the directives of bank leadership and
43

shareholders against public sector mandates. Community development projects are often less
profitable than other investments for the bank, potentially leaving the CRO on the defensive to
allocate needed resources. Additional tensions are experienced through CROs’ roles as
community members who potentially face external pressures and calls to do more to help the
community. CROs’ experiences and reactions to these institutional demands are shaped by the
symbolic elements of institutional logics, including the norms and values of the sector and their
professional networks, as well as from references to logics associated with other sectors from a
banker’s background. These symbolic elements influence references to institutional logics aside
from the field’s dominant banking, private sector logic.
CROs’ reactions to institutional demands are also affected by the material (structure and
practices) components of their position and authority within the bank. The symbolic and material
structures of institutional logics both affect and are affected by the institutional work of CROs,
driving change in the institutional logic of the banking field over time. The boundary spanning
role of CROs, between the private and public sector, requires more explanation to appropriately
set the stage for the empirical research of this dissertation. Further exploration of this
intersectoral role includes detail on CRO job responsibilities, starting with a basic overview of
the CRO role, and then putting the role in the context of regulatory, bank, and community
institutional demands, as background information for the research setting. Across each of these
demands, CROs are simultaneously policy intermediaries, CRA managers and internal
influencers, and community members.
Job Responsibilities of Community Reinvestment Act Officers
Banks are not required by the regulators to have a designated CRO, but many
intermediate and large banks now have dedicated positions, as the workload to maintain CRA
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compliance has increased in the wake of regulatory reforms (Perlmeter, 2017). Some large banks
have entire divisions or teams dedicated to community development. The specific title of the role
and assigned responsibilities vary depending on the bank’s asset size, number of branches,
business model, and exam type (Perlmeter, 2017). Smaller banks may incorporate CRA
responsibilities into an existing role, often in the compliance space. These compliance officers
may be responsible for CRA, HMDA, Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), and other fair lending and
compliance statutes. Regardless of bank size, there must be a designated point of contact at
regulated banks for CRA inquiries (Perlmeter, 2017). An overarching description of the CRO
role entails learning and staying up to date on CRA regulatory policies, as well as “developing,
implementing, and evaluating CRA strategy for the financial institution” (Perlmeter, 2017, p. 7).
The requisite skillsets for CROs are broad, and though these will vary based on the individual,
they may encompass community development knowledge, financial, lending, and investment
expertise, public-facing outreach and engagement, as well as behind the scenes regulatory policy
review and data analysis. Against this backdrop, each of the institutional demands faced by
CROs will be reviewed in turn.
Regulatory Pressures Experienced by Community Reinvestment Act Officers
The banking regulatory agencies and their examiners create significant institutional
pressures on CROs to comply with an enormous body of regulatory policy written over decades
since passage to execute the principles of the CRA statute. If they have direct reports, CRA
managers will be responsible for workers who carry out policy mandates, but whether they are
solely responsible for CRA or team managers, CROs are the direct intermediaries with policy
makers (Cloutier et al., 2016). CROs are the senior bank officers who are directly responsible for
CRA regulations and reports, and who prep for and undergo examinations. Essentially, CROs are
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policed by bank examiners, who aim to maintain regulatory institutions around community
reinvestment and ensure compliance with prevailing norms and procedures through regular
audits and monitoring (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
In order to receive CRA credit, CROs are required to supply vast amounts of data to their
regulators for CRA performance examinations. Prior to examinations, the bank regulators will
gather information already in their databases, as well as request additional information from the
financial institution via the CRO (FDIC, 2017). Banks operating in today’s technological and
complex policy environment must supply a vast amount of data to the banking regulators to
ensure compliance with fair lending laws and the CRA (Stock & Noreika, 2001). Institutions
may use free data reporting software supplied by the regulators, or use their own programs
(Federal Register, 2016). As of 2009, 96% of banks in the Fortune 500 utilized SAS, an
information systems software, as a compliance management solution for data collection,
reporting, and analysis or risk (SAS, 2009). Exemplary of the hope that technology innovations
will ease the pressure of a CRA role, SAS itself advertises that its monitoring capabilities for
changing bank regulations and risk indicators helps banks to understand their “fair lending risks
faster and better than regulators and the public” (SAS, 2009). Yet, the resources and know-how
to use expensive information systems software may be out of the reach of small community
banks. In either case, the ability to collect, catalog, and analyze data has become an increasingly
important requisite skill for CROs.
The data burden is likely to only increase. Since the 1990s, regulators have used
statistical methods for documenting evidence of discrimination (Walter, 1995, p. 70). But in a
2009 audit on fair lending laws, the GAO found that without even more data, the regulators’
ability to identify lending discrimination is limited (GAO, 2009). This theme was highlighted at
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the 2016 CRA & Fair Lending Colloquium. CROs in attendance emphasized the importance of
clean statistical data, comprehensive performance contexts, and market analysis in order to tell a
“fair lending story.” If we do not do this, they warned, “the regulators will tell our story for us”
(Wolters Kluwer, 2016).
Furthermore, analysis of electronic data has become more advanced geographically in
recent years as well. This is yet another skillset that a CRO may or may not possess. When CRA
was passed over 30 years ago, mapping was mostly done on geographic wall maps with
pushpins, but today, mapping tools are sophisticated technologies that are critical to compliance
for financial institutions trying to mitigate risk (Sloan et al., 2015). Agencies seeking to punish
discriminatory practices, such as the Department of Justice, are utilizing maps to visually
highlight fair lending violations during court cases, “making the gaps that much more
identifiable and infallible” (Sloan et al., 2015, p. 5). The concept of a regulator-defined
Reasonably Expected Market Area (REMA) for the bank’s activities has been introduced as well,
which may or may not overlap with the bank’s self-identified CRA assessment area (Yap, 2012;
Pry, 2017). Thus, the CRO may struggle not only to collect appropriate data, but also may not be
collecting data in the right market. CROs will need to develop maps that show market conditions
in their assessment areas, overlaid with demographic indicators and financial data. These maps
aid them to show lending and investment performance over time within regions served and allow
them to plan for future CRA-qualified activities (Sloan et al., 2015).
By requiring banks to maintain advanced compliance management systems in addition to
submitting vast quantities of data, the regulators ensure that the “ultimate responsibility for
compliance rests with the institution” (FDIC, 2017, p. II 1.1). For many banks, this means the
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ultimate responsibility rests with the CRO, creating significant pressure on the CRO to fulfill the
regulatory demands on behalf of their bank.
Internal Organizational Pressures on Community Reinvestment Act Officers
A second category of institutional demand on CROs is internal pressure, including
pressures from bank leadership, colleagues, shareholders, and their teams. At larger banks, CROs
will need to manage teams engaged in the community development enterprise. The regulatory
agencies will review CRO’s qualifications, as well as those of their teams (FDIC, 2017). The
internal pressure stems foremost from the profit motive, central to a private sector institutional
logic. Two key facets make the CRO role particularly challenging. First, while carrying out
CRA-qualified lending, service, and investment projects, CROs operate within the parameters of
a profit-generating organization, meaning financial losses are frowned upon. Yet serving LMI
customers is often not considered profitable. Second, if CRA examinations are not successful,
the bank will not be able to expand, open new branches, or merge and acquire. As this is a
significant growth opportunity for banks, failure to successfully meet the CRA requirements
would be a serious barrier against future profit-generating opportunities of the bank.
CROs provide input or even oversee the bank’s enterprise in product offerings that serve
LMI communities and that are financially sound. They must ensure that these products and
services are offered equitably, yet profitability. While lower profit margins are often accepted as
a tradeoff for compliance, CROs are expected not to lose money for the bank. Furthermore, they
have to ensure that any lending or investment decisions do not compromise principles of safety
and soundness, which they will separately be audited on. CROs will be most capable of serving
community development needs and fulfilling CRA expectations when they have the skill and
expertise to determine which product-lines should be offered in their communities and which
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will be profitable (Willis, 2009). It is also likely to help if the CRO has healthy resources at his
or her disposal. Payton (2014) found that the most significant predictor of an outstanding rating
on the CRA performance exam was simply the asset size of the bank. After ensuring that bank
offerings are able to effectively serve the LMI community, CROs also have to get these
customers in the bank doors, as the numbers of LMI customers served will be monitored by the
regulatory agencies. These are central components of the CROs’ role as a market player.
In addition to the internal pressure to guard against financial loss, CROs are also CRA
influencers in their organizations. Regardless of the size and scope of his or her role, a CRO
cannot single-handedly carry out CRA. Compliance applies to the entire organization, and CROs
have the particularly challenging role of ensuring that all staff are trained in fair lending practices
and that lending, service, and investment activity is encouraged and monitored to ensure that
lending decisions are based solely on credit worthiness and to ensure that there are sufficient
CRA-qualifying activities.
Community Pressures on Community Reinvestment Act Officers
The third significant institutional demand on CROs is community pressure. Due to the
composition of CRA regulatory policies, compliance is de facto enforced by the public, as well
as by the regulatory agencies, creating an additional spoke of institutional pressure. HMDA and
CRA data are public, and with the Internet, customers, competitors, and local community
members all can access it (SAS, 2009). Banks must also maintain public files listing their CRA
examinations and all correspondence related to their performance (Stock & Noreika, 2001).
These can be requested by members of the public at any time. Community monitoring has the
potential to widely publicize cases of discriminatory lending and contributes to the pressure on
bankers to fulfill their roles in CRA compliance.
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Even community partnerships meant to fulfill CRA obligations can be difficult to execute
successfully due to the conflicts in institutional logics of each sector. Arneson et al.’s (2009)
report to Nonprofits Assistant Fund (NAF) is illustrative of the challenges of successful bank and
non-profit alliances. NAF is a cross-sector partnership between a non-profit CDFI and
commercial banks in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolis. NAF works with community nonprofit organizations, including charter schools, housing, human service, and health care
organizations, and community development organizations—to provide loans, technical
assistance, and financial management training, such as skill-building workshops. NAF loans
range from about $5,000 to $500,000, and are made to organizations that typically do not qualify
for traditional financing (Arneson et al., 2009, p.6). The loan fund is fueled by grants from
corporate and foundation partners, including large banks such as Bank of America, American
Bank, and Wells Fargo Community Development Corporation.
For some CROs in the report, community development was a core value, while others
were primarily compliance-driven, simply trying to keep their CRA rating strong. Some CROs
saw their profit-first bottom line as mismatched with the service mission of nonprofits. Because
banks will ultimately be concerned with profitability above all, while non-profit organizations
aim to address a community need, there is a natural incongruence at the outset of any businessto-non-profit alliance. In addition, Arneson et al. (2009) expressed that these “competing cultures
speak two very different languages” (p. 2). As with the bureaucratic English of the regulators
discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the analogy of speaking different languages is used to
illustrate the differences in common values and understanding for cross-sector actors. In other
words, the institutional logics of the private and non-profit sectors are often incongruent.
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In interviews with the bankers, it was consistently shared that there was a lack of clarity
on NAF’s products and which types of nonprofits they served. Despite these challenges, NAF is
a promising intermediator because it bridges the gap and understands the financial sector and
loans, but also a nonprofit’s service mentality. Additionally, NAF needed the banks’ funding.
Thus, the CDFI could serve as a more successful intermediary with community groups than
directly working with the community organizations, in this case. The CROs in the study
perceived that nonprofits were poorly managed, had little capital, and were organizationally
unstable. They also believed the nonprofits would require more technical advice than they were
able to give (Arenson et al., 2009). Arneson et al. (2009) found that partnering with NAF could
mitigate the risks of loaning to non-profit community organizations as a loan intermediary, and
because of the technical training and support provided. Ultimately, partnership with a community
CDFI was more attractive than with community organizations because of closer similarities in
missions and values. NAF had a financial acumen that provided more economic security on all
sides. The bankers interviewed in the study consistently shared that NAF enhanced their impact
on non-profit organizations and was uniquely suited to mitigate risks associated with loaning to
nonprofits. This report illustrates the mismatch in logics of the private sector and community
partners, where even a non-profit financial institution (a CDFI) “speaks a different language”
than the private sector, but where grassroots community organizations (the grantees) are even
farther removed in their normative values and operating procedures. While there are definite
advantages, incongruities may create day-to-day challenges for both sides of the partnership.
Summary
The enhanced enforceability of the CRA since passage has changed the banking field
over time as the goals of the public sector mandate have become more important for banks to
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comply with. The importance of the CRA in recent decades has led many banks to devote more
resources to CRA compliance. Entire roles devoted to CRA have been created at some of the
bigger banks, as well as community development divisions. Additionally, an enlarged CRA has
changed the makeup of the professional field. As banks have expanded their community
development efforts, they have correspondingly hired CROs with more experience or desire to
work in the field (Chazdon, 1996; Dreier, 2003). After the CRA was passed in 1977, by the
1980s, foundations, including bank foundations, began giving grants to community organizations
for community reinvestment activities (Dreier, 2003, p. 199). By the early 1990s, many banks
had created stand-alone community reinvestment divisions. “These divisions were often staffed
by “liberal” individuals who sympathized with the aims of the community reinvestment
movement. Indeed, some of these people had themselves been community activists who were
recruited by banks to serve as liaisons with community groups” (Dreier, 2003, p. 200). As the
individuals within the banks and community groups became more allies than foes, many banks
began to see serving the community as a core part of their business’ values, evidence of changing
institutional logics through institutional work. These new professionals often espoused the belief
that strong community development programs would enhance the bank’s reputation while also
serving the company’s own mission (Dreier, 2003). The processes that drive these changes in
institutional logics over time, institutional work of the senior managers, will be further examined
in this study.
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Chapter Three: Literature Review
Introduction
The literature review for this study is introduced through a discussion about ontology and
epistemology, which are theoretical positions that underpin research frameworks, and are thus
guideposts for the exploration of relevant theory-driven literature. This discussion is meant to
frame the theoretical orientation and the key literature that is reviewed. The remainder of the
chapter discusses the pertinent foundational literature and then further develops the theoretical
framework. This framework explores the promise of linking the institutional logics and
institutional work perspectives to enhance the explanatory power of empirical inquiry within the
public policy discipline. Placing the research topics within the academic literature will
contextualize them within the broader fields where institutional theory has been applied, and
where it needs to be further explored (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The intention is to explain what
we understand from existing research, and then to identify where empirical research and
theoretical development can provide new or unique insights to build on existing knowledge. In
this regard, the literature review is both the dialogue where the linkages of institutional logics
and institutional work perspectives are first explored, as well as the backdrop to the empirical
work.
The literature surveyed to address research question one [R1] investigated each
perspective independently, as well as the foundational literature, followed by exploration of the
efficacy of linking the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives. This literature
review will provide context for the empirical portion of part one of the study, which investigates
the explanatory power of the linked perspectives to explain the conflict in institutional demands
created by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer &
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Phillips, 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009; 2011; 2013; Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). These pressures affect regulated banks, particularly the
managers who are responsible for policy mandates. The institutional demands of the CRA on
managers have not been explored via this lens directly within the public policy field, but the
reviewed literature covers institutional theory and applications of both the institutional logics and
institutional work perspectives in related contexts. The literature points to the promise of an
application in this novel research setting that draws insights from the linked institutional
perspectives.
Second, research question two [R2] asks how Community Reinvestment Act officers
(CROs) interpret and reconcile the institutional demands created by the CRA. Furthermore,
through empirical investigation in part two of the study, it considers how CROs’ interpretations
of policy mandates and references to institutional logics are associated with features of their
banks, their community context, and their individual attributes and backgrounds (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier et al., 2016; Garrow
& Grusky, 2012). In the literature review, the contextual factors and reconciliation strategies of
actors in other policy or organizational contexts is reviewed, leading us to consider how
structural and symbolic elements of institutional logics shape the thought processes and behavior
of individuals engaged in institutional work, including within the community reinvestment field.
Epistemological and Ontological Groundings of the Literature
First, a discussion around ontology and epistemology is instructive for the theoretical
orientation of the reviewed literature. Ontological and epistemological orientations are the
foundations of theoretical approaches and the associated research methods that are chosen to
address the questions of an empirical study (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Ontology is a theory of
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being. It asks if there are essential truths about the world that exist independent of our knowledge
of it, and across all contexts and all times. Epistemology is a theory of knowledge, or what we
can learn (and how) about the world (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). The epistemological
classification of positivists versus interpretivists is a useful distinction.
A positivist epistemology is based on a foundationalist ontology, which states essentially
that reality exists independently of our developing knowledge about it. Social science is a
“science” under this lens, where relationships between social phenomena can be observed
objectively, hypotheses and theories can be tested, and theory is created via the scientific method
(Marsh & Furlong, 2002, p.22).
Interpretivists, alternatively, argue that institutions are socially constructed. The “lived
experience affects agents’ understanding of the institution and also helps change it” (Marsh &
Furlong, 2002, p. 24). This implies that social structures and the institutions that frame them do
not exist independently of the realities of the actors who are both influenced by these structures
and who also influence institutions via their agency.
A description of agency is warranted here and will also be key to an understanding of the
branches of institutional theory that are discussed in this review. Human agency is defined as the
capacity and intentionality of an actor to independently and deliberately make choices that
influence his or her life circumstances (Bandura, 2006). In other words, we are not just products
of our life circumstances, but we can also influence our situation in life. However, the concept of
agency may be visualized on a continuum rather than being absolute. For example, most
individual choices involve other agents, such as work leadership or colleagues. Thus, their
actions may affect our own, and in the professional environment, effective team performance
requires more of a collective intentionality. This requires the group’s commitment to shared
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intentions and action plans (Bandura, 2006). Additionally, agency is influenced by
environmental circumstances, including social systems.
Bandura (2006) argued that many theorists present agency and social structure as a
duality, wherein agency is non-existent because social structures determine our behaviors and
choices. In line with Bandura, that duality is rejected here. Instead, it is recognized that
individuals and organizations both create and are influenced by the larger social systems in
which they exist. “Social systems are the product of human activity, and social systems, in turn,
help to organize, guide, and regulate human affairs” (Bandura, 2006, p. 165). The extent to
which interpersonal and behavioral determinants will influence outcomes, as opposed to
environmental determinants, will depend on the situational circumstances, as well as the agents’
self-efficacy, personal and organizational resources, and power (Bandura, 2006). Thus, drawing
on Burns and Dietz (1992, as cited in Bandura, 2006), there is actually great variation in the
interpretation of, adherence to, and avoidance of prescriptions drawn from social structures and
norms. Here, we are centrally focused on the interpretations and reactions to prescriptions from
the institutions around regulatory compliance. Agents’ reactions to institutional demands of
public policies are shaped by dominant institutional logics that structure and clash in the agents’
current spheres and are additionally influenced by their prior social circumstances and
intrapersonal dimensions. This discussion leads us back to epistemology, or what we can know
and understand about agentic behavior and institutions.
For researchers in the interpretivist tradition, a key understanding of the social world and
what we can learn about it is the belief that social phenomena do not exist in their own right but
are experienced and interpreted through the discourses and practices of the people involved
(Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Thus, social science involves uncovering narratives, deciphering
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discourses and actions, and developing theories that help us to understand them (Marsh &
Furlong, 2002; Braun & Clarke, 2013). The goal is to provide deep insights that advance theory,
and to give voice to the people studied through rich description of their experiences and
discourses in doing so (Marsh & Furlong, 2002; Braun & Clarke, 2013).
This interpretivist lens underpins the institutional logics perspective, as well as the theory
of institutional change and disruption captured in the institutional work literature. Institutional
logics are not fixed, but rather they are constitutive of the sectoral actors who reinforce them, yet
also break down and rebuild norms and values over time through their agency. Institutional
theorists, though epistemologically diverse, are often grounded in this interpretivist
epistemology. This is the epistemological lens employed in this research. With this perspective
underscoring the exploration of the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives, the
following sections will develop the historical background of the theoretical framework through a
review of the pertinent institutional theory literature.
Institutional Theory
The theoretical framework applied in this dissertation is framed by the large umbrella of
institutional theory, which has a rich and long history that will be briefly discussed in this
section. While it is noted that the meaning of “institution” has varied even within this theoretical
tradition, it is the most recent literary use of the term that is employed in this study. In the current
usage, an institution is not an organization, an organizational form, or a sub-organizational
element. Rather, the level of analysis and focal point is at the inter-organizational level (David et
al., 2019). Institutions are conceptualized as the product of purposive norms and actions; they are
the ordered, established rules, procedures, and shared meanings that define social interactions,
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hierarchies, and relationships within societal sectors (David et al., 2019; Fligstein, 2001;
Jepperson, 1991).
Institutional theory is a prominent theoretical approach in organizational research and
sociology, and it is a core theoretical perspective in public policy. Despite the different tracks of
scholarship and the divergent core assumptions and concepts, the literature shares a common
thread in its focus on social norms and established expectations as drivers of organizational and
individual beliefs and actions (David et al., 2019). Over the decades, it can be categorized into
multiple waves. Early institutional scholarship (“old institutionalism”) focused on the
institutionalization of organizations due to contextual and environmental factors (David et al.,
2019). Beginning in the 1970s, new or neoinstitutional theorists continued to study institutional
embeddedness, but also the potential for change in institutional fields (David et al., 2019, p. 1;
Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Institutional entrepreneurship, institutional logics, and
institutional work strands arose from the neoinstitutional tradition. Beginning with old
institutionalism, the academic literature to present-day will be briefly reviewed.
“Old” Institutionalism
Institutional theory can be traced back to the legitimacy and authority scholarship of
Weber, but the theory’s founding fathers are considered to be Parsons, Selznick, and Gouldner.
Their work focused on organizations and their environments observed in the 1950s and 1960s (as
cited in David et al., 2019, p. 1). David et al. (2019) reflected that Parsons’ (1956) article on the
cultural-institutional view of organizations in Administrative Science Quarterly was one of the
earliest works of institutional theory. In reflecting on the legitimizing functions of organizations,
Parsons identified external relations as an institutional level function (in contrast to more
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production and managerial organizational levels), which connected and aligned the
organization’s goals to the wider societal context (as cited in David et al., 2019).
Following Parsons, Selznick (1949; 1957) theorized institutionalization, which involved
linkages between the organization and its embodiment of societal values, as a primary task of
organizational leaders (as cited in David et al., 2019). Thinking back on his earlier work,
Selznick (1996) reflected that he had drawn a distinction between organizations and institutions,
where the latter entailed more stable and socially integrated patterns and practices, yet still at the
meso-level of analysis (the organization). He also drew attention to the novelty in his scholarship
of viewing the corporation as an entity that responds to wider stakeholders, long-term interests,
and societal values, as opposed to strictly shareholder interests, which remains a dominant view
of the corporation entity-type. This offers insights to theorize corporate social responsibility, and
questions the idea that corporations are singularly profit-oriented (Selznick, 1996). Despite
differences in the definition of institution, the old institutionalism literature embedded founding
principles surrounding the exogenous factors that influence organizations.
Neoinstitutionalism
Retaining the ‘old’ institutionalism’s focus on the influence of environmental factors of
institutionalization, but introducing a new level of analysis, Meyer and Rowan (1977) are
credited with launching the neoinstitutional tradition in the late 1970s (as cited in David et al.,
2019, p. 3). Meyer and Rowan’s core argument was that institutional rules function as myths that
are adhered to by organizations to gain legitimacy, attain resources, and to simply survive as
organizations. Their article was significant because it challenged the dominant economic
explanation of organizational behavior, which is that organizational survival is primarily based
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on quality and efficiency of products and services, in other words, of market-based explanations
(David et al., 2019). Instead, they offered a critique to that rationale.
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) article offered a response to contingency theory, which had
become popular in the 1950s to 1970s (as cited in David et al., 2019, p. 3). Contingency theory
hypothesized that the factors related to variations in organizations’ formal structures are linked to
autonomous actors maximizing their organizations’ market efficiency. For example, these
structures could be job responsibilities, work practices and procedures, or staffing structures in
the organization (David et al., 2019). In contrast, Meyer and Rowan argued that formal structures
also have symbolic properties that signal commitment to certain societal values, as opposed to
being related to production efficiencies. Thus, human resources procedures or certain job roles
may reflect society’s value for those roles or procedures rather than being related to market
concerns. Furthermore, the more organizations that adopt these structures, the more
institutionalized they become, increasing pressure for the others to adopt them (David et al.,
2019; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991). Additionally, Meyer and Rowan found that formal
structures are often decoupled from production activities, decreasing efficiency while increasing
organizational complexity, in order to maintain that legitimacy. Their work also emphasized that
plurality in institutional environments contributes to these complex, and often inefficient, formal
structures (Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991). This concept would be later revisited by institutional
logics scholars (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2010).
Early neoinstitutional scholarship that followed Meyer and Rowan (1977) focused on
macro-structures and the influence and power of institutions, especially organizational
isomorphism (similarity and imitation of organizational structures) (David et al., 2019;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) revived the organizational quest for
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legitimacy and explored how organizational forms and practices become the norm due to
environmental factors as opposed to reasons related to efficiency necessarily. They explored
three primary forces. The first was institutional mimicry resulting from organizational leadership
relying on other organizations’ behaviors as a guide for their own. “Organizations tend to model
themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be more legitimate or
successful” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 152). A second key force was normative pressure,
including societal expectations for particular policies, practices, and behavior. And a third was
coercive pressures, which could be demands of resource-powerful organizations, or more
directly linked to government-led regulatory mandates on organizations (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; David et al., 2019). In addition to important insights on institutional pressures of
governmental mandates, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) also importantly theorized the
organizational field as a unit of analysis. They defined fields as being comprised of all of the key
actors surrounding a layer of organizational life. “By organizational field, we mean those
organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key
suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that
produce similar services or products…the totality of relevant actors” (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983, p. 148). This concept of an organizational field would become important for an
understanding of multiple and competing institutional logics within a field. In sum, structures in
organizations tend to reflect the normalized practices and organizing principles of the
institutional environment, as opposed to purely the demands of the work environment and
production activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991).
In his book Institutions and Organizations, Scott (1995) bolstered this viewpoint, arguing
that the wider contextual environment shapes the structures of formal organizations. He
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developed the pillars framework to theorize why individual or collective actors comply with
prescriptions, but he did not see these as mutually exclusive silos. The pillars were labeled
regulative (policies, rules, laws and sanctions), normative (habits and norms that express social
obligations, such as certifications and accreditations), and cultural-cognitive (shared
understandings and values that are often mimetic). It was the latter, cultural-cognitive, where he
grouped neoinstitutional theorists, such as Meyer and Rowan (1977/1991) and DiMaggio and
Powell (1983), noting their emphasis on the cultural context and belief systems that are often
integrated into organizations.
Key insights of these neoinstitutional articles are reminiscent of the old institutionalism
focus on organizations’ interactions with their environments. However, David et al. (2019)
pointed out that neoinstitutionalists signaled a contrast with Selznick’s (1957) conceptualization
of institutions as organizations that had become institutionalized, and instead demarcated the
term as sub-organizational elements of formal structures derived from social context (p. 3).
Nonetheless, core concerns of the literary tradition carried forward. In 1996, Selznick responded
to the wave of new institutionalism that had emerged since his foundational work. While
acknowledging new insights and foci that had emerged, especially DiMaggio and Powell’s
(1983) work on legitimacy and institutional isomorphism, he questioned how different the
strands really were, given the continued focus on the sociological contexts of organizations.
Over time however, neoinstitutional theorists shifted from institutional isomorphism to a
focus on institutional change, for examples studies that focused on the impacts of new laws and
regulations, new market opportunities such as products or services, and new occupations (David
et al., 2019). Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argued that the scholars of neoinstitutionalism did
allow for models of change whereas old institutionalism did not, due to its primary focus on the
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power of institutions. While the strengths of neoinstitutional theory’s foundational literature are
recognized, particularly insights on macro-structures and how they shape organizations, critics
have contended that the earliest work in neoinstitutionalism showed limited capacity to explain
the micro-level foundations of institutions and institutional change, including human agency
(DiMaggio, 1988; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Thornton et al., 2012). It is this branch of the
literature focused on the interplay of the macro-level of the institution and micro-level actors that
is of greatest interest here. Therefore, it is fruitful to take a step back and examine the emergence
of the institutional entrepreneurship literature.
Institutional Actors: Example – Institutional Entrepreneurship
Since the late 1980s, there has been a growing focus on the role of actors’ agency in the
evolution of institutions. One of the earliest actor-centered theories within institutional theory
was institutional entrepreneurship, which examined how highly capable actors influence and lead
organizations through regulatory change (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997). DiMaggio (1988)
spurred an early shift towards this micro-level focus on institutional change. He critiqued
institutional theory for its failure to account for the role of agency in institutionalization, which
meant that it had neglected to consider how the interests and actions of individuals are related to
variations in organizational structures. DiMaggio focused on well-resourced and effective
leaders as institutional entrepreneurs. He argued that new institutions could arise if wellresourced leaders see the opportunity to realize high-value aspirations and rally actors around
them. A key argument here was that institutionalization depends on the power of the actors
involved and whether they support or fight against it. His work also offered a response to an
enduring focus in the literature on institutional persistence at the organizational or field levels of
analysis (Martí & Mair, 2009). Specifically, he proposed to study institutionalization processes,
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laying the groundwork for the institutional work perspective and its focus on the intentional
activities of individuals that leads to organizational change, such as new policies, procedures, or
structures.
Fligstein (1997) also wrote about institutional entrepreneurs and how skilled actors
influence institutional transformation. In essence, through their activities, they recombine
institutional structures, such as rules and practices of the field. Fligstein specifically focused on
how actors with high social capital motivate cooperation in others, especially by influencing the
development of shared meanings and identities. He argued that the strategies employed by
institutional entrepreneurs vary across contexts and thus encouraged studies in a variety of
research settings and professional fields. While the focus on individuals and their role in
institutional change was novel amongst a dominant concentration on the organizational and field
levels in institutional theory, DiMaggio (1988) and Fligstein (1997) wrote specifically about
powerful and prominent individuals with significant resources (Martí & Mair, 2009). Later
scholarship, particularly the institutional work perspective, expanded the lens to a variety of
institutional actors, including those without leadership roles or who lacked power or resources
(Martí & Mair, 2009). However, the institutional work literature holds similar foundational
views to that of institutional entrepreneurship.
Integrating Theoretical Concepts
Building on the societal lens of neoinstitutionalism and the actor-centricity of
institutional entrepreneurship, the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives have
arisen as more recent thrusts of institutional theory. These perspectives have advanced
institutional theory with their focus on the intentional efforts of actors, primarily professionals, to
affect institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009; 2011; 2013; Thornton &
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Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). There has been continued interest in the institutional
entrepreneurship focus of understanding the role of leaders, senior managers and other highranking individuals who play a key role in shaping organizations and institutions (DiMaggio,
1988; Fligstein, 1997; Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010). However, following
Selznick’s (1996) cautionary advice, we should be wary of failing to integrate concepts of both
old and new institutionalism and “taking full account of theoretical and empirical continuities”
(p. 275). Doing so risks embracing dichotomies for rhetorical purpose, when what we really
should be focused on is how to implement public policies in more effective ways (Selznick,
1996). In this regard, contemporary literature should invite the key insights of multiple strands of
institutional theory. This review has highlighted commonalities across much of the institutional
theory literature. We now turn to a closer examination of the institutional logics literature, then
the institutional work literature, building up to a linkage of both perspectives to develop a more
insightful framework on agentic institutional maintenance and change.
Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies
Institutional Logics Perspective: Institutional Demands
Michael Foucault has argued that institutions acquire meaning through language (Marsh
& Furlong, 2002). Actions must be interpreted within the wider discourse of which they are part,
specifically the institutions of the field (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Riaz et al., 2011). Friedland
and Alford (1991) were the first theorists to identify actor-driven field-level discourses—
expressing the norms, values, and accepted practices of the institution—as institutional logics.
Institutional logics are defined as the socially constructed norms, beliefs, values, rules and
practices of a societal sector, embodied by sectoral actors (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lindblom,
1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). Institutional
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logics are both material and symbolic, in that they provide both formal and informal norms
around actions, interactions, and interpretations of what appropriate behavior may be; logics thus
influence decisions of organizational actors, define social statuses, and influence rewards and
penalties within the institutional domain (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Foundational Institutional Logics Literature
Friedland and Alford (1991) viewed Western society as composed of different
institutions, such as the state, market, democracy, family, and religion, where each has a unique
institutional logic constructed of distinct value sets. These logics have both material and
symbolic elements, and broadly provide organizing principles for actors. Indeed, a key insight
offered was that not all logics are necessarily compatible. As individuals reference competing
institutional logics within a field, their sensemaking of predominant structural arrangements may
lead them to reject that structure, and reflect alternative logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991).
The central institutions of the contemporary capitalist West—capitalist market,
bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion—shape
individual preferences and organizational interests as well as the repertoire of
behaviors by which they may attain them. These institutions are potentially
contradictory and hence make multiple logics available to individuals and
organizations. Individuals and organizations transform the institutional relations
of society by exploiting these contradictions (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 232).
The institutional logics perspective thus lends key insights regarding the institutional
ordering of society and the demands faced by individual actors and organizations who interface
with multiple and competing institutional logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith,
2014; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008;
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Pache & Santos, 2010). Critically, Friedland and Alford (1991) argued that multiple levels of
analysis (individual, organization, institution) are required to understand society, as “each is
implicated in the other” and where organizations and institutions both frame the levels of
“constraint and opportunity for individual action” (p. 242). Friedland and Alford’s seminal
article led to a large body of research in this domain (David et al., 2019).
The institutional logics perspective highlights that individuals and organizations are
challenged by both internal and external contradictory demands that result from institutional
pressures. A number of authors have called for a deeper understanding of the influence of these
pressures on individual and collective actors’ behaviors (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Friedland &
Alford, 1991; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Lounsbury, 2007; Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Pache &
Santos, 2010). Organizations facing institutional pressures may operate within a variety of
institutional spheres or be subject to multiple, and often contradictory, “regulatory regimes,
normative orders, and/or cultural logics” (Kraatz & Block, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010, p. 457).
This could be due to the various policy arenas and regulatory agencies that govern organizations,
emerging non-traditional institutional models such as social enterprises, or the competing
cultural worldviews of rapidly changing communities, for example. Compliance is almost
impossible in this context, as satisfying certain demands may directly conflict with others.
Institutional demands are more likely to cause conflict when dominate actors at the field level
can enforce prevailing logics, such as regulatory regimes that instill penalties for noncompliance
or major funders that create resource dependencies (Knutsen, 2012; Pache & Santos, 2010;
Thomann et al., 2016).
Particularly relevant are those studies that responded to the call for more research focused
on the microlevel or intraorganizational dynamics in response to conflicting institutional logics
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(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997; Pache &
Santos, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). This literature has departed from a more traditional
focus on organizations as unitary entities responding to conflicting institutional pressures, and
instead emphasizes the diverse actors within organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache &
Santos, 2010).
Thornton et al. (2012) reflected that their intent in the framing of the institutional logics
perspective was to revamp neoinstitutional theory. They recognized the strengths of the early
insights of the macro-level environmental influences on organizations, but also its weaknesses in
terms of explaining the micro-level, or agency and its influence on macro-level institutions and
theories of logic multiplicity and change. They were excited by the opportunity for a variety of
disciplines to deepen the understanding of the material and the symbolic, including cultural and
structural processes of change, across multiple level of analyses, the micro, meso, and macro
(Thornton et al., 2012).
Approaches to institutional theory within the broader management field lend insight
regarding how organizational actors experience and manage conflicting institutional logics of
sectoral fields. Early institutional logics research focused on how a dominant logic is replaced by
a new one (David et al., 2019). For example, an influential application of institutional logics was
Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) study of the higher education publishing industry. They described
how institutional logics morphed over time from an editorial to a market-based orientation. The
shift in logic affected the focus of executive leaderships’ management practices, as well as
executive succession. The authors illustrated how leadership power and interests are influenced
by prevailing institutional logics in the wider environment. “[While] power and politics are
present in all organizations, the sources of power, its meaning, and its consequences are
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contingent on higher-order institutional logics” (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 802). In essence,
institutional logics—though “historically variant” and shaped by social and economic structure
over time—define the “rules of the game” and whether executive power is gained or lost
(Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 802-806). Within organizational fields, these institutional logics
are embodied by sectoral actors with competing priorities, resulting in competition and conflict.
Within organizations, implicit rules of action and interaction shape social status, appropriate
behavior, as well as rewards and penalties. Thus, institutional logics influence conflict and
political struggles amongst actors within organizations (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Other research of note has also focused on logics coexisting, such as Lounsbury’s (2007)
study of mutual funds which have embraced both trustee logics and performance logics, or Reay
and Hinings’ (2009) study in the health care sector where market-like health care and medical
professionalism logics were found to co-exist. Kraatz and Block (2008) defined institutional
pluralism as the scenario where an organization operates across more than one institutional
domain. This means that the organization may have multiple regulatory regimes, cultural
worldviews, normative orders, and thus identities. In their study, Kraatz and Block found that
conflicting logics can result in a variety of outcomes, from domination of one identify over
another, to the decoupling and compartmentalization of identities, to a balance of identities, or
the emergence of new hybrids.
A subset of authors has focused on organizations with multiple logics in the form of
hybrid structures, for example microfinance organizations and social enterprises, which blend
for-profit and non-profit philosophies (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; David et al. 2019; Fitzgerald
& Shepherd, 2018; Pache & Santos, 2010). These hybrids confront institutional logics in
unprecedented ways and researchers have struggled to identify theoretical frameworks to explain
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how institutional actors handle the tensions created by these conflicting logics (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010, p. 1419). For example, Battilana and Dorado (2010) argued that traditionally
banks are thought to carry a market logic focused on profit, while non-profit nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) embody a development logic focused on helping the poor. In the 1990s, a
number of NGOs determined that they could scale by combining these logics and spun off new
commercial microfinance organizations that would help the poor through market-driven
strategies. Battilana and Dorado found that such hybrid organizations face significant challenges
from the tensions and conflicts produced by these divergent market and development-centered
institutional logics. Specifically, their findings suggest that hiring policies (defining who
becomes an organizational member) and socialization policies (which teach and reinforce
behaviors and values) are crucial for developing a sustainable organizational identity.
Introducing the lens of institutional work into this type of study would add explanatory power in
terms of how institutional logics may hybridize at the junction of sectoral institutional logics.
Pache and Santos (2010) also focused on the intraorganizational pressures that result
from conflicting institutional demands for hybrid structures that may lead to organizational
failure. At the center of the ideological conflict for a market-driven NGO is the question of
whether making a profit in microcredit enterprises is right and whether it would ultimately serve
the greater good or be an immoral social goal at the expense of the poor (Pache & Santos, 2010).
The conflicting institutional demands emanating from each logic is problematic for microfinance
organizations. Echoing the theme that organizations are too often treated as unitary actors thus
failing to recognize these challenges, Pache and Santos argued that there is little understanding
of the intraorganizational strategies available to resolve conflict in institutional demands
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Pache & Santos, 2010). Moving beyond the neoinstitutional

70

tendency to focus on organizations as unitary entities, Pache and Santos examined microlevel
action in order to address their research question, i.e. how organizations experience and respond
to conflicting institutional demands. Their framework attempted to explain how organizations
can manage conflicting institutional demands in some cases, resulting in compromise. Yet in
other situations, particularly where internal power structures are balanced, they found a higher
likelihood of paralysis or breakup of the organization. This focus on internal organizational
dynamics added more depth to Oliver’s (1991) model of organizations’ strategic responses to the
conflict caused by institutional demands.
Institutional Logics and Policy Pressures
The public policy literature has also explored the pressures and conflicting demands
faced by regulated actors in relation to the state (government). In fact, the role of the state has
been featured since the earliest institutional literature. For example, David et al. (2019) reflected
that the state played a key role in Selznick (1949), and that neoinstitutionalists followed Weber
(1978) in their conceptualization of the state’s role as the “primary rationalizer of social life” (p.
10). Similarly, Meyer and Rowan (1977/1991) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) had articulated
the state’s role as the primary influencer of formal structure adoption as organizations sought
legitimacy; furthermore, this was largely through the act of passing laws and regulations (as cited
in David et al., 2019). Additionally, Friedland and Alford (1991) had described the bureaucratic
state logic as one of the central logics of the West. Additional literature has focused on how state
policies and regulations have developed new industries, affected corporations’ competitive
behaviors (e.g., through anti-trust laws), defined the scope of industry boundaries, and led to
changes in organizational forms, as well as even legitimated new products or services through
the state’s own consumption patterns (David et al., 2019).
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The concept of institutional logics, while often examined within the management field in
isolation from public policy, is important to an understanding of the institutional demands faced
by regulated private or public sector managers within organizations. From a governmental
institutional lens, public policy is deliberative action to change existing procedures and practices,
replacing older policy frameworks with new rules based on shared meanings (Smith, 1973). By
pressuring organizations to change their institutionalized operations and procedures, public
policy can be conceived of as a “tension-generating force” (Smith, 1973, p. 202). The seminal
manuscript on work-related policy pressures, predating the nomenclature or theoretical insights
of the institutional logics perspective, was Lipsky’s (1980) Street-Level Bureaucracy.
In his influential book, Lipsky (1980) argued that policy implementation literature
focuses too much on political elites, when in fact it is lower-level public service workers—streetlevel bureaucrats— who make public policy through their discretionary actions and control of
access to government benefits.8 These street-level bureaucrats are the police, teachers, social
workers, public legal defense and prosecutors, health workers, and other social service
employees. These bureaucrats “hold the keys,” in defining citizen to state relationships (p. 4).
Street-level bureaucrats socialize citizens to the provision of government services, frame civic
engagement, and both determine benefit eligibility and the services that citizens will receive
(Lipsky, 1980). Unfortunately, the outlook for policy outcomes is not positive. Lipsky illustrated
that even well-designed public policies often fail on the ground. This is because street-level
bureaucrats work without sufficient resources, with overbearing workloads, and with ambiguity
and conflict between goals set by both the legislature and administrators regarding their work

8

Lipsky (1980) defined street-level bureaucrats as the public service workers who interact with the public daily for
their jobs and who have significant discretion in terms of how they execute their work.
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performance (Lipsky, 1980; Matland, 1995). The institutional logics perspective would have
added rich explanatory power to the conflict in goals for these public servants. Furthermore,
while Lipsky’s (1980) work on street-level bureaucrats has created a voluminous literature in its
wake, the contextual factors that were important in Lipsky’s study have not been sufficiently
applied to more senior-level management or private sector interactions with public policy.
Responding to the street-level bureaucracy literature’s focus on bottom-up policy
implementation, Matland (1995) theorized that the reconciliation of the false dichotomy between
top-down and bottom-up theories of policy implementation could be found at the intersection,
which he recognized as dependent on a policy’s ambiguity and conflict level. In other words,
how clear and aligned are the policy expectations with the realities of the policy implementers?
The incongruence could be theorized as a conflict in institutional logics. In fact, some of the
public administration and policy literature that followed Lipsky (1980) and Matland (1995) has
utilized the institutional logics perspective to analyze policy pressures. Several studies have
recently examined how institutional logics create conflicting institutional demands for employees
responding to policy pressures (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Garrow & Grusky, 2012;
Thomann et al., 2016; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
In 2012, Garrow and Grusky expanded upon the classical focus in Lipsky’s (1980) streetlevel bureaucrats from an institutional logics lens and concluded in short, that logics matter for
frontline employees. They examined the core institutional logic of the organizational field and
the congruence with policy mandates for actors carrying out healthcare policy on the ground.
After controlling for other variables previously shown to affect the success of policy
implementation (such as the practitioner’s knowledge, experience or training, as well as work
constraints such as workload), they posited that the degree of Centers for Disease Control and
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Prevention (CDC) policy compliance by HIV counselors would be directly related to the
alignment of the mandates with the organizational field’s core logic. While Garrow and Grusky’s
(2012) findings echoed prior literature on the adverse effects of workload pressures on
congruence with policy intent, what is particularly novel about their work is their conclusion that
alignment of institutional logics with policies was the most significant determinant of
congruence with mandates. Organizational fields structure logics for the front-line workers
within the field, and thus agency is institutionally embedded. However, the authors did not
consider that institutional logics may differ within organizations as well, as they analyzed logics
at the organizational level. Indeed, the authors conceded that a limitation to the study was their
assumption that each organization adheres to a single institutional logic, as opposed to
recognizing that intraorganizational actors may reference multiple competing institutional logics
(Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Additionally, the failure to account
for attributes of workers, such as their personal identities or race, meant that significant nuance
was left out of the study.
In fact, Watkins-Hayes (2009) found that race was a significant influencing factor on the
internalization of policy mandates and job performance for street-level bureaucrats. Her
qualitative study, which included both participant observation and in-depth interviews, asked
how caseworkers who implement welfare policy both experience and interpret reforms. In the
field of human services and welfare-to-work reform, case workers must provide assistance with
employment, accessible transportation, and affordable housing and childcare. Professional
identities are composed of norms and values, individual backgrounds, and organizational
structures and practices. Ultimately, Watkins-Hayes found that welfare workers’ professional
identities factor significantly into how they carry out their work. For example, if they act as
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social workers, they are empathetic advocates willing to flex the rules to support their clients’
hardships as they work to get out of poverty. Yet if they operate as efficiency engineers, their
greatest concern is reducing caseload and rule compliance, to the detriment of a focus on truly
enabling clients to change their lives. A third identity is the stereotypical bureaucrat—the
survivalist—who is unproductive, resists change, and cares little about the clients. These
professional identities play a significant role in human service delivery (Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
Furthermore, race intersects with professional identity. Although Watkins-Hayes (2009)
found that African Americans and Latinos were by no means homogenous groups (and that they
could fit into any of the three professional identities described), many shared backgrounds of
resource deprivation with their clients. By and large, they were more likely to reference
institutionalized racism and the ways in which opportunity is shackled for low-income people of
color. Not only did they fundamentally believe in their work and the mission to improve lives,
but they were more likely to recognize the institutionalized barriers in access to the market (e.g.,
a job and living wage) (Watkins-Hayes, 2009). Thus, race can be an important variable in how
employees view both their work and the policy mandates that govern their work. This has been
found to be true in the education policy sector as well.
In the education policy arena, Bridwell-Mitchell and Sherer (2017) studied how teachers’
interpretations of policy reform were associated with institutional logics. Their research project
involved a stratified random sample of three schools and 117 teachers (p. 223). The primary
research instrument was a survey with both quantitative and qualitative questions, where the
latter were inductively coded for salient themes. Through latent class factor analysis, they found
that interpretations could be linked to three instructional reform logics: (a) market accountability
logics (associated with market-based reforms around school choice and charter schools), (b)
75

communal sentiment logics (linked to democratic reforms prioritizing community engagement
policies), and (c) professional bureaucracy logics (connected to reforms that centralize authority
or standardize school operations and outcome measures). They argued that the broader cultural
context and the logics that arise from them both provide policymakers with frameworks on the
formulation of reforms, as well as provide teachers with constructions around interpretation of
how to implement those reforms (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017). Bridwell-Mitchell and
Sherer argued that the beliefs and practices enacted into the formulation of various reforms
represent institutional logics, and that these logics play a key role in policy implementation, not
just in policy formulation. The broader cultural, school, and community contexts provide policy
implementers, in this case teachers, with conflicting logics for interpreting and implementing
policy reforms. Thus, competing logics are also a source of internal turmoil for administrators
and teachers. As they implement these reforms in varying ways, Bridwell-Mitchell and Sherer
asked to what extent teachers’ references to these differing logics were associated with
characteristics of their schools, their individual backgrounds, and their participation in
professional networks. The authors found that race was the most significant factor to account for
differences in institutional logics. Teachers of color were significantly less likely to ascribe to
market accountability logics. This is important, because these findings suggest that race—and the
social experiences that accompany it—play a greater role in interpretations of education policy
mandates than previously understood (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017).
The articles reviewed thus far are studies of institutional logic perspectives in cases of
public servant policy implementation. More recently, via an analysis of seven case studies of
private sector policy implementation, Thomann et al. (2016) proposed a framework for policy
implementation by private actors, which they pointed out had typically been overlooked in the
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literature. Employing both a top-down and bottom-up approach, Thomann et al. (2016) argued
that firm performance, in the face of conflicting logics of the state and the market, would be
affected by goal ambiguity (how much leeway there is for interpretation), accountability
(enforcement of policies), and hybridity (mutual relationships between public and private actors).
They concluded that conflicting institutional logics of the state and private sector plays a key role
in whether or not policy outcomes align with policy goals. Specifically, they found that whether
or not the private sector performance would align with the public interest would be related to the
state’s accountability mechanisms (Thomann et al., 2016). In sum, Thomann et al. (2016)
hypothesized that conflicting logics of the state and market can hamper policy goals: “If the
private implementers cannot reconcile the state logic with their own market logic, then they tend
to prioritize the latter” (Thomann et al., 2016, p. 68). Thus, policymakers should expect conflicts
between their goals and the goals of the regulated businesses and avoid conflicts where possible.
While these findings on institutional logics add new insights to the literature on streetlevel public service workers and private sector firms’ roles in policy implementation, a focus on
mid-level and upper-level private sector managers as policy actors requires more attention. This
follows Cloutier et al.’s observation (2016) that senior managers significantly affect policy
implementation. Furthermore, the vast majority of these policy studies have been on public
sector policy implementation. Thus, turning our attention to the private sector is a promising
direction to explore (Ferlie et al., 2003).
Many of the empirical articles utilizing the institutional logics (or similar) perspective in
policy studies have focused on policy implementation by street-level employees of the state, such
as health care managers (Cloutier et al., 2016), social services (Garrow & Grusky, 2012;
Watkins-Hayes, 2009), or educators (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017). Not only would a focus
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on managers be instructive but examing public policy implementation and private sector actors is
particularly intriguing due to the stark differences in norms and values of the market and
bureaucratic logics, which are expected to be dominant for each sector. Policy implementation in
itself constitutes institutional disruption and generates tensions (Smith, 1973). But at the crosssection of organizational fields that experience institutional pluralism, divergent logics are poised
to exacerbate those tensions, resulting in temporal contradictions as managers reference multiple
logics as they attempt to carry out their work. As managers attempt to reconcile public policy
goals with other institutional demands, they also influence institutional maintenance and change
through their work. The reconciliation of conflicting logics is uniquely captured by the
institutional work literature, which we will now turn to.
Institutional Work Perspective: Institutional Maintenance and Change
By the early 21st century, there was a substantive shift in scholarly attention to a subfield
coined “institutional work” within the broader field of neoinstitutional theory (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009; 2011; 2013; Phillips & Lawrence, 2012). Lawrence et al.
(2013) reflected that institutions and work have had relatively different trajectories in the
literature. Within the field of organization studies, work typically was not covered, although it
was a focus of sociology of work journals (Lawrence et al., 2013). Thus, institutional work,
though born of the neoinstitutional tradition, offers an exciting new direction for institutional
theory. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) are two of the earliest theorists to synthesize previous
literature and draw out institutional work as a distinct perspective under the broader institutional
theory umbrella. Whereas the institutional entrepreneurship literature had focused on those with
the leadership and social status to be institutional entrepreneurs, Lawrence and Suddaby
expanded this focus to a taxonomy of all actors who contribute to institutional work. They
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defined institutional work as “the purposive action of individuals and organizations aimed at
creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions,” and noted that an actor’s social position and
control of resources would affect their capabilities (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215).
Institutional work theorists conceptualize institutional actors as capable, contemplative, and often
goal-oriented (Lawrence et al., 2011; Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009). Their actions are at times
highly visible, but are more often subtle or even mundane day-to-day activities (Lawrence et al.,
2009). The perspective combined institutional theory with behavioralist literature on political
actors, squarely putting the individual back into institutions. It promises to enhance our
understanding of the degree to which the agency of actors within organizations can maintain or
change institutions, and it answers criticisms of institutional theory for failing to address both
structure and agency, and their interactions (Battilana & D’Aunno, 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006; Lawrence et al., 2009; 2011; 2013; Phillips & Lawrence, 2012). This focus is key to
examining a previously unexplored paradox around embedded agency, specifically how
institutions are changed by the very actors that they are conditioned by (Gawer & Phillips, 2013).
Individual actors and organizations shape institutions through their activities (such as
advocacy, education, self-regulation) and discourse (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Riaz et al.,
2011). Particularly, the role of rhetoric (the language of persuasion and influence; the often
political or interest-driven use of symbols to persuade) and narrative (language with form and
structure to create a series of connected events-- stories) are increasingly recognized as critical
strategies for influencing institutional change and maintenance (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006;
Riaz et al., 2011; Shanahan et al. 2018).
Embracing these key insights, the institutional work literature has gained significant
popularity. In 2011, Lawrence et al. built upon their earlier work in a dialogue meant to spur
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researchers to pursue an institutional work research agenda focused on efforts to operate within
or against institutional structures. The authors focused on the distinctiveness of the field and its
potential for the examination of innovative research questions. While “the ascendance of
institutional theory as a macro-theory of organizations is at this point undeniable,” they argued,
institutional work puts the individual back into institutions (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 52). This is
crucial, because the institutional perspective loses the “lived experience” of actors within the
institutions that “structure and are structured by” these lived experiences (Lawrence et al., 2011,
p.52). In 2013, Lawrence et al. reflected that institutional work had become a vibrant research
domain, particularly for organizational studies. They surmised that institutional work scholarship
had emerged focused on how institutional work occurs (how institutions are created, maintained,
and disrupted) and who does institutional work (most prominently, professionals or leaders of
organizations) (Lawrence et al., 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). For example, authors employing
this lens have focused on group dynamics as a motivation of institutional work (Dorado, 2013);
the importance of the construction of expertise as a power-accumulating resource in institutional
work (Empson et al., 2013; Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012; Rojas, 2010; Suddaby & Viale, 2011); the
role of social status and resource control (Empson et al., 2013; Micelotta & Washington, 2013);
or the importance of organizational leaders’ role in institutional work (Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al.,
2011; Rojas, 2010). For example, in their study of the 2007-2010 financial crisis, Riaz et al.
(2011) focused on the institutional work roles of elite actors, particularly bank executives, and
how they shaped the nature and content of the public discourse throughout the financial crisis.
Indeed, the institutional work perspective focuses on how institutional actors, such as
organizations and individuals, might shape change in institutions, as well as their intentional
work to resist institutional change, maintenance work (Lawrence et al., 2009; 2011; 2013).
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Literature focusing on institutional maintenance, and then change, will be reviewed further in the
following two sections. However, it should be noted that the literature is separated by these
themes for analytical clarity; many articles discuss both institutional maintenance and change.
Institutional Maintenance
The interchange between regulators and private sector managers in the process of public
policy implementation encounters the embeddedness of institutions (David et al., 2019;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Importantly, however, the
institutional work perspective does not see the elements of institutional orders as fixed. The
purposive actions of individuals and organizations—on either side of the public-private divide—
to preserve institutions, is maintenance work. Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) argued that
institutional maintenance, or the work that reproduces and maintains institutions, had remained
relatively unstudied from an institutional work perspective.
Public sector regulators play primary roles in reinforcement and maintenance of existing
policy norms. For example, regulatory agencies have central roles in the institutional work of
policing. This work category aims to maintain existing policy institutions, for example through
enforcement activities (such as sanctions), auditing, and monitoring to ensure regulatory
compliance (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). The U.S. Congress
enacts legislation, but policy implementation and enforcement is left to the regulatory agencies
(Stock & Noreika, 2001; Walter, 1995). For example, in the banking sector, the bank regulators
police the institutional practices around community reinvestment work through carrying out
periodic, on-site examinations (Walter, 1995). Fox-Wolfgramm et al. (1998) analyzed how bank
regulators, in their implementation of the CRA, define standards for performance ratings
assigned during CRA examinations. These ratings play a powerful role in institutional
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maintenance, primarily in enforcing compliance of existing policy norms, because a bank’s CRA
rating will be reviewed when it submits applications for mergers or new branches through the
federal regulatory agencies (Haag, 2000). In fact, Thomann et al. (2016) found that strong
monitoring and accountability mechanisms led to higher congruence with policy goals across the
cases that they reviewed. Other forms of maintenance work include reinforcing the bounds of
social status, identity, or membership boundaries. This may be part of a formal accreditation
process, or standards and certifications in a field (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
Education is also a form of maintenance work, and entails instructing actors on the skills,
knowledge, and abilities they will need to support institutional frameworks (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006). In the banking field, regulators reinforce and maintain the institution of
community reinvestment through opportunities for instruction on policy norms and best
practices. Examiners provide guidance on CRA policies, train CROs on regulatory policies at
conferences, webinars, and other professional development sessions, as well as communicate
their findings and areas to improve during CRA examinations (Fox-Wolfgramm et al., 1998). In
the course of reviewing the bank’s performance, examiners may communicate best practices and
share experiences from other institutions (FDIC, 2017). In addition to providing guidance during
examinations, regulators engage in outreach activities such as industry conferences, with the goal
of sharing information so that banks can improve their community development practices (Yap,
2012).
To counteract the regulators’ institutional enforcement, regulated actors mobilize to
maintain their normal practices, which typically reflect the market logic within the private sector
(Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thomann et al.,
2016). Academics have identified numerous strategies that actors employ to avoid more stringent
82

regulations and continue to conduct business as usual (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Mahon & McGowan,
1997; Oliver, 1991). For example, Oliver (1991) argued that institutional theory had
inadequately addressed the strategic responses of organizations to institutional pressures. She set
out to categorize and identify various strategic behaviors of organizations in response to
institutional pressures, which may include adoption of new norms and conformity, but also may
result in alternative conflict response strategies to avoid the infringing institutional practices and
ideas. Oliver discussed a number of strategies, including acquiescence, defiance, manipulation,
avoidance, and compromise. The primary goal was to contribute to the institutional theory
literature via an understanding of organizational behavior in contexts where organizations resist
institutionalizing, as opposed to adopting institutional norms (Oliver, 1991). However, Oliver’s
level of analysis was at the meso-level, with organizations theorized as unitary entities, when in
fact, those strategic actions are driven by individuals within organizations.
Following Oliver (1991), resistance to institutional demands is theorized as conflict
response. However, the institutional work perspective adds an intriguing dimension to this
conceptualization. Instead of organizational-level analysis, an intriguing new focus is on agentic
actors and their responses to institutional demands (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Conflict
response strategies include various tools, often discursive or narrative tactics, meant to avoid
further regulation.
In the case of policy reform and institutional work, many of these strategies fit into what
Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) called simply, advocacy. An important role for managers who
wish to affect the direction of reform for regulatory norms is advocacy, which involves “direct
and deliberate techniques of social suasion” to gain political and regulatory agency support
(Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 221). Advocacy can be theorized as both institutional
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maintenance and change, dependent on the actors leveraging it and the end goals sought.
Advocacy is a form of maintenance work if the private sector managers are attempting to
maintain the status quo in their primary domain, which new policies or policy reform would
disrupt. Advocacy-based institutional maintenance work may include lobbying, promoting
legislative agendas, or proposing or commenting on legislation or regulatory policies with the
goal of avoiding new institutional practices or norms (Fligstein 1997; Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006). In the community reinvestment field, CROs have significant opportunity to share their
feedback, as the regulatory agencies hold interagency public hearings and invite testimony and
written comments from the public and bankers as they consider how to modernize regulations,
the state of fair lending, and community development needs (Federal Reserve, 2010).
Strategies of policy advocacy fit well into Oliver’s (1991) category of avoidance of
institutional demands, because these strategies often attempt to deflect more stringent public
policies, or even to roll back some of the more challenging policy elements. Agenda denial is an
umbrella concept that is useful to explain several techniques of avoidance (Cobb & Ross, 1997).
Cobb and Ross (1997) defined agenda denial as the tactics or strategies used to keep an issue off
of the policy agenda. It is closely related to issue containment, which specifically refers to tactics
to limit discussion around problems to the narrowest angle or perspective possible, often when
more complete agenda denial is not possible. Strategies of agenda denial may include narrative
stories spun to garner support, as well as efforts to keep additional regulation off the policy
agenda, such as denying that a problem exists, strategies to preempt outside regulation via selfregulation, co-optation of normative concepts and ideas, and arguments that the profession is too
complex for regulators to understand (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Mahon and McGowan, 1997;
Shanahan et al., 2018; Stone, 2012).
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For example, in the 1960s, after substantial scientific evidence showed that tobacco
caused health problems, the tobacco companies continued to deny this science, asserting that a
problem did not exist (Cobb & Ross, 1997, p. 28). Evidence has now surfaced that tobacco
manufacturers were aware of the harmful effects of tobacco, even while they were
simultaneously running public marketing campaigns that said the opposite (Cobb & Ross, 1997).
Co-optation may involve hiring leaders from the opposition, or actors can co-opt the opposition’s
symbolic ideas and narratives. For example, the timber industry has successfully been able to call
themselves environmentalists and stewards of healthy forests, in response to environmental
activism against logging (Cobb & Ross, 1997).
Another strategy is focused on problem definition. Specifically, this technique focuses on
the complexity of the problem or the profession under scrutiny. Mahon and McGowan (1997)
illustrated how the accounting profession was able to avoid more stringent regulation by
focusing on the complexity of their profession and promoting self-regulation tactics, in
combination with other influential factors. First, they denied that any problems existed. When
blatant cases of accounting error and fraud emerged such that the profession had to admit them,
they employed an “antipatterning” strategy, which recognized the problem, but painted the fraud
cases as isolated instances (p. 82). When the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
given authority to regulate the accounting profession, the first chairman came from the business
community, ensuring that the SEC would shy away from more stringent regulation. Additionally,
accounting firms professed that they possess complex expertise that only other professionals in
the same field have. The pivotal argument that allowed them to continue self-regulation centered
around the idea that only the professional accountants would “understand the intricacies” of the
practices and regulations that would protect the public interest (Mahon & McGowan, 1997, p.
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76). They were able to skillfully use this strategy to undermine the congressional bills drafted to
further regulate them. They pointed out errors in the verbiage and claimed that there was a
significant lack of understanding around what accountants even do. Furthermore, they were able
to claim that their self-policing practices were sufficient and continue the institutional norm of
self-regulation.
Micelotta and Washington (2013) found similar results in a study on Italian professions
that directly employed the institutional work perspective. They analyzed how individuals within
the professional services sector in Italy were able to avoid government reform efforts, and reestablish their status quo, business as usual. Micelotta and Washington found that social
positions and resource control were key to actors’ institutional work, wherein Italian
professionals, let by two professional associations, were able to ward off regulatory reform
efforts by the Italian government (Micelotta & Washington, 2013). In fact, the professionals in
Mahon and McGowan (1997) and Micelotta and Washington (2013) were in essence, building a
narrative about their expertise and heroic roles in protecting the public interest. Narratives are
powerful tools of policy persuasion.
Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) scholars’ work can also contribute to theories of
institutional maintenance. The NPF focus is on how actors use narrative strategies to gain
support for their policy positions or to avoid more stringent regulations. NPF draws on some of
the insights of the marketing field, which has long studied the use of effective narrative
techniques for advertising, and it applies them to the construction and manipulation of strategic
narratives of policy stakeholders (Jones et al., 2014; McBeth et al., 2014; Shanahan et al., 2018;
Stone, 2012). The central assertion of NPF is that policy narratives are important; that they have
both “generalized narrative elements” and these elements may be “applied across different policy
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contexts” and thus studied systematically (McBeth et al., 2014, p. 228). A main tenant is that the
way in which a story is depicted is equally important to successful policy bargaining as the
actions that are taken.
A number of assumptions make up the framework, including four policy narrative core
elements. First, the narrative has a setting. There is both a policy problem and orientation within
a policy context (such as legal parameters, economic conditions, demographics, geographic
boundaries, scientific evidence, etc.). Second, policy narratives have characters, often depicted as
villains, victims, or heroes. Stone (2012) theorized heroes as the ones who could fix a policy
problem, villains as the ones causing it, and victims as the ones harmed by it. These characters
can be individuals, or larger entities such as organizations or even abstractions. Third, there is a
plot. Within the policy context, the relationships between characters and actions will be defined.
Fourth, there is a moral, which means that policy narratives promote a policy solution (Jones et
al., 2014; McBeth et al., 2014). Stone’s (2012) policy story types have factored commonly into
NPF studies (Jones et al., 2014). Two primary plots include stories of decline and stories of
control. In the first, a tale is spun regarding how conditions will get worse if a specific policy
action is taken. In the latter, hope is offered by the implication that certain actions can allow a
character (a policy actor) to reach previously unattainable goals (Stone, 2012).
Thus, a number of authors have theorized conflict response strategies to institutional
demands stemming from public policies. Some of the literature does not fit directly within the
institutional theory umbrella, such as Cobb and Ross (1997) and Mahon and McGowan (1997),
yet they spoke of conflicts with worldviews and of policy success being linked to the wider
environmental context. As illustration, Cobb and Ross (1997) wrote that macro-level forces,
particularly the dominant social views of the time, affect whether or not micro-level actions will
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be successful. Considering these elements, as well as the fact that policy advocacy can be
conceptualized as institutional work, their frameworks for agenda denial can be theorized from
the institutional perspective (Cloutier et al., 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Strategic
responses to institutional pressures can be powerful mechanisms of institutional maintenance. In
the next section, response strategies leading to institutional change will be further discussed.
Institutional Change
The literature review has progressed from an overview of institutional theory to a
description of the institutional pressures that manifest in the policy arena. Public policy mandates
generate tensions, which cause institutional disruption. Conflict is even higher in cases of
institutional pluralism, where sectoral actors draw on divergent institutional logics (Besharov &
Smith, 2014; Chazdon, 1996; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991). These actors may attempt to avoid
institutional change through institutional maintenance strategies of institutional work as
described in the previous section. Alternatively, they may compromise, adapt, and adopt new
constructions, leading to change in institutions through institutional work. A large body of
institutional work literature on institutional change has emerged since the perspective was first
formalized by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006).
For example, in their review of the role of professionals in institutional change, Suddaby
and Viale (2011) describe the critical, yet sometimes invisible role of professionals in
institutional work. Based on a review of previous research, the authors observed four primary
mechanisms of institutional change, including: (a) the elevation of professionals’ expertise and
legitimacy to challenge existing institutions; (b) employ of their social capital to bring in actors
that better fit newly defined identities; (c) introducing new rules and standards; and (d)
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reproducing social capital within the field to change notions of who gains social status and the
social order (Suddaby & Viale, 2011).
In a study that examined one industry in particular and processes of institutional change,
Gawer and Phillips (2013) analyzed the case of Intel corporation through a comprehensive case
study and observed how it had transformed from a supply chain logic to a platform logic. They
identified various forms of internal and external work, including practice work, legitimacy work,
and identity work, during the shift in logics.
In fact, one of Oliver’s (1991) conflict responses strategies, compromise, could be
theorized as institutional change (in addition to institutional maintenance, which most closely
aligns with her framing, although her article predated the institutional work framework). Oliver
argued that when organizations are faced with conflicting institutional demands or demand
inconsistencies (for example, regulatory pressures versus work or production efficiencies), they
may attempt to balance or negotiate these demands. Balancing involves attempts to
accommodate divergent stakeholder demands in the face of multiple institutional pressures.
Organizations may find that their situational outcome (and organizational survival) is better if
they compromise on competing demands. While Oliver (1991) conceived of compromise as a
strategy of institutional maintenance (giving in a little, in order to mostly maintain the status
quo), here it is theorized as contributing to institutional change, because over time, these
compromises become more embedded, and thus new norms and practices replace the old.
As intersectoral actors work together and interact (in both harmonious partnerships and
through more conflictual mandates) norms and values may seep across field boundaries,
producing hybrid logics. While new normative structures may emerge, former logics exert
powerful maintenance forces, thus new logics are blended with the previous (Cloutier et al.,
89

2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Rojas, 2010). As novel normative associations emerge,
practices are reformulated between accepted norms of behavior and their moral and cultural
foundations, for example applying private-sector approaches to a non-profit field in social
business, or in the case of community reinvestment, addressing the implementation of public
sector goals within private sector activities (Knutsen, 2012; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006).
Through institutional work, institutional logics may hybridize, or they may be displaced.
Knutsen (2012) found that the assumptions of public, private, and non-profit institutional logics
failed to reflect all non-profit organizations’ behavior. In fact, institutional logics that may have
been more innate to nonprofits often shifted to external institutional logics based on resource
dependency. Thus, the non-profit organizations would adapt their institutional logics due to
competing logics and relationships with funders who held a conflicting logic (Knutsen, 2012).
Adaption or displacement is on a continuum with hybridization of institutional logics, where it
would be difficult to draw hard boundaries across these outcomes.
In the higher education field, Rojas (2010) utilized the institutional work perspective to
illustrate how a college president reshaped the school’s structure and norms. Building on the
institutional entrepreneurship literature that predated institutional work, he explored how
institutional work both expresses and facilitates the attainment of power. Institutional work may
lead to the creation of recombinant institutional logics, as concessions are made to “rival logics
and interests” and “[a]ctors may incorporate competing belief systems that shape behaviors and
practices (i.e., institutional logics) into new policies…Simultaneously, external actors, such as
stakeholders or state authorities, may intervene in response to an expansion of power within an
organization. Recombinant institutions result as actors combine rival logics and outsiders roll
back practices deemed inappropriate within a new political and social environment” (Rojas,
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2010, p. 1264). Actors’ belief systems may be influenced by the dominant logic of the
professional field, often reflected by their colleagues and professional networks. Alternatively,
the institutional logics that are more dominant in their actions may have developed through
diverse career or life experiences that preceded the current role. Institutional work helps to
explain these power struggles, hybridized logics, and the resulting new normative orders (Rojas,
2010).
Furthermore, institutional work is a valuable lens for the policy arena. The institutional
work lens frames policy change as a result of the activities that actors engage in to affect change.
“Rather than viewing policy change as solely flowing from political decision making to
administrative implementation," the processes of implementation, and resulting misalignment,
can be viewed from an institutional work perspective (Svensson et al., 2017; p.150). Indeed,
excepting Lipsky’s (1980) literature on street-level bureaucrats and the policy implementation
literature that followed, policy change is too often framed as a linear evolution from government
strategy constructed of rational preferences, followed by aligned implementation efforts
(Svensson et al., 2017). Through a case study of Lithuanian cultural policy, Svensson et al.
(2017) found that the implementation of policy required institutional work techniques such as
benchmarking experiences from other fields of practice, the buildup of external support, and the
construction of legitimacy.
Furthermore, Canning and O’Dwyer (2016) reviewed how the accounting profession, in
this instance, in Ireland, became regulated by independent oversight bodies, marking the finale of
the profession’s decades long grasp on self-regulation. Canning and O’Dwyer employed the
institutional work lens to consider how individuals within the Irish oversight body were able to
achieve regulatory change. A key insight was the extent to which socio-political factors
91

supported the institutional work to enact regulatory reforms, enabling the shift in regulatory
logics, as constructed by institutional work. Interestingly, the authors encouraged future research
to explore how the accounting professionals (targets of the regulation), engaged in institutional
work in response to the pressures of regulatory demands. In fact, Mahon and McGowan’s (1997)
chapter on the U.S. accounting profession’s avoidance of regulatory reforms could be freshly
updated and gain additional nuance from this theoretical perspective. Canning and O’Dwyer’s
article, following much of the foundational work on institutional work and institutional logics,
points to the intriguing research direction of linking the institutional logics and institutional work
perspectives, within the regulatory arena specifically (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Ferlie et al.,
2003).
Linking Institutional Logics and Institutional Work Perspectives
The review of existing literature, including articles such as Rojas (2010) and Canning and
O’Dwyer (2016) that employed insights from both lenses, suggests that integrating the
perspectives of institutional logics and institutional work offers great promise regarding the role
of institutional actors in both institutional maintenance and change. In fact, Chazdon’s (1996)
dissertation, Contradictions of Compliance: The Ideological Work of Community Reinvestment
Officers, is notable for the similarity of research setting to the study at hand (although it was a
study of CROs within one city, as opposed to nationwide). Although Chazdon’s research
predated the more formal institutional work literature, his conceptualization of the ideological
work of CROs, as well as his findings, align with a sociological institutional work perspective.
His work was clearly embedded within institutional theory, and analyzed the social context, and
thus symbolic and material elements, which influenced CROs’ thought processes and
legitimizing work around the CRA. Drawing from Friedland and Alford’s (1991) theory of
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contradictory institutional logics, he viewed CROs as approaching their work within a banking
field where they would be navigating the conflicting logics of industry (profit and growth),
regulators (standardized procedures and rules), and community (shared identity and stability).
Chazdon’s use of “ideological work” followed Berger’s (1981) conceptualization of a
process whereby individuals legitimate their own actions and beliefs in yielding to the pressures
of external social pressures (as cited in Chazdon, 1996, p. 2). He found four primary techniques
of CROs in their ideological work, including techniques of complaint (describing the
contradictions they faced), as well as coping techniques such as avoidance, accommodation, and
cooption of the market logics. Utilizing these techniques, he categorized CROs’ roles as
community bankers, old school bankers, CRA advocates, or CRA product specialists. Ultimately,
he found that banks that created specialized CRA positions, which was rapidly becoming an
institutionally embedded and replicated best practice (especially at larger banks), were in danger
of deflecting the adoption of novel financial principles to support community development more
centrally, because they decoupled or siloed the CRA role from the mainstream work of the bank.
This often led to partnerships with community organizations, where the more difficult work of
technical assistance, such as credit counseling, could be outsourced to partners (Chazdon, 1996).
Although he did explore regulatory reactions as ideological work in the face of
contradictory pressures drawn from institutional logics, Chazdon (1996) wrote within the field of
sociology, analyzing the discourse around motive from a sociological point of view. Therefore,
he focused more on CROs’ internal thought processes around their work, as opposed to their
intra and extra-organizational institutional work strategies for policy avoidance or compromise.
Recognizing that Chazdon’s research was an insightful exploration of CROs within the
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institutional logics perspective, the public policy arena offers an exciting new direction to build
upon the strategies of institutional work of CROs in the face of conflicting institutional logics.
More recent literature has also pointed to the promise of a linked perspective. Gawer and
Phillips (2013) recounted that early work on institutional logics had focused on the broader
organizing principles of societal sectors, constituting institutional logics. Yet, more recent work
offered new insights on how these logics are both embodied and evolve over time at the field
level. Gawer and Phillips argued that institutional work offers this elaboration of how logics
change. In fact, in their recent review of the institutional theory literature, David et al. (2019)
recommended that more studies focus on the role of agency, but that doing this adequately would
likely require theorizing across the different branches of institutional theory that have emerged.
Specifically, they recommended combining the strengths of insights from the institutional logics
and institutional entrepreneurship perspectives (which institutional work is built upon), which
would develop our understanding of how field-level logics change and evolve. This would also
prevent accounts of “unbridled agency.” “In brief, studies that offer full accounts of agency
(institutional entrepreneurship and work) while at the same time accounting for institutional
context (logics and their interaction) may be best positioned to avoid the caricatures of homo
economicus and homo sociologicus” (David et al., 2019, p. 12). These analogies refer to a
tendency of academics to view individuals as either rational, self-interested and profit
maximizing actors versus habit-driven, socially constructed actors entirely shaped by their
environments. David et al. (2019) called for a nuanced integration of both, e.g., the role of
agency within institutionalized contexts, and they additionally recommended more work that
bridges the state and institutional agents, particularly where market actors work to influence
public policies.
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A blended framework recognizes both the embeddedness and power of socialized norms
and practices due to the institutional logics of bureaucratic and private sector professional fields,
as well as the acknowledgement that these logics can change over time as agents within
organizations exert influencing forces on the logics of their fields through institutional work.
These individual actors, with their own varied backgrounds and social contexts, reconcile the
institutional demands of public policy in divergent ways, and influence policy outcomes in doing
so.
The question of what contextual factors influence how professionals reconcile the
institutional demands created by public policies may be best considered via insights from both
institutional logics and institutional work. While the institutional logics perspective helps to
explain the potential of conflicting institutional demands, it is the institutional work perspective
that assists in the exploration of how policy actors respond and reconcile these demands.
Understanding actors’ institutional work strategies requires evaluation of both the material and
symbolic nature of institutional logics, including structure and practices, as well as implicit
assumptions that constitute actors’ value-systems and behavior (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Thus, the linked perspectives invite additional focus on contextual factors—such as individual
attributes, organizational context, and community influences—that impact both how actors
reference institutional logics, as well as their conflict and reconciliation strategies (Battilana &
Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier et al., 2016; Garrow
& Grusky, 2012). These linked institutional perspectives hold explanatory potential broadly
within public policy. However, cross-sector scenarios are particularly interesting to explore
given that challenges are expected to be even greater in this type of setting. Indeed, conflict in
institutional demands is found within single organizations, or within the public sector, as this
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review has shown. Thus, the scenario is likely to be further complicated when there are a
multitude of organizations that span the public and private sector.
Private sector managers who are responsible for public policy implementation are policy
actors at the intersection of public and private sector institutional logics. These logics are
embodied by individual actors within each sector, and evident in their discourse and practices
(Riaz et al., 2011). Institutional logics are composed of integrative symbolic and material
elements that influence the activities and sensemaking of sectoral actors (Thornton et al., 2012).
While the institutional logics perspective acknowledges that logics can change over time, even in
the face of institutional forces that resist change, the institutional work perspective brings
theoretical clarity to the actor-driven micro processes of institutional change that lead to hybrid
logics or displacement. As sectoral actors, who may possess deep-seated differences in their
belief systems, interact in inter-sectoral relationships (whether mandated by regulation or
voluntary cross-sector partnerships), their references to institutional logics drive their actions and
the way that they make sense of policy implementation and compliance.
Linking the two perspectives of institutional logics and institutional work is expected to
be especially insightful in studies of policy implementation. Applying these perspectives within
public policy represents an enhancement of the older street-level bureaucracy literature (Garrow
& Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000), which
also examined the role and discretion of individual actors but failed to pay attention to the crucial
role that organizational leaders play (Cloutier et al., 2016). Furthermore, an exciting research
direction involves studies that are inter-sectoral, rather than between public sector actors.
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Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies for Institutional Demands
The institutional logics and institutional work perspectives can develop our understanding
of how actors experience, manage, and reconcile institutional demands created by public policy.
External demands may conflict with the internal demands of organizations given the differing
norms and principles of dominant institutional logics across sectors. Thus, actors engage in
institutional work to reconcile these demands. Individual actors’ abilities to manage institutional
pressures and to adapt or work against them is influenced by a number of environmental
influences. This may include pre-existing structures of the organizations that they work for or
features of their communities (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996). Individuals’
responses may instead be more related to their personal attributes and backgrounds, which
influence sensemaking about the meaning of policy mandates, including whether policy is just or
not (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). The final influential article
discussed in this literature review is Cloutier et al.’s (2016) application of institutional work in
the context of health care policy reform and implementation. The theoretical framework they
developed is useful to explore the institutional work strategies of managers faced with policy
reform. It would be enhanced through the addition of the institutional logics perspective.
By the early 21st century, institutional work theorists had begun to recommend more
research on institutional work in day-to-day activities, and to call for institutional work
scholarship that would have practical relevance (Canning & O’Dwer, 2016; Dover & Lawrence,
2010; Lawrence et al., 2013). Cloutier et al. (2016) joined the institutional work dialogue,
applying the institutional work perspective first developed by Lawrence and Suddaby (2006) and
Lawrence et al. (2011), with the intention of conducting empirical public policy research that
would enhance policy implementation and offer practical application. One of the primary
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elements of institutional work is the study of individual and collective actors for their practical
skills, cultural competency, and reflexivity within their respective fields (Empson et al., 2013;
DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997; Kraatz, 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lefsrud & Meyer,
2012; Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010; Suddaby & Viale, 2011). In
this vein, Cloutier et al. (2016) identified institutional categories of work to clarify senior
managerial roles in policy implementation within their organizations.
Cloutier et al. (2016) focused on the day-to-day experiences and challenges of public
sector managers implementing policy reforms. The authors conducted a multi-year, longitudinal
case study of managers in Canadian health care organizations responsible for implementing
policy reforms. This setting allowed them to explore the sociohistorical entrenchment of work
practices and roles, and the challenges that reform creates within these embedded institutional
contexts. Challenges arose due to a lack of conformity in interests and values of various
stakeholders of policy reform.
Specifically, Cloutier et al., (2016) asked how managers responsible for health care
organizations defined and carried out their roles to operationalize government reforms. Actors
were seen as “embedded agents” whose activities were crucial in shaping reforms and driving
policy implementation internally, where policies were at times unclear and lacked legitimacy
among stakeholders (Cloutier et al, 2016, p.262). These professionals had to manage,
manipulate, and adapt to policy reform, which is often ambiguous and contradictory. The authors
found that managerial work often diverges from the original intent of policy—despite significant
effort—affecting the scope of reform implemented. This is not only due to ambiguity of the
mandate, but also due to contradictions with existing institutional norms. Cloutier et al. found
that the managers’ responses to policy pressures were affected by the institutional arena and the
98

dominant norms and practices that constituted meaning. This can also be described as the
institutional logic of the field, though this nomenclature was not used by the authors. The
managers in the study affected institutional change in the course of their jobs through
institutional work.
To enhance explanatory power after review of their data, Cloutier et al. (2016) developed
a framework categorizing modes of institutional work to better understand managerial roles in
policy implementation. After 136 interviews with managers and CEOs in the health agencies, as
well as with regulatory agencies and partners, Cloutier et al. (2016) developed a theoretical
model of institutional work that proposed that managers engage in four kinds of institutional
work as they attempt to enact, adapt, and at times, appropriate public sector reforms. The four
primary categories of institutional work include structural, conceptual, operational, and relational
work strategies. Each has distinct elements and entails difficult and time-consuming work.
Understanding managers’ activities clarifies how implementation will proceed and what actions
contribute to policy slippage. These four types of institutional work categories will be described
in the following sections.
Structural Work
Structural work refers to managers’ efforts to create the material practices, roles, job
responsibilities, and resource allocations that enable adherence to policy mandates. These
structures tend to precede more operational activities (Cloutier et al., 2016). This kind of work
entails creating the appropriate organizational structures for the staff who will carry out reforms,
including departmental composition and staffing charts. Prior institutional arrangements may be
embedded, making reform challenging. Managers often must act quickly to clarify how reform
will be implemented, even as they are attempting to understand the reforms themselves.
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In the case of the CRA, Kane (1993) found that managers must analyze their staff’s
strengths and weaknesses in order to implement successful community investment plans, then
organize their internal staffing structures for community development. Managers may need
additional staff or staff training to be able to adhere to new data reporting requirements or to
measure outcomes utilizing new methodologies. The banking regulators will review how bank
managers conduct their compliance training (which may be conducted internally at small banks,
or through external audits and formal third-party training at large banks), if it is current, and how
staff responsibilities are assigned, in addition to the existing written policies and procedures.
Even the level of resources dedicated to compliance will be examined (FDIC, 2017). This
implies that regulators are not just judging performance outcomes, but also the structures that
CROs instill to adhere to policy mandates.
Key literature reviewed in this chapter supports the importance of structural work in
policy implementation. For example, early literature, including Matland (1995) and Lipsky
(1980), and later Watkins-Hayes (2009) focused on the difficulty of policy implementation when
street-level bureaucrats work without enough resources, stifling workloads, and with ambiguity
regarding the intentions of policy makers and administrators. Within institutional theory, Meyer
and Rowan (1977/1991) found that job roles and even the creation of new units was likely to
reflect institutional pressures, as well as the societal context, as opposed to market strategies of
efficiency. More recent scholarship, such as Battilana and Dorado (2010), found that hiring
practices and socialization practices, which defined who became an employee of the organization
and how they were trained and onboarded, were critical to the development of novel institutional
identities. Furthermore, in line with earlier scholarship, Suddaby and Viale (2011) and Thomann
et al. (2016) reflected on the importance of introducing new rules and standards for congruence
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with institutional logics, as well as confirmed challenges with goal ambiguity in managing
appropriate organizational structures.
Conceptual Work
Conceptual work involves managerial efforts to influence the symbolic elements of
institutional logics. In conceptual work, managers will attempt to influence interpretative
schemes and norms to support regulatory mandates that they are responsible for (Cloutier et al.,
2016). While the federal regulatory agencies may provide supporting guidance, documents, or
training, managers still must understand what policy mandates or reforms mean for their
organizations and how to adhere to them, as well as communicate guidelines to staff and
stakeholders. Internal training and documentation will have to be created to clarify ambiguities,
particularly when mandates disrupt existing understandings that employees hold about their roles
and responsibilities within the organization or the primary goals of the organization (Cloutier et
al., 2016).
Regulators expect for managers to be responsive to changes in banking laws, regulations,
and market conditions (FDIC, 2017). Any guidance from federal regulators may give managers
additional clarity about what the regulations mean, but it will not guarantee policy success.
Although interagency questions and answers and other guiding documents are meant to provide
clarity on how CRA exams will be conducted, a substantial lack of understanding remains due to
the complexity of regulatory compliance, particularly in community reinvestment policy.
Ultimately, the success of conceptual work is expected to be influenced by the
institutional environment (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Cloutier et al., 2016; Dimaggio &
Powell, 1983; Garrow & Grusky, 2012). This may include features of the organization, such as
leadership commitment and organizational culture supporting the policy mandates (Cloutier et
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al., 2016; Dimaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Fligstein, 1997; Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al.,
2011; Rojas, 2010). It may be affected by features of the community, such as local factors that
may have led the organization to be more community-oriented prior to policy mandates
(Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier et al., 2016). Or, it may be affected
by individual attributes and backgrounds of managers, which affect their sensemaking of policy
mandates, whether policies are right or wrong, and whether policies are in line with their sense of
their roles and responsibilities and the primary objective of their organizations (BridwellMitchell & Sherer, 2017; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
Where managers accept policy mandates as worthwhile and just, conceptual work is
expected to be managed more effortlessly. Managers may even be involved in driving external
policy change as part of their professional networks. CROs may believe that responsible lending
to lower income areas is not just a regulatory mandate, but that it makes “good business sense” in
a competitive market (Chazdon, 1996; Gardineer, 2016, p. 3; Kane, 1993). Kane (1993) argued
that community investment is a market and should be approached with a profit motive. What’s
more, expecting a profit out of community investment is likely to predict performance in the
market. If CROs conceptually believe that their work on behalf of public sector mandates is
actually contributing to business success and profit, their work may feel more aligned with the
dominant market logic of the banking sector.
Operational Work
Operational work consists of managers’ concrete efforts to implement daily practices and
operative policies for their organizations and particularly for frontline team members whose
work contributes to policy compliance (Cloutier et al., 2016). Operational work differs from
structural work. While both involve the more structural elements of institutional work,
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operational work entails specific initiatives or on-the-ground programs. Initiatives may be
disjointed without corresponding success of other types of institutional work given the
synergistic effects each has on the others. Operational work is also contentious in that
operationalizing policy involves negotiating with many stakeholders, who may not be supportive
of policy mandates. Operational work has budgetary or investment implications as well, which
may lead to resource struggles, which is especially crucial in the private sector where a marketdriven institutional logic is likely to be dominant. Entrenched interests may better fit older
institutionalized rules. Thus, operational work confronts powerful actors and entrenched power
hierarchies where institutional demands conflict with existing practices (Cloutier et al., 2016).
Managers may attempt to influence policies to their advantage so that their operational
work can be more successful (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Mahon &
McGowan, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Stone, 2012). For example, in the community reinvestment field,
CROs have the opportunity to influence policy reform through interagency public hearings and
requests for public comment on proposed regulatory changes (Federal Reserve, 2010). In recent
years, CROs have increasingly advocated for greater predictability in CRA examinations, more
precision around exam ratings, streamlined data collection mechanisms, and enhanced
consistency across regulatory agencies and examiners (Willis, 2009; Perlmeter, 2017). They have
also advocated that published lists of CRA-qualified activities would support these goals
(Perlmeter, 2017). With more clarity on which programs and initiatives will qualify for CRA
credit, managers could be clear which programs they should implement. This lobbying reflects
responses to the institutional pressures of policy compliance, and points to reforms that would
bring clarity to CROs’ operational work.
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Relational Work
Relational work plays a central and integrative role, underpinning other types of
institutional work (Cloutier et al., 2016). This type of work entails collaboration and trustbuilding and it requires strong interpersonal skills to forge coalitions around policy compliance.
“Although new structures, concepts, and operational projects could be developed on paper,
defined in offices and presented in PowerPoint presentations, without relationship work, they
[are] unlikely to penetrate very far” (Cloutier et al., 2016, p.269). Policy implementation and
compliance requires managers to interpret regulations (conceptual work), develop structures,
strategies, and initiatives to adhere to them (structural and operational work), and build trust and
support from the team members responsible for carrying out day-to-day tasks (relational work).
But without the latter, initiatives are likely to fall flat. Ideally, this means that managers must
create shared understandings around the policies, enabling the other types of work to take place
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
As depicted in Figure 2, reproduced from Cloutier et al. (2016), their model proposed
that managers engage in all four types of work as they attempt to implement and shape public
policies. While it is useful to separate them as an analytic exercise, the figure illustrates how
each type of work is connected and reinforcing, and where “ambiguity, pluralism, and
contradiction” influence policy outcomes (Cloutier et al., 2016, p. 266).
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Figure 2

Forms of Institutional Work in Policy Implementation
Note: Reprinted from “Agency at the Managerial Interface: Public Sector Reform
as Institutional Work,” by C. Cloutier et al., 2016, Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 26(2), p. 265. Reprinted by permission of
Oxford University Press.

In the case of CRA compliance, if CROs have a clear vision of how to manage
institutional demands created by the policy, they will be better prepared to engage their teams in
policy compliance. Thus, relational work is interwoven with conceptual work. Although
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compliance will be evaluated in line with the bank’s products, services, and market context,
regulators will fully expect that the board of directors and leadership of the bank are aware of
and effectively manage community reinvestment compliance, and that they model a
“commitment…to compliance” (FDIC, 2017, p. II 1.3); this requires a well-integrated and
embedded team effort. At CRA & Fair Lending Colloquiums, participants have shared that it is
vital to make the CRA part of the institutional culture for the whole team—creating a “culture of
compliance”—rather than just another regulation; furthermore, adherence to the CRA and
widespread institutional “buy-in” is a business strategy and should be considered in all business
lines, not just the community development division (Wolters Kluwer, 2016). Under a compliance
culture, CRA and fair lending managers have “a seat at the table” more centrally, and they will
have visible roles in their organizations to ensure executives are aware of strategies to
successfully manage CRA policy requirements.
Summary
Cloutier et al. (2016)’s research findings point to the need for further studies, such as this
dissertation, on the institutional work of senior managers, particularly during windows of policy
reform. Given that policy reforms tend to have poor implementation outcomes, the authors
recommended that academics could offer policy makers a more nuanced understanding of how
managers carry out their work, their daily challenges in implementing policy reforms, and what
they can accomplish. More informed policy formulation can critically influence policy outcomes
on the ground (Cloutier et al., 2016).
Although the empirical research carried out by Cloutier et al. (2016) made a significant
contribution to the institutional work literature, it has limitations that also point to opportunity
for new insights given the research setting of this dissertation. First, the context for their study
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was government-led public policy reforms that were implemented within public service agencies,
as health care is nationalized in Canada. What new insights would emerge if the study were of
private sector managers implementing public policies? Both cases entail public service-focused
and government-led policies implemented by senior managers of organizations, but the latter
introduces a new challenge for managers, the conflict of institutional logics across the publicprivate sector divide. Though undoubtedly policy implementation is challenging within the
singular sector of the public realm, this between-sector scenario introduces a new set of tensions
and potential conflict in priorities to reconcile (David et al., 2019; Ferlie et al., 2003).
This new research direction presents an exciting opportunity to expand traditional foci of
institutional theory to the regulatory policy environment of the private sector, and to update the
street-level bureaucracy literature (Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011;
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Many years ago, Selznick (1996) pointed out that the
foundations of institutional theory are rooted in the study of bureaucracy and how bureaucrats
can carry out their duties in more effective and responsive ways. “After many years of research,
and much earnest theorizing, the ideal of an effective, fair, and responsive bureaucracy remains
elusive. Our society desperately needs organized ways of dealing with social problems; we
cannot rely solely on market strategies” (Selznick, 1996). Exploring the interplay of hybrid
bureaucratic and market strategies in addressing these social problems is an area of institutional
theory that needs to be more deeply explored at present.
Furthermore, introducing the theoretical lens of institutional logics into Cloutier et al.’s
(2016) study would have added clarity to the mechanisms through which norms of the health
care managers clashed with norms of the policy regulators, as well as insights regarding how
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institutional work can result in the face of conflicting logics, leading to new hybridized logics.
An understanding of both institutional work and institutional logics would be fruitful.
This literature review has shown evidence of conflicting institutional demands that were
explored across a variety of fields of literature, as well as numerous professional fields and
policy contexts. The review has also attempted to illustrate how the application of either
institutional logics or institutional work perspectives to the more singular theoretical frameworks
of many of the studies would have added explanatory power through a linkage of both
perspectives. Existing literature in public policy has not yet explored the conflict in institutional
demands created by the CRA for CROs, the managers who are responsible for policy
compliance. Both the community development banking sector and the theoretical development
for institutional perspectives offer an exciting avenue for research discovery.
In the community reinvestment field, the interplay of market, bureaucratic, and
development logics reflected at the micro-level, influences discourse, practices, and structures of
the macro-field. From the thought leadership originating in professional networks, to the
strategies CROs implement to respond to policy mandates, the reforms pushed by public and
private actors, and the structures of bank departments that enact community reinvestment
programs, the entire enterprise around CRA is constituted by the actors involved. This includes
all of the actors in the organizational field, including the regulators, the regulated and the sectoral
actors they interact with, and the communities who are affected by policy activities. For CROs in
the course of CRA policy compliance and reconciliation of conflicting demands of regulators
and their employers, it is through the social interactions and actions of these actors over time—
their institutional work—that institutional logics are created, disrupted and changed (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011). Existing literature suggests that there is the potential for
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enhanced explanatory power by linking the institutional logics and institutional work
perspectives (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999;
Thornton et al., 2012). This combined approach, as well as the perspectives’ application within
the community development policy field, is expected to expand our understanding of the effects
of conflicting institutional demands. Furthermore, it will point to the determinants of success in
public policy compliance. It is to this exciting research direction for empirical exploration that
we now turn.
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Chapter Four: Research Design
Introduction
This chapter describes the research design, the blueprint, for this dissertation in depth. It
begins with an overview of the methodology, including the motivation for the study, as well as
the theoretical orientation that framed the approach to the research questions. It then moves into
the tools and techniques used to address these questions—the research procedures—including
data collection, data analysis, and operationalization of the research constructs. Substantive detail
is included to ensure that the research design of the study is credible, transparent, and may
inform future research.
Methodology
Overview of Methodology
The purpose of this study was to understand first (research question one or “R1”), if the
combination of two institutional theories, institutional logics and institutional work, could inform
our understanding of the experience of conflicting institutional demands created by the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) for bank managers responsible for CRA policy
mandates—CRA officers (CROs). Second, the empirical research in this project was intended to
develop our understanding (research question two or “R2”) of the microprocesses through which
CROs reconcile the institutional demands created by the CRA. R2 asks how institutional logics
are related to these reactions and explores the contextual factors of bank features, communities,
and individual attributes and backgrounds of the CROs. Institutional logics are constituted and
transformed by the actors in the fields where CROs interact, where CROs bring their personal
and work experiences to the field and influence discourses of bank leadership, colleagues, and
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professional networks. These processes of actor-driven institutional change are understood as
institutional work.
Throughout the research, the intent was not to test the theories, but rather to further
contribute to their development in concert with each other. This was done by focusing on a
specific research setting, but the approach can be reproduced in other settings during future
research studies. The research employs theoretical principles from both the institutional logics
and institutional work literatures, responding to calls in the literature to explore theoretical
questions utilizing learnings from each (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012).
The first stage of research, which centered on R1, was intended to initially address the
appropriateness of the theoretical framework for illuminating the institutional demands of the
CRA and how CROs experience them, before conducting primary research. A blended
theoretical framework was expected to contribute to our understanding of the institutional
pressures bankers face and conflict response strategies they employ as they operate between
multiple field-level institutional logics. They are at once policy actors responsible for carrying
out regulatory mandates, business managers who answer to leadership demands to remain
profitable and avoid negative publicity, and community members who respond to community
pressures to act responsibly. A better understanding of conflicting institutional logics is expected
to provide explanatory power regarding how CROs experience, manage, and react to multiple
levels of institutional demands, articulated as conflict response strategies.
After the initial data suggested that the framework enhanced explanatory power for the
research setting, the empirical study was carried out in response to R2. Institutional logics are
evident in contextual factors and CROs’ adaptation strategies, including the dominant material
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(structure and practices) components of CROs’ authority and job responsibilities within the firm
and in their communities. Additionally, CROs’ individual attributes and backgrounds, as well as
the influence of their peers and professional fields, is reflected in the sensemaking of their
roles—the symbolic elements of institutional logics. It was these environmental elements and
variables that lead a CRO to be better or worse at adapting to conflicting logics that R2 sought to
understand.
Institutions are maintained or change over time as actors exert influencing pressures on
institutional fields and associated logics, through these agents’ day-to-day actions and discourse,
their institutional work. Accordingly, institutional fields have the potential to hybridize over time
as sector-based actors (with varying sectoral backgrounds themselves) work together and exert
influencing pressures on their respective fields through their actions and discourse. The
dimensions of institutional work studied here include structural and conceptual work (associated
with features of banks and organizational culture), operational work (associated with
communities) and relational work (associated with CROs’ individual attributes and backgrounds)
(Cloutier et al., 2016). The next section explains the methodological choice of a qualitative
research design for this study.
Epistemology and the Qualitative Paradigm
Researchers’ ontological and epistemological orientations are embedded in and underpin
their theoretical approaches and research methodologies (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). This
orientation undergirds all of the choices made in a research design. This dissertation approached
the research questions from an interpretivist epistemological orientation and from the qualitative
research paradigm, recognizing that institutions do not exist independently of the lived
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experiences of actors affected by them, and who also influence institutional change through their
agency (Marsh & Furlong, 2002).
Typically, an interpretivist employs qualitative methods to study the social constructions
of institutions, to uncover how these constructions form, morph, and yet exert influence over
time (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Social construction questions the idea that knowledge could be
produced to reflect an objective reality of the social world. Rather, what we know of the social
world, as well as ourselves, is constructed or produced through various discourses and systems of
meanings. The social world is understood within specific social and cultural contexts (Braun &
Clarke, 2013).
Qualitative methodology refers to both this wider framework or paradigm for a research
study, as well as to qualitative research techniques, including both data collection and data
analysis, that may be employed by a qualitative study (Braun & Clarke, 2013). A qualitative
study does not convert qualitative data into numerical representation (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
This study uses strictly qualitative methods for both collection and analysis.
It also recognizes that research is essentially a subjective process. Researchers bring their
own “histories, values, assumptions, perspectives, politics and mannerisms into the research—
and we cannot leave those at the door” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 36). It is not problematic in
itself that this subjectivity exists. It would be more of a concern to not recognize it. Researchers
can appropriately consider subjectivity by being reflexive, which refers to a process through
which we reflect on both knowledge production and the researcher’s role in the process (Braun
& Clarke, 2013). What we find interesting to research, the ways in which we ask questions about
these topics, and the aspects of our data analysis that we find intriguing and interesting reflect
our subjectivity as researchers.
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Knowledge produced is therefore going to reflect the social context from which the
researcher writes. This is no different for the participants in the research, who also bring their
own experiences and perspectives. In qualitative research paradigms, our human perspectives
become research tools in themselves through our explorations of and participation in the
discourse of our research. We can also be attentive to functional reflexivity, or how the choice of
tools influences the research (Braun & Clarke, 2013). For example, this involves attention in data
collection processes, such as how the dialogue in a focus group may develop differently than a
semi-structured one-on-one interview where the researcher is the only discussant other than the
participant.
This discussion has supported the choice of a qualitative methodology to address the
research questions in this study. Additional detail on this research design and the methods used
for this study will be covered in more detail in what follows. The next section will overview the
specific qualitative research procedures that were employed in this dissertation.
Research Procedures
Overview of Research Design
The purpose of this research study was to use principles from institutional logics and
institutional work to further develop our understanding of the ways in which private sector
managers attempt to reconcile public policy goals with the goals of their firms. The nonexperimental, qualitative research design here utilized the case study approach and the
application of institutional theory to explore the research questions. The case focused on a
particular profession and the public policies these employees are mandated to follow, specifically
CROs and the institutional demands of the CRA. The population of study was all CROs at
regulated U.S. depository institutions (banks), including a range of asset sizes and regulators.
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The unit of analysis was the CRO. The empirical research was conducted after thorough review
of the relevant literature, as well as after initial analysis on secondary data. This initial data lent
evidence that the theoretical framework held promise and that gathering primary data could offer
additional explanatory insights.
The research design was not intended to illustrate causation or to test theory. Rather, the
focus was on theoretical development and deepening our understanding of the day-to-day
experiences of institutional logics and institutional work strategies (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016;
Lawrence et al., 2013). Thus, the study design took a cross-sectional vantage point, rather than
analyzing changes over time (Shanahan et al., 2018).
“How” and “in what way” questions, such as those explored in this study, typically lend
themselves to qualitative research procedures, as relatively open-ended, rich and nuanced
explanation is sought to describe the manner in which behaviors play out (Berg, 2007). The first
research question, which explored institutional pressures and conflict response strategies, was
addressed through an analysis of publicly available letters written from bankers to the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) after a September 2018 Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR). It asks, to what extent can the theoretical lens of institutional logics linked
with institutional work explain the potential for conflicting institutional demands created by the
CRA for regulated banks and the conflict response strategies of managers responsible for policy
mandates?
The second research question focused on contextual influences and reconciliation of
institutional demands, and it was examined by conducting primary qualitative research,
specifically interviews with CROs. The question asks: how do private sector managers,
specifically CROs, reconcile the institutional demands of a particular public policy, the CRA?
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And in what way do these reactions and actors’ references to institutional logics relate to their
own backgrounds, their organizations, and their communities? Interviews, as a research method,
have the ability to provide rich data to understand research subjects’ experiences and the
meanings they draw from them (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). The empirical evidence, twenty-four
qualitative interviews, was gathered from June through September 2021.
Case Study Method
These research questions were addressed via the case study method, which is an approach
to systematically examine events or phenomenon with the intent to describe and explain, thus
contributing to theory development, but not typically theory testing (Berg, 2007). This was a
good fit given the emergent nature of the theoretical framework guiding this work, as well as the
lack of policy literature exploring private sector managers’ implementation of public policies via
this lens.
Many qualitative researchers use the case study approach because by focusing on a single
phenomenon, the researcher can develop a deeper understanding and rich information about the
many contributing factors and characteristics that might be overlooked in more quantitative
studies. It should be noted that the case study method is often specific in focus and conceived of
as an in-depth examination of one person, group, or event (Berg, 2007). However, some
researchers effectively argue that the case study approach can examine a broad view of society,
capturing many unique nuances and patterns that other research approaches overlook, and
enabling the study of complex phenomenon (Berg, 2007). Here, the case study is not of a single
bank or CRO (a person), but rather looks at the community reinvestment profession as a whole
across regulated banks of all sizes in the United States.
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Yin (2003) contended that theory development prior to the collection of case study data is
important. Thus, although studying the community reinvestment field was of interest for a
dissertation in community development policy, institutional theory was thoroughly surveyed in
the existing literature prior to arrival at the research questions and the selection of the case study.
This is because (1) theory was utilized to select the appropriate case to be studied, and (2) theory
informed what would be explored in the case study and the appropriate research design. The a
priori research model supports generalizations the researcher draws with regards to other cases
that may be worthy of review against the same theoretical lens (Yin, 2003). In brief, the goal was
to further develop and understand the utility of two linked theories through the case study, and to
more richly understand the case via this perspective.
Case Selection
The intent of the research, the central guidepost for how the case study was selected, was
to deepen our understanding of the influencing effects of institutional logics on policy
interpretations, and how those logics both form and change through institutional work. The case
in this dissertation was selected for three primary reasons. First, following Yin’s (2003)
recommendation that theory drive case selection, this study offers to expand our understanding
of institutional work when conflicting institutional logics must be reconciled. CROs are
responsible for policy compliance at the intersection of the private and public sector, given the
highly regulated nature of their work. Regulatory agents, expected to most dominantly reflect a
bureaucratic logic, are charged with assessing the community development performance of banks
through periodic examinations typically managed by the CRO. Yet CROs have a dual
responsibility to the bank as a profit-maximizing organization operating under a capitalist market
logic. In this context, CROs may face internal opposition against potentially less profitable low117

to-moderate income lending and community development investments and are at the same time
under scrutiny from their regulatory agencies, as well as their communities.
Second, the CRA, originally enacted in 1977, has undergone multiple iterations of
regulatory policy reform. An active window of regulatory reform commenced in 2018 when the
OCC launched a request for public comment on proposed reforms. The reforms were still
undefined in 2021 when the empirical data for this study was collected, and by 2022 the
regulatory agencies had issued a new joint proposal to modernize and strengthen the CRA and
again asked for public comment (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2022).
As the financial industry changes, the regulatory policies for banks subject to the CRA
have also shifted, driven by the actions of civil society actors such as fair lending and housing
advocates, regulators, and the bankers themselves. Because policy reform aims to alter rules and
practices, reform efforts are attempts at “deliberate institutional change” (Cloutier et al., 2016,
p.261; Smith, 1973). Thus, this case offered the opportunity to assess the explanatory power of
the lens of institutional work at the intersection of conflicting institutional logics, and the postempirical analysis contributes to the scholarly literature on institutional theory.
Third, the banking sector is one of the few private industries in the U.S. that is directly
mandated to invest in communities and then monitored by federal regulatory agencies for its
outcomes, making the sector particularly intriguing for community development policy,
especially policy aimed at supporting low-to-moderate income (LMI) individuals in the United
States. Additionally, the banking sector holds significant financial resources. This makes the
CRA potentially highly influential on community development outcomes if it meets policy goals
of revitalizing U.S. communities through capital access.
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Data Collection
This was a study of the institutional work and institutional logics referenced by private
sector managers attempting to implement federal mandates. Thus, the level of analysis for the
research and data collection was primarily micro-level and was focused on actions and discourse
of the unit of analysis—CROs—operating within their organizations and the macro community
reinvestment field. However, because the focus was on actors’ agency, their responses to federal
regulatory agencies, and institutional field logics (micro, meso, and macro), the dissertation
examines the linkages between levels of analysis, which is a “ripe area of research” (Shanahan et
al., 2018).
In order to collect empirical data about CRO bank managers appropriate for the research
questions, the data collection involved two stages, including a set of bankers’ letters written to
the OCC advocating regulatory policy revisions, followed by interviews with a select set of the
bankers who wrote these letters. The first sample was of all bankers who commented on CRA
modernization to the OCC over a distinct period of time, and the second sample was a smaller
subset of those bankers. Specifically, the large “N” letters from the first dataset were used to
create a purposive sample to conduct interviews (Greene et al., 1989). This is a non-probability
sampling method.
Although labeled simply Community Reinvestment Act Officer, or “CRO,” in this
research project, a CRO’s specific title and role within each bank varies widely (seniority in the
bank and job duties were both considered during data analysis). Some CROs were titled “CRA
Officer” directly or a similar title such as “SVP/VP, Community Development,” while others
were in broader managerial roles, typically in compliance. Large banks are more likely to have
dedicated managers for CRA or even entire divisions for community development, while smaller
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banks often have to rely on one manager for compliance to CRA as well as other banking
regulations. It was expected that this role within the organization would affect bankers’
references to institutional logics.
The bankers who wrote letters during the OCC’s call for reform were an appropriate
sampling pool of the population for the case study, all CROs, because they represented a wide
variety of CROs from banks of all sizes, across the U.S., and reporting to various regulatory
bodies. Some of the largest banks in the world were represented, as were many small community
banks. The characteristics of the pool will be described further in this chapter. However, it
should be noted that CROs represented in the sample could potentially possess stronger opinions
about the CRA than the general population of CROs, whether positive or negative, because they
took the time and effort to compose letters to the OCC and express their perspectives on the
direction of reform efforts. There could be some elements of these extremes in any sampling
strategy that requires time and effort to respond, however.
Furthermore, while it is valuable to be cognizant of this, the sampling strategy enabled
access directly to CROs whose perspectives were appropriate to the theoretical underpinnings of
the research design. Three key points compose this argument. The CROs who were motivated
and informed enough to submit letters were: (1) most likely the key responsible party for CRA
within their organizations, which was important to identify the manager who would be a policy
intermediary; (2) leaders within their profession who are knowledgeable about CRA; and (3)
they were likely more actively seeking CRA reform since they opted to comment on the reform
efforts, which is evidence of intentional institutional work (Cloutier et al., 2016).
There were several reasons for conducting two stages of data collection. The primary
reason was to first explore the appropriateness of the theoretical framework, a linkage between
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institutional logics and institutional work, prior to conducting data collection for R2. The second
research question was expected to require a much larger empirical research effort, and it needed
to be appropriately informed by the analysis of the first research. Improved research validity and
a richer understanding of CROs was expected through data triangulation, the use of two different
data collection strategies to answer two distinct, but intertwined research questions (Berg, 2007).
Each set of data lent itself to different data gathering techniques and introduced diverse
knowledge.
In stage one data collection, documents were compiled to address the first research
question. The database of letters to the OCC offered a glimpse of institutional work in the form
of direct communication for the purpose of reform efforts (though it is not bi-directional)
between actors at the intersection of the market and bureaucratic institutional logics, as bankers’
letters were directed to the regulators.
In stage two, to address the second research question, the collection of empirical
interview data allowed deeper exploration of institutional logics through questions to CROs
designed to more directly understand how CROs describe their experiences with the institutional
demands created by the CRA. It also allowed direct inquiry about contextual factors, such as
their individual backgrounds, role structures within their organizations, and their interactions
with their communities. Furthermore, interview questions drew out information to connect these
actor-level experiences of adaptation with their interpretations of policy mandates and references
to institutional logics. The first dataset provided very little visibility to the day-to-day
experiences of CROs in managing CRA, to their bank structures, or to CROs’ backgrounds, and
thus was not well-suited to address the second research question.
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In addition to informing different, yet iterative, research questions, two stages of data
collection enabled a feasible sampling and contact strategy within the project scope. The CROs
who submitted letters were not only an appropriate sampling pool, but the database of letters also
offered a method for directly contacting a smaller-N purposive sample of CROs for interviews,
as contact information was submitted with many of the letters. Obtaining contact information for
CROs would otherwise have presented a particular challenge for the research, as CROs’ working
titles vary widely (and sometimes bankers are responsible for CRA within broader job duties
such as compliance) and contact information is challenging to find on banks’ websites or
elsewhere online. Additionally, previous researchers studying CRA officers have had difficulty
matching the names of banks in the CRA examination online database with the public name
(Perlmeter, 2017).
Data to Examine: Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies
The data used to explore R1 was textual data, or data produced in written form (Braun &
Clarke, 2013). Secondary data is the use of written words that already exist; the researcher does
not play a role in the production of the data.9 Secondary data offered advantages, including
access to perspectives without the challenge of shaping responses through more researcherengaged data collection methods, including interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2013). R1 did not
engage with the social context of the individuals in the sample. Rather, the intent was to observe
how these individuals communicated, through written discourse, with the regulators.
The first data set, documents submitted through the OCC’s portal for Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) feedback, consists of 358 secondary documents collected to
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Secondary data may include documents, online forums, or transcripts of television programs, to name a few
examples (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
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initially respond to R1, specifically CROs’ letters and comments submitted to the OCC between
September 6, 2018 and January 9, 2019.10 These documents were publicly available online via
individual download; however, the agency was directly contacted to obtain a zip file.11
The full docket obtained from the OCC contains 1,487 letters and comments from
bankers, non-bank financial institutions or other businesses, private citizens, and civil society
members. Submitters could post their name, email, phone, address, and organization name, but
some elected to submit anonymously. Comments ranged from single lines to formal multi-page
letters. About a fourth of the submissions were reasonably determined to be written by CROs,
either via the title of the submitter or the content of the letter.12
The OCC regulates about a fifth of all banks in the U.S., but the ANPR had implications
for the entire banking industry because the OCC was a first mover in 21st century modernization
of the CRA. The other regulatory agencies publicly stated that they would observe the OCC’s
efforts and consider collaboration in final joint rulemaking (Sullivan, 2018). Perhaps because the
OCC was the only agency that had asked for comment regarding modernization at the time—and
had cited collaborating with the other regulators—the comments that were submitted came from
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On September 5, 2018, the OCC issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) entitled
“Reforming the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory Framework.” The ANPR outlined the agency’s principles
for modernizing the CRA and asked 31 specific questions for the public to provide feedback on (OCC, 2018).
11
All of the public letters and comments were available on the federal government’s regulations.gov website by
searching for Docket ID OCC-2018-0008. Each submission was available to review and download. However, it
proved to be a labor-intensive process to download the letters individually (particularly since identification of the
bankers’ letters was difficult via meta details alone, and each letter had to be skimmed to determine if it would be
included in the data set). Initially, the general help desk number on regulations.gov was contacted, who suggested to
contact the OCC directly. Therefore, the agency contact listed on the docket (counsel at the Chief Counsel’s Office
for the OCC) was contacted. The counsel was able to identify a program specialist who emailed a zip file with all of
the documents in the docket.
12
One of the researcher’s initial assumptions was that any banker who submitted a letter had an intimate knowledge
of or interest in the CRA. After becoming familiar with the dataset, review of the majority of the bankers’ letters
confirmed that the letters were likely written by CROs. This assumption was validated further through the interviews
in stage two, as many of the authors of the letters were contacted for interview, and it was confirmed during this
process that they were, in fact, CROs for their banks.
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a wide range of bankers whose organizations are regulated by all three regulatory agencies.
Reviewing feedback from a subset of banks regulated by each of the three regulatory agencies
was important to ensure that the study would have relevance across each agency.
A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet with meta details about each of the submissions was also
exported from the regulations.gov site.13 This file was used to assess the types of documents
submitted, and which ones were from CROs. However, there was limited ability to infer the type
of submission using the meta details, unless “bank” was in the organization name, and at times
submissions were anonymous. Thus, in combination with reviewing the details, the documents
themselves were skimmed in order to categorize submissions. This process also aided in
familiarity with the data. All submissions that were identified as being written by bankers were
tagged for inclusion in the first data set.14 These initial data collection efforts resulted in both an
Excel index with key details and document ID numbers, and the corresponding 358 documents,
which comprised the ANPR feedback data set. Letters were stored with their document ID
number as the title and uploaded to NVivo.

13

The meta details provided in the download included: document ID, title, first name, middle name, last name,
organization name, submitter’s representative, email address, phone number, mailing address, city, state, country,
zip, date posted, tracking number, and submission type.
14
A variety of non-bank submission types were excluded from the data set for analysis, including non-bank financial
institutions (such as non-bank CDFIs), community development corporations and coalitions, government entities,
trade associations, non-profit organizations, academics or researchers, regulators, small to medium business
enterprises, non-affiliated private citizens, duplicates, submissions in the incorrect docket, and submissions that were
unidentifiable.
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Data to Examine: Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies to Meet Institutional
Demands
Data Selection
In order to develop a second primary data set of interviews, a purposive and stratified
sample of 50 CROs who submitted contact information was identified from the first data set for
the initial outreach list. There are no set rules for sample size in qualitative research, but it should
be credible. A final sample of 15 to 30 individual interviews is common in research that aims to
identify patterns across qualitative data (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p.55). Sample size is also
affected by the purpose of a study and what it intends to explore (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The
concept of saturation, or the point at which additional data yields no further insights, is the
accepted standard to determine sample sizes, however, the point of saturation is not something
that can be pre-determined (Namey, 2017).
Morgan et al. (2002) plotted the number of new concepts identified across successive
interviews across multiple datasets. They found that almost no new concepts had been identified
after 20 interviews. Reviewing this data, Namey (2017) found that approximately 80-92% of
concepts were identified in just the first 10 interviews. Namey (2017) reported that Guest et al.
(2006) also found that 92% of themes were identified in their first 12 interviews. Additionally,
the themes that were the most common were evident early in the study, as the first 12 interviews
contained 97% of the most highly prevalent themes. These analyses lend credibility to the
approach in this study of pursuing approximately 25 interviews.
To adequately explore R2, the sample size needed to be large enough to segment
participants in a variety of ways without having too small of an N in the associated category, thus
the target number of participants was 25, which would allow smaller thematic groupings to
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emerge, such as by race, gender, generation, seniority in the bank, or bank asset size, to name a
few. A response rate of approximately 50% was expected, resulting in initial outreach to 50
CROs. A larger sample size also ensured that there would be some flexibility for the number of
interviews needed for saturation.
Purposive sampling is common in qualitative research, as it allows the researcher to focus
on the topic of interest and on participants who are expected to provide relevant data (Braun &
Clarke, 2013). Additionally, stratification of samples is a technique used to include a range of
characteristics in the data set, when they are important to the research topic and question (Braun
& Clarke, 2013). Here, the factors of importance were geographic diversity, inclusion of a range
of bank asset sizes (identified via the proxy of exam type), and representation of banks across all
three bank regulatory agencies. Although characteristics such as gender, race, seniority in the
bank and more were of interest in R2, these characteristics were not known for respondents in
the first data set, so they were not part of the sampling strategy (but they were collected for the
interview respondents later). Thus, the purposive stratified sample of 50 CROs was identified
using a multi-step process with the following three key principles in mind.
First, the researcher sought to maintain geographic diversity in the sample. The CRA is a
federal law regulated by three federal regulatory agencies. Because it applies to all FDIC-insured
banks across the United States, it was important to ensure that the widest variety possible of
geographic representation was selected to avoid a regional bias in respondents’ perspectives.
Second, the researcher sought to maintain diversity in the size of the bank. Large banks
are examined under one set of CRA examination criteria, while small and intermediate small
banks have a different set of criteria. It was important to speak with respondents representing a
variety of bank asset sizes in order to capture how reactions differ by bank size. Additionally,
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features of banks, as well as CRO role and job responsibilities, were expected to vary widely
across different sizes of banks. And finally, different size banks may attract individuals from
quite different backgrounds, which was also of interest. For example, a small bank where a VP is
responsible for CRO and other compliance regulations may be more likely to have a compliance
background, whereas a large bank with a well-resourced community development division may
attract individuals who have worked in the community development field previously. In fact,
Payton (2014), found that a bank’s asset size was the best predictor of outstanding CRA ratings.
Banks with more financial assets tend to make larger commitments to investments and lending in
LMI communities, reflected in their higher ratings. These ratings may also reflect the larger staff
size and combined expertise of team members in community development divisions at larger
banks. Being well-resourced within a division that manages CRA is expected to create less
pressure for the CRO in the role.
Finally, it was important to maintain a variety of regulatory agencies across the banks in
the sample. While Payton (2014) did not find ratings by regulator to differ significantly,
suggesting that there is no one easy grader, the various regulators conduct their own trainings
and education for regulated banks under their purview. Thus, it was expected that banks’
experiences with the regulators might vary by regulator even if average ratings do not.
The process followed to select the interview sample is described next. First, the CRA
ratings database was downloaded from the FFIEC Interagency CRA rating search database
(FFIEC, 2017). This database includes all banks regulated by the CRA in the U.S., by name and
regulator. Additionally, the database includes the regulators’ ID for the bank, asset size (in
thousands), exam method, recent CRA ratings and exam dates, total CRA qualified investment
dollars, CRA services as measured by bank locations or ATMs in LMI neighborhoods, median
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income in the assessment area, and city/state of the bank’s headquarters. Second, this ratings
database was utilized to merge details with the initial index spreadsheet of 358 bankers’ letters
from the first data set. The index was filtered to individuals who listed banks as their
organization (bankers associations and retired bankers were excluded, which narrowed the data
set to 300). Next, anonymous submitters whose bank name could not be identified were
removed.
Then, utilizing the CRA ratings database, the regulator, asset size, and exam method was
recorded for the 265 identifiable banks and their representatives. Next, the index was filtered to
the 86 individuals at banks who included contact information (emails and phone numbers) in
their submission.15 Of these 86 letters, the banks that were listed as regulated by the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) were removed (as this regulatory agency was merged with the OCC),
leaving 82 banks. The index was further refined to only include banks that are examined by one
of the three main examination types: large bank, small bank, and intermediate small bank. Eight
banks were removed that did not have an examination type recorded or had exceptional
examination types listed such as “strategic plan” or “wholesale/limited purpose.” This review of
the data narrowed the data set to 73 CROs at 73 banks located across 36 states.
Finally, to further narrow the purposive sample to 50, the index was sorted by state to
ensure geographic diversity in the sample. One to two letters were purposefully selected from
each state. Where only one or two letters had been submitted from a particular state, all
submitted letters were marked for inclusion. Where more than two letters had been submitted
from within one state, two letters were marked for inclusion with attention to the overall data

15

In hindsight, it would have saved time to filter to the 86 individuals with contact information available first, and
then record the regulator, asset size, and exam method for each submission.
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set’s variety of exam methods (indicative of asset size of the bank and the corresponding
examination level), as well as a variety of regulators.
This sample intentionally had more evenly disbursed geographic spread than the first data
set, but similar samplings of regulator and examination type. A major advantage of utilizing the
first data set to obtain the purposive sample of the second data set was that the letters contained
contact information (email and phone number) for the CROs. Ultimately, 23 individuals agreed
to be interviewed. Table 1 shows a quantitative overview of the filtering of the data set to arrive
at the initial interview sample. The final two rows show the distribution of the final cohort of 23
interview respondents across regulator, exam method, and region. In general, the distribution
remained relatively consistent between the identifiable letters and the final interview sample
enrolled. The following section will provide more detail on the recruitment and enrollment of
these study participants.
Table 1
Filtering the ANPR Feedback Data Set to Final Interview Sample
Regulator

Description
Identifi a bl e l etters (by
ba nk na me)
Letters wi th contact
i nforma tion

Exam Method

Region

Wholesal
Small Intermediate Strategic e/Limited
Bank Small Bank
Plan
Purpose

OCC

FRB

FDIC

OTS

Large
Bank

265

82

35

128

20

109

43

83

10

3

17

NA

NA

NA

NA

% of Respondents

31%

13%

48%

8%

41%

16%

31%

4%

1%

6%

NA

NA

NA

NA

86

30

8

44

4

33

23

21

1

3

5

18

31

21

16

% of Respondents

35%

9%

51%

5%

38%

27%

24%

1%

3%

6%

21%

36%

24%

19%

Total Number of
Respondents

73
Letters by pri ma ry
regul a tors /exa m types % of Respondents
Purpos i ve Sa mpl e to
50
Recrui t for Intervi ew
% of Respondents
23
Fi na l Intervi ew Sa mpl e
Enrol l ed i n Study
% of Respondents

Other

West MidWest South

NorthEast

27

7

39

0

31

22

20

0

0

0

15

26

18

14

37%

10%

53%

0%

42%

30%

27%

0%

0%

0%

21%

36%

25%

19%

20

7

23

0

22

14

14

0

0

0

13

14

14

9

40%

14%

46%

0%

44%

28%

28%

0%

0%

0%

26%

28%

28%

18%

7

5

11

0

12

2

9

0

0

0

4

5

10

4

30%

22%

48%

0%

52%

9%

39%

0%

0%

0%

17%

22%

43%

17%
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Participant Rights, Privacy and Recruitment
This section discusses actions that were taken during and following data collection for R2
to ensure participants’ rights and privacy were protected, including protocol submission with the
Institutional Review Board (IRB).16 Recruitment of interview participants is also covered. Data
to address R1 involved documents that were publicly available and thus IRB review was not
necessary. However, R2 was well-suited to be addressed through primary evidence, specifically
via interview data where additional information about the sample subjects’ backgrounds,
employers, and communities could be obtained along with exploration of their experiences with
CRA policy regulations. Because this entailed Human Subjects Research (HSR), an IRB protocol
was submitted prior to recruiting participants or commencing CRO interviews.17
A total of 23 interviews were conducted. The IRB protocol explained the target
population and recruitment process for interviewees. This population included individuals
employed by financial depository institutions (banks) in the United States who had some level of
responsibility for the implementation of the CRA. Interview participants were recruited via
introductory emails to the sample of 50 CROs, with follow-up emails when necessary if there
were no response.18 Many individuals in the initial sample were reminded one or two times about
the request to interview before an interview was scheduled while approximately half of the
sample did not respond at all. Five individuals declined to participate.

16

The University of Arkansas, where this research was carried out, is committed to the safe and ethical conduct of
research. Accordingly, it maintains an IRB Institutional Review Board (IRB) that oversees all Human Subjects
Research (HSR).
17
Expedited Approval was obtained from the IRB prior to the commencement of recruiting participants or
conducting interviews. The IRB coordinator found that the research is exempt from full board review under
Category 2 (45 CFR 46.104(d)(2)). Approval was received June 15, 2021 with Protocol number 2105335433. A
copy of the approval letter is in Appendix 1.
18
The introductory email to participants can be reviewed in Appendix 3.
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It had been anticipated that responses from CROs at large commercial banks would be a
logistical hurdle. CROs at these banks might be very senior-level managers within their
organizations and might ignore or decline a request to interview. One of the largest banks in the
sample did decline to participate. However, the final set of participants had a relatively even
balance between large banks and small or intermediate small banks in the interview sample.
Each CRO was requested to participate in a one hour Zoom call.19 If the participant
agreed to be interviewed, the Informed Consent Form document was emailed along with a
calendar invite. The form advised research participants about the study and its purpose, why they
were being asked to participate, and their rights, including their ability to withdraw at any time,
as well as how to request results of the study.20 No possible risks were identified. Before the
interview or recording commenced, the participant would be asked if he or she had any questions
concerning the form or her rights and the interviewer would verify receipt of a signed consent
form (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The demographic questionnaire was sent after the conclusion of
each interview.
An important ethical aspect of HSR is protecting privacy of interview participants.
Several steps were taken in this study to ensure confidentiality. First, interview recordings from
Zoom (stored as MP4 files), transcriptions generated by Zoom, final interview transcriptions, and
the demographic questionnaires were all stored in a secure, password protected University of
Arkansas Box folder. No hard copies of data were stored. Recordings of the interviews were

19

The interviews were estimated to take one hour and filling out the demographic questionnaire added five minutes
to the overall time estimate.
20
Other elements of the rights of the research participants were detailed in the Informed Consent Form, including
how to contact the University of Arkansas Research Compliance Office and the IRB Coordinator. A copy of the
form is available in Appendix 2.
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deleted after transcriptions were finished. Additionally, participants’ names, states, and the
names of their employers are anonymized in the report of the findings in this dissertation.21
Interview Data
Designing the Interview Protocol
The first step to curate primary data to explore R2 was to develop the main research
instrument, an interview protocol. There is an art to designing effective interview protocols
(Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Interviewing can be defined as a more formal or professional
conversation, with the goal of encouraging participants to share about their perspectives and
experiences in order to understand the meanings they make of them (Braun & Clarke, 2013;
Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Semi-structured interviews, as employed here, are common in
qualitative research. In this style, an interview guide is prepared before commencing interviews,
but the researcher does not rigidly adhere to the question guide and may ask follow-up questions
during the interview (Merton & Kendall, 1946; Braun & Clarke, 2013). In fact, the lack of
rigidity is a major benefit of using interviews in qualitative research. The order of the questions
can be contextual and responsive to the conversation as develops with the participant. The
researcher becomes a research tool by engaging in the conversation and developing a rapport and
comfort with the participant that draws out his or her experiences (Braun & Clarke, 2013). This
flexible format allowed CROs the ability to discuss topics that they found important, and even
topics that had not been anticipated and offered key insights (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
Nonetheless, the conversation was guided to cover key concepts of interest to the study in the
short time allotted.

21

It was also important to keep a separate, password-protected document that contains the non-anonymized data to
keep transparent records, including the pseudonym key (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
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Irrespective of the intention to be flexible, this steering of the conversation and proper
preparation of the interview guide is essential to successfully use interviews in qualitative
research (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Effective wording of the interview questions is critical to
ensure quality data collection that elicits responses to what the researcher actually wants to
know, thus questions were revised multiple times (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Additionally, the
interview protocol was evaluated against the criteria of: (a) interview question alignment with
the research questions; (b) eliciting an inquiry-based conversation; (c) incorporating key
informant feedback (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Each of these criteria ensured that the research
instrument was congruent with the purpose of the study and research questions (CastilloMontoya, 2016). They will each be covered in more detail in the next three sections.
Alignment with Research Questions
The first criterion for evaluation was alignment between the research question and the
interview questions (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).22 It is important that interview questions are
examined for their utility to the topic of research, as well as to eliminate extraneous questions
that may digress from the central focus and waste valuable and limited time. Human experiences
are complex and not easily unraveled. An interviewer must draw out these experiences (CastilloMontoya, 2016). The key point here is that a qualitative interview protocol is not intended to
attain basic answers to informational or descriptive questions. Rather, the goal is to understand
the participants’ lived experiences and how they make meaning of them through the lens of the
theoretical framework in the study (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Skillful planning of these interview

22

Because the theoretical framework for institutional work developed by Cloutier et al. (2016) was to be explored in
this setting, Cloutier was contacted to request the interview guide that she and her colleagues used during interviews
of health care organization managers after policy reform. It was surmised that the questions could be adapted to the
pre-reform context, and then the questions could be modified, adding an additional level of external validity to the
questions used. However, ultimately, after reviewing their protocol, the determination was made that it would not be
appropriate for the research question of interest in this study or for this setting.
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questions ensures that the interviews will draw out these rich personal accounts (Braun & Clarke,
2013).
A matrix approach can be utilized to chart interview questions against the conceptual
constructs of the research questions and identify alignment. This approach also facilitates review
of question order. Questions that are most central to the core purpose of the study should be
asked in the middle of the interview to ensure that rapport has been established prior to more
complex questions (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Ultimately, every question in the matrix should be
reviewed under the lens of what the question intends to uncover, and whether the question is
optimally designed to uncover that information (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The researcher can
anticipate what respondents might answer by responding to each question him or herself as a
mental exercise (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
The interview protocol was designed from a review of the relevant literature, and after
findings and insights in response to R1 were developed.23 The initial dataset had provided
evidence of the conflict between private and public sector institutional logics, as well as
institutional work processes as reactions to the institutional demands of the CRA. The
overarching intent of R2, and thus the intent of the research instrument, was to ask questions that
would aid in the understanding of how CROs’ banks, communities, and backgrounds influenced
their reactions and adaptation to the institutional demands created by the CRA. While the first
data set allowed for the analysis of conflict response strategies in the face of conflicting
institutional logics, the data lacked the context to draw deep understanding of the material
(structures and practices) and symbolic (ideation and meaning) elements of the institutional
orders that CROs interface with. These elements may influence adaptation to institutional

23

The interview protocol can be reviewed in Appendix 4.
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pressures as experienced by individual CROs and elucidated by the institutional logics
perspective. To achieve this level of understanding, further discussion with the CROs who wrote
the letters was required (Thornton, et al., 2012). It is evidence of these material and symbolic
elements as influencing mechanisms that the interview questions intended to uncover.
The interview protocol for this study was mapped against the a priori identified
conceptual constructs. R2 asks how CROs experience, manage and reconcile the institutional
demands created by the CRA. If CROs’ experiences with the CRA are influenced by material
and symbolic elements of the dominant institutional orders, then a better understanding of these
elements may explain their interpretations of CRA policy mandates and reactions to these
institutional demands. Specifically, within the banking sector, structure includes (a) features of
the bank the CRO works for, such as internal policies and practices around profit and appropriate
program design, or hierarchy of the organization and the CRO’s level of influence within the
organization. Furthermore, (b) features of a CRO’s community and professional network may
influence structure through best practices on organization structure and practices, as well as
influence symbolic elements of the field-level logic through norms, values, and ideas. Symbolic
elements of these institutional orders include not only the norms and values of the banking
profession, but also the realization that CROs, with their own (c) varied backgrounds,
experiences, and individual attributes, may differ in how they reference field-level logics, and
may even reference a different sector’s logic or a hybrid of institutional logics.
Questions to establish a frame of reference around interpretations of CRA policy
mandates and references to institutional logics included:
▪

To what extent do you think that the CRA has produced greater bank investment
in local communities than would otherwise be achieved through corporate social
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responsibility or market demands (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon,
1996; Cloutier et al., 2016; Friedland & Alford, 1991)?
o Do you feel that your opinion is mainstream or commonly held by banking
professionals? Or is it more of an unconventional response?
▪

To what extent is your regulatory agency helpful with regards to carrying out your
CRA responsibilities? For example, do they (a) provide training, (b) educational
material, (c) webinars, (d) conferences, or (e) other resources or assistance to
improve your exam score or clarify regulatory policies (Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier
et al., 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006)?
o Which of these resources or services are most helpful to improve your
CRA outcomes?

The intent of these questions was to gain an initial understanding of CROs’ interpretations of
CRA policy mandates and their regulatory agencies, as well as the worth of the CRA via early
evidence on their attitudes and desire to work in community development. It also drew out their
perceptions about other CROs and their philosophies, which would point to shared norms and
values with other CROs, an expression of institutional logic. And finally, these questions and
most of the questions that follow below, continued exploration from R1 on the evidence of
conflicting logics, e.g., conflict in the commercial and social mission of the bank and the
regulator.
Questions to explore features of the bank included:
▪

Can you tell me about your CRA related responsibilities and what percentage of
your role is focused on the CRA (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Chazdon, 1996;
Lipsky, 1980)?
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▪

Would you categorize yourself as a senior leader, middle manager, or entry-level
manager within this organization (If not senior leader, who do you report to?)
(Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier et al., 2016;
DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1997)?
o How much authority would you say that you have to determine CRA
policy implementation for your bank?
o Have the team size or responsibilities changed since you started your work
here? Why?

▪

Could you describe the size/responsibilities of the team working on CRA, and
your role within that team (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996;
Cloutier et al., 2016; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein,
1997)?
o Do you have a sense of how this compares to similarly sized banks that
you are familiar with in the state or nationally?

▪

How do you measure profitability in your CRA activities? In your view, to what
extent do CRA responsibilities align or conflict with the business bottom line,
making a profit (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Chazdon, 1996; DiMaggio & Powell,
1983; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Scott, 1995; Thomann et al., 2016)?
o If pressures to make a profit conflict with your CRA responsibilities,
where are these pressures coming from?
o If you’re spending a lot of time on CRA, does that mean less time where
you could work on projects that are more profitable? (Battilana & Dorado,
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2010; Chazdon, 1996; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thomann et al., 2016;
Watkins-Hayes, 2009)
▪

What are some of the major hurdles you face to increase community investment
or to fulfill other CRA requirements (Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier et al., 2016;
Lipsky, 1980; Matland, 1995; Watkins-Hayes, 2009)? For example, are
challenges more related to:
o Staffing/time availability and job role demands related to your non-CRA
work?
▪

What would you be able to do if you had more time?

o Safety and soundness or underwriting standards?
o Profitability of CRA related investments?
o Competition for community development loans?
o Have these challenges changed in recent years?
▪

I see that your most recent CRA rating was (X). Is there pressure within your
organization to raise this score? If so, from whom (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1997; Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010)?

▪

To what degree is your bank/bank leadership committed to the goals of the CRA?
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996;
Cloutier et al., 2016; DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein,
1997; Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010)?
o Do compensation package structures (for example base versus
commission) deter from working with LMI customers?
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o Have you taken any actions to gain more buy-in on the CRA from your
leadership or colleagues (Cloutier et al., 2016)?
This robust set of questions about features of the CRO’s bank intended to draw out a deep
understanding of the structural elements of institutions of the banking sector, including job
responsibilities, authority or decision-making power within the hierarchy of the organization,
staffing structure (including size and makeup of the team devoted to community development),
These questions also touched on more symbolic elements of the institutional order of banking,
including interactions and influence of peers and bank leadership concerning demands of the
CRA, changing structures over time, and views on profit and social missions of the bank. They
also drew out experiences with the demands of the CRA, including the primary issues faced in
implementation, the commitment of the organization and bank leadership to CRA policy
performance and to community lending. Finally, these questions dealt with strategies to deal with
these challenges and influence institutional buy-in around CRA.
Questions aimed at features of bankers’ communities included:
▪

Are there groups or members in your community that are pushing for you to do
more with regards to CRA (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017 Chazdon, 1996;
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Scott, 1995)?
o Where do you see most of the community pressures coming from (like
local government, community-based nonprofits, etc.)?
o What do they want you to do?

This subset of questions aimed to understand the conflict in institutional logics between the
community and the banking sector, as well as how these institutional demands might be
expressed.
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Questions designed to explore CROs individual attributes and backgrounds included:
▪

How did you get into your current profession in banking? Have you spent
significant time in a different field (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell
& Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Watkins-Hayes, 2009)?
o If a probe was needed, the participant was asked: with which of the
following professions have you spent the bulk of your career? (a) Career
banker; (b) Business finance or other private sector; (c) Public sector (e.g.
government, including regulatory body); (d) nonprofit/community
development; (e) Other?

▪

Did you specifically seek out a career or role with CRA responsibility? Why or
why not (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon,
1996; Watkins-Hayes, 2009)?
o How is the role aligned with your personal career interests (e.g. regulatory
compliance, finance, social impact, etc.) (Chazdon, 1996)?

Questions regarding the individual attributes and backgrounds of CROs were primarily intended
to understand how backgrounds and social values might affect references to institutional logics
and interpretations of policy mandates. For example, did career bankers identify with the
dominant institutional logic of the banking sector, and did public sector or community
development professionals reference more of a development logic?
Inquiry-Based Conversation
The second criteria for evaluation of the interview protocol was that, as a method of
inquiry, it asked questions intended to draw out participants’ experiences and understandings
through a conversation about participants’ ideas and life experiences (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
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Castillo-Montoya (2016) called this balance of inquiry and conversation an “inquiry-based
conversation” (p.813). The key components of an inquiry-based conversation include: (a)
interview questions written differently than the research questions; (b) a protocol that is
organized via social norms for ordinary conversations; (c) attention to question variety; (d) a
protocol script that plans for probing questions and transitions (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
First, interview questions should utilize everyday language, not the theoretical language
of the research question, where the concepts of institutional logics and institutional work would
be too complex and broad to answer. Thus, components of these theoretical notions were broken
down into more common verbiage around regulatory demands and the reconciliation of multiple
pressures from banks, communities, and regulators. Interview questions are used to develop the
broader understanding sought by the research inquiry, but there is an art to developing interview
questions that fit the context of participants’ everyday lives. Interview questions must be
accessible and easily understood by research participants, and thus take into account their context
and the research setting of the case, such as the professional field and norms of their daily work
(Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Notions of the banking field, such as corporate social responsibility,
safety and soundness, regulatory compliance, and financial inclusion were commonly understood
references for bankers.
Second, the social conventions of ordinary conversations should also be followed in
interviews, which are a form of conversation. This includes attention to asking questions that are
easily accessible or in recent memory for the participant, as well as social norms such as asking
one question at a time, actively listening, and not interrupting the participant. It is important that
the interview guide is prepared to build both trust and rapport with the respondent in order to
draw out personal information (Braun & Clarke, 2013). As in a normal conversation, it is
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important to acknowledge that you are hearing what the respondent has said, including through
visual cues such as nodding, or reactions such as clarifying questions or responses, transitioning
smoothly between topics, and developing rapport throughout, such as by expressing gratitude for
responses (Castillo-Montoya, 2016; Rubin & Rubin, 2012). At the end of the conversation, the
researcher should express gratitude.
Third, sequencing of questions is important to ensure that the flow is logical and
clustered into topics to allow smooth transitions (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Various types of
questions are useful to progress both conversational and inquiry goals of an interview (CastilloMontoya, 2016). Introductory questions set the tone and begin the interview with straightforward
and non-threatening questions that draw out narrative description, develop rapport, and ease the
participant into the mode of describing his or her experiences (Braun & Clarke, 2013; CastilloMontoya, 2016). These early questions should be “less probing, sensitive and direct than later
questions” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p.84). The earliest questions in the interview protocol for this
study focused on how the CRO got into banking and general opinions on the CRA, which
allowed the exploration of career narratives and built rapport early on. Transitional or structuring
questions or phrases keep the inquiry-based conversation moving forward towards key questions
but retain a conversational tone. These questions can signal shifts towards new topic areas
(Braun & Clarke, 2013; Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Three key sections were structured in the
protocol, with transitional phrases between each. Key questions are intended to draw out the
most valuable insights for the study. These questions are instrumental for understanding the case
and made up the bulk of the question set (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
Finally, an inquiry-based conversation can be supported through the development of a
script as part of the interview protocol, although it is not read word-for-word, but rather is used
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to be well-prepared to skillfully execute the interview (Castillo-Montoya, 2016). The script
should support a conversational tone and makes a plan for guiding the respondent regarding
where the conversation is headed, as well as smoothly transitioning between topics. This
included writing an introductory script to ensure key information about the study would be
reiterated at the beginning of the interview, thoughtful construction of the order of questions, and
categorizing the questions with transitional phrases between sections. Furthermore, the interview
protocol planned probing questions in case the initial interview question had not elicited the
information of key interest (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Castillo-Montoya, 2016; Rubin & Rubin,
2012). These probing questions, when used, encouraged respondents to expand on their initial
answers and provide more detail relevant to the research (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
Key Informant Feedback
The fourth criterion for design and evaluation of the interview protocol is to refine it
through feedback. Some researchers go even further than this and pilot the protocol via
interviews that simulate the actual interview conditions, as in a dress rehearsal (CastilloMontoya, 2016). This aids in testing rapport and timing and helps to fine-tune the research
instrument (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Castillo-Montoya, 2016). However, this is not always
realistic given time available or access to potential participants. Given the bounds of this
research project as an introduction to empirical research through a dissertation in the pursuit of a
doctoral degree, piloting the interview protocol was deemed unpractical given the study scope
and time limitations. Indeed, Braun & Clarke (2013) found that there is usually limited scope for
formal piloting in most research studies. Where piloting the protocol is skipped, gaining
feedback from key informants becomes even more important (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
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Accordingly, after the researcher has developed an interview protocol that is
conversational and designed to draw out key information relevant to the purpose of the study, the
interview questions can be improved by obtaining this feedback (Castillo-Montoya, 2016;
Chazdon, 1996). Feedback should be obtained from volunteers who are similar to the
participants who will be recruited for the study itself, but they are not actual research
participants. The purpose of this feedback is to improve the deliverability and reliability of the
protocol as a research instrument. It is quite useful to try out the questions, and ask for advice on
tone, clarity, and difficulty of questions (Braun & Clarke, 2013; Castillo-Montoya, 2016). Key
informants can also provide a safeguard to test if participants will be likely to understand the
questions and whether responses are in line with what the researcher hoped each question would
elicit in response (Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
The interview protocol for this study was refined through informational interviews with
two bankers who were contacted through professional networks of the researcher. They were
asked to provide insight on the appropriateness of the questions within the discourse of the
banking field. Personal network can be an important strategy for gaining access to key
informants (Chazdon, 1996). Particularly, due to a lack of direct researcher experience in the
banking field, it was important to engage with informants in the field who could speak the
professional field jargon and identify any questions that might not make sense to peers. Thus,
interviews with these two individuals did not provide data for analysis, but the conversations
aided in the refinement of the interview protocol.
Both of the key informants oversaw CRA compliance for their banks. Conversations with
these bankers resulted in valuable modifications and edits to the draft interview protocol, but also
confirmed that overall, the interview protocol would likely be effective at eliciting the
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information sought for the study. One key informant stressed, “Who is the banker—what is their
role in the bank? This all plays into how they perceive the CRA” (personal communication, May
3, 2021). This confirmed the value of the questions meant to understand the background of the
CRO and the structure of the CRA responsibility in the bank. In fact, this banker had previously
been a regulator, which she attributed to her appreciation for regulations, in contrast to many
bankers in the field. Additional questions were suggested around bank structure. For example,
banks have the ability to structure compensation packages in ways that incentivize or
disincentivize working with LMI populations (personal communication, May 3, 2021). This was
added to the interview protocol.
Another validating discussion was around the need for banks to reconcile regulatory
pressures with community pressures with safety and soundness. The verbiage around safety and
soundness was useful jargon of the banking field to add to the protocol, but the wider discussion
also indicated that CROs were likely to experience conflicting pressures across these institutional
orders of the regulatory field, communities, and bank practices. “A big heart only goes so far for
a CRA officer” as she bumps into safety and soundness or employer pressures (personal
communication, May 3, 2021). Additionally, the first key informant encouraged exploration of
whether or not the CRO makes the assumption that the CRA is not profitable? How does she
measure profitability in CRA activities? These perceptions could be key to understanding
experience with the CRA and the ability to reconcile various pressures created by the regulatory
policies. Questions about profitability could be fundamental to an understanding of alignment
with the institutional demands of the CRA regulatory demands and the market logic of the
banking field.
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Continuing an expression of support for the interview protocol, the key informants agreed
that bank structure is vital to understand. The size of the CRA team is critical to the ability of
CROs to manage CRA. Large banks have dedicated CROs typically, whereas in a small bank the
CRO may be stretched and have a lot of responsibilities (personal communication, May 3-4,
2021). In addition to bank size, geography and the rural-urban divide could be key to feelings of
worth about the CRA. Rural banks are the center of America. They are there to support the
community, and many of the rural banks feel that it is the big metro banks who were not doing
the right thing, yet CRA was saddled on everyone. This is further complicated by the
increasingly competitive market, especially for smaller banks due to banking consolidation.
Certain markets are overserved for community development loans while others continue to be
vastly underserved. Despite the regulatory burden and overhead, you can’t be a community bank
without taking care of your community: “Anyone who says CRA is onerous, well their bank isn’t
doing a very good job” (personal communication, May 4, 2021).
A key logistical modification was that the length of interview time was adjusted from an
estimate of 45 minutes to 60 minutes (comprising of 55 minutes for interview questions and 5
minutes for introductory and closing statements), noting that 45 minutes was too brief to cover
the entire protocol. Other minor adjustments were also made, including some verbiage edits for
clarity and professional jargon.
After obtaining this valuable feedback from key informants, the interview protocol was
thoroughly aligned with the key purpose of the research study, it was prepped to be
conversational yet inquiry-driven, and it had been examined for clarity and answerability
(Castillo-Montoya, 2016).
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Conducting the Interviews
All of the interviews in this study were conducted via Zoom. Zoom Meetings is a video
teleconference software program developed by Zoom Video Communications.24 During the
COVID-19 global pandemic that swept across the United States starting in the spring of 2020,
use of video software such as Zoom became ubiquitous as millions of Americans grappled with
working from home with offices and campuses closed to prevent spread of the virus. The
interviews for this study took place in the summer of 2022, thus there was a general familiarity
of video teleconferencing software that was quite rare prior to the pandemic.
Interview participants were located across the United States. Prior to the pandemic, the
interviews likely would have been conducted via telephone, before teleconferencing became a
norm of everyday work-from-home environments for so many Americans. Despite the majority
of the interview participants being quite familiar with Zoom and equipped with cameras and
microphones to participate virtually, a few participants called into the teleconferencing line.
These participants tended to be at small community banks in more rural areas of America, where
they had continued to work in the office during the pandemic and had not shifted to more
technology-enabled modes of working. The benefits of conducting interviews via either
telephone or video conference were that the sample was not limited by geography. Furthermore,
respondents could participate in the location that would be most comfortable and conducive to
the interview from their perspective (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Video teleconferencing has a
number of benefits over telephone interviews, however, including the ability to more clearly
communicate due to visibility of the respondent’s face, as well as a significantly enhanced ability
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Although there is a free plan available, the enterprise license of the University of Arkansas was available to the
researcher, which enabled additional features such as conference calls over forty minutes in length, call recording,
and call transcription.
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to build rapport through visual cues such as nodding, or other visible expressions of
acknowledgement or empathy.
The interviews commenced with a greeting and expression of gratitude to the research
participant for taking part in the study (Braun & Clarke, 2013). First, the intent of the research
and its purpose was described. Participants are often interested in the personal motives of the
researcher or may have other questions, thus the opportunity to ask questions was presented both
before the interview began and at the end of the interview (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
As planned via the election of a semi-structured interview guide, the interview protocol
was used to steer the conversations, but it was not adhered to in exacting order. This allowed
reflexivity and responsiveness to the research participant’s developing story (Braun & Clarke,
2013). This means that questions were sometimes asked out of order, that some were not asked at
all (especially due to time limitations), and that unplanned questions were asked (Braun &
Clarke, 2013). This is all part of the qualitative research process and discovery.
It is important that participants open up and talk. The researcher must be prepared to use
effective conversational strategies such as silence, asking for clarifications or examples, and
active listening. The researcher showed interest in what participants were saying via body
language and verbal cues that conveyed active listening, and even provided feedback that
opinions expressed were interesting (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Evaluative comments, including
honest agreement or empathy regarding experiences, were used to build trust and rapport (Braun
& Clarke, 2013). Empathizing with the bankers on the pressures they face in their job
responsibilities was helpful to build rapport. It also reflected the researcher’s own developing
and personal understanding of the difficulty of compliance roles where managers attempt to
carry out an incredibly complex regulatory framework which is often at odds with the
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commercial mission of their firms. Again, qualitative researchers are not robots. They are
extensions of qualitative research instruments, and while it would not be ethical to feign interest
or agree with antithetical opinions, it is a natural part of human interaction to personally engage
in the interview within the bounds of professional and polite conduct.
At the conclusion of the interview, the participants were asked if they would like to add
anything else, then the recording was turned off and they were given the opportunity to ask
anything further about next steps in the research study (Braun & Clarke, 2013). As is common,
several participants wanted to know if they would receive the final report (Braun & Clarke,
2013). Two retiring CRO officers shared contact info for incoming CROs for this report. In these
cases, the participants thought that the incoming CRO might benefit from reading the study
results.
A couple of the participants in this study requested that findings be published in more
practitioner-facing journals, such as American Banker or via the American Bankers Association,
or even community-facing media so that the readers would not be limited to academics. One
respondent, Tiffany, expressed frustration at the general negativity towards bankers and
expressed hope that this research was being done and could help to change that narrative. “I hope
through this that, you know, it becomes clearer as to what banks’ purposes really are and what
we’re trying to achieve in our communities as well as with CRA…to serve those communities
and be there and provide the services where we’re needed, we need the relationship with our
customers, so that’s you know, where I’m coming from, from a CRA initiative, is I do want to
change that narrative one way or the other of what the banks’ purposes are.” Tiffany’s expression
of the inherently good nature of most bankers was echoed by other bankers, and it was important
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to validate these feelings of worth through empathy and understanding of the normative nature of
their intentions to make a positive impact.
Interview Transcription
Transcription is often left out of research methods chapters, as a seemingly technical
(though extremely time-consuming) concern. However, Braun & Clarke (2013) have pointed out
that transcriptions involve choices surrounding how speech is translated into written texts, thus it
is a theoretically influenced practice in itself.
Orthographic transcription, otherwise known as verbatim, focuses on transcribing spoken
words and sounds into recorded data, but it does not attempt to record how it was said, as in
phonetic or paralinguistic styles of transcription (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Verbatim transcription
was appropriate for R2, as the focus was more about the thematic content of respondents’
answers and did not concern linguistic aspects of their responses.
The translation from spoken into written English can be challenging, and it is very laborintensive. Despite having Zoom transcriptions from each interview, transcriptions took about
four to five hours per one hour interview and involved playing each segment of the recordings a
number of times. Yet this is half as much time as transcriptions typically take in qualitative
research as reported by Braun and Clarke (2013), evidence that the Zoom transcription service
saved time. Verbal speech does not use punctuation, but rather uses pauses, intonation, and
varying volume or methods of speech to convey meaning. Furthermore, speech is messy,
including hesitations, misspeaking, stumbling over words, repetition, or trailing off (Braun &
Clarke, 2013). Transcribers make choices about how to preserve what they hear in the recording,
and how to maintain consistency across transcriptions of all interviews. Braun and Clarke (2013)
recommended being especially careful to watch for punctuation choices that might alter meaning
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from the original speech, quotation mark errors on reported speech, accidentally leaving words
out, or misquoting. Despite these challenges, it is critical that transcriptions are thorough,
accurate, and high quality (Braun & Clarke, 2013). This necessitated concentration, multiple
replays of the recordings, and transcribing the interviews as close as possible to the actual
conduct of the interview so that it would be in recent memory (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Again,
Zoom enabled higher quality transcriptions in this regard as well, because video recordings
conveyed more cues for accurate transcription than an audio recording alone.
Demographic Questionnaire
A demographic questionnaire was designed in order to classify the participants during
analysis.25 The form captured gender, race or ethnicity, hometown, number of years in current
community, age group (26-44: Gen Y/Millennials; 45-56: (Gex X); 57-75: Baby Boomer) (The
Center for Generational Kinetics, 2020), number of years with CRA responsibilities, and number
of professional years of experience in banking (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon,
1996). The purpose of collecting this data alongside interviews was to capture demographic
characteristics that might influence references to institutional logics and interpretations of policy
mandates through the social constructs of age, gender, race, and professional career, as well as
the connection to one’s community. For example, is there a connection between banking and
community development in one’s hometown versus a community transplant?
Data Analysis
Good qualitative research analysis aims to gain a deep understanding of the data under
study and is “plausible, coherent and grounded in the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 21).

25

The demographic questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5.
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Qualitative analysis is interpretative, and goes much further than descriptive analysis, aiming to
uncover deep insights from the research data to understand what is going on in the data and how
to make sense of it (Braun & Clarke, 2013). This type of analysis produces rich understandings
of the data that has been collected, looking beyond surface understandings in order to produce
insights, generated via the theoretical lens, to illustrate meanings and concepts found in the data
(Braun & Clarke, 2013). The aim is to generate insights around how or why respondents
answered in the way that they did, and further develop theory in doing so.
Qualitative analysis begins with data immersion, where the researcher becomes keenly
aware of the content of her data. Through this process, content relevant to the research questions
of the study begins to emerge (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The analytic process of engagement with
the data in this study entailed reading documents and interview transcripts numerous times,
looking for content of interest, jotting down initial impressions or conceptual ideas, and keeping
notes along the way (Braun & Clarke, 2013). In stage two data collection, engagement with the
data began as early as active listening during the interviews, making analytic notes on potential
themes at the end of each one, and continuing this process of analysis during interview
transcription.
Yet the data analyses a qualitative researcher produces are not free from subjectivity.
There is not a singular way to draw meaning from the data analyzed in a research project (Braun
& Clarke, 2013). Though analysis should have clear logic and a thoroughly explained research
design that illustrates how conclusions and insights were drawn from the data, qualitative
research allows for the fact that we bring our own socially constructed identities to analysis.
Thus, what is salient to the researcher may be influenced by his or her personal experiences
(Braun & Clarke, 2013). However, a deductive approach to analyzing the data can ensure that
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theory is the driver of the analysis, not the researcher. Validity requires the researcher to be open
minded and to look at how the data could be influenced, seeking to detach from oneself to
examine the data in a constructive manner (Norris, 1997). By being self-aware, the researcher
can attend to validity and guard against retrofitting the data into what she hopes it will say.
Familiarization with the data, at its heart, is reading the data as data, and reflecting on what it
means in relation to the research questions and within the theoretical perspective employed by
the researcher to explain the case (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
We are not robots, nor are Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software
(CAQDAS) programs; they simply aid in our organization of the researcher-derived meanings
drawn from qualitative research data. Accordingly, CAQDAS programs offer convenient techenabled tools as the researcher works through analysis. NVivo, a CAQDAS produced by QSR
International, was utilized to manage the analysis of both data sets in this study, including 358
bankers letters and comments, as well as 23 interview transcripts. NVivo allows the user to
upload data sets, after which the researcher can classify, sort and organize the data by coding
themes, as well as by interview question. When the data is from interviews, it is especially
helpful that NVivo can autocode using paragraph styles via the use of heading styles for various
questions. All verbiage under that heading will be coded to the question. This allows all the
participants’ responses to a single question to be compared side-by-side, aiding the analysis.
Many other features assist in the analytic process, such as data memos, annotations, a variety of
methods to code data via line-by-line coding, and queries according to participant classifications.
The NVivo visualization tools include a mind map that is especially helpful for the
brainstorming phase of coding, clustering themes, and identifying aggregate dimensions.
Conceptual maps of codes and themes were created to explore relationships between codes and
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themes. Visualizations can help to explore the connections, refine them, and land on a final form
of the analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
The first data set was analyzed via discourse analysis, and the second was analyzed via
thematic analysis. The following sections will delve deeper into these qualitative methods as they
were employed in this study. Furthermore, analysis was conducted after each of the two stages of
data collection, a development research strategy, which encompasses the sequential use of
different methods or data to generate new observations about the phenomena under study
(Greene et al., 1989). The theoretical framework was further developed during and following the
empirical research after new insights were formed through the case study data.
Discourse Analysis of Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies
The first data set in the study has several interesting features, including that the intended
audience was the regulatory agencies, thus there is communication across two levels of
institutional orders, the public and private sectors. Because the comments were written, the
primary mechanism for influencing the audience (regulators) was language. Lawrence and
Suddaby (2006) found that Discourse Analysis (DA) would be particularly insightful in studying
how individuals rely on discursive devices in their attempts to influence institutional change—
institutional work. Thus, DA was utilized to better understand both the rhetorical and narrative
features employed by CROs operating as policy actors attempting to influence CRA policy
change and the regulatory field. DA was used to examine institutional work processes at the
intersection of two potentially conflicting institutional logics.
DA is an interpretative, constructionist, and qualitative method that focuses on how text
and discursive structures of written or spoken language are used by participants to make sense of
various topics and aspirations (Hardy et al., 2004; Gering, 2015). These discursive structures
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may include the use of concepts, ideas, stories, strategies, and roles (Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006). Specifically, as in other methods of qualitative analysis, patterns are sought, in this case
across linguistic data (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Pattern-based analysis DA is the systematic
identification and reporting of salient features in the data, as well as interpretations of these
patterns. The assumption is that “ideas which recur across a dataset capture something
psychologically or socially meaningful” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p.223). While frequency could
be of importance, DA is distinct from content analysis in that it seeks to understand the saliency,
or most meaningful patterns of language use, not necessarily the most frequent (Braun & Clark,
2013). This differs significantly from Content Analysis, which is positivist, quantitative, and
grounded in statistical analysis; furthermore, it is disconnected from its context, as it assumes a
consistency of meaning that enables the textual and quantitative counting of word usage (Hardy
et al., 2004).
Language and its patterned features are viewed as important tools to understand social
context and the construction of these contexts (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Thus, DA takes the
importance of the wider social context into account. Additionally, language is understood as a
tool, not just used to provide descriptive information (Braun & Clarke, 2013). To get beyond
description, discourses must be examined within their sociohistorical context (Hardy et al.,
2004). This point is critical for this dataset, as much of the data in the ANPR letters was
descriptive. Analysis sought not to capture specific regulatory revision recommendations, but
instead to understand the discursive techniques that were used to deliver these recommendations,
and how features of the message delivery might offer clues as to the institutional pressures and
conflict response strategies employed by CROs.
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Rhetoric and narrative are key categories of discursive techniques that DA seeks to
understand. The reoccurrence of these techniques and the common narratives that are told help to
construct meaning out of data. Rhetoric is centered around persuasion and influence, while
narrative conveys a series of connected events—a story. Policy narratives possess the general
elements of narrative, are applicable across various policy settings, and can be studied
systematically (McBeth, Jones, & Shanahan, 2014). In the policy context, the rendering of the
narrative around that context can be a more crucial factor in achieving desired policy outcomes
than even concrete actions (Stone, 2012; McBeth et al., 2014, p.225). Through DA of the first
data set, the narrative around community reinvestment policy pressures and conflict response
strategies could be richly explored for R1.
In fact, DA works well with more general research questions where the goal is to
understand implicit meanings and the nature of the phenomenon under study (Gering, 2015). R1
was more general than R2, in that it sought to explore the intersection of private and public
sector institutional logics via the lens of institutional work and through the experiences of
regulated CROs. It did not attempt to review the specific aspects of a CRO’s background or bank
structure that might influence these experiences, as was the focus in R2. Rather, analysis on R1
served as the foundation to establish the potential for conflict between commercial and social
missions for a CRO. Thus, DA was an appropriate qualitative method to explore how bankers
use discursive techniques to define their societal roles and the ways in which they balance
market and moral imperatives, in the reconciliation of institutional demands.
Data set one, consisting of 358 letters, was uploaded and analyzed within NVivo. This is
quite large for a qualitative research project where samples are usually closer to 15 to 30 (Braun
& Clarke, 2013, p.55). However, qualitative analyses of printed text do tend to be quite a bit
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larger than interview datasets (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Additionally, because R1 was a more
general research question to review the potential utility of further exploring the institutional
logics and institutional work theoretical lens, this data set was not reviewed in its entirety.
Rather, when about 25% of the letters had been coded, data saturation was reached, or the point
at which new insights were no longer being uncovered in relation to the research question (Braun
& Clarke, 2013). Because additional review of the letters was failing to generate new insights
related to R1, and because moving into the second research question was of keen interest, the
first data set was only partially coded and the final sample was 80 documents.
Thematic Analysis of Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies to Meet Institutional
Demands
Thematic Analysis (TA) was employed to respond to R2. Although TA has been around
in various forms since the 1970s, Braun and Clarke (2006) are credited with penning TA and
establishing clear procedures (Braun & Clarke, 2013). The authors were frustrated by the lack of
a named and more systematic research approach to analyze and identify themes (patterns) across
qualitative data. Since 2006, TA has substantially grown in popularity, now being recognized
widely and frequently employed (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p.178).
TA is specifically a research method for qualitative data analysis. Thus, it does not
prescribe data collection methods, the use of particular theory, or epistemological or ontological
frameworks. This makes TA incredibly flexible, inviting to new qualitative researchers, and it
can be used to analyze data collected to address a wide variety of research questions (Braun &
Clarke, 2013). In essence, TA is a pattern-based analysis that seeks to identify and interpret the
most salient features across datasets (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Themes—captured via patterned
responses and meanings in the data— capture what is important about the data with regards to
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the research question. Whereas a code captures one idea, themes have central organizing
concepts. Various ideas and aspects of the data (typically captured by codes), cluster together
around these central organizing concepts (Braun & Clarke, 2013). In short, codes are mapped
together to form themes which interpret the data in connection to the research question of the
project. The data analyst actively engages in how to craft these themes into the story the data
tells. While the data provides the basis of analysis and the bounds on what is possible to derive
from it, the story told in qualitative analysis cannot be entirely pre-determined (Braun & Clarke,
2013). It is possible to create different analyses from the same qualitative data if there were
different researchers using different tools. This recognizes that the theoretical lens and the
method of analysis influences the overall story of the analysis. It is not possible to represent
everything that is said, but the intent is to draw out the most salient features of the data (Braun &
Clarke, 2013). Ultimately, there is no one true story about the data, but the story that is told
should be “faithful to the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2013). It should be transparent, reasonable, and
clearly explained through the theoretical lens.
Although themes can be identified inductively, in a data-driven and “bottom-up” way,
they can also be analyzed deductively, “top-down,” where the data is used to explore and further
develop a particular theoretical lens (p.178). In fact, TA has great interpretive power employed
within the lens of a theoretical framework. Without that, it errs on just entailing descriptions of
what participants said.
In this study, the foundation for the theoretical framework linking institutional logics and
institutional work was already established through the first data set. Thus, the deductive
approach allowed further exploration and development of this multi-perspective framework.
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Constructs and Coding
This section explains how the research constructs in the study were conceptualized and
operationalized and how they connect to the coding and pattern-based DA and TA analyses.
Whereas some variables in the study could be directly measured, such as a CRO’s age, gender,
race, or seniority in the bank, most of the qualitative constructs could not be directly measured as
they were more abstract and not easily directly observed (Bhattacherjee, 2012). This section will
clarify how these more complex constructs were conceptualized within the context of this
research study. This is crucial for clarity, because constructs usually have more than one
meaning (Lund Research ltd, 2012). Unidimensional constructs consisted of a single underlying
dimension (such as a CRO’s age), while multidimensional constructs consisted of at least two or
more dimensions. After a theoretical concept is defined, it is operationalized through indicators
of measure. Given the fuzziness of theoretical constructs, they tend to be measured via multiple
indicators. Analyzing linkages between these indicators aids in research reliability
(Bhattacherjee, 2012). Sufficient attention to research constructs during the research design
phase was essential to research validity and reliability. We now turn to an overview of the coding
process in this study, before moving into conceptualization and operationalization of the research
constructs for each of the research questions.
The coding process identified elements of the data that connect to R1 and R2 and their
component parts, the research constructs. Phrases of interest were coded and viewed as analytical
“building blocks” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 207). These codes were then strung together to
develop themes and subthemes, and ultimately, aggregate dimensions. Selective coding was
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utilized to identify analytic concepts in the data (Braun & Clarke, 2013).26 While critics may
advocate that line-by-line coding is more systematic, especially for theory creation, selective
coding can be done transparently and analytically when guided by a pre-existing theoretical lens
and analytic knowledge (Braun & Clarke, 2013). This aids in the identification of the relevant
concepts and supports theory development. In this study, the first dataset was used to explore the
utility of the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives to explain the conflict in
institutional demands caused by the CRA. The second dataset dug into the application of this
theoretical perspective further. Thus, theory-driven coding was appropriate as an exploration of a
particular lens during theory development.
Selective coding was employed in NVivo to code 80 of the 358 ANPR feedback letters,
at which point saturation was reached with regards to the initial coding scheme. Saturation is key
to how much data is needed, and at this point in the analysis, the data was not leading to new
insights (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Sufficient data is necessary for rich insights and a
comprehensive story about the case, but an abundance of data may prevent engagement with the
data in a way that allows deep examination of the research question (Onwuegbuzie & Leech,
2005). The letters contained significant detail about highly specific reforms that bankers sought
with regards to the CRA regulatory framework. The intent of R1 was not to assess the prevalence
of specific regulatory recommendations in this feedback, as was likely the intent of the OCC
itself in reviewing the letters. Rather, the intent was to examine the discursive features of the text
through DA, in order to (a) understand the potential for conflict at the intersection of institutional
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Alternatively, line-by-line or complete coding is the process of reading the entire data set with the intention of
identifying everything that could be of interest or relevance to answer the research question (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
Rather than selecting out components of the data, all data is coded that could be relevant to the research question, in
a systematic and thorough manner (Braun & Clarke, 2013).
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logics; and (b) to understand the ways in which CROs used rhetoric and narrative as discursive
processes of institutional work as they attempted to reconcile these conflicts.
With the second dataset, deep familiarity with the interview transcripts had already been
developed when coding commenced because of prior engagement with this data including both
during and after the actual interviews. Indeed, throughout the interview period, conversations
were transcribed soon after the interview concluded, and reflections and potential themes of
interest were noted. Due to the previously developed knowledge from the first dataset regarding
the promise of the institutional logics and institutional work perspective in TA, as well as prior
engagement with the data, selective coding was again the most appropriate strategy. In this
second case, institutional theory guided the coding process, with regards to both material and
symbolic elements of institutional orders, including features of CROs’ banks, communities, and
their individual attributes and backgrounds. The next two sections will describe the constructs
and coding for R1 and R2, respectively. Although the relevant codes are mentioned, the full
codebook and their definitions is found in Appendix 6.
Operationalization of Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies
Institutional Demands
The first key construct with regards to R1 is institutional logics. Institutional logics are
the socially constructed norms and practices embodied by sectoral actors (Friedland & Alford,
1991; Lindblom, 1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). The umbrella concept
must then be broken into the specific institutional logics analyzed in this research. The key
institutional logics of interest in this study were market logics, bureaucratic logics, and
development logics), and hybrids that emerged through the process of analysis, which were
labeled shared value logics. A market logic reflects the dominance of the capitalist market
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system, and is focused on resources, growth and acquisition, and profit (Averch & Johnson,
1962; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Dahl & Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Epstein et al.,
2016; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Thomann et al., 2016; Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). A bureaucratic logic reflects shared norms around public
service and the public interest, including regulating private firm externalities that conflict with
the public interest, and providing goods and services that are not adequately supplied through
economic markets (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Epstein, et al.,
2016; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lyden, 1975; Rainey, 1983; Viscussi, et al., 2005). It may also
reflect dominant beliefs regarding centralization, regulation, and standardization of operations
and procedures (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017). Community-based institutional logics may
reflect various values, but democratic logics tend to encompass democratic values such as
concerns about equity, as well as a development logic focused on community development and
concerns such as poverty alleviation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer,
2017; Chazdon, 1996; Knutsen, 2012).
A third logic also emerged in the dataset, and thus was also coded; it was labeled “shared
value” (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Throughout the letters, there was substantial evidence of
compatibility between community development and business missions, as opposed to a strict
incompatibility of logics between social and commercial missions. Shared value is the creation
of business value by identifying social problems that intersect with business. In essence, it is the
belief that public benefit, or advancing the economic and social success of a community where a
business operates, makes the business more competitive and profitable over time (Porter &
Kramer, 2011). Thus, it is a hybrid of market and bureaucratic logics, with some elements of
development logics. However, development logics value clients as beneficiaries (Battilana &
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Dorado, 2010), and shared value is more akin to market logics in this regard, because shared
value sees clients as customers and sources of income. The key institutional logics were coded
where CROs’ discourse in the ANPR feedback letters reflected one.
The second key construct is conflict, specifically addressing institutional demands.
Because institutions provide the guiding principles for individuals’ and organizations’ work, give
legitimacy to norms and practices, and govern the distribution of power and resources, their
demands are significant (Pache & Santos, 2010). These institutional demands create pressure or
tensions. For example, in the public policy field, policies are intentionally disruptive to private
sector institutions, in that they mandate changes to the regulated organizations’ normal practices
(Smith, 1973). Failure to adhere to public policies typically has undesirable consequences, which
increases this pressure (Scott, 1995; Thomann et al., 2016). Individuals that work in more
fragmented fields—including cross-sector collaborations or regulatory relationships— are more
likely to deal with contradictory institutional demands from each institution where they interface
than more linear fields (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer & Rowan,
1977/1991). Because different sectors hold distinct institutional logics, the norms, practices, and
values reflected in these logics are often incongruous and incompatible. The ability to manage
conflicting institutional demands depends on how they are perceived. This is where the construct
of institutional logics is useful. Dependent on the dominant institutional logics referenced by an
individual, their beliefs may be more or less compatible, and therefore more or less conflictual,
with institutional demands.
The pressures of institutional demand conflict are reflected through the expression of
challenges or struggle (Chazdon, 1996; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). The primary
manifestations of these tensions in the case of CRA are grievances with policy mandates and
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were related to primacy of the business model and profit motive (including codes such as “local
market conditions” (CROs felt that their assessment area limited opportunity for CRA-qualified
investment), “inflexibility” (regulations did not adjust to support the bank’s business model), and
“modernization,” or the antiquity of the policy regulations considering technological advances
such as online banking), as well as “ambiguity” (unclear interpretation of policy expectations)
and the strain of “workload and resources” (the regulatory burden exacerbates a situation where
workloads are high and resources are insufficient). The conceptual map for these codes can be
found in Appendix 7. The codebook with definitions can be found in Appendix 6.
Institutional Maintenance
Conflict, as defined in this study, is mental struggle due to incompatible demands,
specifically, institutional demands in this case. In addition to the manifestations of conflict
through grievances, evidence of conflict is clearly identifiable through reactions to institutional
demands. Reactions are theorized as institutional work, which is defined here as the deliberate
actions of individuals to create, disrupt, or maintain institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006;
Lawrence et al.,2009; 2011; 2013). In this research, these institutional work activities were
evidenced in written responses to the OCC regarding proposed CRA policy reforms. These
responses can be conceptualized as conflict response strategies (Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos,
2010). Conflict response strategies, as institutional work, were separated into two main thematic
constructs: avoidance strategies and compromise strategies. Avoidance strategies are theorized as
institutional maintenance, in that they are intentional strategies to maintain existing institutional
norms within the profession, while avoiding the changes that public policy reform seeks (Cobb
& Ross, 1997; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Mahon & McGowan, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Stone,
2012). Within avoidance, rhetorical strategies of agenda denial were first coded. Initially codes
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were created for “complexity of the regulated profession” (a strategy that depicts a field as too
complex for others to understand or regulate), “co-optation” (borrowing the narratives from
one’s opponents and using them in your own arguments), and “self-regulation” (strategies for
private regulation to avoid more stringent regulations), however, these strategies were not
identified widely in the data (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Mahon &
McGowan, 1997; Malhotra et al., 2019). Denial that a problem existed was the most common
agenda denial strategy noted. Then, narrative plot strategies such as “stories of decline” (tales
about conditions getting worse without specific actions being taken) and “stories of control”
(tales that certain actions can enable attainment of previously unreachable goals) were coded
(Stone, 2012). Narrative characters were also coded, such as banks as “heroes” in their
communities and banks as “victims” of undue regulatory burden (Stone, 2012). Furthermore,
policy narratives with “villains” were coded, such as credit unions (who are not regulated by the
CRA), large banks (who are blamed for the CRA, this was also conceptualized as
“antipatterning” (depicting issues as isolated incidents) following Mahon and McGowan (1997)),
or the regulatory bodies (who enforce the institutional demands of public policies) as villains.
(Stone, 2012).
Institutional Change
Conflict response strategies of institutional work can also include compromise, which
entails a blending of qualities between institutional logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Kraatz &
Block, 2008; Thomann et al., 2016). In this case, it is the blending of the market and bureaucratic
logics. In this scenario, as opposed to maintaining the status quo, actors enable institutional
change over time through compromise in response to institutional demands. Here, institutional
logics hybridize over time, evidence of adaptation to the institutional pressures of imposing
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institutional demands. The primary evidence of compromise was specifically the emergence in
the data of a hybrid logic, “shared value,” which was coded as such (Porter & Kramer, 2011).
Operationalization of Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies
The second research question builds on the first, thus there was a continued interest in the
relationships of institutional logics and institutional demand conflict. After the analysis for R1
had shown evidence of conflict in institutional demands through the response strategies of CROs,
R2 was explored in order to introduce the environmental—or contextual—influences that could
affect the ability to more or less skillfully manage and reconcile these institutional demands.
Specifically, the key categories of inquiry from R2 need additional explanation, including bank
features, communities, and individual attributes and backgrounds. They will be overviewed
below within the wider aggregate dimension of institutional work of which they are part. The
institutional work framework, which comprises of structural, conceptual, operational, and
relational work, is adopted from Cloutier et al. (2016). This framework both informed the
theoretical development of the study and the composition of the interview questions, alongside
other pertinent literature. However, the empirical data were initially coded more loosely, leaving
this framework to the side. During the data analysis, after all of the codes, themes, and higherorder themes had been mapped, the appropriateness of Cloutier et al.’s model emerged as a
particularly well-suited framework for the aggregate dimensions of these themes. The framework
is intended to aid in our understanding of managerial efforts to implement public policies,
specifically how managers reconcile government mandates with their organizational and
individual missions. Following Cloutier et al., however, the framework is utilized as a conceptual
and analytical tool, and the categories should not be seen as silos. The institutional work
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categories are recursive; each category is part of the whole, and the elements of each type of
work are intricately linked with elements of the others.
Structural Work
Structural work, the first institutional work strategy, entails the efforts of managers to
establish formal rules, procedures, roles, and resource allocation models within an existing or
new policy framework (Cloutier et al., 2016). The multi-dimensional construct, organizational
culture (under the umbrella theme of bank features in R2), fits first here, as well as under the
next dimension of conceptual work. There is little consensus on what organizational culture is
(Watkins, 2013), making it especially important to define here. In this study, organizational
culture is understood as the forces that shape patterns of behavior in organizations, including
how behaviors are legitimized through incentives or sanctions, as well as the collaborative
process of sense-making and shared norms (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Scott 1995; Watkins, 2013). Thus, organizational culture has material or structural
elements, as captured here, as well as more symbolic elements. Internal structures, such as how
job roles are structured, departmental composition, and authority of various positions within the
bank are all understood as dimensions of organizational culture. Codes included “100% CRA”
(the CRO’s job responsibilities were entirely related to CRA as opposed to many bank
regulations) and “many hats” (a CRO was responsible for many banking regulations or
compliance functions within the bank), where the latter included “back-end data analyst” (the
CRO had to comb through extensive bank data to identify CRA-qualified activity, but had very
little opportunity to influence actual CRA activities), “lending portfolio” (job responsibilities of
the CRO included a lending or investments portfolio, such as affordable housing), and
“regulatory compliance soup” (responsibility for multiple complex banking regulations where
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the CRO had difficulty comprehending all that the CRA or other regulations entailed). An
additional code set was “workload,” which included “managing data,” which was connected to
the challenge to collect, document, and analyze all of the data required for CRA, and
“ambiguity,” which pointed to unclear interpretations of the policy (Cloutier et al., 2016; Garrow
& Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995; Maynard-Moody & Musheno,
2000; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). Additionally, the internal structure of “authority” was coded,
which was evidenced in the ability of the CRO to influence structural requirements of policy
mandates as well as conceptual understandings. Other variables that could affect structural work
were more easily and directly measured, and included the bank regulator, asset size, exam
method, and exam rating. The conceptual map for this set of codes is in Appendix 8. The
codebook with definitions can be found in Appendix 6.
Conceptual Work
The notion of conceptual work captures efforts by managers to cement belief systems,
norms, and shared sensemaking consistent with policy mandates (Cloutier et al., 2016). It
requires managers to develop an understanding around what policies mean to them, and then to
bring others alongside them consistent with those notions. Conceptual work entails two
constructs that are related to the social construction of the individual. The first is worldview, or
the CRO’s CRA worldview, which entails one’s conceptions of the world around them. In the
context of this study, the interest is on the manager’s worldview about the CRA, which
specifically points to their broader notions and internalizations of the mandates. This symbolic
construct gauges an overall understanding of what CRA policy and being a CRO actually mean
to the CRO. For example, does CRA offer a market opportunity? Two codes in response were
“CRA is profitable,” as well as “CRA isn’t profitable.” The first was evidenced in CROs
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discourse around whether CRA activities offered market opportunities while the latter more
directly either did not calculate profit at all (de-coupling functions) or the CRO specifically
voiced that CRA was not profitable. Additionally, what was the CRO’s view on whether CRA
has made a difference? CROs varied on whether they believed that the CRA has had a greater
impact on capital access than would have already been achieved through the market alone.
The second construct connected to social construction was personal identity. Personal
identity is our individual identity, or those traits or attributes which are defining or distinguishing
about an individual (Olson, 2002). In this study, social constructs such as race and ethnicity,
gender, and age group were understood to be part of personal identity, as was the geographic
region where the CRO worked. While age and region are not necessarily social constructs in
themselves (your age is defined by the year you were born, and your region is simply where you
live), they have socially constructed elements regarding how our age groups or region of the U.S.
are viewed by others and ourselves, and thus were considered as part of personal identity.
Region, race, gender, age, and region were directly measured via the demographic questionnaire,
while race and gender were additionally explored within the data.
A key variable of organizational culture is organizational and leadership commitment to
CRA. How much support has been pledged? First, whose responsibility is the CRA? It is the sole
responsibility of the CRO? Or do others in the organization, such as the loan and investment
officers, have a key role to play? The related codes include “CRA is everyone’s responsibility”
(where bank leadership embraced a distributed vision of CRA implementation throughout the
organization) and “CRA is your responsibility,” where the CRO was fully responsible for
compliance. This could entail analyzing every loan searching for CRA activities that could be
documentable. Additionally, this conceptual variable entails consideration of the organization
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and leadership’s commitment, but commitment to what? Codes included “commitment to CRA
performance,” where bank leadership sought an outstanding CRA rating, and “commitment to
community,” where bank leadership voiced support for the community more broadly,
recognizing the importance of economic development. A final element of organizational culture
was the organizational and leadership conception of what type of work is required for CRA and
whether it is compliance alone or necessitates community outreach. These were the final two
codes for this section. The first was evidenced where the CRA was viewed in the same category
as other banking regulations and necessitated analytics and checklists of activities and amounts.
In the latter, CRA was viewed more as community development, and thus it necessitated
community engagement and outreach to enable LMI individuals’ increased access to capital.
Operational Work
Operational work is the concept of managerial efforts to implement more on-the-ground
or concrete initiatives that will affect how the team involved with policy compliance carries out
their work. Operational work is deeply embedded within the community context in the case of
CRA. Here, the construct is called community market context as an umbrella theme. The
community includes the assessment areas where banks operate, while the market refers to the
economic activity in that area. Variables of interest for this construct included market
competition from non-bank financial institutions, large banks, or credit unions; changing
communities (as demographics changed or incomes rose, banks would find that fewer LMI
residents lived in their assessment areas, limiting opportunities for CRA-qualified investments);
and community pressure on the bank to do more for the community. Market competition also
included the code “decline of the community bank,” which connects to a narrative around
community banks in America declining in numbers due to the proliferation of larger banks,
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exacerbated by extensive banking regulations and overhead cost. One facet of market context
was modernization and its impact on the workplace. A related code was “technology changing
the way we work,” where the CRO pointed to new banking technologies and the necessity of
advanced data software that might require sophisticated skillsets. Another code was “innovation
and intrapreneurship,” which necessitated keeping pace with market needs by innovating new
financial products or services for market opportunities. Two other variables of interest with
regards to operational work were whether the CROs were banking in their home states, and the
number of years they had spent in the community. These were collected via the Demographic
Questionnaire.
Relational Work
The final aggregate dimension of the institutional work framework, relational work,
entails managers’ efforts to build trust and collaboration between the people involved in policy
compliance. Relational work is intimately connected with the other three types of institutional
work, and in fact without it, the others are unlikely to be successful. Relational work requires
trust and collaboration between team members (Cloutier et al., 2016).
The aggregate dimension of interest here, relational work, was a primary mechanism for
expressing CROs’ individual attributes and backgrounds. This is because the ability to both trust
oneself and for others to hold that same trust while working collaboratively, is intricately linked
to the social construction of the individual. Social construction refers to the notion of how
individuals develop their knowledge of the world through social interactions. These
understandings are historically and culturally situated (Burr, 2015). They are also core to the
construction of trust. There is one key construct of interest here, professional identity.
Professional identity is understood as one’s professional self-understanding based on beliefs,
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values and experiences (Ibarra, 1999; Slay & Smith, 2010). It also has been defined as
internalization of the norms of a profession leading an employee to think and act like a member
of that community (Welch et al., 2020). Professional identity included CROs’ self-understanding
of their professional roles as outreach or compliance professionals, where the codes were “CRA
necessitates community outreach” and “CRA equals compliance.” These themes refer to
divergent understandings of what being a CRO entails, including community engagement versus
a focus on regulatory compliance. A final set of codes was within the area of professional
interactions. This set included “in their shoes” (interpersonal relations with the team were
enhanced because the CRO had held similar roles to others previously and understood what the
day-to-day of other teammates entailed), “teamworking” (the capacity to effectively cooperate to
accomplish collective goals), and “agreeableness” (the aspect of professional identity that leads
to contentment in the workplace and investment in one’s work and relationships) (Wilmot &
Ones, 2022). Additionally, the personal identity variable of gender was included here, because as
expressed by women CROs, gender was an aspect of their professional identity. Professional
identity also included the more directly measurable variables of seniority in the bank, years with
CRA responsibility, and years in banking, which were included in the Demographic
Questionnaire.
Summary
Throughout the coding process, patterns in the codes became themes. Themes identified
early on in the data (even as early as the written reflections immediately after each interview)
were provisional. They were let go where they did not provide the most interesting ways to look
at the data (Braun & Clarke, 2013). Qualitative analysis is an iterative process. Themes and
subthemes, as well as numerous codes, were organized and reframed multiple times as the data
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became more familiar. In analyzing the data for the research questions, revisions of the NVivo
mind maps could be made while saving copies of the earliest drafts. Once the map was
satisfactory, the map was automatically turned into codes through NVivo’s “Create as Codes”
feature in visualizations. After that point, numerous rounds of adjustments were made in concert
between the code map and the NVivo codes to better capture the story of the data.
After themes and subthemes were identified, the analysis could be more fully developed.
This is the point at which the researcher starts to interpret and make deeper analytic sense of the
thematic patterns that have evolved from working with the data. At this point, writing of the
findings commenced, as in fact, writing and qualitative analysis should be done in parallel
(Braun & Clarke, 2013). The next chapter will explicate the findings of the analysis.
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Chapter Five: Findings
Introduction
This chapter discusses the primary findings of this dissertation in two parts, supported by
the empirical evidence. The subsequent chapter will discuss these results and elaborate upon how
they fit into the existing literature, as well is what is novel and adds to our understanding about
policy implementation.
The first data set was analyzed via the theoretical lens of institutional logics and
institutional work to understand the extent to which the perspectives can explain institutional
demand conflicts and actor-level responses. The report of the findings from the first data set will
begin with a presentation of the discourse that reflected dominant norms embodied by CROs. It
will then move into the specific pressures and responses that CROs express with regard to CRA
regulations that they see impacting their work. These findings are presented in Part One:
Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies. These findings were primarily informed
by discourse analysis of the first data set in this study, 80 letters written by bankers to the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in response to a 2018 Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPR) requesting public and banker feedback on proposed regulatory changes.
A development research strategy was employed in this study. Two sets of data, collected
via different research methods, were analyzed to generate rich observations about the
experiences of private sector managers—Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) officers
(CROs)—and how they interpreted institutional demands of public policies. The analysis
indicated that the institutional logics perspective holds promise in framing the responses. The
analysis was further enriched by in-depth interviews with a smaller sample of CROs to draw out
more contextual data regarding how CROs reconcile institutional demands stemming from
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public policy, as well as the contextual or environmental factors that influence their
interpretations and reactions. These findings were informed by 23 interviews with CROs who
worked for banks who responded to the ANPR. These findings are presented in Part Two:
Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies for Institutional Demands.
Part One: Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies
Research Question 1 (R1): To what extent can linking the institutional logics and
institutional work perspectives illustrate the potential for conflicting institutional demands
created by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) for regulated banks, as well as the conflict
response strategies of managers who are responsible for policy mandates?
Institutional Demands
To address the question of whether institutional logics and institutional work perspectives
may help to explain the potential for conflicting institutional demands created by the CRA, data
set one was analyzed for references to institutional logics (including bureaucratic, market, or
development logics).
First, findings regarding the dominance of a profit-first discourse, reflecting a market
logic, will be presented in this section of the chapter. Evidence of bureaucratic and development
logics will be returned to under the section of this chapter labeled “Institutional Change.”
Profit-First: Dominance of the Market Logic
In letters to the OCC where they had been invited to comment on the ANPR, bankers,
such as the respondent identified as “Gary,” described the need for reform of the CRA such that
it would align with their business models and practices so that they could continue to be “engines
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of economic growth” for community development (CD).27 Many conveyed that through their
lending and investment activities, economic development was catalyzed through the
infrastructure improvement, new businesses, and jobs that were created. Banks contribute to
development by providing access to capital, they maintained, thus associating the capitalist
market with economic growth, which may include, but is not exclusive to LMI communities in
the dominant viewpoint.
Gary stated simply that banks take “pride in being engines of economic growth,” a concise
summary of the prevalent view expressed by bankers that banks are economic development
catalysts. Many respondents asked that banks receive CRA recognition for economic
development more broadly, including for “projects that benefit the entire community,” or for
“workforce development [and] financing the construction of infrastructure and community
service establishments, such as hospitals,” “to upgrade sewer lines…” or for “homeless or abuse
shelters; drug addiction facilities; neighborhood revitalization projects; [and] financial literacy,”
as well as “libraries, theatres, [and] youth/senior centers…”. Craig suggested that community
development loans and investments receiving CRA credit should count financing of community
infrastructure “without regard to LMI geographies. Not allowing these loans/investments to be
considered as CD limits the economic development of all the communities a bank serves.”
Another anonymous banker suggested that its own investments count for CRA, as it spent
“millions of dollars building branches, building operation centers, and hiring employees in and
from LMI communities.”

27

To protect the identity and confidentiality of submitters to the ANPR, they have been assigned pseudonyms.
Where they submitted anonymously, the anonymous terminology was retained. All of the comments and letters are
available via the online repository (GSA, 2018).
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More directly focused on LMI individuals, Brighton Bank proposed that “job creation and
economic development initiatives in LMI communities should all count for CRA consideration”
and that the CRA not overly focus on low wage jobs such that they are prioritized over better
paying middle-income opportunities.28 Another bank shared a few examples of indirect impacts
of investments in moderate- or higher-income tracts, which could attract new businesses, and
create jobs for LMI individuals (William). “Shouldn't the standards reward banks for lending to
all companies that hire people regardless of the wages those companies pay” (Charles)?
The narratives often included comments about banks’ profitability and market competition.
Edmund asked for CRA reforms to be flexible so that a bank would be able “to compete in its
local market while maintaining profitability.” Arthur described how inflexible regulations
interfere with the free market:
Requiring banks to meet the lending, service, and investment tests artificially
drives funds to certain activities. The CRA regulations should be revised to allow
banks to serve their communities more effectively. Inefficient time is spent
monitoring this [sic] criteria. This has an impact on time, expense and efficiency.
Market competition was frequently discussed, especially competition between community
banks and larger banks. For example, Blythe argued that the regulators’ comparison of banks to
one another was challenging for “community banks who have difficulty competing with [the]
number of resources and lenders available at larger banks or banks with larger market shares.”
Echoing that sentiment, another banker lamented that they had only a small market share in their
assessment areas, thus “the opportunities for CRA activities are slim. The mega banks and large
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Bank names are also fictitious, and have been assigned pseudonyms where the submission was under a bank name
rather than an individual’s name.
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regional banks take the majority of loans and investments so smaller banks must get creative
when searching the CRA opportunities” according to one anonymous submitter. Another
anonymous banker expressed that “it is very difficult to compete with larger banks that lack
branches in our area but offer loans here. Since they don't have assessment areas here they are
able to make loans to only the best borrowers, those with the highest incomes and the best
credit.” In other words, they were able to take the most profitable higher-income customers from
the local banks’ market share.
Even for a larger bank, one bank echoed the peer-comparison challenge as a $10 billion
dollar bank being contrasted with trillion-dollar banks. Sarah, at this large bank expressed that
the even larger banks have “significantly greater resources, capacity and ability to provide a
broader range of products…peer assessments need to be tailored to the relative size and
operating models of the institutions being evaluated.” Furthermore, the respondent argued that all
institutions cannot serve LMI individuals equally. There will always be market leaders. There is
“a finite amount of demand for services, investments and loans at any point in time,” therefore,
the CRA regulations should not “penalize institutions that fall short of peers when they are also
actively trying to serve LMI areas” (Sarah). Understanding these nuances would require a more
localized lens of market competition.
Another quote illustrates that in addition to fierce competition for community development
products, banks stressed that each market looks quite different from others:
Opportunities vary from market to market and what is available in a major MSA
may not be available in a rural, underserved, or distressed county. For example,
in certain Assessment Areas, there is a limited availability of qualified
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investments and multiple banks competing for the same community development
dollar (Kathryn).
William echoed this sentiment, arguing that a bank’s performance must be tied to where it
actually has the ability to lend and has a market edge: “How can a bank with a very low market
share of deposits and relatively little name recognition in a community be expected to perform at
the same level as a bank with a longstanding presence in the community?” Brighton Bank
echoed that “banks need time to grow their business and services, develop relationships in the
community and expand their operations sufficiently to respond to the credit needs of the
community…” Furthermore, allow the bank to determine its assessment area “based on the local
economy…then validate if the community is being effectively served” (Jack).
Many banks were unhappy that the CRA does not apply to non-bank competitors, such as
credit unions or FinTech companies. To illustrate how this market competition could create
tensions for the bankers, one relevant example is a metaphor that expresses frustration with the
uneven application of regulations to credit unions:
Due to the lack of regulation, [credit unions] are able to offer interest rates that
our small community bank cannot match and would be criticized by our
examiners if we did. Ultimately, we're playing the same game as they are, but by
a totally different set of rules [emphasis added]. Until the credit unions are
required to follow the same criteria as the banks, many of our goals will remain
unattainable (Carrie).
Other bankers also expressed that non-bank competitors challenge regulated banks with
market competition, where uneven regulation was blamed for exacerbating the problem. Sarah
wrote about the number of non-bank mortgage lenders in its market, who were directly
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competing with banks for loans to LMI populations. “For example, in our California assessment
area during 2017, there were a total of 4,250 HMDA [Home Mortgage Disclosure Act] loans
originated…There were 590 lenders competing for this limited market of loan opportunities”
(Sarah).
Many of the other respondents echoed the call for CRA regulations to apply equally to nonbank competitors: “The time has come for credit unions to be held to the same CRA standards”
(Gary); “All banks and financial institutions that function as banks should be subject to CRA.
Credit unions, federal agencies (SBA, USDA, and Farm Credit) should all be required to comply
with CRA regulations and be subject to regular examinations” (Anonymous). Without CRA
regulations being “applied equally to marketplace competitors,” credit unions are able to
advertise statewide, yet invest their deposits in the biggest metro areas, just as the CRA does not
allow banks to do (Julia). Or as Albert expressed:
Our institution has been making residential mortgage loans since our inception,
and we feel strongly that this is a core part of our mission. Still, between the
intense competition from all sides (including credit unions not subject to the CRA
and large “factory lenders” like Quicken Loans) and increasing cost of
compliance, we are constantly questioning whether or not it makes sense to stay
in the mortgage business.
Not only did bankers express that credit unions are gaining more market share without being
subject to CRA, it was pointed out that credit unions are exempt from paying income taxes, and
thus “one could argue that they are well positioned to reinvest at a higher level of activity than
Community Banks that have always and continue to support local, state, and federal government
through the payment of our taxes” (Matthew). Agreeing that mortgage companies and credit
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unions should be held to CRA, Craig argued that “banks should not shoulder the responsibility of
community reinvestment alone.”
New market products also strongly affect business growth and profitability. “More credit
should be given to convenient services such as online banking, mobile banking, text banking,
mobile deposit, and even ATM access especially when these services are clearly invested in an
LMI geography” (Penny). Sarah also asked for credit for other forms of consumer lending that
serve communities, such as “student loans, automobile financing, credit cards and small dollar
loans.” Another example was Cassandra suggesting that a metric approach to CRA examinations
could provide more flexibility that would allow the bank “to choose the products and activities
on which we focus so long as we meet the prescribed ratio.” Others asked for financial incentives
to offer those new products: “Incentivize banks in areas that may need special incentives to lend
in an economically stagnant or depressed market…” (Edmund). Furthermore, regulation can
stifle modern market innovation. “It is imperative we provide excellent service while also
maintaining the latest in banking technology. However, to provide the latest technology, but be
regulated by rules put in place over 40 years ago, simply doesn't make sense” (Jack).
In sum, many bankers desired for CRA to better fit their business models and allocations of
financial resources that reflect their specific competitive environments and community
conditions in which they conduct business. “Understanding the monetary expectations for
support, perhaps compared to asset size, customer base or profitability would be helpful in
budgeting and allocation” (Jim). More generally, Charles argued that the CRA exam should be
“tailored to the bank’s business model.” Also expressing the need for flexibility in business
models, Sarah expressed the “challenges for various business models,” where peer analysis
reviews lead to evaluations of banks “in areas that might not make sense for the institution.” And
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while Sarah agreed that the general principles of the CRA were legitimate, “reform is necessary
to give greater consideration to the way banks do business today.” This idea of flexibility in the
regulations was a way for bankers to express that they needed to be able to operate according to
their market strengths while focusing on their communities. The regulations need to be “flexible
to adapt to changing [market] conditions over time,” to “determine whether more flexibility
should be allowed in order to incent smarter development” (Sarah), and to allow “strategic
flexibility that allows us to choose the products and activities on which we focus” (Cassandra).
And the regulations should allow “for greater flexibility to address the financial needs of LMI
areas outside a bank’s assessment area…” as well (Sandy).
Helen provided a closing comment consistent with the common position that the business
model of a bank requires that it already do what CRA intends for it to do, so why be further
regulated on it? Quoting from the CRA, Helen wrote: “if we were not "helping to meet the credit
needs of our communities, including low-and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with
the safe and sound operation of the bank,” we certainly would not be in business after 74 years.”
Helen’s synopsis is the final evidence reported here to illustrate the dominance of a profit-first,
market logic in the discourse of the respondents to the ANPR. In the next section, we move into
findings related to the evidence of conflict or tensions in the interpretation and reconciliation of
the public policy demands of CRA.
Institutional Logics Conflict
The bankers’ letters to the OCC discussed economic development, doing business, and
how regulation can constrain profits, such as when it is unevenly applied to diverse market
conditions. The letters also revealed tensions of both comprehension and administration of
regulatory mandates, particularly due to the ambiguity (or lack of consistency) in policy
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enforcement, as well as the strain of workload and resources. Some bankers expressed an
opposition to regulations more broadly, using the analogy of “big government” intervention, for
example. “This is just one more example of a cookie cutter regulation…It would be greatly
appreciated if banks of certain size or located in certain populations [could] be looked at
differently instead of big government throwing a regulation blanket on everyone [emphasis
added]” (Anonymous). Similarly, Henry spoke of regulators with “hidden agendas,” Benjamin of
regulators who “have adopted unofficial CRA goals (e.g. CRA activities should total a certain
percentage of assets or Tier 1 capital),” while Christopher pointed out that “like most regulation
the current system puts the burden of proof on the bank without any real guidance…” One
southern state’s bankers association argued that assessment areas are “overly restrictive and
arbitrary” and that “tying Assessment Areas to political subdivision boundaries imposes arbitrary
barriers to a bank’s ability to logically expand the reach of its services to customers by increasing
the risk inherent in an unnecessarily expansive CRA Assessment Area” (Blake). In other words,
these respondents believed that regulation and politicians should not define the market, but the
business model should.
Bankers also expressed that they had to navigate incongruities between multiple
regulatory logics. One set of regulations included safety and soundness standards that governed
underwriting standards and credit worthiness of applicants. The other set of mandates connected
to the CRA encouraged lending to LMI communities who typically do not meet those credit
standards: “CRA compliance cannot be a uniform stringent set of rules as there are too many
factors that can affect a bank's ability to compete in its local market while maintaining
profitability as well as originating safe and sound loans” (Edmund). Jack suggested that banks
under a certain asset size not be regulated by CRA so that the bank could “focus on safety and
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soundness and the many regulations which have been added over the last 40 years.” And
Edmund proposed that regulators address the safety and soundness of lending in certain LMI
areas on behalf of banks, and then incentivize lenders to lend in those markets, as opposed to
“[forcing] a bank to make unsafe and unsound loans that will take years before they will manifest
losses as a result of doing so.” One banker expressed that as long as LMI individuals qualified
for their loan standards, they would be happy to lend to them: “We are happy to lend to low to
moderate income individuals that qualify for our mortgage loan products and meet our normal
lending underwriting standards” (Paul). However, LMI individuals often do not qualify for
normal underwriting standards.
Others conveyed how government regulations have allegedly “damaged” their profits:
“Just as loan documentation and collateral requirements choke off lending to small businesses
and first-time homebuyers, overly aggressive CRA rules have the same effect” (Anonymous).
For another bank, “due to regulations implemented by government agencies [emphasis added],
the bank no longer makes loans on owner-occupied residential real estate. The elimination of
these loans has caused [sic] our loan-to-deposit (ltd) ratio to decrease substantially. This also
affects our income” (Anonymous). Or returning to Albert, who had detailed the difficulty of
making a profit from mortgages solely within his bank’s assessment area, his bank was
originating mortgages from outside communities where it had branches but was “concerned that
[the bank would] have negative repercussions in [its] next CRA exam because of it.” He seemed
incredulous that policymakers and bureaucrats would be complacent in the bank taking a profit
loss: “I personally can’t believe there is any regulator, or legislator, that would prefer we got out
of the mortgage business altogether because we can’t make money on it serving only our core
market.”
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In addition to more general objections about regulation and interference of “big
government,” the bankers also expressed specific grievances about the CRA policy framework.
The primary additional grievances could be categorized as ambiguity and strain of workload due
to committing additional resources.
With regards to ambiguity, defined previously as an inability to comprehend the
intentions of policy makers or regulatory agencies, many of the concerns centered on the lack of
consistency with policy enforcement, subjectivity of examiners or the challenges of not knowing
what would count or how to predict performance on a CRA assessment. In fact, ambiguity was
the most common code in the first data set, as references to ambiguity were coded 127 times
across 64 of the 80 files. Bankers asked that the CRA reforms “not make it more cumbersome
with ambiguity; [CRA] should be reformed with clarity and plain language…” (Carol) and
expressed struggle with the ambiguity of the regulation: “The biggest struggle I have with CRA
is that the regulation is vague in many key areas…” (Amber).
Joanne stated the challenge with interpretation of CRA due to policy ambiguity
concisely: “Are the current CRA regulations clear and easy to understand? No. The regulation is
very “gray” in areas and left to the interpretation of the examiner.” Or Nathan: “No, as a whole,
the current CRA rating system is not objective, fair, or transparent. In fact, the rating system has
become more subjective than ever.” Charles wrote: “The regulation is very convoluted, and the
commentary has gotten so voluminous it is hard to get your hands around. I suggest scrapping all
the commentary and write a regulation that is straightforward and much easier to comply with.”
Other bankers echoed this: “it creates a level of guesswork…” (Blythe); “the reasoning is
inconsistent and unclear” (Darren); “it should be clear and conspicuously written so that it does
not leave open the opportunity for variance in interpretation” (Linda); “There is also a lack of
185

predictability regarding CRA activities…” (Daniel); “CRA regulation and supervision have
become overly complex, unpredictable…” (Gary). Many of these phrases occurred numerous
times across separate letters. A quote from Gary summarizes many of the opinions expressed by
other bankers:
There is a lack of predictability regarding activities that count for CRA credit.
Regulators should provide clarity regarding activities that receive positive CRA
consideration. Challenges arise when: an activity qualifies for CRA credit during
one exam, but not the next; a bank believes that an activity will receive CRA
credit, but does not; and a bank is unable to obtain confirmation in advance that
an activity will receive credit.
As Gary expressed, a lot of the ambiguity for CROs is around which activities are CRAqualified. “An area of confusion that has plagued bankers is trying to understand what counts
towards CRA credit” (Alice); “we have experienced inconsistency from exam to exam regarding
activities that count for CRA from our regulator…” (Tina); “In particular, there is a lack of
predictability regarding activities that count for CRA credit” (Lucas). Additionally, perceived
lack of transparency is linked to ambiguity: “I do not feel the current CRA rating system is
objective, fair, and transparent…there is no clear definition on what innovative, complex, or
impactful really is and [these] can be very subjective and therefore, not clear or transparent”
(Penny). Furthermore, this perceived lack of transparency around activities that would count for
the CRA felt like regulatory failure for some. Without proper guidance, “how is the bank to
make strategic investment and loan decisions? The CRA regulation has failed if banks are unable
to determine if an activity is likely to receive positive CRA consideration during examinations”
(Anonymous).
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Some of this ambiguity was attributed to the inconsistency and subjectivity of bank
examiners. For example, Tina, asked, how can we judge “our performance when we do not have
clear expectations set for us by our regulators”? This sentiment that the regulators and examiners
have not set transparent expectations was broadly shared. Hyperbole was one rhetorical strategy
used to express this frustration: “One very knowledgeable regulatory compliance attorney noted
that a qualified CRA investment is ‘Whatever the examiner says it is. And that can change if it’s
raining outside [emphasis added]!” (Betty). Comments that echoed this frustration included, for
example: “[there are] inconsistent performance evaluations between and within agencies (and
even amongst field examiners)” (Blythe), and “examiners have inconsistent expectations
regarding documentation standards” (Alice); “CRA is indeed a very subjective regulation…[it]
depends on subjectivity issues of the examiner” (Edmund); And there are“…several areas of
subjective grading that exist in the process…” (Clyde). “This leads to a lack of transparency and
consistency regarding the assignment of CRA ratings…[which are] too subjective and often
depend[] on which examiner conducts the exam” (Alice); “CRA credit appears to be subjective
amongst examiners; what one examiner gives credit for another may not” (Sandy). Sandy’s
northeaster bankers’ association then suggested a training opportunity to their regulator: “We
believe the OCC should also develop universal examiner training to ensure examiners are
consistent and not subjective when conducting CRA examinations.”
Other bankers not only expressed their own views but contended that it was a common
concern among CROs in their professional networks with whom they had discussed these issues:
“No, the current regulation is not applied consistently because it allows interpretation…Peer
discussion indicates that there is no consistent application for identifying CD activities.
Interpretation is left to the discretion of the examiners…” (Kathryn); “Based on discussions held
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at our regular meetings, the underlying criteria used to arrive at the final grades are not uniformly
applied, neither across agencies, nor even by different examiners from the same agency on
consecutive examination cycles” (Peter). And Penny explained:
What I consistently hear from other CRA Officers is that Community
Development activities “count” depending on your regulator and, more
specifically, your examiner. The current system seems to allow for much
discretion on the part of each regulatory agency and on the part of the individual
examiner.
Many bankers expressed confidence about CRA modernization to address these
pressures. For example, Sarah declared that it “supports many of the concepts necessary to
modernize the framework to continue to encourage lending and investment in our communities
and provide greater clarity and transparency for CRA related activities and CRA performance
evaluations.” And William closed his letter with: “we feel this is an opportunity to provide
clarification and uniform performance standards that will assist banks in striving to meet
regulatory expectations for outstanding CRA performance and to even better serve our
communities. The need to modernize the regulation and ensure that it reflects the changing
banking industry and the changing needs of communities is evident to all.” Others asked for the
CRA to be rewritten with less ambiguity:
It would be very beneficial if the CRA was rewritten so that clear objectives are
outlined for the different size entities with the expectations under each test, clear
examples of investments that may be attainable depending on the size of the bank,
clearer definition of community development loans according to the size of the
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bank or category, tools for the collection of CRA service reportable criteria, etc.
(Carol).
Some bankers offered input regarding how CRA reform would help them to better
manage this ambiguity, particularly regarding access to data and software tracking systems.
There was not universal agreement, however, that an improved metrics-based system would be
beneficial. For example, Cheryl contended that a metrics-based framework would actually not
“increase transparency” and that the “quality of reinvestment activity matters just as much as
quantity.” She was wary of focusing too much on the dollar value of loans, and not enough on
the nature of those loans. But many bankers were interested to make better use of shared metrics
and databases. For example, “with the proper databases [banks] could have a wealth of
information at our fingertips that could essentially tailor a metric framework bank by bank.”
(Penny). Penny went on to suggest that this database could offer information on assets, deposits,
capital, and community development service, loans, and donations, so that banks could
benchmark with peers and determine their baseline. Jim added that financial ranges could also be
established for donations and investments, along with standardized data tracking systems. One of
the bankers’ associations found that “Community bankers generally support a more objective and
quantitative based approach to CRA performance. A metric-based system could be beneficial for
both banks and examiners in helping manage objectives and could add much needed
predictability and transparency” (Betty). Brighton Bank also felt that the introduction of metrics
for CRA performance would enhance understanding of performance expectations and offer
“greater clarity with regard to expectations.” They additionally argued that:
Examiners should be transparent about the databases they use to assess
performance and the assumptions they use to do their evaluations. If using
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proprietary data bases, examiners should disclose their assumptions. Banks should
have access to data and information used by regulators that will help to improve
their performance prior to their exams.
Carol suggested that banks be given access to the regulators’ tracking software.
The software and collection mechanisms/tools need to be reviewed and determine
which are the most beneficial for tracking and determining what “counts”. If they
were made easily accessible and not so costly every bank and regulator could use
them so a more accurate comparison could be made from bank to bank.
Similarly, Craig offered that banks could better “monitor or improve their community
development lending performance” with “real time data” from the regulators leading to
better tracking, and improved “CD lending strategy to achieve desired outcomes,
resulting in greater support of economic development in our communities.”
In addition to access to the databases and metrics of the regulators, many bankers
requested clarity on “activities,” or the financial services, investments and loans to specific
organizations or initiatives, that would count: “We believe the OCC should look to create a list
of acceptable CRA worthy activities that banks can look to when trying to achieve credit”
(Sandy); “there needs to be a more specific definition given that describes what is allowed and or
counted when examiners are reviewing a bank’s Investments” (Carol); “provide clarity regarding
activities that receive positive CRA consideration through an illustrative, but not exclusive, list
of approved CRA activities and a timely process through which banks could receive advanced
confirmation of eligibility for credit” (Blake).
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Some bankers pointed out that the ambiguities of the law made it difficult to
communicate to other internal or external stakeholders, such as bank leadership or their
communities: “Without a defined standard, it is difficult to advise bank management on when an
assessment area should be expanded” (Amber); “While the CRA regs [sic] are generally easy to
understand for those who are intimately involved in the Community Development arena, the
regulation is not clear to all senior level bank managers or to community groups” (Peter). And
the reform could offer a way for CROs to manage internal expectations: “A metric-based
approach would make regulatory expectations known and reduce subjectivity. A metric would
also enable a bank’s executive team to establish CRA goals, obtain Board signoff, and have
confidence that the bank will receive a particular CRA rating if it achieves those goals” (Eric). In
addition to more clearly communicating to other stakeholders in the CROs’ spheres, some simply
asked for more clarity so that they could spend more time on intent of CRA, community
development:
Providing clearer guidance in what is expected of a bank would be helpful to
ensure a bank is meeting the needs of its communities and surrounding areas so it
can spend more time developing programs, products and/or services to assist
those that may be unbanked or underserved (Benjamin).
Bankers argued that they knew their markets and were best positioned to be responsive and
innovative to serve their respective community development needs. Speaking on behalf of their
many members, a midwestern bankers association pointed out that “the needs of the community
are often fluid in nature and require a system of evaluation/interpretation that is very specific to
knowing that market. Being highly responsive to the community needs often requires the bank to
be innovative.” Furthermore, the association wanted to recognize that the tensions experienced
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by CRA regulations were more with regulatory practice than with the underlying intent of the
law:
Our members want to do what is right for the communities they serve. They want
to fulfill, and often surpass, the expectations of the spirit of the Community
Reinvestment Act in their operations, practices and culture of their organizations.
Having greater certainty of the expectation, the evaluation of the overall
investment to CRA and consistency of what qualifies is needed. Banks also need a
process to ensure that an area of investment that they feel is highly responsive to
their community needs will be recognized in their evaluation (Ron).
Indeed, many bankers asked that the CRA lessen “additional compliance burdens to the
financial institutions whose business model[s] reflect [] the very nature of the Act itself
— community banks” (Helen).
The perceived ambiguity of CRA was also said to create a workload and “compliance
burden” for CROs (Anonymous). Much of the time, this often-cited regulatory burden was
related to time pressures to both engage in and document activities that would count for CRA.
For example, Sarah expressed that her bank “spends hundreds of hours partnering and engaging
in CRA programs…as well as vying for loans and investments.” Much of the time the programs
don’t count for CRA and the loans or investments don’t come through. Two quotes further
illustrate the time burden that ambiguity causes:
We are spending hours trying to find "proof" that a loan will qualify without
knowing what kind of proof will actually satisfy the examiner. All while knowing
what worked last time may not work with the next examiner. This ambiguity
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causes confusion and takes time and resources that community banks don't often
have [emphasis added] (Darren).
Oftentimes, a considerable amount of time and resources have been invested
[emphasis added] in loan, investment or service activities that one agency has
determined eligible for community development merit, only to discover at the
time of examination by either the same or another agency the activity will not
receive positive CRA consideration (Cheryl).
As expressed above, the time pressures are often related to research and documentation.
For example, “each bank is spending lots of time “proving” an entity qualifies when probably
every other bank in the area has already “proven” that the entity qualifies,” while any additional
tracking of loans would add to an already “heavy tracking burden” (Penny). The organizations,
such as nonprofits, that must be investigated and documented can range in the hundreds:
“Annually, we can investigate and gather documentation for over 900 nonprofits, which requires
significant time and resources.”
Eric echoed the theme of wasted time, mentioning that individual CRA examiners are
requiring different methods of calculation on community development loans, leading to the need
to redesign their analytic processes multiple times: “This caused confusion, wasted employees
[sic] time, and resulted in inconsistent CRA credit…”; “the amount of time it takes to document
any and all events that qualify under our tier of CRA regulations is overly burdensome”
(Hubert); “an enormous amount of time is spent tracking, researching, and documenting loans,
investments and services to LMI income geographies that we believe would qualify for
Community Development only to be told that it does not qualify at time of examination” (Linda);
“banks spend a substantial amount of time reporting and documenting the CRA benefit of an
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initiative, project or activity, without necessarily having clear guidance about how acceptable the
documentation will be to examiners” (Brighton Bank).
Although closely related to time, educating and keeping track of staff was mentioned as a
workload barrier as well. Jason noted that “the first challenge is educating our staff on what
qualifies for [community development] loans, services, donations and investments.” “Educating
and empowering staff to make qualified donations [is] difficult because there is uncertainty as to
whether they will receive CRA credit at the next exam” (Blythe). With regards to knowing what
staff are doing for community service, Jack shared that “we feel our employees are either our
best asset in the success of the bank or our largest struggle…We have chosen to encourage and
support employees as they become more involved in various organizations and activities within
our community.” Similarly, another banker complained that “the cost of maintaining and
correlating activity diaries across hundreds of employees is expensive and unproductive”
(Anonymous).
Time for compliance and education of employees regarding regulatory mandates also
requires financial overhead, and “is both expensive and confusing” (Betty). “Regulatory
reporting costs could be significantly reduced if CRA regulatory agencies provided greater
clarity and consistency about which activities qualify and offered guidance on what
documentation is sufficient to report” (Brighton Bank). Daniel called on the regulatory agencies
to “reduce the cost and burden of CRA evaluations…Any new CRA related costs need to be
offset by an easier framework to operate under.” And one banker went so far as to say that CRA
was the most expensive and least effective banking regulation: “Currently CRA compliance is
one of our most expensive compliance burdens while at the same time, we believe, one of the
least effective in achieving its stated goal of increasing lending and investment in LMI
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neighborhoods” (Anonymous). One banker even put this time into financial terms, noting the
time required to prep the data for CRA: “Tracking involves 10 hours a month costing on average
$250 a month and $3,000 annually” (Anonymous).
The workload is also sometimes necessarily passed onto partners, placing strain on those
relationships. For example, Tina explained how her bank was not able to count donations to
United Way because they donate to entire communities rather than specifically to LMI, thus they
would need to ask United Way to document the LMI portion. This burden “has caused strife
between the bank and the organization.” Similarly, Benjamin expressed that “banks should not
be expected to micromanage nonprofits and document the precise area to which every dollar
goes.”
For some bankers, the workload of the CRA was unbearable. For example, Anthony
described how he had been with his bank for 25 years and that this was the first time he had “felt
the imperative need to comment on proposed regulation reform.” This was because the “current
CRA regulatory framework is entirely unfriendly and over cumbersome on any community bank,
regardless of asset size, that is located in a smaller populated rural area…” Anthony expressed
that it was his “sincere and urgent request [emphasis added] to “exempt or re-define” how small
banks in rural communities are evaluated. Similarly, Henry, called for CRA regulations to “be
simple and reduce the cost of administration. Documentation needs to be streamlined. Please
don’t allow this to be another reason small banks sell [emphasis added].” And Jack declared that
“documentation requirements to maintain an exam rating which does not matter to the
community is a waste of valuable resources. This move would be the first of several necessary
changes to ensure community banking does not become extinct [emphasis added].”
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As with the call to clarify the regulations, bankers expressed their desire for the
regulators to lessen the regulatory burden so that banks could “continue to meet their
community’s needs far into the future” (Julia). “We have provided the preceding points of
interest that challenge our bank’s CRA resources and time, in hopes that modernization will
provide relief to enhance our efforts to focus on ensuring that all of our communities have
greater access to credit, community development services and economic development” (Cyrus).
The workload and “voluminous double reporting…creates unnecessary administrative burden
and siphons resources away from entities serving underserved communities” (Don). And while
one bank’s “efforts are done with a great sense of pride…the complex CRA regulation focuses
more on accomplishing number goals versus assessing and serving the needs of the areas we
operate in” (Lynn). In other words, if the business cannot be profitable, it will not be able to
serve the community at all, including LMI and underserved populations.
Even so, a retired CRO offered the most biting critique of the industry’s complaints about
the regulatory burden in his declaration that the intent of the CRA “was never to establish a
checklist approach so banks could fulfill the requirements of the law without achieving anything.
Burden is an excuse that inefficient banks use to increase their profits rather than improving
their services or products for their customers [emphasis added]” (Steve).
Institutional Maintenance
Evidence of conflict with institutional demands was presented in the previous section.
This section will focus more specifically on the discursive and narrative techniques that bankers
employ in reaction to the CRA, as they attempt to maintain their existing business practices,
avoid further regulation, or even go back to the old way of doing things. Analysis specifically
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examined bankers’ use of discursive strategies, such as narrative and rhetoric, as they attempted
to avoid further regulation.
Conflict Response Strategies: Avoidance
Bankers may seek to avoid regulation via a number of strategies of agenda denial that
were evidenced in letters to the OCC, primarily centered around denying that a problem exists.
For example, bankers may deny that a problem exists and conclude that they do not need to be
regulated. For example, the following comments indicate that banks would serve their
communities effectively regardless of the existence of the CRA: “Community reinvestment is
necessary for the bank to be profitable” (Jack). “As a locally owned and organically grown
organization, we have long been committed to safe and sound banking practices and serving the
needs of the communities in which we do business” (Sarah). “We are part of the fabric of our
community…It seems counter intuitive that a rural bank like ours wouldn’t be serving its
community” (Barbara). “If a community bank does not serve its community, it will not succeed”
(Kathryn); “clearly community banks are dedicated to the areas [where] they conduct business”
(Henry). Similarly, “we are committed to the goals of meeting the credit and financial services
needs of our customers and communities. Our survival depends upon meeting this goal” (Carl);
“our community bank [] must meet the needs of its community for its survival, regardless of
regulation” (Jason). “We are a reflection of our community, we live and die by how well our
community thrives. We lend, support and invest to make our community better. These items
which enhance our community should be awarded CRA credit” (Daniel). “Having worked in
many small town banks, all of them not only went above and beyond with their customers and
towns, but they were above and beyond according to what was required by CRA” (Anonymous).
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This rhetoric indicated that the regulation is useless. By arguing that the situation would not
change with or without the regulation, the bankers are indicating that no problems exist.
Worse yet, the CRA was simply painted as entirely ineffective by one small community
bank in the south: “The current regulatory framework does not support the goal [emphasis
added] of effectively serving the convenience and needs of the entire community and encourage
banks to lend, invest, and provide services to LMI neighborhoods based on today’s banking
environment” (Anonymous).
For many banks, this felt quite personal. For example, recall Helen, who felt that if the
bank was not meeting credit needs of its communities, how was it still “in business after 74
years”? “CRA, in reference to my bank in an undesignated rural town of 600 people, has little
value to consumers or regulators” (Kerrie). “We do this in order to be successful as a bank and
not to meet CRA requirements” (Jack). “Iowa banks are and have always been committed to
meeting the credit and financial needs of their customers – not because of the requirements of the
CRA – but because banks cannot exist if they don’t” (Julia). “ICB consistently demonstrates its
dedication to the Wisconsin farmer and its communities as a whole, because it is the right thing
to do, despite the fact that outdated CRA guidance does not qualify most of these commitments”
(Stephen). “We are very proud of our industry and our community. Our motto: "Locally Owned
and Community Focused!' is our core belief and hand painted on the bank's wall. That belief had
nothing to do with CRA requirements” (Jack).
Other banks also felt that they would continue to do right by their communities without
CRA. For example, one community bank felt that they “understand the challenges of keeping
local deposits invested in our local communities…this was the basis for the creation of most
mutual savings banks and cooperatives. Our commitment to those fundamental values has never
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wavered” (Albert). And one savings bank declared that it “is a 149-year-old mutual organization
who gives back in countless ways each and every year. With thousands of employee hours and
many thousands of dollars in grants and donations given annually,” the bank is “left wondering
how all we do for our customers and communities can have such little impact on our Community
Reinvestment Act rating”? (Ramsay).
Another strategy of agenda denial was to suggest that regulation would interfere with free
market principles, while unnecessarily stifling needed community development innovation:
“Ideally, it would be best to regulate all lenders to create a level playing field but politically, that
would be an unrealistic expectation which would negatively affect the economy as a restraint of
trade” (Edmund). Furthermore, “banks trying to meet obscure CRA objectives are pulled away
from innovation that would better serve their customers and communities” (Blythe). The lack of
clarity meant that banks could not be “more innovative to address real needs” of LMI
communities (Ron). At worst, the CRA is faulted for actually working against its own
proclaimed goals to support underserved communities: “CRA implementing rules have not kept
pace with the times or with new technologies and actually restrict investment in the communities
that the law is intended to benefit” (Anonymous).
Some of the discursive strategies of the CROs in the first data set were consistent with
policy narratives, including narrative plots and characters. The first narrative plots identified
were stories of decline, essentially where the plot centralized on conditions worsening because of
the CRA.
For example, one of these narratives was from a small, rural community bank in Texas.
The Executive Vice President shared his “imperative need” to comment on the CRA policy
regulations, sending in his “sincere and urgent request” to exempt intermediate small banks
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(ISB) from the “near impossible” regulatory mandates. He detailed how the bank had been in
business for over 100 years. Even though most of the bank’s loans are to small farms and
businesses, and LMI individuals, the FFIEC (2017) geo-codes show that the LMI population is
dispersed, thus “efforts to target loans to the two small LMI Geocoded areas is next to
impossible” (Anthony). Furthermore, it is “near impossible” to invest in rarely available local
city and school bonds, and documentation of CD tasks is “arduous” for the “27 hardworking
individuals that do not have the time to stop serving our customers that have entrusted us with
their business, just to document that we are serving the very same individuals that we are having
to ignore due [sic] documentation that fact.” Anthony closed with his assertion that the regulators
would be “hard pressed” to find anyone in the county that did not believe that the “bank does
anything but serve a very healthy cross section of this community. Therefore, I sincerely pray
that you would find some way to offer banks such as ours some form of relief from this highly
burdensome CRA ISB regulation, which I believe was intended more for metropolitan areas.” In
addition to conveying the great burden which the CRA regulations would impose, which would
harm the end customer and the hardworking employees of the bank, the plot depicts the bank as a
hero in the community who cannot continue to do that good work unless the regulators (the
villains), lessen that burden.
In Nebraska, another rural banker told a similar heartfelt story. Located in rural Nebraska,
this bank is located in a “sparsely populated, rural area…”
The bank tries hard to make every loan we can that fits within safe and sound
lending parameters. Many of our employees grew up in this area and want the
area to prosper and succeed. Our employees are active in the community and both
they and the bank contribute financially to many organizations and events.
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Joe, the bank president, went on to share about his bank’s challenges with the mandates of the
CRA, specifically how credit is not given for important community development activities. He
specifically told one story:
Recently the bank provided a large donation for the construction of a new
community swimming pool [for] which the bank did not receive any CRA credit.
Without the bank’s contribution, it is unlikely the pool would have been built,
leaving the kids in a community of 800 without a summer activity…(Joe).
He went on to share that many of the bank employees held key positions in the
community, such as the mayor, school board president, positions at the chamber of
commerce, economic development committees, and so on. He suggested, “one test to
consider would be to see how the community would function if the bank were to
suddenly leave the area. This possibly is a different issue in a rural setting compared to an
urban setting where there are numerous banks” (Joe). This depiction of the bank’s vital
role in the community gave it a hero stature of sorts.
Jack also spoke of the significant damage inflicted on community banks by banking
regulations, employing anti-patterning by blaming the ills of the CRA on large banks, and thus
depicting both the regulatory agencies and large banks as “villains.” As a result of the regulatory
burden, inflicted because of the transgressions of larger banks, community banks are on decline,
largely closing their doors or being acquired by large banks. Yet, it is specifically the community
banks who uniquely focus on community reinvestment.
Community banks have been irreparably affected and harmed by the numerous
regulations they have been forced to address due to the actions and activities of
some large institutions. The result has been obvious and devastating to rural and
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small communities. The number of small banks who have either closed or sold to
a large institution has been well documented by a number of publications. As the
number of community banks has decreased, that void has been filled by large
institutions. While they may fit the requirements of CRA purposes, they are NOT
supporting the local community or economy. While they may give to national
organizations or large relief efforts, they are not providing the unique
reinvestment the CRA Act was intended to monitor in small, rural economies
(Jack).
Another banker spoke of the severe repercussions for banks that receive poor CRA ratings:
“Some banks have lost their ability to branch nationally as a result. If the results are unknown or
unpredictable some banks will choose not to branch or choose to close branches in LMI
geographies rather than jeopardize their system” (Anonymous).
In addition to stories of decline, one banker’s narrative aligned with stories of control, in
that it offered hope by implying that the CRA could be modernized, allowing the underlying
goals of the law to be met better than ever before. Bethany wrote that the CRA was passed to
encourage financial institutions to meet communities’ credit needs and to guard against
redlining. She believed that “the CRA regulations are clear and easy to understand, but they are
interpreted differently by the various agencies and by the examiners within those agencies.”
In today’s times, CRA has been a thorn in the side to financial institutions due to
the frustration of how it is applied…If CRA were to be reformed and have a set
standard for every institution to follow, I feel as if the thorn would be
removed…Financial institutions are trying to meet a blind goal that could be

202

acceptable for one institution but not acceptable for another. Financial Institutions
are struggling with “what is enough?”
Bethany went on to describe how peer benchmarking can create unrealistic expectations, and that
thresholds for performance need to be clearer. Ultimately, she felt that CRA and banks are
aligned, and that with reform, the CRA could help banks to do even more in their communities:
Financial Institutions are to serve people, to build long lasting financial
relationships, and to be prominent members in the community; CRA reinforces
these principles. CRA is necessary, useful, and beneficial tool to the communities
we serve; it encourages institutions to live up to the integrity of the services they
should provide, but financial institutions are questioning whether the regulation is
being used to implement punishment rather than encouragement. With CRA
reform I think Financial Institutions would see that the agencies are trying to work
with them instead of against them (Bethany).
Though several policy narratives were identified, more independent metaphors of heroes,
victims, and villains were often found as isolated references within the letters. For example,
returning to the theme of uneven regulation, there were many references to non-bank institutions,
such as credit unions as “villains.” A few are included here. For example, Matthew argued that
since credit unions do not pay income taxes, should they not be even better “positioned to
reinvest at a higher level of activity than community banks”? Daniel echoed that given their tax
break, credit unions “should be held to a higher standard than tax supporting banks. There is no
reason for credit unions to be exempt from CRA…” And Marty didn’t mind the CRA so much,
but did feel that the credit unions ought to be kept in check:
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We are facing competition from large Credit Unions located in different parts of
the state. They are not required to pay taxes and not required to meet CRA
requirements. This makes it hard to compete. We do not begrudge the CRA act,
for it is important that our banks be required to support projects that will benefit
low income individuals. But I would like to see Credit Unions included in these
requirements.
At times the non-bank “villains” were unidentified, but simply alluded to as predatory lenders:
“CRA has made great strides in ensuring access to credit in LMI communities and among
minority and low income borrowers. Systemic economic and social challenges, however,
perpetuate to lack of access to fair services for many and allow predatory providers to thrive.”
Additionally, in an anti-patterning strategy, many community banks argued that large
banks were the “villains.” Returning to Jack, he argued that given the decline in community
banks, large banks were filling that void and not providing the type of reinvestment the CRA had
intended. Sarah also expressed that they “recently had a more challenging time competing with
the largest institutions for investments.” Even when they bid competitively, the investments were
still going to the large institutions. And recall one banker’s comment that “the mega banks and
large regional banks take the majority of loans and investments” (Anonymous). Cyrus also felt
that his bank’s struggles were directly linked to “super-regional large banks or much larger
financial institutions, whom [sic] often own a majority market share” as well as the non-bank
financial institution in the markets “whom [sic] operate under their own distinct supervisory
authorities; thereby, creating a competitive imbalance and inflating the aggregate metric for true
peer comparison.”
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Perhaps most telling of the “victimization” the small banks feel by the large and
villainous mega banks is Don’s description of how this has actually hurt the communities CRA
was intended to help: “The decline in the number of locally-based banks and the consolidation of
banking assets by a small number of $100-plus billion money center banks has had profound
effects on access to capital in LMI communities.” Don expressed that CRA is meant to help
those communities, while their ability to have fair access to loans is hindered “as more credit
decisions are made by geographically remote corporations and/or credit scoring models replace
relationship banking.”
Institutional Change
Not all of the bankers’ references associated with conflicts in institutional logics were
strictly linked to more isolated mentions of profit, acquisition, and growth (evidence of a market
logic), nor did all bankers voice that the CRA is conflictual with their goals. Furthermore, many
of the letters spoke of more harmonious experiences with the CRA, and thus were
conceptualized as compromising tactics given the regulatory pressures of the CRA, as opposed to
avoidance tactics. Even so, the discourse is still heavily rooted in economic interests, as opposed
to the policy emphasis of equitably serving LMI communities. These conceptualizations will be
reproduced in the following section.
Conflict Response Strategies: Compromise
References to alignment between the profit-seeking business model of a bank,
community needs, and the public benefit intent of the CRA were more prevalent than expected.
In some cases, an attitude reflecting that the bank would benefit their communities without the
CRA was coded as agenda denial, especially where language specifically indicated that the CRA
was not an impetus for any of the community development activities of the bank. Yet, there were
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multiple banks who emphasized the importance of alignment with the goals of the CRA and
expressed a perspective that the CRA had worthy intentions and served an important purpose. In
fact, second only to the code ambiguity, this code, labeled shared value, was the most common
theme in the data, coded 102 times across 55 of the 80 files. While findings related to “shared
value” encompassed discourse that related to the market logic, this discourse also exhibited
verbiage related to community development and public benefit.
One conceptualization of a bank’s role as an “economic engine” relates to this concept of
shared value, and heavily alludes to both capitalist market activity, as well as espoused
communal values. For example, Alice wrote that her bank takes “pride in being a community
bank that helps to promote economic growth in a state where the poverty rate has not decreased
since the recession.” And Darren declared that his bank was both committed to the goals of CRA
and proud of its role as an engine of growth. Cyrus expressed how committed his bank is to the
goals of the CRA and their shared purpose in capital access, as well as pride in being “leaders of
economic growth and community development” through “substantial financial support,
economic investment, considerable service hours and volunteer philanthropy…”
Lucas and Blythe both described what this dual bottom line means to their banks, who are
committed to “the goals of CRA” and to providing access to credit for their communities:
We are very active in area schools and local community college campuses with
our Financial Literacy programs, we serve on the boards of the Boys and Girls
Club and Habitat for Humanity, and take advantage of investing in CDFI's to help
facilitate affordable housing initiatives. Simply stated, we take pride in being a
catalyst for community and economic development for our customers in the areas
in which we serve (Lucas).
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[Our bank] is committed to serving its communities with conservative banking
practices and progressive banking products. We strive to build stronger
communities by helping local businesses with their financing and cash
management needs. We help build neighborhoods by making it possible for
homebuyers to buy, build or renovate property. We give back to our community
through our donations and personal involvement with area schools, local
organizations and civic groups (Blythe).
These descriptions of banks’ roles in community development and affordable housing paints a
picture of shared value, and the belief that a community cannot survive if the bank does not
invest in it.
The vital role of a bank, and its intimate link with the health of its community was
prevalent. For example, Daniel wrote that “we are a reflection of our community, we live and die
by how well our community thrives. Almost directly echoing the previous statement, Barbara
wrote: “We are a reflection of our community, we survive by how well our community thrives.
We lend, support and invest to make our community better.” Many other bankers also felt that
they were part of the social fabric of their communities: “We are not only located in the
community, we are part of the community from teaching financial literacy, to coaching little
league, to church members, to civic leaders. We want our communities to prosper and grow
along with our institution” (Cassandra). “Community Reinvestment and building vibrant
communities is an area in which we have a great deal of passion and commitment” (Craig). In
one specific example, Kathryn wrote how banks may even play key roles in the public education
system: “In many communities, financial education is no longer taught in schools. A bank’s
involvement may be the only way these programs can make it into the curricula.”
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With regards to small business lending specifically as part of that economic growth,
Kathryn wrote that “small business lending is the economic engine that benefits the entire
community by providing jobs and services.” Frederick echoed that, writing that his bank works
“very hard to support businesses within our market so they may provide jobs and good [sic] and
services to the local economy.”
Other bankers wrote of mutual interests with the economic goals of the CRA, such as the
simple quotes: “CRA is critical to the economic lifeblood of LMI communities” (Don); “The
bank believes in the spirt of the CRA” (Clyde); “the bank is committed to the goals of CRA”
(Gary); “we are committed to the goals of CRA” (Alice); “we are committed to the spirit and
intent of CRA and we strive to meet the credit and financial needs of our clients in our
community” (Marty). Or, for example, the Michigan Bankers Association wrote that: “Our
members want to do what is right for the communities they serve. They want to fulfill, and often
surpass, the expectations of the spirit of the Community Reinvestment Act in their operations,
practices and culture of their organizations.”
Some banks wrote that their missions are aligned with the CRA: “As a small community
bank and the only bank in the county which is locally owned, being involved with our
community is embedded in our mission” (Jack). “We firmly believe in our bank’s mission to
serve the needs of our communities through our deposit and lending services, as well as
community involvement through investments, donations and volunteering” (Anna). A
bank/CDFI wrote: “We serve communities in some of the less economically prosperous states of
the country and are considered a leader in supporting job creation and financing housing needs in
these communities” (William). In another example, Brighton Bank stated: CRA has promoted
access to capital and equitable treatment and encouraged banks to invest in the people and
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neighborhoods where they do business, helping to create more thriving and healthy communities
that are essential to the success of the economy. Specifically, Brighton’s goal is “to build wealth
in our communities. The bank considers CRA to be good business resulting in well performing
assets that contribute to its financial success while also contributing to the economic health of its
communities and the people who live and work there.” Another example recognized the huge
financial impact of the CRA.
CRA has leveraged significant amounts of loans and investments for low- and
moderate-income communities. Since 1996, banks have issued almost $2 trillion
in small business loans and community development loans and investments in
low- and moderate-income communities. These investments are crucial to the
economic vitality of our neighborhoods (Anonymous).
Some banks asked for more flexibility so that they could serve even more LMI families,
even outside of their assessment areas: “If we could have this latitude, it would make it easier to
purchase investments that benefit LMI families” (Charles). Brighton Bank echoed this goal as
well, stating that its “aim [with reform] would be to promote reaching broader markets which
would serve more LMI places and people.” And Cheryl conjectured that a reformed CRA
framework would allow her bank to deliver more “community development activities.”
Others described how in collaboration with local partners, banks were well-suited to
identify the community development needs of their communities. Banks should identify their
“specific development needs,” and this should involve “engagement with community or
economic leaders (be that local governments or entities that support economic growth) that can
identify these needs” (Kathryn). The situation felt more unique for rural banks, who suffered
already from out-migration and economic flight. In these situations, the development needs of
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the community might look different, where “established communities have “pains” that affect all
members of the community. When community banks contribute to help build up a local county
fairground, schools, or the downtown…every dollar donated to build or maintain [is] helping to
reinvest in that local community” (Julia).
Banks also pointed to innovative products that can serve LMI customers, such as
alternative delivery channels that can better reach LMI communities (Blythe). CRA reforms
could provide incentives so that banks would “create more innovative financial tools,” which
would both support LMI communities and be profitable (Margaret). For example, a retail finance
program offering financing that would not otherwise be available, programs for health and
wellness, or other financing that could be offered to homeowners who cannot afford, for
example, home improvement loans (Kathryn). Another bank developed product portfolios, such
as small loans, and lower fees to support LMI households (Anonymous). In addition to new
product models, one bank suggested that better access to CRA data would help well-performing
banks to get more customers. Penny suggested that the public be able to access the same data as
the regulators and banks, so that they can compare banks’ community development initiatives as
they choose where they bank. Though it is public, it is difficult to pull it in one spot that could be
used to “shop around” (Penny).
In summary, while many banks desired reforms of the CRA, respondents expressed that the
general intent of the CRA was congruous with the goals of many banks to provide access to
capital that will support LMI and broader communities. For example, Brighton Bank encouraged
the regulators to continue to modernize CRA and look for shared value opportunities.
Accordingly, new norms were voiced, originating from a sustainable development focus, such as
suggesting investment in mixed income housing to avoid potential segregation of LMI
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individuals into blighted neighborhoods: “Although care is required not to promote negative
effects of gentrification in communities, banks should receive full consideration for all units for
promoting affordable housing opportunity in all communities and those that provide mixed
income solutions” (Brighton Bank). This bank joined others in expressing a commitment to
community development, but a belief that the structure of the CRA does not always align with
more nuanced understandings of pathways out of poverty. Enabling low-income persons to rent
or buy affordable housing in higher income communities can be a pathway out of poverty, in
their view.
In another example of discourse connected to sustainable development, Sarah suggested
consideration of mixed-use planning concepts where individuals could live and work, which
might help to decrease the need for vehicles, thereby also cutting carbon emissions while cutting
transportation costs for LMI families. Indeed, sometimes meeting the underlying goals of the
CRA felt like a mismatch between what counts for CRA and what truly develops communities:
“Is it better to support the schools, hospital or sports teams to build a strong community or wait
until people have hit hard times before giving support?” (Nelson). Additionally, Peter quoted an
economist in his reflection that “investments in early childhood development can reduce
downstream costs and support workforce productivity decades later.”
Carol closed her letter with a heartfelt note about both the importance of the CRA and the
need to reform it so that more banks would contribute to the vital work to be done in
communities: “We feel it is critical that the CRA be reformed and brought current as it is one of
the most important regulations in banking.” This reform would “have wide-spread impact on
improving our communities if banks are given clear, appropriate guidance on how to accomplish
the intended objectives.” Another bank echoed that call: “CRA can be a powerful tool to support
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disinvested communities, but we urge the OCC and other bank regulatory agencies to update
CRA lest it risk becoming functionally obsolete…A strong and effectively implemented CRA is
critically important to the LMI communities that we serve” (Don). Additionally, Don asked that
CRA reform “help promote financial inclusion among LMI populations, unbanked, underbanked
and other vulnerable populations.” Another banker warned against making the CRA too broad in
what counts as CD: “I feel like for us to make an impact and really move the needle for LMI
geographies and LMI individuals we have to keep “the main thing, the main thing” and keep the
CRA focus on those areas and individuals” (Penny). These quotes illustrate the passion that
many CROs express for their CRA work.
Part Two: Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies for Institutional Demands
Research Question 2 (R2): How do CROs reconcile the institutional demands created by the
CRA? How are their interpretations of policy mandates and references to institutional logics
associated with (1) features of their banks; (2) their communities; and (3) their individual
attributes and background?
This section will elucidate the environmental factors that influence CROs’ responses to
the pressures of the CRA and their adaptation to policy mandates. It will present the evidence
surrounding these factors in the second data set.
Structural Work
Findings related to structural work centered on the job duties of the CROs and their peers,
such as whether the CRO focused entirely on CRA or also managed compliance with other
banking regulations, and whether or not the CRO might also engage in community outreach or
have a lending or investment portfolio. Structure also connected to the staffing arrangements in
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the organization, the size of the team (including whether or not there were data analysts to
support the documentation required by CRA), and how both job responsibilities and team
composition connected to the overall workload of the CRO. Structure also was connected to
organizational authority, which was complex and multifaceted, relating to the reporting structure,
but also the diffusion of CRA responsibilities throughout the organization, and control of
financial resources, for example. The next section focuses on job responsibilities of the CROs
who were interviewed and will elucidate the nuances of the various arrangements of job duties
for CRO roles.
Job Responsibilities
The size of the bank correlates with the number of team members who are assigned to
work on CRA. It is not linear, however, with great variation especially at the larger banks.
However, in most cases, CROs at community banks are assigned CRA as one job duty among
many according to the bankers interviewed in this study. The participant identified as Robert, the
CEO for his bank, shared that he did have a named CRA officer at his $500 million bank.29
Previously, he had been at a $75 million dollar institution, “and in an institution of that size,
everybody wears multiple hats, and so there, we did not have the depth of the department like we
do here.” The theme, and even the verbiage, around many hats, was recurrent. For example,
Michelle shared her experience with this:
From what I run into usually in community banks your CRA officer wears
another hat or two. You’re just trying to keep the [lights on]… and usually you’re
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In order to gain access to interview CROs, to comply with human subjects research requirements governed by the
IRB, and to protect the identity of the respondents to ensure that they would feel comfortable discussing potentially
sensitive information, they have all been assigned pseudonyms. Pseudonyms were retained for respondents from the
first data set who agreed to be interviewed.
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a one person shop. Whereas a large bank has so many more resources as far as
people…at the larger banks, that’s, the only thing that person does. Alright, so the
focus is different.
Michelle’s response indicated the pressure of a CRA role at a community bank in survival mode,
just trying to keep the lights on. She compared the robust resources at a large bank to the lack of
resources at community banks. At most of the community banks, the CRO was also a
compliance officer. When assets reached a certain threshold, banks might be told they need a
CRA officer according to Michelle, James, and others.
In fact, Michelle described how her bank had gone through an exam and realized they
needed to focus more on compliance. But the job role was to be both the compliance officer and
the CRA officer, “because they didn’t think at that time the compliance officer would be busy
enough. And that certainly changed…” (Michelle). Not only did the work pile up, but Michelle
received no training either, without a predecessor. The bank president had been acting as the
CRA officer until that point, so Michelle “got no input from him whatsoever and so it [had] been
more of an experience by fire…” Furthermore, the weight was increased because of the
responsibility to get others to comply as well: “it’s challenging to keep everybody focused and
making sure they’re doing things the way they’re supposed to. And the way this job came into
play, they just tacked on the CRA stuff because they didn’t think that the compliance job was a
full-time job.” In fact, for some of the CROs, CRA was only a small part of their work portfolio.
Thomas, who happened to be quite committed to the importance of the CRA, shared that it was
only about 10-15% of his time: “More of my current role is focused on Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, reconciliation, and fair lending reviews and other compliance
reviews, but I mean 15% of my time is still a good chunk.” Thomas felt that the bank would have
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to have him devote more time to CRA with regulatory reform: “if the OCC passes a more robust
CRA rule or if the agencies decided to get together and pass a more robust CRA rule, I expect
that percentage of my job devoted to specifically community reinvestment act to increase by
quite a bit.”
Kathryn’s experience was similarly stretched across compliance functions: “I am full
time compliance officer, that’s my title.” Like Thomas and multiple others, she was also
responsible for HMDA, where her time was about equally split between the two. What’s more,
until recently, she was the entire CRA team, and that was for a bank with over 70 branches.
Previously, Kathryn had been entirely responsible for CRA, including “preparing for the
evaluations, putting all the information together, analyzing the investments, the loans, the
services, the grants for applicability. [She had] since then added an analyst…[who was] doing
that review of those community development instruments to make sure they have those qualities
that fit the community development and CRA definition.” Though Kathryn had a few analysts
conducting data integrity review for HMDA and small business reporting, she was alone running
the entire compliance program for an over $10 billion dollar bank.
Melissa confirmed that typically banks under $10 billion in assets may only have a “part
time CRA officer who [wears] a hat of something else.” Melissa got started in CRA specifically
at the time that her bank had decided that they were growing enough to warrant a full-time
person. She was able to enlarge the role and further develop the strategy. And Stephanie, at a
bank over $100 billion in assets, only did CRA, as did several other people on her team. But she
had been the sole CRA officer at a number of community banks previously, where she had been
able to run their entire CRA programs. Candice also shared that at smaller banks the CRA officer
would typically also do fair lending compliance, but that at larger banks the two functions were
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separated: “Sometimes if you’re in larger banks you’ll have separate people looking after each
part of it, but in smaller banks or moderate sized banks and smaller banks it’s going to be all the
same lineup.”
For the most part, holding other job duties, alongside CRA, appeared to spread the CRO
thin. While there were some synergies between fair lending compliance and CRA, some of the
regulations that CRO/compliance officers were responsible for had little to do with CRA and
would have just taken their focus away from it. For example, as a $5 billion dollar large bank,
Candice’s response to the percentage of her role focused on the CRA was:
It's a complicated question because I’m the Chief Compliance Officer and I have
duties that are spread across. CRA fair lending is one of my major duties. But I’m,
so I’m the CRA officer, I’m also the fair lending officer, but I’m also the OFAC
officer, I’m also the BSA officer. And the chief compliance officer, like all
together, so I have like the whole of compliance for my bank right now.
With responsibility across so many banking regulations, Candice could not have focused
significantly on just the CRA. In fact, CRA was sometimes not even considered the most
important job duty for some of the compliance officers who served as CROs at smaller banks. At
an intermediate small bank in the Midwest with just over $1 billion in assets, Leslie shared that
staff structure for the CRO really just depended on the main role of the CRO. For Leslie, she
reported to the Senior Vice President of Operations because 75% of her role was actually Bank
Secrecy Act. “So it's very strange, because you know even they don't consider the CRA to be a
full time position it's kind of ancillary to your main focus, so whoever takes on the role, whoever
they're currently reporting to, that's where it falls.”
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Furthermore, when the CRO was responsible for many compliance regulations, they
seemed to function more as a back-end data analyst as opposed to proactively engaging in
community development. For example, when asked how much time he spent on CRA, John said
“whenever I have an exam coming up, then I’m pretty much working on CRA stuff. But
whenever the exam is done and it’s kind of past us, then you know, the amount of time I spend
on CRA is a lot less. Then it’s just a matter of us updating data whenever it becomes available
[emphasis added].” John’s other work responsibilities were also analytic. His “non-CRA
responsibilities [were] primary BSA, fraud prevention, looking at filing SARs [suspicious
activity reports], looking at fraudulent activity and things such as that.”
And it was not just because of the other compliance job duties that the CRO could feel
like a back-end data analyst. Organizational cultures often relegated the CRO into an audit
function regarding financial activities of the bank:
There's not necessarily an emphasis, especially on the lending side, to go seek
community development loans, the emphasis is make loans and then CRA officer,
you need to review those loans to see which ones are CRA compatible or not…I
am not involved in the investments at all. Basically we have an investment
advisor that it is his responsibility to basically look at those investments that are
profitable for the company. He knows that I’m looking at them from a different
mindset than what he is, so he gets a little bit of information from me. But
basically we get presented an investment portfolio and told: here are the
investments that we've done for the quarter, do your research and see if any of
them are CRA compatible.
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Similarly, Michelle felt that her bank would mostly do the right thing for its community
on its own, and that her role was to just check the boxes for CRA compliance: “primarily again,
it was the bank would do it anyway, and then it was my job to see if, by any chance, we could
make it work for CRA credit or not.” Similarly to Kathryn, Michelle felt that the investment
team would “pretty much have an idea of what kind of investment they want to invest in and then
it’s going to be the back office side of CRA and see if, by any chance, you know, it’s got a CRA
purpose.”
A slightly more coordinated effort might be where the loan officer would check with the
CRO if something would qualify for CRO, which was a more effective way to ensure more CRA
activity. For example, John described how one of his loan officers would call him and ask
whether bonds for a specific school district would qualify for CRA credit, for example.
There was one scenario where a multi-focus portfolio appeared to complement and
strengthen commitment to CRA as opposed to spreading the CRO thin. In cases where the
banker also maintained a lending portfolio, she contributed to the CRA numbers and financial
decisions for the bank and also understood the roles of loan officers who contributed to CRA
lending. For example, Anna, though primarily focused on CRA, also had “a small lending
portfolio of affordable housing types of loans, you know, to nonprofits in the affordable housing
space.” Anna shared that if you looked at the expertise on their commercial lending team, there
just wasn’t anyone “very skilled at affordable housing.” She went on to explain how her
community outreach focus actually made her a prime candidate to play this role:
I just happened to serve on boards of a couple of affordable housing, you know
organizations, nonprofits and I’m a big advocate for affordable housing, and so I
just know a lot about the rules, and you know, and all of that, and so it kind of
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made sense. Oh, and then I also because of my community involvement, I have
contacts in the in the community that are in this business, who are occasionally
looking for you know the lender on the next project, and so they reach out to me.
So for me to take that referral and give it to somebody else … the clients who are
in my portfolio are clients that are new to our bank that might not have already
had a relationship with us, and rather than build a relationship with another
lender, you know, they just said why don’t you handle it? And, and it seems to be
working really fine right now.
Jane also had a lending portfolio. In fact, 90% of the CRA-qualified commercial lending
at her bank was in Jane’s portfolio! But in terms of job breakdown, she spent probably 35-40%
of her time doing CRA general responsibilities and the rest of her time in commercial lending.
Jane did not appear to have any trouble keeping up with both of these responsibilities, and she
was contributing substantially to the CRA activities of the bank as well.
If the CRO herself did not have a lending portfolio, there were also avenues to embed
CRA lending into job descriptions of the production roles in the bank. For example, at Candice’s
bank, mortgage bankers were designated as CRA mortgage bankers, “because they decided your
typical mortgage banker isn’t going to spend the time and resources, it takes too much time.” In
most cases, mortgage bankers would go for the higher dollar home loans, “the low-lying fruit,”
so they actually arranged the compensation structure differently for CRA mortgage bankers.
They still had a base and compensation overrides, but it was a different kind of incentive to
support the affordable housing loans.
In general, the small bank and intermediate small bank CROs interviewed were likely to
be in the compliance space responsible for multiple regulations, while large banks were more
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likely to have a 100% focused CRA officer. However, large banks varied substantially in that
regard and in the size of the team. Anna was at an institution with just over $1 billion in assets
but was fully focused on CRA (in addition to a small affordable lending portfolio, but no other
compliance regulations), while Kathryn’s bank was approaching $10 billion and still had not
created a dedicated CRA position. Additionally, Leah’s bank, over $100 billion had around 15
community development managers and another six to eight CRA compliance managers. Yet,
Luis’ bank, over $40 billion, only had five CRA team members total. He recounted one unnamed
large bank with more than 30 people on their CRA team and offered that his own team was a
“very small team…but mighty.” Similar to Luis, Stephanie was one of only three on the CRA
team. These small teams, and especially the CROs who were responsible for many compliance
regulations had taxing workloads.
Indeed, the broad data requirements and perceived ambiguity of CRA mandates often left
the CRO dealing with a complex workload. This was exacerbated by both responsibility for
multiple roles (especially managing other banking regulations) within the banks, but also by the
extent of data required by the CRA. Michelle conveyed that a lot of CRA work is “more of a
documentation…not only are you looking at service hours and you're looking at donations and
you're looking at investments or you're also looking at your small lending to small farms and
small businesses.” The data requirements meant that John’s experience as an economist served
him well in a CRA role. “I’m pretty familiar with all of the data out there from Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis. All of the income data, all the census data FIPS codes
and I’m familiar with all that…” John described how he maintained all the databases, pulled the
data down, sorted it, and identified which school districts would quality for CRA, for example.
John also had a person who would sit in on the loan committee meetings and see if he could pull
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any loans that qualified for CRA. As at most of the other community banks, CRA was a data
documentation and data analysis exercise above all. Ensuring that the data was clean was an
additional workload burden and stressor.
For example, Kathryn shared that “if our data integrity is not sound” then the regulators
would look at that during exams. “Is your data statistically accurate? And if it’s not then there’s
a whole other level of pain and suffering that goes on.” Kathryn was worried that the data burden
would only increase with the proposed regulatory reforms. She conveyed that modernization was
going to require banks to have to track historical loans and “all these different kinds of
transactions in a lot of different areas so it’s a massive, massive amount of record keeping.”
There were also differences regarding who took on that data gathering burden, but for the
majority of the CROs, it was almost entirely their responsibility. For example, Anna felt that her
lending team has enough “regulations coming at them,” so she looks at every single loan that
comes through to see if it qualifies. “I look at every one of them and go to loan committee, I read
every one of them, and I make my determination as to whether they qualify or not.” In a different
scenario at a very large bank, Melissa ensured that record keeping was a responsibility shared by
all. Melissa, though benefitting from a large team at her over $40 billion dollar bank, described
the meticulous record-keeping across the organization: “And then we track those goals monthly,
so we have tracking sheets and we track our banks’ activity at a market level, so you know, we
like to say we're exam ready, or nearly exam ready, at each and every time.” Everything was
documented in a software system, but Melissa had ensured that data keeping was diffused
throughout the organization. Smaller banks might not be able to afford this data-tracking
software. For example, Michelle shared how her bank just had a paper form that was completed
after loans such as small business or small farm loans were completed. But at Melissa’s bank,
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every team member had to log their service hours and the mission of the organization who they
worked for in the software system so that the “responsibility of data collection behind the
different pieces of community development” would be reported. Melissa felt that it was her
responsibility to set the goals, communicate them, and then report back to executive leadership
on how those goals were being executed. But it wasn’t her role to execute them. She had the full
backing of the bank’s executive team to set requirements for all of the bank’s market area
branches. Thus, she had created a team effort in the data tracking.
The perceived ambiguity of complying with CRA also contributed to the workload. This
was tied especially to the complexity of the policy regulations. For example, Barbara’s reflection
on the CRA was that it is “very complicated…it’s like to try and understand some of those
regulations, it’s like reading Greek and then trying to explain it to the other employees. I mean it
took me I don’t know how many years, to even halfway understand it and I’m sure I don’t
understand it completely.” And Robert felt the same way about the difficulty of understanding
the regulations: “I mean all of this stuff it’s, I mean it’s nebulous.” He went on to explain the
need to better understand where you are in meeting the requirements in the interim between
exams, which other CROs echoed.
The expressed lack of clarity over what would count for CRA, as well as not knowing
what to expect at CRA exams also were tensions. Kathryn recounted a $6 million dollar
children’s advocacy center loan. She wasn’t clear if it would count or not. “Well, now I’ve gone
from outstanding to needs improvement over one credit.” Similarly, Stephanie asked:
And what if you get it wrong? And then one of the examiners comes up and says,
you know, no I’m not going to consider any of these for CRA, sorry. And then
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your numbers go down or they get skewed and you know you go into an exam
thinking “oh, for sure I have this down,” and then you don't.
Stephanie continued, highlighting the unpredictability of the examiners’ decisions about what
would count for the CRA:
So I think that's the other challenge, when you have examiners who are not
consistent, which I’ve seen a bunch of times. You get the examiner in charge,
who doesn't even know, CRA, right they just got assigned to it. You never know
what the examiner’s going to take and accept or what it’s going to kick out on
you. Yeah, so it’s a lot of things, you know. It’s like you’re playing dodgeball
when all your teammates are out and you’re the only one and the other team has
all 10 players on their side. Like you can only do so much before, you know, you
think you got it, you think you got it, until somebody slams you on the side of your
head.
Stephanie laughed over her analogy comparing a CRA exam to dodgeball. But it was a powerful
expression of several aspects of the difficulty of the CRO role. First, it conveyed that she was in
it alone, that the rest of the bank employees were not contributing to the CRA compliance
enterprise (“all your teammates are out”). Second, she communicated the idea that the examiners
were trying to find flaw, keeping her in the dark about how well she was doing, and then
“slamming her with the ball” upon finding something that was inaccurate in the exam.
Modernization would require more data and record keeping “with no clear expectation or
explanation of how you’re supposed to get that information” (Kathryn). However, it did promise
some clarity on what would count for CRA, including an illustrative list. One issue though was
that it was unclear if modernization was moving forward or not, and thus Kathryn found herself
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having to analyze data two ways, the old way and the new way, and was not sure what would
stick. So the reform itself also created additional workload and was a stressor. Candice added
that this could be “kind of scary” that the regulatory agencies weren’t in sync about the direction
of regulatory reform.
Organizational Authority
In general, CROs in the study reported to a senior leader in the bank and felt that they had
significant responsibility for CRA compliance. This was often the chief executive, such as the
president or CEO of the bank for small community banks or large banks on the smaller side. As
banks approached $10 billion, there was likely to be another layer, such as reporting to the Chief
Compliance Officer. Mary reported to the Chief Risk Officer and was viewed as the “subject
matter expert for this topic.” In another example, Kathryn reported to her Chief Compliance
Officer: “Seniority wise I’m the second longest tenured compliance professional in our
compliance team.” At a large bank, Melissa reported to “a C suite member…[the] Chief
Communications Officer, so you know, good prominence with the CEO.” Even at one of the two
largest banks in the study, at over $100 billion, Stephanie only had one supervisor in between
herself and the chief compliance officer of the bank. And John and Anna, at banks closer to $500
million to $1 billion, reported directly to the President of their banks. Thomas felt that CROs
across the U.S. would vary widely with regards to who they report to in the bank: “You should
get varied responses for this…I would probably consider myself somewhere in the middle, so I
know that some institutions, their CRA officers are much higher up the chain and then some
institutions they are very entry level, so you should see the gamut…” For Thomas, being
relatively entry level meant that he did not have much authority:
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I can make recommendations, I do report to the board and the executive
leadership team, but when it comes to making an actual decision about our CRA
program I have to get everything approved by the board of directors and our
executive team here at this institution, [who] are very hands on, keep it kind of
tight, close to the vest on that one. That being said, if it is something that benefits
our community or the institution normally those leadership boards are very keen
to act quickly and allow for those activities to occur so it's not like they're holding
it at gunpoint; they're allowing these things to happen, but there's a definite
bureaucracy, a different chain of command and while they consider the CRA
important, it's definitely not at the forefront of everybody's mind here.
Thomas was one of the few Generation Y/Millennials interviewed, and was one of the
more junior CROs, while also being at a small bank close to $500 million in asset size. His
experience can be contrasted with Michelle’s, Anna’s, John’s or Lisa’s at similar size banks from
$300 million to $1.5 billion in asset size, but with greater authority for CRA policy. For example,
Anna said that she was “responsible entirely for the recommendations” for CRA, and “it is a
fairly important, high importance, in terms of the role.” Michelle felt that in terms of authority to
determine CRA policy implementation for the bank that she “pretty much had the full gamut.”
And John said, “I’m about the only person that deals with CRA, other than if I get a couple
people to help me.” Lisa similarly conveyed that “with CRA I do have total support from my
direct report, who is considered to be executive management and pretty much anything with
CRA, as of recent anyway, that I suggest or recommend for the most part, I receive buy-in.” And
at a small bank in the west with assets of only just over $40 million, Tina and Amanda, who
interviewed together, noted that the CRO reported to the Chief Risk Officer and was “just a
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couple of degrees of the top echelon” at the bank (Amanda). Tina, having been CRO previously
to Amanda thought that “your level of responsibility there is pretty darn high.”
These direct lines to the senior leadership of the bank often meant that the CRO was the
key strategist for CRA policy compliance. For example, Luis stated that he was “primarily
responsible for driving CRA policy, and that includes the development of the policy, as well as
procedure development. And so we have an enormous amount of controls around all of the CRA
activities…” Luis also chaired a CRA committee with executive leadership that would help steer
activity. In fact, Luis shared that most CRA officers “have a number of years under their belt or
have extensive experience in this space,” because there is so much authority for CRA strategy
placed with the CRO.
Despite the fact that most CROs reported to senior leadership, and that they were
responsible for CRA strategy, that did not translate into as much authority for CRA
implementation as might be expected. This was both due to the lack of influence over financial
decisions and resources in the roles, and because the nature of CRA meant that compliance was
affected by most senior team members in the bank, not just the CRO. While CRA strategy
typically did rest with the CRO, the financial aspects of CRA typically did not. This felt like a
career long struggle for Rosa. During a merger, CRA contributions “went down to the level that
[the acquiring bank] was accustomed to…” Rosa had to “fight” and try to convince them that
they were bigger, they couldn’t “spend less.” As a larger bank now, they needed to give more to
the community, not less. At budget time, if the budget had to be cut, “the first place people
always wanted to go was CRA.”
In addition to lack of control over budgets, the CROs typically did not have much
involvement in CRA qualified activities. Indeed, Jane felt that she was interested to do
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something for the CRA, she could just “go to the President of the Bank,” so she felt like she had
“pretty good influence.” Yet, “ultimately larger donations and investments are a financial
decision for the bank overall and so those really rest with the President and with, you know,
investment, the accounting department, they all make those decisions.” That was similar for
Leslie. When asked how much influence she had over loan and investment activities of the bank,
she said “Well, I would say, not a lot.” When it came to bank loans, all she could do was say
“here’s how many community development loans we have, and we need to do better, or we need,
you know, we’re doing fine. And that’s basically when I’m reporting to audit committee…” She
went on to reflect that her authority was related more to making an assessment of what would
count for CRA and what would not. “So, to quantify how much influence I have on the CRA
program as far as those different areas go, I don't know that I have that much, other than to say
here's what qualifies and here's what doesn’t.” In a sense, Leslie was more of a “resource, so that
they [loan officers] know what they need to do and what qualifies.” The situation was the same
for Barbara:
Our president of the bank pretty much handles the loan side and our CFO pretty
much handles the investment side. They might ask me questions or make sure you
know, to see if it will qualify, but it's gotten so they pretty much handle those two
areas. But it is up to me, when we do have the CRA exam, that I’m the one that
makes sure we have all that information that they've completed what they need to
complete, and I’m the one that works with the CRA examiner.
This was also the case for Kathryn. Her biggest roadblock to fulfilling CRA policy
stipulations was the “way our program is designed.” She continued on: “there’s not necessarily
an emphasis, especially on the lending side, to go seek community development loans. The
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emphasis is make loans and then CRA officer, you need to review those loans to see which ones
are CRA compatible or not.” While this was less of an issue on the lending side, because a
number of CRA-qualified loans tended to be made because of the bank’s commitment to
community lending, it was problematic on the investment side. Kathryn expressed her
frustration: “I am not involved in the investments at all. Basically, we have an investment
advisor that it is his responsibility to basically look at those investments that are profitable for the
company…Basically we get presented an investment portfolio and told: here are the investments
that we’ve done for the quarter, do your research and see if any of them are CRA compatible.”
Thus, on paper, while most of the CROs reported to senior leadership, and had the authority to
determine a CRA compliance strategy for the bank, it was often more tied to finding CRA
qualifying financial activities, as opposed to driving the financial decisions of the bank.
Rosa was forthright about the lack of control over the financial and budgetary decisions
of the bank. Like Mary, Rosa had some authority as the “subject matter expert.” Thus she could
say what counted, “we will get CRA credit for that, or no, we won’t get CRA credit for that, or
provide advisement” about whether or not a community development loan was a good one. Yet,
continuing on and shaking her head “no” with regards to how much authority she had, Rosa said:
“As far as, you know, what our budget should be, or—and everything kind of hinges on your
budget you know, or staffing—no, no I didn’t.” She continued on, “I was always working with a
shoestring staff…” She didn’t feel it was effective to rely on the existing commercial and retail
loan officers to do CRA lending, because “they don’t know the regulation, first of all…they’re
just doing it off the side of their desks. So that’s not effective.” So without the budget or staffing,
Rosa did not really have true authority to drive CRA impact.
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Authority was also substantially limited by the holistic team effort required to comply
with CRA. The true authority came from the executive, and the support they gave for CRA
compliance to be diffused throughout the bank. Thus, the leadership’s conceptual understanding
of CRA had a significant impact on bank structure. The importance of the leadership
commitment to CRA will be further explored in the next section.
Conceptual Work
Findings that provided evidence of conceptual work were connected to the beliefs, norms,
and interpretations around CRA policies. This included the organizational culture around CRA,
such as the organizational leadership’s commitment to community development and to CRA
performance. It also centered around the conceptualization around responsibility for CRA
mandates, and whether that onus was shouldered by the CRO alone, a group of individuals, or
the entire organization. Furthermore, conceptual work connected to the CRO’s own worldview
on what the CRA policies entailed, such as whether or not CRA can be profitable for the bank
and whether or not it has worked, which was closely intertwined with the personal identity of the
CRO and their race.
The next section will delve into the findings around conceptual work, commencing with
the evidence around how organizational leaderships’ commitment to the CRA impacts the efforts
of CROs to manage regulatory mandates.
Organizational and Leadership Commitment
Tiffany, at a large $3 billion dollar bank in the northeast reported to a C suite officer, but
in response to how much authority she had in the bank, she answered:
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As far as like the policy, the procedures and what we're doing goes, I would say, a
good portion of it lies there. The difficult part you have is that with CRA, there's
so many other people involved that aren't under your organizational structure
umbrella right, you have to get all of the employees involved with CRA, not just
one person. So it kind of started to revamp it, it started with our CEO actually and
he was the one that kind of drove it and said “okay, you know this isn't just a
compliance piece, this is everybody's piece, and this is what we have to do to get
to the next level when it comes to CRA implementation,” if you will, throughout
the whole organization. So I would say that the CRA officer has some authority,
but in order to really make changes, no, that lies more with the senior
management and executive management as far up as the CEO.
Tiffany conveyed that compliance in general and being a CRA officer more specifically
are operations roles. “You can make as many changes as you want to your internal policies, your
internal procedures, anything that affects your department, but once that kind of goes outside of
your department, you’re kind of stuck.” CRA, by its nature, requires a lot of people in the bank
to contribute, so Tiffany “felt like in order to really make changes, in order to really implement
something new, you had to go above and beyond and get more authority from executive
management than you had on your own.” Thus, authority in the bank bleeds into leadership
commitment to the CRA goals.
Lisa echoed Tiffany’s sentiment. She reported to executive management and felt she
generally received support on her CRA strategy, in fact that she had “received huge support with
CRA.” Yet, “getting buy-in from all the employees and getting that communicated down the line
is not always the easiest.” Across multiple assessment areas, Lisa needed the employees of the
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bank to engage in service hours and log them, and while lending could be straight-forward at
times, “getting those loan officers to be aware and to try to, you know, fight to get those loans, is
really a challenge for sure.” Many of these individuals were not under Lisa’s reporting umbrella,
and thus she needed bank leadership to convey what their responsibility was with regards to
CRA.
Many of the CROs felt that the CRO responsibility was placed squarely on their
shoulders. Across more than 70 branches in one state, Kathryn was the primary individual at her
bank with CRA responsibility, other than one analyst who had recently been hired. The
responsibility on behalf of bank leadership was enormous. “It's my responsibility to make sure
that those evaluations run smoothly and that they comply and that they're successful. Because the
bottom line is if they aren't successful then the bank can't do what it wants to do” (Kathryn).
What the bank wanted to do, was acquire banks to add to the profitability for its growth strategy.
And you had to be satisfactory, at least, on the CRA, to open or acquire new branches. Kathryn
continued on, “it is the pressure on me to manage that exam just simply because I know what’s at
risk. If you fail—if you don’t have the ratings that you need, you know, ultimately, you derail the
entire growth plan of a company.” In a more light-hearted tone, Kathryn said, “the good news is
it’s only obscene pressure once every three or four years, depending upon how the exam cycle
is…” But the pressure was indeed enormous. Kathryn was asked “If your exam score were to
drop, would you feel the brunt of the blame for that or would it be widespread across the entire
organization because there are so many staff whose performance wraps up into that score?”
Kathryn’s response was simply, “ultimately, I mean the buck stops with me for CRA
performance. If I know there’s a problem and I haven’t alerted anybody to it, then it’s going to
be my head and rightfully so.” She realized that she was not the one making the loans or services
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in the assessment areas, but it was her job to monitor them. “If I haven’t given them the right
information, then they can’t fix the problem. And, ultimately I’m the only one that knows,
because I’m the one that’s seeing the day-to-day, month-to-month.
Defending less profitable CRA activities to bank leadership could indeed be a challenge.
Tiffany conveyed that “at the end of the day, our responsibilities are to serve our shareholders
and make a profit, and we have to keep that in mind, as well, is we have to remain profitable or
we will get bought up.” So maintaining this profitability had to remain top of mind in the design
of any CRA products.
Stephanie described her experience with this mentality of CRA performance falling
squarely on the CRO as well. She spoke of a loan executive who she tried to inform about CRA
requirements. But “he would never show up…He didn’t want to have any part of it.” Stephanie’s
leadership did not offer any support either:
I could go complain to, you know, the other executive management, and they’re
just telling me, I’m just ruffling the wrong person’s feathers or something, and
they’re like, “well just get it done, just get it done,” and I’m like, “I’m not a
lender, I just can’t get it done.” I can't just go out and make loans, that’s not even
my job, like I’m not even licensed. You know what to do, you do it. Like, I will
tell you how to do it, I will help you do it, I will connect you with organizations
that can, you know, provide you with CRA opportunities, but you’ve got to bend
with me, and it was just such a challenge, it was almost, you know, it got to
almost like a rivalry. And it’s like listen, if I lose, that means the entire bank loses.
It’s not me and I get fired and I get kicked out. It's on you as well, it’s on
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everybody, and when you work in a smaller bank, like that, it really is on
everybody to carry it.
Stephanie understood the importance of CRA, but without executive leadership’s understanding
that CRA could only be implemented effectively through an entire team’s efforts, there was not
much that she could do alone. The loan executive and his team of lenders did not report to her,
and she could not do CRA-qualified loans for them.
At some of the other CROs’ banks, the leadership was more committed to the idea that
CRA required the attention of the entire team. This was described most directly and succinctly
by Melissa:
What we have is our go to model, it’s something that we created…and that was
definitely led by our CEO to say, CRA is an important component of our bank,
and if we don’t get CRA right in your market, it’s not Melissa’s fault, it’s your
fault. So, you know, the ownership of CRA activities is at a market level. So I set
goals corporate wide and follow up to make sure that we are achieving those goals
at a market level, but the markets themselves own their production, and they
know, because our C suite has made it very clear, you know to those leaders, that
they own their CRA activity. If they don’t get it right, they’re going to be in
trouble, you know…There’s accountability on a market level, I guess is a nicer
way to say that.
The CEO’s elevation of the importance of CRA made Melissa’s job “very easy because [she
didn’t] have to tell or explain to a market president or try to push him or her to do” what was
required for CRA, because “he’s hearing it from somewhere else too.” Where her C suite
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leadership had “identified the importance of [CRA] publicly, early and often” made an enormous
difference in Melissa’s ability to implement CRA mandates.
Though Melissa’s description of her executive support at a large bank over $40 billion
was the most empowered account of leadership support, there were cases at smaller banks where
the responsibility was also more diffused and supported by bank leaders, such as at Candice’s $5
billion dollar bank. Candice described CRA fair lending as a second line of defense, and it was
individuals in the first line of defense, the production crew, that were doing the day-to-day of
CRA financial activities. Yet, adherence to CRA was “spread out,” because even though Candice
was the one “monitoring and like pushing, every front-line business, every first line of defense
business is doing everything they can to get all the deals, they can.” She expressed that they also
shared the pressure of CRA:
If I say to them your percentage to LMI communities dropped as a percentage of
overall loans you made this quarter, you need to bring that thing up again, they’re
going to be like “oh my gosh, how are we going to bring that up, we're gonna
have to do this, we're gonna [sic] have to do that.”
Like at Melissa’s bank, for Candice, the entire team shared the responsibility for CRA mandates.
This was also a key feature of the organizational culture at Anna’s bank. Anna talked
about how she, with the support of executive leadership, created a culture around proactive CRA
activities. Anna conveyed, “you need people to understand the impact they’re having.” When she
talks to the lending team about their CRA activities, she does not just share the numbers of
qualified activities. Rather, she puts it in terms to illustrate their impact. Thus, rather than saying
“you closed 500 loans”, she would say “you helped 20 people get into their very first home.”
There was an important element here that Anna pinpointed: “Now who doesn’t want to feel good
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about that, right? So we…it’s how you change the message to give people a sense of what the
purpose is for what they’re doing.” It was not just about booking loans, but also helping LMI
families to get into their first homes, and to “help them on their path to wealth building and
wealth accumulation.” Anna felt strongly that “everybody wants to have an impact…and you
know, any investment in our community is something we’re going to feel ourselves, right?”
Through this messaging, a focus on helping their community to “thrive and prosper,” Anna felt
that all of the bank employees would stay very engaged and contribute to the mission of CRA.
Melissa, Candice, and Anna expressed what Stephanie also iterated as critical: “You can’t
do it by yourself, you have to have everybody involved…You’re always hoping you have
somebody backing you, you have a team backing you, you really have to get everybody’s buyin.” Then, only if you have senior leadership’s support, if you run into issues with team members
who are not contributing to CRA performance, then you have the ear of your C suite team and
board of directors. If they are listening, and they understand the importance of CRA,
“then it's easier to get them to say, “hey listen,” to enforce that to, “listen, we need this,” you
know, “do whatever they say,” you know, “because this is really important, this is actually vital
to the bank.” Thus, the strategic influence and organizational authority of bankers is inextricably
linked with the actions and discourse of organizational leadership regarding CRA. Yet, the way
in which CRA is implemented within the bank is not entirely dictated by senior leadership. It is
also tied closely with the conceptualizations of CRA mandates from CROs themselves.
CRO’s CRA Worldview
Worldview is an individual’s self-construction of understanding about a particular
domain, public policy in this context. In this section I will explore to what extent a CRO’s
worldview about what CRA mandates mean correlated with how they carry out these mandates.
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While structures of the bank, operational context (including the market), and internal and
external relationships all influenced a CRO’s capacity to carry out CRA mandates,
implementation necessarily began with the work that the CRO had determined would be
necessary. While aspects of the CRO’s personal and professional identity were connected to
institutional work in multi-faceted ways, there were two primary facets of the CRO’s worldview
of CRA that were most prominent in the data. The first was their understanding of the connection
between profit and purpose, and whether these missions are congruous. The second facet was
whether or not the CRO believed that the CRA has increased bank investment more than would
have been achieved through the market. Although this second key question is related to the
CRO’s worldview, it was intimately connected with the race of the CRO in this study, as covered
in the subsequent section. Here, we start with the key question asked of CROs regarding whether
or not the CRA could be profitable, and to what extent CRA work aligned with the commercial
mission of the bank.
Specifically, how did CROs interpret profitability within the context of CRA? Did the
CROs measure profitability of their CRA program, and did they perceive that the CRA aligns or
conflict with the business bottom line, to make a profit? For most, the CRA is not profitable in
the traditional sense. Michelle was clear in her response that she did not measure profitability in
CRA because “it’s not a profit-making tool for the bank.” And Robert stated: “It’s really
overhead without any revenue…because of the report filing, salaries of these kinds of roles,
they’re not really a financial contributor, therefore, they just become overhead.” And Thomas
concurred, “I would say the profit is looked at very little when it comes to the Community
Reinvestment Act…”
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Similarly, Kathryn answered, “our leadership lovingly refers to compliance as a “loss
leader,” because compliance is a necessary evil that doesn’t add to the bottom line.” She
continued, you must have compliance personnel because the banking industry is so regulated,
and there are penalties for failure. Thus, compliance could affect the bottom line, but only from a
penalty standpoint. Kathryn was not involved in any of the production activities at the bank that
contributed to the bank’s profit. Rather, it was the lenders who “really feel that profitability
crunch.” So it was up to them to “balance that is the loan profitable versus is it going to be CRA
compatible?” The lenders knew that Kathryn would be reviewing the loans for CRA qualified
activities, but they did not have any incentives related to CRA other than the audit or compliance
function (though Kathryn expressed that they’d been satisfactory on exams, so at that point they
didn’t need incentives).
Like Kathryn, Robert saw the relationship with profitability as antagonistic within the
regulatory framework. “The government takes the approach, I think, because we provide the
backstop with FDIC insurance, you’re going to do these things for us.” He felt that the
relationship with the government was much more positive when banks were compensated for
work the government wanted to see carried out, as opposed to regulatory mandates:
We just went through PPP [Paycheck Protection Program] with the corporate shut
down, and this was a case where we were paid to be the arm of the government
really, to help distribute these funds, and it was very positive, but most times
when there’s a mandate from the government, it comes and there’s no revenue
attached to it, so therefore it defeats the profitability.
In Robert’s view, CRA was detrimental to the profitability of the bank. And when the banks tried
to come up with ways to still make a profit with LMI customers, the government would again
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crack down. He gave the example of overdraft fees, a way the bank could make money, and how
Congress was trying to do away with those too. He felt that “the market always figures out a way
to keep working,” but that the regulators would come back and interfere again. “You can’t give
us a mandate and then not give us the ability to do it in a profitable way.” And Robert pointed
out that there are “degrees of tolerance.” “Is it cheaper to maybe charge [LMI customers] a few
bucks for the overdraft privilege, versus loan sharking something to get money where they’re
charging you 30% interest?” Robert’s bank actually had avoided getting into mortgage lending
because of all of the HMDA reporting. Considerations about mortgage lending as a new profit
line had to be weighed against the compliance cost, the reporting burden. So regulatory policies
were experienced as being in direct conflict with profitability.
Although some CROs did feel that the CRA diminished profitability, most of the CROs
voiced that CRA was not necessarily profitable, but that it did benefit their communities, and
thus resulted in tangential positive benefits for the bank. Tiffany had encouraged her bank to take
any marketing costs related to CRA out of their profit calculations. The bank’s norm was to
calculate return on investment (ROI) for their marketing. But because she felt that they were not
doing marketing to LMI communities for ROI, she thought it should be removed from those
calculations. They were not doing that marketing for profit, they were doing it “to reach those
communities, and we don’t care, you know, what our profitability is on it.” Most of the bankers
did not factor any of these calculations into profitability.
For example, Jane said “we do not measure the profitability of CRA activities, we just do
it because we want to support our community…because it supports our community, it’s good for
the bank.” In short, if the bank supported the community, then people would want to bank with
you. Marshall also felt that though the yields of community development loans and investments
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were low, that the benefits they provided to a community were tangible. And Thomas shared
how he also had the growth of the community in mind, as did his bank.
Some of the investments that we do make do have decent interest like you put
them into CDFIs…but a lot of the investments that we make too are considered
investments, not because we’re investing money in order to make a big return on
it, we’re investing money into our community for the community to grow…
Melissa agreed that CRA was not a profit center. But she also felt that CRA could be profitable,
such as tax credit details, and “certainly, you know our investments that we have do make
money.” Melissa thought that it was good to find better ways to generate revenues with CRA, but
she really was not as focused on that as on giving back to the community. She did not think that
CROs should have the expectation of making a profit. Thomas agreed with that. “On the one
hand, you want to be profitable, but on the other hand, you want to make sure that your
Community Reinvestment Act and fair lending programs aren’t completely reliant off of making
money.” If they are, then there might be that gravitation towards the higher income customers.
For them, keeping a balance in mind was very important. Melissa reflected that banks generally
cannot make loans to the lowest credit score borrowers, they have to leave that more to CDFIs or
non-profit organizations. As a large bank, Melissa’s bank was a “publicly traded company, we
have expectations of us, our shareholders, our investors, etc. So we do have to be prudent in our
choices, and we can’t just put products out in the home mortgage space and lend to whoever
walks in the door, because we still have you know, to make money at the end of the day.” Safety
and financial soundness, relating to the banks’ commitments to make loans and investments only
to customers who met underwriting standards, were major limiting factors regarding who the
bank could take as potential clients.
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These sentiments were echoed by John who explained how getting too many LMI loans
out the door could actually be detrimental to the profitability of the bank. “We don’t want to do a
loan that doesn’t meet our current underwriting standards. We’re not going to do a loan just
because it’s CRA eligible.” John reflected back to the 2009 Great Recession, and observed, “you
know the CRA was probably a contributing factor in it, because there was so much pressure on
banks to make low and moderate income loans on homes…” John continued on that if a CRA
loan was made, “it’s going to be a good loan, it’s going to be a profitable loan, and we wouldn’t
make the loan if we didn’t make money on it.” In fact, if the bank did make bad loans and “gets
itself into financial trouble, then the depositors are at risk.” So like Melissa, he was careful to
observe that safety and soundness was a limiting factor regarding the ability to do more LMI
loans. Michelle bolstered that message: “When you have a safety and soundness exam, you know
that, of course, is your primary…you shouldn’t make bad loans to just, to get CRA credit for.
That’s not good business either.” But John also shared that that wasn’t supposed to be the point
of the CRA. The CRA regulations “do not encourage a bank to make a bad loan. That’s just not
the way it works.”
For the CROs who believed that the CRA was profitable, it was primarily from a longterm perspective. LMI customers could be future bank clients, but they needed the technical
assistance first. Stephanie shared about how bank programs could be wealth-builders:
You want to see [LMI individuals] continue to grow their wealth and then be able
to offer them the products that they couldn't once afford or couldn't get into but
now can, you know now they qualify for those. Because, you know, it’s not about
keeping people in debt to a bank, it’s about investing and, you know, having that
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good debt and having, you know, assets and ownership, you know and that's you
know, that's the point right?
Tiffany concurred that outreach to LMI customers “may mean more customers, more
households, more deposits.” But she cautioned against equating profitability with revenue. “It
may be a revenue driver, it may not be a profitability driver.” Products for LMI communities are
more affordable, so the net interest margin is lower. Fees are lower, and the “propensity to lose
money on a product is higher.” However, even if profitability wasn’t the main driver, Tiffany did
feel that reaching more communities was good for the image of the bank, and that it was the right
long-term strategy for the communities they operated in.
The challenge was that the profit was so much lower on LMI products. While affordable
mortgage loans do not typically operate at a loss, they are lower dollar loans, so they tend to not
generate as much profit as a large loan. Rosa pointed out:
And your loan originators are all after the half million dollar loans--that's what
they're trying to do, because commissions are going to be higher, the bank's
profits are going to be higher, so that's where all the attention and focus is, and
everything else is just, a drag, you know, on profitability.
Leah concurred that from a short-term line of sight, CRA was not exactly profitable directly, but
that long-term “it would only improve profits,” as a long-term community development strategy.
But it was not just about long-term clients for a few of the CROs. Some banks were
seeing immediate profits from CRA, such as Melissa, who had reflected that the bank certainly
made money on CRA qualified investments. Similarly, Barbara said that her intermediate small
bank actually made a profit from CRA participation loans, such as for LMI apartment buildings:
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“I mean, and with a lot of our participations, that’s where we make a lot of our profit.” A
participation was a way for banks to buy into other banks’ loans. And Anna, one of the only
CROs with an outstanding rating, was one of the few bankers to directly answer that she did
measure profitability: “I would say that yeah, we do measure, we’ve started measuring our
performance on our CRA investments, and you know overall we’re quite happy with the results.”
Rosa mentioned that she had not exactly “figured out a way to measure the profitability.”
Part of this problem was because she did not have the data. It is intermingled with other data, and
so for example the investment team measured their overall portfolio, but not the CRA component
independently. But it was absolutely something that Rosa had wanted to do. “As an advocate for
CRA, you want to show that it’s not only doing good in the community, but that it is good
business.” The lack of staff described earlier contributed further to not being able to measure
profitability. With few staff available for CRA, you needed those people just to run the program.
“So there’s no additional analytical staff to just take the time out and figure out profitability on
CRA you know.” Rosa felt that the “conventional wisdom” was just that it was something that
had to be done for compliance, so just do it, but that it was not making the bank any money. She
had long wanted to change that mindset. “Everything’s about the bottom line and shareholder
values and all of that. And if there is a perception that, you know, the CRA is not providing
anything to the bottom line or to shareholder value, then there’s a conflict right there.” So, it was
important to show that CRA was “good business” given its tension with the profit bottom line.
Luis, at a large bank just over $40 billion, similar to the size of Melissa’s bank, also
shared Rosa’s sentiment that as a CRA advocate he wanted to demonstrate that CRA was good
business:
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Yeah, you know, we do measure profitability, because at the end of the day, you
know my job as a CRA officer… is to demonstrate to our leadership that the CRA
is not just the right thing to do, but in reverse, like I mentioned earlier, it's also
good business, right. And what does good business mean, it means profitability.
That profitability was coming from large mortgage pools, impact investments in private equity
funds, in long-term DUS [Delegated Underwriting and Servicing] bonds, and in partnerships
with other financial institutions on community development transactions. There is also a
monetary and reputational risk to non-compliance with the CRA from an exam rating standpoint,
but Luis did feel that measuring profitability was a driver for the importance of the CRA. Like
Luis, Mary also recognized that there was a profitability risk to non-compliance. “How much
does a damaged bank reputation cost, how much does noncompliance cost?” But she also
recognized LMI clients as customers, and important ones at that:
So, I always come at our CRA products from the perspective of bringing in new
customers. And that these customers are more likely to stick with you longer and
be more committed to you and have what we call the stickiness factor than higher
wealth individuals who will leave you over the slightest reduction in an interest
rate. But that individual that you helped get their first home or first car or start
their first business, is more likely to stay with you and come back to you for their
financial needs, and they're more likely to encourage their other friends and
family members to come to you. So yes, I believe in that wholeheartedly.
James provided a nice conclusion to the comments of other bankers, like Rosa, Anna, Mary,
Luis, and Leah, who believed that the CRA could be profitable. James said he would tell his
critics that “there’s money to be made. I tell them that the people that are smart when it comes to
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CRA compliance, know how to make money at it.” He conceded that there is less profit with
low-income housing tax credits, affordable housing, and LMI loans, but, generally, “they pay
you back, you know, you’re making loans, new products, and so there’s money to be made in
servicing the entire community,” you just have to do it “in a smart way.” James acknowledged
that it could be harder to lend to a single head of household first time homebuyer. “It’s hard. But
that’s why you have to know the programs out there, the services out there, the down payment
and closing cost assistance programs out there…” If you don’t take care of the LMI members of
your community then “it’s going to bring down the rest of your community.”
One factor that was relatively consistent across bankers’ comments regarding the
profitability of CRA, was race of the CRO. It became apparent from the analysis that the
majority of bankers who said that CRA could be profitable, were bankers of color. The next
section transitions into a discussion of the influence of race on the CRO’s CRA worldview, or
conceptualizations of the CRA.
Race and Personal Identity
Personal identity is composed of the concepts about oneself that evolve over a lifetime
and encompass your values and life experiences (Olson, 2002). The answer to whether CRA
matters, across bankers of color, was unequivocally that the CRA has had a major impact on
banking practices. For example, Mary, a Black Gen X woman: “um I say it has been essential,
vital, critical, the key…” or Leah, a Black Millennial woman: “I definitely feel that CRA was
absolutely necessary!” Most of the White bankers espoused a belief that had been prevalent in
the first data set: banks would be committed to their communities without the CRA, as it is good
business. While the commitment to community is a tangible value for the banking sector, there
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was a perceptible difference in commitment to the CRA specifically, based on the interviewee’s
race.
In response to this question, Rosa, an African American Baby Boomer in the South,
responded: “I think if there were not this regulation, that we wouldn’t have the lending programs
that we have for low-and-moderate income individuals; I think that we would not have brick and
mortar branches in low-and-moderate income communities. I believe that with all my heart…that
this regulation is necessary.” The emphatic nature of Rosa’s heartfelt response pointed to a
career dedicated to CRA.
…I think because once you understand the regulation and who the regulation is
supposed to benefit, and of course that’s the most vulnerable populations right,
and you see an opportunity to help uplift those individuals by advocating for
them, if you will, you know internally in your bank and all that, and you can
really see the difference that it makes in lives and maybe have a heart. You know,
it can be very satisfying work. And people just don’t seem to, to leave, you know.
It’s a balancing act for sure, but…um, it’s a good, it’s a good career, it really is, I
enjoyed it. I enjoyed my time.
Rosa had dedicated her entire career towards making a difference in low-income individuals’
lives through her CRA work, and this stood out in her sincere belief in the necessity of the CRA.
She deeply believed that her work mattered.
When questioned about the uniqueness of her response as compared to other bankers who
had shared that CRA had not made much of an impact, Rosa was incredulous:
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Those people must not be retired, they must be working for somebody still!
[laughs]…Maybe they don’t know their communities…um I…I don’t
understand…You know that’s the patent answer, you know, it’s the right thing to
do, but trust me, if we did not have this regulation…we would not see brick and
mortar branches in low- and moderate-income communities. I mean you barely
see them now, you don’t see a lot of them, but there’s enough so that there’s
access, right. But you know, if you look at closures and stuff, you know, I can’t
believe anybody said that with a straight face. There IS a need for this regulation.
This belief that the CRA has changed the nature of banking significantly was consistent across
each of the Black bankers interviewed in the study. Like Rosa, Mary, and Leah, James, a Black
male Baby Boomer at a bank in the South, believed deeply in the CRA:
I think it’s huge, quite frankly, because bankers, you know, avoid risk, and all the
models that we look at, you know, that determine risk, seem to all in a lot of cases
point back to low-and-moderate income communities…if it wasn’t for the CRA
some of these communities would not have received money, I feel pretty sure of
that. The banks were complicit with their redlining programs and the Federal
Government was complicit with their discriminatory programs when it came to
lending money, and so the CRA sort of forced that and I am totally convinced that
the CRA was the major reason for that.
Moreover, James believed that race was a major factor for the disparate responses when he was
questioned about why he thought the common mantra across other CROs had been that banks
would invest in their community anyway, and that the CRA had not made a difference. First, he
credited it to a defensive strategy: “Bankers are defensive, no one wants to be accused of being
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discriminatory or having disparate impact…You know that’s embarrassing, you know you want
to speak up for your bank, you want to say we’re going to do the right thing.” After first sharing
that it was overall a strategy to uphold the reputation of the bank, he then expressed that race was
a factor in the failure to see this disparate impact. This is exacerbated by the lack of bankers of
color: “There’s not enough lenders. I can count the number of Black commercial loan officers,
probably in this whole state, probably on both hands.” Many banks do not have even “a single
African American in a leadership position.” He felt that bankers of color had to be at the table to
focus attention on the inequalities, “to try to make people think about that, to try to look for
opportunities, and if you’re not at the table talking about that, then it’s out of sight, out of mind.”
James had found himself in the minority throughout his entire career, and he was often the only
one to speak up. It could be exhausting.
And sometimes I get tired of bringing up issues that deal with disparate treatment.
And I just sit at the table, sometimes, and I just look to see, well is somebody else
going to bring this up? Or if they say something and then everybody looks over at
James. You know, I’m tired of that, at times, and so I want to…are there any
other allies in the room? Is anybody going to speak up other than me? I speak up
and it’s kind of, well that’s James, blahblah. And so it’s tough, you know.
James’s response indicated that bankers of color were more likely to recognize unequal access to
capital issues, as well as speak up about them.
The support for CRA was consistent across bankers representing other minority groups as
well, such as Luis, a Hispanic Gen X banker at a large southern bank:
I know that the CRA has made an impact through its regulatory requirements,
right, but I also believe that the CRA has encouraged financial institutions to
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rethink how they meet the needs of the community, and one of the things that the
CRA does, that CSR [Corporate Social Responsibility] does not, is encourage
investments and lending. And so the CRA alone has been responsible for over $5
billion dollars of community development lending activity in low income
neighborhoods since inception right, and that’s just domestically because it’s just
a U.S. reg. $5 billion dollars to revitalize communities and neighborhoods. That’s
a significant number, right?
Anna, an Asian American Baby Boomer, also pointed out the impact of the CRA, even for
community banks:
I would say the CRA has really gotten us, you know, has given banks, an
opportunity to really look at a very different population that perhaps they mostly
don’t serve… I think CRA gives the bank that opportunity to you know, do a real,
you know, realistic assessment of where are the needs, what are those needs, and
what should our role be? I think without CRA we probably would be more
focused on just the communities with the high population, you know, and I think
it would be to the detriment of the overall state, you know.
Like James, Anna pointed to the racial inequalities in the country.
You know, somebody forwarded me an article that says that the IRS tends to audit
predominantly communities that are majority minority based, and that very few
audits are done in communities that are predominantly not minority, or African
American. And so you look at these things, and how do you ever fix the structural
nonsense that's going on even today, right? And I think CRA has a role to play, if
nothing, we just talk about it internally, we talk about it externally.
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It is important to state that none of the White bankers voiced an explicit desire to not help
LMI individuals or communities of color via the CRA. A few bankers indicated that CRA had
been intended to help racial minorities, whereas their assessment areas were simply less diverse,
as Robert stated:
Now, I know I will also say in these communities that we’re in, again we’re in
rural [Midwest]. Racial diversity is not much. In other words, there’s a little
Hispanic population, but you have to go to [the urban cities] for there to be more
like Black population. So CRA originally, I think originally was targeted at work,
trying to fix the racial inequities and all that kind of stuff. But we, community
banks as a whole, have to invest in the community, because that’s how we
survive. And so, while it may have helped in some fringe areas, from a
community banking perspective, I’m not sure that it’s raised the bar.
Many of the bankers made no mention of race at all, or the racial discrimination evident in
lending when the CRA was passed.
The majority of the White CROs simply were resolute that while there might be illintentioned banks in urban centers or historically, that their banks would invest and lend to LMI
communities without the CRA, even if perhaps they were unique: “Hmm, well, you’ve got to
understand that my bank is probably a little bit unique” (John); “I think my position on that is
going to be a little bit different…” (Kathryn). This perception that banks would likely support
their communities without the CRA was generally shared by the majority of the White bankers,
while not a single banker of color espoused that belief. However, it is also important to note that
many of the White bankers, despite the common theme, shared that they were only speaking for
their banks, and some, like Kathryn, indicated that perhaps the CRA had made a difference in
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urban areas, even if not for her bank. The “community first” approach is summed up well by
Kathryn:
I think banks always have had an understanding that you have to give back to the
communities in which you’re located, because ultimately banking is a business
and if you’re not a good corporate citizen in those areas in which you are located,
you’re not going to have the business. And so I don’t really know that CRA has
been an impetus in certain areas in this market or in this state.
Other bankers shared a similar sentiment, such as Michelle’s expression that “I think the
Bank would help the community, no matter what. Whether we were getting credit for it or not.”
Robert’s response was similar: “Well, I’m gonna generally take the position that community
banks as a whole do a whole lot of CRA type activity, whether the CRA was out there or not.”
While a minority of White bankers had viewpoints that resembled those of CROs of
color, the view that banks would develop their communities without the CRA did not hold for
White bankers at banks with asset sizes over $10 billion. For example, Melissa stated:
I think it absolutely has been a huge driver, particularly around lending in low-tomoderate income neighborhoods and to low-income people. As you know,
lending is 50% of the CRA exam and you know, banks were not doing enough in
that space prior to 1977. You know, the law was enacted initially to combat
redlining and banks now look for affirmative opportunities to lend and push very
hard on their lenders to find opportunities to lend to low- and mod-income people
and in low- and mod-income census tracts, and that work, I don’t think would
have would have happened organically.
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Stephanie, another White banker at a large national bank, (who had previous been a CRO at
multiple community banks as well), was unconvinced when asked how she would respond to the
comment that CRA has made little difference:
I don’t think so, um, I think, especially from the beginning…I think when it came
out, you know 42 years ago, you know we had some serious redlining issues, and
banks were not willing to just give money to anybody, right, that was the
problem. And I think banks needed that incentive, uh you’re going to get rated on
how well you perform in the community.
Like Kathryn, some of the other White bankers, such as Thomas, felt that CRA had made a
difference for large, national banks that are located in urban city centers and farther removed
from rural communities, but that it had had no tangible impact on his bank, or community banks
in general. Thomas explained his view:
So, a lot of smaller financial institutions like community banks like I work for
generally have a desire to get out there and help the communities that they’re a
part of…also a lot of the smaller banks are just full of good people that want to
help the people that they’re around. Now, where I think it’s had a huge impact is
in mega banks, national banks and institutions that are more widespread than a
community bank. Because now we’ve got these institutions that have an
incredible amount of capital that are required, through this regulation to give
some of that capital back to communities that they probably wouldn’t have served
otherwise.
Although Robert joked that: “it’s not like we all got together and agreed that this would
be our story,” the community banking response was a dominant theme, reflecting sincere beliefs
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that community banks would be devoted to the goals of the CRA even were it not enacted. This
study cannot discern whether or not CRA really has had an influence on community banks
versus large banks or not. It is not a study of outcomes. But the evidence does point to a finding
that, for the bankers of color in the study, even those at community banks under $10 billion in
asset size, the answer was very different than for White bankers on whether the CRA has
worked.
Operational Work
Findings connected to the operational work of CROs were centered around the concrete
actions and initiatives to fulfill CRA day-to-day, and the various environmental influences that
affected this work. The findings were primarily related to market context, specifically the
assessment areas where the banks worked and the relationships with customers and community
groups. In the various situations described by the CROs in this study, themes emerged around the
barriers to fulfilling CRA requirements given community context and market competition with
other organizations such as non-bank financial institutions. This connected to a perceived threat
of loss of profitability due to CRA and other banking regulations, as well as a broader concern
about the decline of community banking in America. But other CROs approached the market
opportunity from a different perspective. These CROs saw a role for innovation and
intrapreneurship to roll out the new products and programs that would be needed to appropriately
serve the LMI market.
Market Context
Banks’ assessment areas are their markets for carrying out the mandates of CRA,
including their loan, investment, and service activities. Many of the CROs both in the first data
set, and in the interviews that composed the second data set, felt that the nature of their markets
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was the most significant barrier to carrying out CRA policy mandates. For example, Charles
shared that “in most communities, they’re overbanked, and so you're struggling. Any loan that
you can originate where the underwriting meets your standards, you're going to take it, you
know.” This was the case whether or not the loan was likely to be CRA-qualified or not. Charles
went on to express that even where a CRO would try to find CRA investments, often the biggest
struggle was to find them:
We have our brokers, brokerage companies that we buy our bonds from, know
that anything that’s in our assessment area that could get CRA qualified…banks
are competing for this stuff and so the opportunities are not that great… Any of
them that come our way, if we can, if it looks like it's gonna be CRA, we're gonna
take it…You know, a lot of this is not at our mercy, you know we're at the mercy
of whatever is available out there in the market, plus you’ve got other banks that
are asking the broker for the same thing. So it’s difficult, it’s challenging.
Charles expressed that all of the banks would be competing for these CRA qualified bonds, and
that it was really out of the hands of the bank if they would get them or not. It depended more
upon market competition and whether or not they were a market leader in that community.
Marshall also spoke about how the profitability of CRA investments was tied to the
competitive nature of CRA community development loans. Underwriters who come up with
bonds, such as housing finance agencies, actually know if something is CRA qualified. “And
they know that the demand is out there for CRA qualified investments, so they’re always…the
yield is not as good on those.” Marshall felt that it wasn’t “a secret in the industry” that
community development loans that were CRA-qualified were coveted. Because CRA loans had
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such high demand, and so many banks were vying for them, the yield would be much lower,
according to supply and demand.
Other bankers, such as Michelle expressed the same sentiment about the difficulty of
finding CRA qualified investments:
And that's probably one of the hardest struggles that we have in our area are
finding investments that would also qualify for CRA credit. One because there are
so few of them. And there are so many banks within the market area that you
know, it's the one that gets there first that gets it. And so the investment side is a
struggle for us.
It was a similar situation in Lisa’s state. “Trying to find loans that are CRA qualified in the state
is very hard.” Lisa shared that her state had more banks per capita than in any other state in the
country, and each of these banks had to obtain CRA credit. “So, we’re all going over the same
thing.” Barbara had a similar experience: “that’s pretty much our biggest hurdle, we are not in a
low to moderate income area and, especially, to try and find a loan sometimes when you've got
four other banks in town trying for that loan also…” John also had no low-income census tracts
and only three moderate income tracts in his entire market area. Everything else was middle or
upper income. John had a lot of trouble finding CRA eligible loans because of this, but he also
disagreed with the way the CRA was written in general with regards to operations. He felt that
any loan that created jobs should be given credit, as those jobs would allow income mobility at
all rungs of the income ladder, and those support lower wage jobs as well.
Kathryn reiterated that competition was a challenge, especially in rural markets. Those
markets just did not have the same opportunities as a metropolitan area, yet you still had to fulfill
CRA requirements there. Reputation was critically important for the bank in this regard. “If you
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have that reputation of being the leader or being that financial institution that gets it, then you
will get the loan or get that opportunity.” Similarly, Thomas’ Chief Financial Officer was
looking for more CRA investments. But they were “really, really competitive” in the region.
Good investments that would make a little return or even just break even, while benefitting LMI
communities, would often have many financial institutions after them. You would have “to be
the first one, with the best rates or best offer to get those investments.” A community
development loan for affordable housing that was “just like super cut and dry and it’s in a low to
moderate income community, and you’re going to make money,” that would definitely be a
“unicorn.”
As for the bankers in the first dataset, there was also frustration that market competition
was disrupted when regulations were unevenly applied. For example, Candice lamented:
The other thing that's really not right about the CRA right now, is it doesn't apply
to credit unions. And there are also non-bank financial, like fintech companies
and things that are starting to play in the market…the bank's already at a
disadvantage because they don't have the same regulatory environment that we
do. And they also can undercut our prices because they don't have to make a
profit because they're non-profit, so they undercut our pricing also…that’s an
unfair playing field for us too…We’re still stuck with our economics and they
have different economics.
Thus, as had been the case in the findings in the first data set, market competition
pressures were exacerbated by being regulated, especially due to the perception that
regulations created an unfair playing field for the non-regulated non-bank financial
entities.
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As had been discussed extensively by the respondents in the first data set, the CRA often
was seen as creating tensions between something that would get the bank CRA credit versus an
investment that would still be critical for the community yet did not receive credit. For example,
banks could invest in local school bonds, but only a fraction will quality for CRA credit because
of a condition requiring that a majority of the children be on free or reduced cost lunches. For
example, Amanda said she felt that she had to “be careful what you're going out and looking for
in CRA investments, because you might unwittingly be ultimately diverting some investment
funds from the very areas that you're serving as you go looking for a larger regional investment
that might get you that CRA credit.” Luis explained how the lack of profit opportunity in LMI
areas could require that the banks take actions that were counterintuitive from a market context
standpoint, such as opening a branch in a LMI neighborhood. And that bank branch is “going to
spark other economic development…maybe you get a drugstore, maybe a Walgreens or CVS,
you know, maybe you get a grocery store attached to that bank branch, maybe you get
restaurants, maybe you get housing.” So that bank branch could really create an economic engine
for the community. In his view, it was also about doing the right thing as a bank corporate
citizen.
The market context was less of a struggle for Leah. Leah was assigned to a growth
market for her bank. “So we’re very, very new to the market and my strategy is to utilize
community engagement to improve business development opportunities.” She felt that once the
bank engaged and volunteered with non-profit organizations, and that the community saw the
great work the bank was doing, that the nonprofit employees would “also be our brand
ambassadors, as well as clients.” The nonprofits that her bank invested in were investing in the
community, into “small businesses that are not ready for traditional capital…and so our
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nonprofits help to get them ready and then eventually they’ll refer them back to us.” It was
similar for investments in homebuyer education. “Once people are ready to buy a home, where
are they going to go?” So, she felt that their community work would bring them business over
time.
Jeffrey also referred to the positive goodwill generated by being a good corporate citizen.
He knew that CRA activity, and being a strong social business overall, impacted how the bank
was viewed in the community. “There are people that value working with organizations, not just
banks, but businesses that are, you know, practice responsibility, you know give back to the
community, concerned about the environment…” Jeffrey’s bank was also a Certified B
Corporation, and he knew that they had gained clients because of that. He also felt that
investments in the city, such as workforce housing, would help the city and the bank “to retain
and attain good employees, I mean that’s to me, it’s cost effective if I can hold on to somebody
and they can live within the community in which they work.”
Not only could these customers be attracted to their bank, but new products could be
developed to serve them better. Despite his aggravation with the government and regulatory
burdens, Robert did point out that innovative products could potentially serve the LMI clientele
better. He spoke of his bank’s investment in ITMs [interactive teller machines] to serve more
rural communities via two-way video to “still have a more personal transaction,” without having
a bank branch in that area. Unfortunately, the rural communities had not embraced this new
technology yet, but they were still trying new initiatives. Another example of a new product
related to small dollar loans, which cost a lot to originate, was for the bank to offer a credit card
program instead. A lot of the time, it was about finding “the channel that will accomplish the
objective and is still the cheapest delivery.” Robert also spoke of phone-to-phone transfers of
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funds in areas with limited infrastructure and he did believe that there were market-based
solutions to serve LMI clientele; however, he thought that these would arise in the absence of
regulation, not because of it.
In contrast, James felt that this is where the government truly has a role to play. The
government could issue bonds to help developers build affordable housing, for example. But
also, he felt that this is where innovation comes in, when the industry is faced with the rapid pace
of technological advancements in the financial sector. James pointed to the FinTech industry.
“The bankers can’t play in that space, but why not? How come we can’t think enough to try to
play in that space? As opposed to us leaving that place to the predatory lenders?” In fact, James
ventured that there were “millions of dollars in some of these low-mod income areas, certainly in
the urban areas…We just haven’t learned how to play in that space.” In his view, the
opportunity for the CRA would be for banks to learn to operate in that market, and to do it in a
“safe and sound way.” Perhaps one would not be able to take out all the risk, but James truly
believed that “we can do it smarter. We can help people.” He went on:
I think we’ve got smart enough people to come up with services and products that
can service this side of the market. And so, we don’t need to have people
overdrawing their account. Let’s create a product where they can’t overdraw their
account. Let’s do some things, let’s do a product where they can’t write a check. I
mean check writing is going the way of the dodo bird anyway, I mean at the end
of the day people are going to have this darn computer in their hand, and they’re
going to be able to do everything. And so let's think smarter.
Thus, James offered a positive path forward in a rapidly changing market context, pointing to the
need for innovation to address these dynamics. And from the larger socioeconomic picture, the
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banks did have a role to play in changing communities and to do more, at least according to
Anna. Anna spoke of how the metro city in her state was becoming gentrified, very fast. Lowincome individuals were leaving, as they could not afford to live there anymore. Anna spoke
about how you hear of this, and you see the impact on the children who are now getting into
trouble with no resources for them to access. “So, you hear that stuff and you think, you know,
for all the good that CRA has done, we’re still just scratching the surface in terms of how do we
fix some of these fundamental structural issues.” Thus, for many of the CROs, it was about
finding the right programs, the right products, and even the right neighborhoods, where they
needed to work.
Finally, analysis sought to understand how community pressures might add to the
demands of the CRA. Yet, for the majority of the CROs, they did not experience these pressures
at all. For many of the community banks, they felt that this was because they were already
serving their markets well or they had good relationships with community groups. For example,
Kathyrn voiced that she did not “have a lot of pressure from other community groups in our
assessment areas because our banks understand the basic premise, that we’ve got to be good in
those markets; we’ve got to be good partners; good corporate citizens; good leaders…” She
ventured that banks in the major metropolitan areas likely did have more “aggressive pushback”
from activists in the community. Thomas also attributed the lack of community pressure to the
positive role that his bank played in the community. He shared that their employees were out
there in the community involved in events, investing dollars in the community. “I would argue,
we probably do more for this community than any other financial institution or, at least as much
as any other financial institution so knock on wood, we keep making our community members
happy and keep serving them to a high level.” And Marshall shared that he had always had a
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“very good relationship with our community groups from a donations and volunteer service
perspective.” He'd had only positive relationships, and he felt that the groups needed the bank
too, from an investment perspective.
Michelle also had never had “any activists, you know, showing any interest in what we
did.” She had only had one request to view her public file ever. And John shared, “I really don’t
hear anything from the community that really pushes CRA.” Barbara stated simply that they had
not heard from any community groups. Lisa wondered if other banks had that pressure, because
she had heard about it, but really had not experienced it herself:
I do participate in many calls and webinars and things like that, I hear so much
about these community groups, but I don't hear from any of them, so I don't know
if it's just my part of the country and we're uniquely different, but I don't have a
lot of pressure from any community groups, in fact, I don't even know any like in
the whole state.
Robert also did not think that his bank experienced any pressure, and he thought it could have
been because of the lack of racial diversity in his region. “Unlike in the metro areas, we don't
have people outside picketing about redlining and all this stuff because, again we don't have the
ethnic diversity.” He thought that perhaps the situation would be different in metro areas, both
because they would be in more diverse regions, and because big banks in those areas have
“deeper pockets.” He also felt that for community banks, doing the right thing was in their
“DNA,” but that bigger banks might not be as responsive to their communities. For virtually
every other bank in the study, whether small, intermediate small, or large bank the answer was
similar that there had not been any community pressure. But the answers changed for large banks
with asset sizes over $8 billion.
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In fact, some of the bigger banks in the study had experienced either community
pressures via CRA activists or had faced fair lending violations. Stephanie, at a bank over $100
billion in asset size, shared that her bank had been hit with fair lending violations that had
affected its CRA rating. She believed there were also some individual activists that were out
there scrutinizing her bank’s performance evaluations and looking for negative comments to
publish. And of course, she shared, the National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC)
was always pushing the large banks. But she did not have any direct experience with them
herself.
Mary did not feel that she had any “adversarial relationships.” She communicated that
“we work really, really hard to try to engage with community and communicate with community
what we are doing.” She talked about “grassroots level engagement,” and though certainly there
would always be groups who would love to do more, she felt that it was a “positive pushing.”
Melissa also confirmed that organizations like the NCRC was definitely out there pushing on the
large banks like hers, especially during merger and acquisition activities. The NCRC would
complain about a bank’s lack of activity in a market when the opportunity arose during mergers
or acquisitions, and so that could be an effective “lever” for community groups to utilize. Yet,
for Melissa, “many banks like ours partner with NCRC and we have community benefits
agreement in place, so we make sure that we are serving the needs of the community and listen
to them for input, so, you know, but yes there's lots of CRA advocacy around.” Melissa also
confirmed that community groups really do not typically focus on banks under $10 billion in
asset size. “The big banks are who they focus on, right, because those are the deep pockets.” This
sentiment was echoed by others. For example, Leah’s bank, like Melissa’s and Stephanie’s, held
over $10 billion in assets. In fact, it was over $100 billion. She felt that there were “absolutely”
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community groups pushing for more CRA activity. In her view, there were two types of activists,
“those that have their own agenda that they're pushing and those that really do want to push the
community forward.” While activists who were just pushing their own agenda could be
problematic, she felt that there was a real need for the latter kind, “so those activists, we need
those, we need them to keep us on our toes.” Rosa also confirmed that yes, there were advocates
that thought banks could do a lot more. Yet, they were typically “unrealistic” and didn’t know
that the bank was “regulated in a certain way,” and had “safety and soundness” standards to
balance. For some activists, they just had it in their mind that “banks are the enemy” and “they’re
quick to believe anything negative.” Rosa felt that there “was a lot of pressure there from the
community.”
James’ experience was similar to Rosa’s and Leah’s. Both James and Rosa were at large
banks between $10-20 billion in asset size. He concurred that there were groups that knew how
to leverage the CRA. “They’re going to protest you, they’re going to picket you, do all this
stuff.” James would try to develop relationships with those people and encourage them to “use
your honey, don’t use your stick.” He would encourage community groups to build relationships
with the bank, as opposed to being conflictual. This pointed to the relational work required of the
CRO, which is the final contextual factor analyzed in the data.
Relational Work
Findings around the relational work of the CRO comprise the final section of this chapter.
This evidence is connected to the efforts of CROs to collaborate and built trust across members
of their internal teams as well as with their communities. These findings connect to the
professional identities of the CROs, which influence their professional interactions, especially an
ability to engage in effective teamwork and to understand the roles of other colleagues in the
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organization. These interactions were influenced by the way the CRO internalized the
responsibilities of the CRA role, especially whether the role necessitated community outreach.
This view directly affected with whom the CRO interacted. Finally, gender played a unique role
in the professional identity of many of the CROs who identified as women, where CRA work
was seen to have been their only professional pathway to promotion, as opposed to other reasons
that might have played a more prominent role in their career motivations, such as a genuine
desire to do CRA work.
Thus, a central theme in this section focuses on the importance of relationships for the
CRO’s work. The evidence for relational work will commence with findings regarding the
banker’s perceptions of themselves as CRA professionals (as opposed to their worldview of the
CRA discussed previously). The way in which the CROs internalized their roles influenced the
types and nature of the relationships they needed to develop, especially whether they needed to
do outreach work or focus internally. Findings related to their strategies for building effective
relationships in the organization will follow.
Professional Identity
Professional identity, as previously defined, is a worker’s self-understanding as a
professional. For CROs who were in their roles because of the outreach and engagement work,
their motives were evident. For example, Melissa said “it’s really, you know, my kind of passion
for giving back and helping community that really drives the work.” And Stephanie shared a
similar passion for the outreach: “You know, I’m a pretty social person, and what I really love
doing is doing the network and outreach part of it, right and you know, things happen, seeing
good happen and being able to make, you know, people's lives just a little bit easier.” Stephanie
knew that social change would not “happen overnight” or “serve the entire community,” but she
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felt that she was doing her part, and thus she would think at the “end of the day, like yeah, I did
my part to make the world a better place.” Thomas, another Generation Y/Millennial like
Stephanie, got into the role because his supervisor thought CRA and fair lending would be
something that he “would be passionate about.” He continued, “which I am, was, and continue to
be because it gives me a role to assist and help the community and get out there and really do
things that benefit the people that we serve instead of just the bank.” James had gotten into CRA
because of his personality. “I’m a people person,” he reflected.
Later in the interview, James discussed the key differences between a community
“development person” and a “compliance person.” He directly identified with the former.
Reflecting back on the significant impact he felt CRA has had on the field, he offered an
observation about the bankers who did not believe that CRA had made a difference: “Those are
compliance people. They’re just data people. They just check boxes. They don’t, you know…I
go out…and that’s what I’m passionate about. I don’t check boxes.”
Anna also elaborated upon this commitment to community engagement. She had lived in
her state for over 30 years and had “always been involved in the community with volunteering,”
and thus had developed a lot of contacts. When the previous CRA officer retired, she was asked
“hey, you spend a lot of time in the community, would you like to get involved?” Anna
recounted how she had responded, “sure, you know, sounds…doesn’t really sound like a job, but
I’d love to have it.” She continued on, “and so here I am, and it really has, I think helped a lot
with the work I do that I’ve had these relationships across a pretty wide swath of people.” In fact,
the different contacts she had made in the community were “very, very welcoming” when she
began to do community outreach for the bank. Anna had spent her entire career in banking, and
from the beginning, she had developed a sense of the magnitude of the “impact of a bank” on the
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economy, and it just resonated with her. In her youth she remembered thinking “wow, that’s the
most powerful position I know that I’d like to have.” Anna expressed a deep satisfaction with the
career in banking that she had developed, especially as an outreach professional.
Kathryn recounted that she had also been in banking for over 20 years and had ended up
taking on CRA responsibility. In contrast to the outreach professionals, Kathryn was a
compliance professional, where CRA was not as popular. In fact, Kathryn shared, “the running
joke in, especially in a small financial institution, is the person that winds up doing CRA is the
person that was absent the day they decided to name a CRA officer.” Kathryn did not necessarily
feel a deep commitment to the CRA itself, but she did to the field of compliance. She was proud
of the career she had developed in compliance and felt that she had a strong aptitude for it.
Through early compliance roles, she had found that she had, “I don’t want to say gift for it, but a
knack for compliance and CRA, and I’m one of those people that I thrive on the challenge. So
when I got asked to come back into banking, it was strictly as a compliance professional.” She
felt like she was “one of those weird people” that did like compliance. But she was honored that
she had been asked about her career. It gave her special recognition for a role that was
specifically acknowledged to be quite difficult to carry out. At the end of the interview Kathryn
said:
I'm flattered that you reached out and that I can help you, I mean this is another
one of those things I get to kind of check off and say well, this is something I’ve
done that I never thought I’d get to do, and so I’m honored that you feel like my
information is beneficial to what you're doing so thank you for asking me and
allowing me to be a part.
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Her graciousness was indicative of the validation the request to interview gave, as it suggested
that her role and her reflections on her career were important.
The dedication to a career in compliance was also evident in Candice’s interview.
Candice had first started as a bank secretary. She had moved around a bit doing home equity
lending to consumers, then mortgages. Then she had gotten into a role doing policies and
procedures, around the time that the “niche career of “compliance officer”” was born. Prior to
that, banks had relied more on outside or in-house counsel. Candice reflected that there had not
been a compliance officer role prior to that:
But then they saw the need, and so they created it, so this was probably the kind
of, near the middle to late 80s when they started to see that there was a role for
somebody who could zoom in on laws and regulations without actually being
counsel, so the compliance officer was born, that kind of concept. And then from
there, I’ve been a compliance officer in different levels of authority all the way up
till today, so I’ve been doing it literally since the 80s. So that’s a long time.
In fact, while many of the bankers interviewed had been in banking for over 20 years, Candice
was one of four interviewees with the most years in banking, at 38 years in the field, almost all
of which had been spent as a compliance professional. She reflected that she “had an aptitude for
legalese, which was an important piece to be a compliance officer.” Reflective of the career
experiences of both Kathryn and Candice, the majority of the other CROs interviewed also
identified primarily as compliance officers, as indicated in their job titles, which often explicitly
incorporated the word “compliance.”
Even for the CROs who prized the outreach work, and may have self-identified more as
outreach professionals, they typically still had to have a strong understanding of the compliance
266

component of CRA and its data and documentation requirements. Anna’s community
relationships and outreach work meant that she had an easier time making CRA loans, and that is
why she had gotten into the CRO role to start with. But her agreeable attitude regarding both the
outreach work and the compliance work also permeated her responses:
You know, you can't be in banking for as many years as I have without somewhat
enjoying the regulatory aspect of it too. You know and it's good because it does
keep you on your toes, it's always, it's always new and fresh. They always come
up with new ways to attack the same old problems, so that's, it's been fun.
Anna declared “I welcome exams! Everybody goes: “what is wrong with you?!” I just think, oh
that’s great, there’s something to learn and something to sort of toy with, with the regulators
so…” This positivity was key to Anna’s attitude about the CRA rating as well. “Well, if you’re
going to do the work, why not get an outstanding rating, right? And who wants to be second
anyways?” Anna was certainly a self-described “big cheerleader for the work” of CRA.
Like Anna, Stephanie identified as an outreach professional, but she also enjoyed the
diverse workload and the constantly evolving nature of CRA work, including the analytics side.
The agreeableness with which she and Anna approached their roles was palatable. In fact,
Stephanie was also particularly strong on the data side having started her career in programming.
Resurfacing the metaphor of multiple hats from the section on job responsibilities, the workload
also played into how Stephanie perceived herself as a CRO:
I like all the moving pieces because there's so much, and you can, you know,
when you're in a smaller bank, you have to wear all those hats. When you’re in a
larger bank, you kind of spread it around. But after you know, having all those
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hats, I like to, I like to keep my collection, you know. I like the entire parts of it. It
keeps me busy, it keeps me fascinated.
For Stephanie, the career mobility of working at community banks where she had lots of
responsibilities and working at large banks where she just focused on one aspect of CRA, had all
been exciting and kept her intrigued in the space with all the complexities of CRA.
The CROs’ views of their own professional roles were key to their understandings of the
relationships that they sought to build with others. Outreach professionals were more externally
focused while compliance professionals focused on internal relationships. Relationships with
others were critical when it came to influencing CRA performance by other employees at the
bank, especially through the professional interactions with colleagues. The fact that almost
everyone in the bank contributes to CRA performance directly or indirectly increases the
importance as well, as was discussed with regards to organizational and leadership commitment
to CRA. Michelle’s experience paints a picture of the extent of the pressure here for some of the
CROs:
If you're somebody that has moved from a deposit side of banking of the bank and
then moved into compliance, they all look at you like you're crazy in the first
place. You know why, would you want to do that…the responsibility is enormous
and you have to be able to try, you're not only trying to keep yourself in line, you
know, you've got all of you know, the whole network to try to keep in line with
banking compliance. And so again, it's like the fact of, if you're driving you know
what you're going to do, but you don't know what the other person's going to do.
Michelle’s feelings about the importance of relationships for CRA compliance work expressed
the challenge well. Accountability is linked to the actions of everyone on the team, and while
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you can control your own actions, you do not always have the tools to influence others. This
makes the personal relationships of the CRO critical. This was discussed from the perspective of
sensemaking of CRA mandates with regards to organizational and leadership commitment. Here,
it is further elaborated from the standpoint of relationship building.
Melissa discussed how it could be difficult to get “all associates involved in the
process…to remind people to log their service hours…making sure that our associates keep CRA
top of mind in what they do.” Often, the work entailed getting “business partners to do more…to
again lower credit scores, to the best of their ability and take on more clients that are, you know,
very small businesses, maybe I mean, there’s always a push to maybe ask people to make a little
less money than they might otherwise, you know.”
Communication with other team members was critical. For example, Lisa conveyed: “I
think the relationships that I have, and that I have been able to continue to build with our lending
team has significantly, made the biggest difference because again they are so production driven,
you know because I mean that's what makes the bank money…” While profit was a primary
motivator for most of the roles in the bank, it took strong relationships to ensure that there would
also be a focus on less profitable CRA opportunities. Reading a loan report really did not give
Lisa a great sense for whether the loan might have been CRA worthy or not. “When I talk to the
loan officer, it's amazing what I can get out of them just by a conversation overall…because
when they start talking about it, I can get, I can find something that they didn't even realize was
there.” Lisa had been able to improve the bank’s CRA compliance through this relationship
building with the loan officers in the bank. Stephanie had found similar success through internal
networking. On one occasion, when met with some hesitance, Stephanie had asked to see a loan
officer’s portfolio, and noted he actually had some affordable housing units. Stephanie was able
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to count them for CRA, to his surprise and delight. “And he’s like, “really? This counts?!” And
I’m like, “you have 50% going to affordable housing, this is fantastic! Yeah, let's get started with
this.” These are the things I’m looking for, and once you start showing them, they’re like “Oh,
I’ve got a whole bunch all over!! Why didn’t you tell me! I could totally do this!” You know,
“yay”!” So these were small wins for Stephanie and also, what kept her in CRA. “It’s like that
moment, that epiphany, you know, like “this is fantastic!” And I’m like, “exactly, you don’t have
to go out of your way, just give this to me when I ask for it!” And, “oh! I got it, I got it now!” So
you know…it’s great, except for when everybody is a complete grouch, you know, are
completely against it, but it sometimes it takes a lot of massaging.” She took on a lighthearted
tone here: “And I also find if you have a drawer full of candy bars, bribing them with chocolate!”
Relationships within the bank often started from communicating the CRO’s own passion
for the work. For example, Thomas shared how he would always tell teammates that the CRA is
his “favorite because of the spirit of that regulation; it’s about serving our entire communities, no
matter who you are, where you’re from, or what you’re about.” Anna agreed that communicating
that passion for supporting communities could get colleagues rallied. “Who doesn’t want their
community to thrive and prosper? So as long as we can communicate those messages and bring it
home to ourselves, I think people stay very engaged.”
Professional interactions with teammates were enhanced for some of the CROs who had
previously been loan officers. They had, in a sense, walked “in their shoes.” Kathryn felt like this
was the case for her, and that it served her very well for communicating with the loan officers in
her bank:
I mean I’ve been a lender, I’ve been a lending assistant, and that serves me well,
in that the lending staff knows I know the language, and they also know that I
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understand the complexities of their position. I think the pushback sometimes
between bankers and compliance personnel is well compliance people don't
understand that day to day grind that a lender or a teller or a personal banker
has to go through. Me, I’ve sat at that desk and so I get it, I know that compliance
is not the thing you think of first. It's serving the customer and getting the deal
done, and so I think that serves me well, that I have that background, because I
am able to converse with the lending personnel on a level that's commensurate
with what they're dealing with.
Kathryn also realized the importance of thoughtfulness in her interactions with teammates, to say
“hey, you did this loan, this loan, and this activity that were all CRA credit; that actually got a
mention in the public file or in the public comments report from the OCC. So it's funny you
know, everybody likes that pat on the back.” She went on to recognize that the lenders needed
recognition and that she could bolster their “point of personal pride of “oh yeah, that was me. I
made that one and I did good.” Anna concurred that not only did having the lending background
help in relationships, but it also was extremely beneficial to simply capture the CRA qualified
activities of the bank. She conveyed that “having the background, in commercial lending or in
retail lending, really goes a long way towards helping us identify those opportunities or
recognize those opportunities as they come along right and so it's been useful.” Like the other
internal relationship strategies, Anna also focused on recognizing production staff for the work
they had done for CRA and verbalizing the impact they had made on their communities.
CROs’ professional identities thus played a vital role in their professional work,
especially as it connected to whether they viewed themselves as outreach or compliance
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professionals. CROs’ professional identities were also associated with their gender, specifically
as it related to career mobility for women.
Gender and Professional Identity
In response to why she moved into the CRA compliance role, Barbara shared that she
wanted career mobility: “I wanted to move up in the bank, and I felt that was the only way I was
going to be able to.” After she observed that at least 75% of the attendees are women at
compliance conferences, she considered why there might be more women than men in
compliance. Barbara paused, and then responded: “I…maybe for the same reason I went into it,
you know, if you want to move up in the bank, maybe that’s one of your only opportunities.”
When pressed for why compliance would be an opportunity to move up as opposed to other
fields, Barbara could not say for sure why women do not usually get loan officer positions.
“Evidently compliance doesn’t matter.” But she did surmise that perhaps it is because women
“are a little bit stricter or follow rules better than men.” Like Barbara, Stephanie had gotten into
CRA work as a way to move up in the bank. She had gotten her foot in the door at a large bank
by doing tech support, and one year in started applying to many of the internal positions. She
found a role with CRA and HMDA because of her programming skills, given the large amount
of data on loans they needed to manage. From there, she was able to increasingly progress within
the compliance space. But to find senior enough roles, she eventually moved to community
banks. “From a professional standpoint, you get a lot further in your career and a lot faster if you
go a little bit smaller right. To be you know the big fish in a little pond, so I started running the
entire CRA program…” Stephanie’s experience of finding career mobility within CRA or
compliance was common among the women bankers.
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Similarly, Leah had been in a compliance secretary role at her bank, and though she “had
no idea what CRA was and what it meant, [she] just knew that there was an opportunity for
growth, because [she] didn’t want to be a compliance secretary for ever.” She surmised that an
analytical role would be a good “stepping stone” to “progress in the future.” “I just feel that
sometimes you know, secretary roles and assistant roles, they kind of are dead ends and so unless
you seek other additional opportunities and try to learn more about just other things within the
bank, you get stuck in that role.” Leah shared that she had grown up in a single mom LMI
family, but that that fact really hadn’t played into her career choice, it was just the job
opportunity. When asked if that looked different for women than men, Leah ventured that “most
men don’t want to do compliance.” They don’t want to do the “back-office work and things of
that nature, not only that, but with compliance work you don’t make the most money…” She
offered that the roles in banking that make money are production roles, so lenders, private wealth
management, or similar. While compliance is not as low paying as being a teller, it is not the
most well-compensated role in a bank. But it is not just about the pay. Leah recounted that “most
women go into social work and public service” and so perhaps CRA work is another way to
“have meaningful work.”
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Chapter Six: Discussion
Qualitative analysis is “about telling a particular story about the data, a story that answers
your research question[s]” (Braun & Clarke, 2013). That story is told in this chapter and is
supported by significant qualitative evidence reported in Chapter Five. The findings of this
dissertation add significant depth to the policy implementation literature by focusing on the more
senior-level managers involved in policy implementation. While Lipsky’s (1980) noteworthy
scholarship on lower-level public servants remains one of the most important texts in the public
policy field, the findings of this dissertation bring new insights to the discipline. Senior-level
managers play important roles in organizations and in policy implementation (Cloutier et al.,
2016; Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). They are typically
the primary interlocuters with policy regulators and their organizations’ executive teams, and
they often manage teams who support policy implementation strategies that they direct (Cloutier
et al., 2016). As organizational leaders, they are likely to feel the brunt of the pressure related to
policy compliance, because ultimately, they will be accountable to their senior leadership should
operational strategies not work (Cloutier et al., 2016). Thus, the senior managerial level deserves
significantly more focus given the extent to which managers are positioned to affect policy
implementation. Furthermore, the bulk of the policy implementation literature primarily focuses
on the public sector (Cloutier et al., 2016; Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto,
2011; Matland, 1995; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Watkins-Hayes, 2009) which tends to
obfuscate the heavy involvement of non-governmental actors in policy implementation. Yet
many private industries are heavily regulated, including banking. If public policy designers
expect businesses to play a part in serving the public interest, then it is imperative that we
understand how the implementation of policy goals may fall short. Understanding the
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complexities inherent in this process can enhance our understanding of how policy makers might
improve policy outcomes based on empirical evidence regarding what barriers managers may
encounter in the implementation of the goals.
The discussion will commence in Part One by focusing on how the institutional logics
and institutional work perspectives aid in the explanation of the potential reasons for the
existence of conflict among institutional logics and actor-driven responses to these institutional
pressures, as illustrated in the case on CROs managing the demands of CRA policies. Part Two
will explore the contextual factors that contribute to the nature of these responses. How does the
environmental context of a CRO’s employer, community, and own background contribute to
their ability to reconcile the pressures of public policy and carry out policy work? How does
institutional work enable them to reconcile the demands of multiple institutional sectors and
logics? These questions are the focus of the second part of this chapter.
Part One: Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies
The discussion in this section is informed by Research Question 1 (R1): To what extent can
linking the institutional logics and institutional work perspectives contribute to the
understanding of the potential for conflicting institutional demands created by the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) for regulated banks, as well as the conflict response strategies of
managers who are responsible for policy mandates?
Institutional Demands
The initial goal of this study was to consider the utility of linking the institutional logics
and institutional work perspectives to enhance our understanding of how the CRA creates
conflicting institutional demands for the managers who are responsible for policy mandates
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(Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et
al., 2009; 2011; 2013; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012). Analyzing the discourse
of CROs with their regulatory agencies, the case offered evidence of perceived institutional
pressures on private sector managers stemming from public policy. Analysis of this discourse
from the lens of institutional theory enhances our understanding of how managers experience
and respond to these policy demands. The initial task was to analyze the discourse of bankers to
understand the dominant beliefs and norms that they espouse, which reflect the dominant
institutional logics of the organizational field. Field-level discourses that express norms and
values across a professional field inform the institutional logics of that domain (Friedland &
Alford, 1991; Marsh & Furlong, 2002; Riaz et al., 2011; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et
al., 2012). Evidence for the presence of bureaucratic, market, and development logics were found
in the data, as illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3

Field Level Institutional Logics
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Evidence of a profit-first discourse, reflecting a market logic, factored most prominently
in the data, despite the fact that CROs carry out public interest work mandated by public policy.
Although the discourse of banking policy regulators was not analyzed in this study, prior
research has shown that public sector agencies tend to reflect a bureaucratic logic (Atkinson &
Stiglitz, 1980; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Epstein et al., 2016; Lyden, 1975; Rainey,
1983; Viscussi et al., 2005). Based on the foundational literature, we would expect for the
regulators to most dominantly reflect a bureaucratic logic that is largely incongruous with the
institutional logic of the private sector, the market logic. The evidence for the dominance of a
private sector market logic will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Profit-First: Dominance of the Market Logic
Although professionals hold multiple societal roles (for example, a professional woman
may be a working professional, a consumer, a voter, a mother and a wife, amongst other roles),
the dominant institutional logic of her organizational field will play a powerful role in her
professional identity and in how she carries out her work (Friedland & Alford, 1991).
Institutional logics influence not only the dominant discourses of the workplace, but also
organize social life of the workplace, including standards, merits and rewards (Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). For example, logics may influence how job performance is measured, and thus
promotions and compensation. They influence how organizations are structured, what is
considered important or the right thing to do, and how actors conceive of their job strategies
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lindblom, 1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Thus, institutional logics are critically important in an employee’s conceptualization of her
professional identity and her role at work.
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In their letters to the OCC, bankers’ written comments were heavily laden with allusions
to the capitalist market and related principles. The most prominent theme was around a bank’s
role as an “economic engine” and the “lifeblood of a community,” key economic development
metaphors. For example, bankers saw their investments and loans to businesses and consumers
as key drivers of community well-being and economic development. They felt that the narrow
interpretation of the CRA focusing exclusively on LMI census tracts and customers does not
encapsulate the extent of the contributions banks make to their communities. For example,
respondents mentioned that student loans, auto loans, credit cards, and personal loans could be
important for their communities and should receive CRA credit. They saw investments in
infrastructure, workforce development, and their contributions to community service
organizations (such as libraries, treatment facilities, hospitals, libraries, theatres, youth and senior
centers, homeless shelters, and community pools) as critical investments to communities,
enabled via access to capital that they could provide. These investments in quality of life, while
returning a profit to banks, illustrates how they attempt to manage the conflicting institutional
demands while operating their businesses in a highly competitive environment.
This profit-centered lens also framed their desire for the types of reforms they favored,
such as asking for more flexibility so that their CRA activities would better align with their
business models. As discussed, banks wanted to see a wider definition of community
development activities be recognized for CRA credit. They also wanted to see the definition
expanded to smarter development, recognizing that higher wage jobs, mixed income housing,
sustainable and climate-friendly development are all good for communities that require
investments. Furthermore, they felt that the CRA should recognize innovative products and
services more broadly, especially modernized banking technology that could positively impact
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LMI neighborhoods. Rather than focus mostly on regulatory mandates and monitor compliance,
the banks suggested that financial incentives might be more effective to not only streamline
compliance but also respond to the changing nature of local communities.
Many of the tensions that bankers expressed through their airing of grievances with the
CRA were related to the need to make a profit, business growth, and market competition. Thus,
regulations that threatened to damage their profitability felt quite imposing especially in the
presence of the pressures from market competition. Highly competitive local or regional markets
were seen as threatening the banks via CRA exam comparisons to market leaders. This concern
about the lack of comparability of banks of varying sizes and types (such as credit unions, which
are not subject to CRA regulations) as well as an uneven consumer market playing field featured
prominently in the comments.
These findings are consistent with previous studies. Prior literature has pointed
extensively to the public private sector distinction and the dominance of a profit-centric logic for
private sector actors in the capitalist market economy (Averch & Johnson, 1962; Dahl &
Lindblom, 1953; Downs, 1967; Epstein et al., 2016; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Shleifer &
Vishny 1994; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Wamsley & Zald, 1973). The findings of this
dissertation, regarding the centrality of a market logic within the private sector, add additional
confidence to prior scholarship regarding the dominance of this logic. For example, Perry and
Rainey (1988) argued that most comparative literature on public and private sector organizations
has presented the differences between the organization types as a simple public private
dichotomy. They recommended that this distinction be extended to address the institutional
mechanisms that shape the logics with these sectors, specifically how economic and political
control are organized. A theory-driven empirical analysis, such as this one, goes beyond unitary
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organizational levels of analysis (Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991; Oliver,
1991) and considers the effects of the public private sector distinctions on the day-to-day
experiences of organizational actors at the intersection of both sectors.
Institutional Logics Conflict
Through the analysis of managerial discourse in the first data set, evidence of conflict in
attempting to meet the institutional demands of the CRA was apparent. Following Smith (1973),
policy is a “tension-generating force” because it is a deliberate attempt to change the regulated
actors’ or organizations’ established activities (p. 202). Thus, public policy can contribute
intentionally or unintentionally to institutional disruption. This pressure is even greater when the
disruption would require significant modifications of existing practices or when it is too rigidly
enforced, requiring strict compliance. Thomann et al. (2016) offered two key insights that are
important to the context at hand. First, they found that the state and market logics tended to
conflict in cases of private and hybrid policy implementation. Policy goals required actors to
draw on both logics, and where the stage and market logics are incongruous and cannot be
reconciled, private actors are likely to reflect the values of the market more dominantly. Second,
they found that private actors who were tasked with implementing policy particularly
underperformed when there was weak accountability. In other words, policy outcomes were
subpar when compliance was not strongly enforced. These persistent dilemmas for finding a
proper balance between flexibility and accountability is clearly in evidence in the case of the
CRA.
After the CRA was first passed, the banking industry treated it as a suggestion. However,
in the several decades that followed passage, multiple regulatory revisions expanded its
regulatory clout (Stock & Noreika, 2001). After CRA performance evaluations and ratings were
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required to be public in 1989, and applications for branch expansions or mergers and acquisition
were tied to the bank’s performance on the CRA exam, it became critical for banks to perform
well on their CRA evaluations (Haag, 2000; Murphy & Cunningham, 2003). This increased the
importance of CRA policy mandates. The associated increased workload to manage CRA
documentation and compliance led to the creation of the CRO job role, or even entire divisions
related to community development in case of the largest banks (Perlmeter, 2017).
CROs have complicated roles in their organizations due to the multiple internal and
external demands they must respond to. They must answer to their bank leadership and to their
regulatory examiners, as well as to community organizations if they are actively engaging the
bank. Responding to these multi-sector pressures requires a more complex skill set than merely
answering to their organizational leadership.
With regards to their interactions with regulatory examiners, CROs appeared to feel
constrained by regulatory mandates themselves. They contended that regulations had proliferated
over the past few decades (this felt like ‘big government’ to some), that regulators had hidden
agendas, and that the burden of proof was on the bank even when they felt that regulators’
expectations were not always transparent or consistent. Answering to multiple regulatory
examiners was perceived as another significant strain. Safety and soundness concerns could
leave the CRO wondering which would be more important to adhere to, underwriting standards
or CRA obligations, where they might feel like it was impossible to comply with both.
In addition to their more general adverse reactions to “big government,” some tensions
were more specific, especially where CROs pointed to particular examples where they felt
regulations had damaged the bank’s profits. This also provided more evidence of the prominence
of the profit-centric discourse. Two other specific tensions originating from CRA policy
281

implementation included grievances about the ambiguity of CRA policy expectations and
workload attributable to the extensive data analysis and documentation requirements.
Policy ambiguity was perceived as stressful in a variety of ways (Cloutier et al., 2016;
Lipsky, 1980; Matland, 1995; Thomann et al., 2016). Most of the CROs felt that the regulations
around CRA are convoluted and difficult to understand, and that the examiners and regulatory
agencies are subjective and inconsistent in their expectations. In addition to a voluminous interagency commentary that elucidates performance expectations, respondents complained of a lack
of transparency regarding which activities would “count” on CRA performance evaluations.
Particularly, banks felt misled by their lack of access to data. For example, while they were
spending a significant amount of time and effort to gather economic data, as well as understand
the performance of their peers, regulators had most of this data already. Respondents believed
that their banks’ contributions to improving community conditions and assisting LMI members
were given insufficient credit and support.
Internally, CROs felt that the ambiguity about standards could cause a strain with the
CRO’s leadership. Without clear metrics and standards, CROs could not develop their own
strategy for CRA compliance effectively, and they also could not advise bank leadership or loan
and investment officers in a timely fashion on what needed to be done. CROs who held largely
compliance roles believed that their work could benefit from greater interactions with other
managers involved, for example with direct lending or with data collection.
Furthermore, the perceived compliance burden of CRA created additional workload for
the banks. Many contended that they viewed the compliance burden as “wasted hours and
resources” especially when the required documentation was not always clear to them. A
frequently heard complaint was that banks were competing in an oversaturated market and
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committing resources to meeting vague compliance standards rather than addressing the
competitive pressures. Others described a large tracking and documentation burden with regards
to tracking contributions of non-profit organizations that could be counted toward CRA
compliance or for the documentation to validate the bank’s positive impacts on LMI populations.
Finally, training and educating staff was also seen as a large time drain especially when the
compliance standards were not clear or shifting. For some of the smaller banks, the weight of the
compliance burden was perceived as unbearable and would spell the end of more community
banks.
From an institutional lens regarding the level of analysis for this study (organizational
actors), the dominance of the private sector logic for managers who are responsible for public
policy mandates is important. Lau et al. (1980) found that management roles in the public and
private sectors are quite similar. Their study results indicated that managers in both sectors
perform similar activities within comparable job contexts, “both in terms of complexity of job
content and roles, and in terms of job characteristics, i.e., the fragmented, high pressure, quick
reaction nature of executive positions” (Lau et al., 1980, p. 343). While public and private sector
leadership roles may be similar in terms of the nature of job duties performed more generally,
these findings fail to recognize the difference in sectoral context that changes the nature and
extent of these pressures. While both types of leadership roles may be described as high pressure,
a key question is what contributes to those pressures? From an institutional logics perspective,
this knowledge is key to making the appropriate structural adjustments, whether that is within the
organization or in the structure of policy design. For example, Knutsen (2012) found that due to
resource dependency on their grantors, non-profit organizations often had to adapt their own
logics to those exerted by external demands. Nonprofit leaders would potentially face pressures
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because of their varying resource needs which forced them to adjust their staffing, advocacy, or
impact reporting. When compared to the work of the CRO, banks are rarely the recipients of
grant funds, but managers must manage budgets, revenue, and community investments, while
under constant regulatory scrutiny.
Furthermore, these separate institutional contexts would point to the different practices to
address the pressures of each. A large body of research has found that ambiguity and workload
contribute to policy implementation failures. In the case of CRA implementation, unique insights
are gained from understanding the nuances of these pressures because they can be attributed to
managing conflicts in logics rather than competitive pressures within an industry. Thus, the
findings support previous policy implementation literature that found that policy ambiguity and
workload can contribute to policy failures (Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995;
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Policy ambiguity and the workloads of regulatory
mandates are primarily connected to policy design. Yet many of the factors that affect policy
implementation are entirely disconnected from the construction of policy or the implementation
strategies of regulators.
The next segment will focus on the strategies banks have devised to avoid regulatory
mandates to the extent possible, in order to maintain existing structures and practices.
Institutional Maintenance
The work of actors to subvert the imposition of new institutional “arrangements” and to
retain existing policies and practices is maintenance work (Cloutier et al., 2016, p. 269;
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Powerful actors within the organization may support existing
arrangements, making it difficult to modify structures or practices for CROs who may wish to do
more with CRA. Often it is the CRO who works to maintain the status quo. The following
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section discusses the avoidance strategies of CROs in response to the institutional demands of
the CRA.
Conflict Response Strategies: Avoidance
Cobb and Ross (1997) defined agenda denial as the tactics that actors use during the
policy cycle (“from issue inception to implementation”) to keep an issue off of the public agenda
(p. 19). Although this literature is primarily focused on agenda setting as opposed to policy
implementation, the core insights are illustrative here. In other words, tactics used to keep
policies off of the public agenda are similar to tactics actors use to keep more stringent public
policies from being implemented. Actors may feel that policies meant to address a public
grievance will impose penalties or undue regulatory burden. Applying institutional theory to
organizational responses to institutional demands, Oliver (1991) developed our understanding of
strategic responses that organizations employ to resist such demands for compliance. Because
public policy creates institutional pressures for regulated actors (Smith, 1973), the framework is
relevant to studies of policy implementation and provides insights regarding organizational
responses to policy pressures. Two key response categories that Oliver theorized were avoidance
and compromise when faced with institutional pressures that were inconsistent with
organizational norms. Neither Cobb and Ross nor Oliver conceptualized these conflict response
strategies as institutional work, because they did not consider, to a great extent, actors within
these organizations. Yet individual actors are the ones who actually carry out the compliance
work regarding regulatory reform. The tendency of the majority of actors within a field to sustain
institutions through institutional work is theorized as institutional maintenance (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006).
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The actor-level of analysis is intriguing from an institutional work perspective.
Organizational fields are constituted of individual and organizational actors. The institutional
logics of an organizational field contribute both symbolically and structurally to the composition
of the field (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lindblom, 1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton &
Ocasio, 1999). The concept of agency encourages a view of actors as more reflexive than simply
pawns of their social environments. Under certain circumstances, or given unique backgrounds,
they may not reflect the most dominant norms and practices of their organizational field
(Cloutier et al., 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, the embeddedness of institutions in institutional practices is important for
the stability of a field and tends to be resistant to change once formulated (David et al., 2019;
Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Institutional change is typically a slow process, and
breaks with dominant institutional norms are uncommon, given the powerful socialization
processes associated with institutions. When all of the actors around you are committed to
standardized practices and expectations, institutional maintenance can be a powerful force. To
break from these norms would be out of step with organizational culture, potentially leading to
job strain, damage to promotion potential, loss of wages, or other social ramifications for an
individual as well as challenges with relationships with other organizations in the field.
The reported responses from participants in this research illustrate these issues well. A
number of conflict response strategies were evident in CROs’ responses to the institutional
pressures they reported when attempting to comply with CRA mandates. Both avoidance and
compromise techniques—institutional responses strategies—were observed in data set one
analysis (Oliver, 1991). Strategies of avoidance are covered here, while compromise is discussed
in the next section. Conflict response strategies of avoidance are conceptualized as agenda
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denial, essentially denying that a problem exists or that more stringent regulation is needed to
mandate organizations to behave in a certain manner (Mahon & McGowan, 1997; Cobb & Ross,
1997). In this vein, some bankers argued that they would seek to develop their communities in
absence of regulation. Bankers primarily argued that their business strategies were in line with
community reinvestment and serving their communities, thus regulation was seen as unnecessary
overhead. For example, many referred to their ongoing local ties and maintained that the health
of their communities would affect their own business health. They also stressed that the verbiage
of the CRA statute (‘safe’ and ‘sound’ banking practices and serving the needs of the
communities in which they do business) already was consistent with bank business models in
general.
Strategies of avoidance were also seen in policy narratives, which employ storytelling
principles including ‘plots’ and ‘characters’ (Jones et al., 2014; McBeth et al., 2014). Bankers
may wish to avoid additional policy pressures through stories of decline, spinning tales of how
conditions will get worse with additional regulation (Shanahan et al., 2018; Stone, 2012). One
elaborate policy narrative painted the picture of a small-town community bank, the hero, doing
business for decades, and threatened by the regulatory villain. All of the hardworking employees
of the bank could not stop what they were doing to manage arduous paperwork, and the banker
desperately pleaded for regulatory relief. Another bank stated how embedded the bank was as the
‘heartbeat of small-town America’. The banks’ employees held volunteer positions across the
community from mayor to the school board to the chambers of commerce. When the children in
the community had no summer activity, the bank donated money for a swimming pool. In this
rural setting, the author depicted how the bank was a community hero.
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Institutional Change
Institutional work also takes the form of purposive actions to disrupt institutions,
conceptualized as institutional change (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011). In
fact, institutional work was intended to enhance neoinstitutional theory through its added focus
to explain agentic action and change, as opposed to lingering on high level discussions of
institutional embeddedness as had often been the focus (Thornton et al., 2012). Organizational
resistance to change, or institutional maintenance stems from the embeddedness of organizations
in their institutional contexts (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Yet, as the literature has shown,
institutions do change, driven by institutional work (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Canning &
O’Dwyer; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Micelotta & Washington, 2013; Suddaby & Viale, 2011;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Conflict Response Strategies: Compromise
The first data set showed evidence that although the logic of the professional field is
likely to be prominently reflected in employees’ discourse, references to institutional logics are
not singular. Rather, individuals within an organizational field may reference various
institutional logics that are reflected in their language (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Canning &
O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Knutsen, 2012; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer &
Rowan, 1977/1991; Rojas, 2010). While the private sector market logic factored heavily into
bankers’ discourse, as previously discussed, this was not the sole logic reflected in the written
text. Elements of the market, bureaucratic, and development logics were also embedded into
some of the language choice. There are two key avenues by which this could be explained.
The first is, normatively, a more pessimistic view of actors’ underlying intentions through
rhetoric that emphasizes mutual interests during policy advocacy work as a placating strategy. In
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their theory of agenda denial, Cobb and Ross (1997) found that actors would engage in
“symbolic placation” to keep regulation off the policy agenda, a strategy whereby they would
“adopt a language emphasizing mutual interests” and set aside more adversarial discourse (p.
34). In doing so, these policy actors might admit that some work needs to be done, but they will
downplay the significance, while purporting to be working on a solution. Cobb and Ross wrote
that one reason this strategy is employed is that actors may recognize the importance of
appearing to deal with a problem which others have recognized as a real issue. Actors may feel
that by recognizing the issue, they will be able to influence actions that are taken on it (Cobb &
Ross, 1997). This lens could be a portrayal of bankers’ intentions in their letters to the OCC.
Unfortunately, it is quite difficult to gauge underlying motivations without the benefit of
hindsight. Given the conflict expressed with the regulatory burden of the CRA, there is
considerable evidence that many banks are averse to more stringent regulation from the CRA.
This, along with the rather prominent theme of avoidance described in the previous section, lend
support to the supposition that many of the bankers were engaging in symbolic placation, while
both a) believing that their bank’s business models promoting economic growth should be
sufficient for CRA, and b) not actually planning to specifically do more to address capital access
for LMI communities.
Despite the evidence that this may explain some of the verbiage around shared value, it is
unlikely to explain it all. None of the banks asked for the CRA to be repealed. Only a few asked
for their banks to be exempted from the regulations. However, many asked for support to better
interpret and manage the regulations, so that they could make more of an impact on LMI
communities and community development. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly,
organizations are not unitary entities as previously dominantly studied in the institutional theory
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literature (Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991; Oliver, 1991). This opens up
the possibility that while the private sector may, in general, be averse to regulation, that there
may be individual actors within the sector who genuinely believe in the importance of this
regulation and the benefits that actually accrue to their organizations and to LMI communities.
Understanding that the motivations, worldviews, and dominant belief systems of individual
actors are diverse, we cannot make the assumption that banks are uniformly engaging in
symbolic placation.
Rather, there was evidence of compromise. Oliver (1991) theorized that when
organizations must contend with conflicting institutional demands, they may attempt to balance
these demands. In striving for this balance, they will attempt to accommodate the conflicting
institutional pressures that they face. CROs face pressures from their communities in both direct
and indirect ways. Even if their public files have never been requested, banks face a daily
imperative to maintain a positive image in their communities to earn business. Additionally, they
must manage the expansive requirements of adhering to the CRA—a major workload regardless
of their opinion of the virtue of the act. And finally, they must manage the CRA internally, both
conveying to bank leadership or the board how they will comply, as well as guiding staff
contributions to CRA compliance. Thus, the prominence of shared value in the data, reflected by
some of the bankers, could point to something besides symbolic placation. Rather, it may
represent shared norms regarding a bank’s role in community development, across the public,
private, and community sectors. This intersection of logics is labeled “shared value” and
illustrated at the intersection of the bureaucratic, market, and development logics in Figure 4.
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Figure 4

Field Level Institutional Logics and Hybrids

The institutional work perspective aids in the explanation of some of this fluidity. Oliver
(1991) theorized that when faced with conflicting institutional demands or inconsistencies,
organizations may balance or bargain their positions. This would be done to accommodate
various institutional norms, but would entail only partial compliance, as opposed to total
acquiescence. In situations of compromise, organizations would still be active in promoting their
own interests, yet they would tend to look for pathways to lessen those tensions. This could
include, for example, hiring more individuals that have the knowledge, skills, and passion to do
community development work.
These strategies could be theorized at the micro-level as well from an institutional work
lens. As new professionals enter the community reinvestment field, they will have different
motivations for taking CRO roles. Some may just be assigned, but many will have specifically
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chosen that path. They may do so because they believe that the CRA mandates are the right thing
to do. As new CROs enter the field, they may engage in institutional work that changes the
nature of the community reinvestment field, and thereby the banking field.
The findings of Part One have given reasonable confidence of the appropriateness of the
institutional logics and work perspectives to examine how CROs experience and react to the
institutional demands of the CRA. In Part Two, the processes that lead to this reconciliation of
the multiple institutional demands of the CRA will be explored. More specifically, a deeper
understanding of the contextual factors that influence policy interpretations, reconciliation
strategies, and references to institutional logics will be explored.
Part Two: Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies
The discussion in this section will address Research Question 2 (R2): How do CROs reconcile
the institutional demands created by the CRA? How are their interpretations of policy mandates
and references to institutional logics associated with (1) features of their banks; (2) their
communities; and (3) their individual attributes and background?
CRA is an example of a public policy created at the federal level, but the actors and
organizations are situated in communities where they carry out regulatory mandates (Garrow &
Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). As much of
the earlier policy implementation has illustrated it is this distance that often leads to a dilution of
the original intentions of policy makers (Cooper et al., 1996; Edelman, 1992; Edelman et al.,
2001; Ferlie et al., 2003; Lipsky, 1980; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1979; Smith, 1973). Public
policies may cause institutional disruption for regulated organizational actors, who must change
their practices to adhere to policy expectations (Smith, 1973; Cloutier et al., 2016). Yet their
ability to modify their own work, as well as influence their teams and executive leadership to
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support necessary changes, is constrained by existing norms and behaviors (Cloutier et al., 2016;
Rojas, 2010). Essentially, the institutional logic of the regulatory bureaucracy is constrained by
existing logics on the ground. The differences are especially stark when policies require that
public and private sector interact during the implementation process (David et al., 2019; Ferlie et
al., 2003; Thomann et al., 2016). Managers’ capacity to successfully adapt to policy mandates
depends on their ability to reconcile the conflicting pressures of the different institutional spheres
that affect their work. This is typically what we conceive of as institutional work, i.e., the norms
and practices constituted by workplace demands, policy mandates, and community pressures,
and the organizations’ or employees’ own conceptions of their work. Institutional work is
influenced by features of the organization, such as internal structures and leadership commitment
and organizational culture supporting the policy mandates (Cloutier et al., 2016; Dimaggio,
1988; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; Fligstein, 1997; Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010).
In the case of the CRA it may be affected by features of the community that may have led the
organization to be more community-oriented prior to policy mandates (Bridwell-Mitchell &
Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Cloutier et al., 2016). And it may be affected by the individual
attributes and background of the manager, which affects their sensemaking of policy mandates,
and whether it is in line with their sense of the roles and responsibilities and the primary mission
of the organization (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
Thus, understanding of the factors that influence managers’ abilities to adapt to the
institutional demands of regulatory policies is important. Policy makers expect that certain
outcomes will occur when they write and enact policy, but outcomes often fall short of
expectations (Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995; Maynard-Moody & Musheno,
2000; Montjoy & O’Toole, 1979; Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980; Van Meter & Van Horn, 1975).
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Effective policy implementation necessarily must consider the factors that enable successful
execution of those policies. There were six primary factors that emerged in this empirical study
as influences on CROs’ interpretations of the CRA and how they reconciled policy demands with
the commercial missions of their banks. Each factor can be mapped back to R2, which asks how
features of banks, bankers’ communities, and individual attributes and backgrounds of CROs
influence interpretations of policy mandates and references to institutional logics. With regards
to bank features, the three key factors were (a) job responsibilities, (b) organizational authority,
and (c) organizational and leadership commitment; for communities, the key factor was (c)
market context; and for individual attributes, the two key factors were (d) the CRO’s perception
of the CRA aligned with their personal identity, and (e) professional identity. Within each of
these contextual factors, a number of symbolic and material elements constitute the institutional
logics of the organizational field and interpretations of policy mandates. These elements directly
influence CRO managers’ efforts to carry out the institutional work that is necessary to enact
regulatory mandates (Cloutier et al., 2016). Following Cloutier et al. (2016), the types of
institutional work that were analyzed in Part Two included structural work, conceptual work,
operational work, and relational work. Institutional work categories are not performed in silos;
rather, each type of work affects the others. However, each institutional work category is
described in association with the contextual factors that most directly enabled or constrained that
type of work. Thus, structural work was most centrally influenced by job responsibilities and
organizational authority; conceptual work by organizational and leadership commitment and
CROs’ CRA worldviews; operational work by the market context, and relational work by the
professional identities of CROs. The visualization map that illustrates the conceptual associations
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between categories of institutional work, contextual factors, and themes or codes in the data for
R2 can be found in Appendix 8.
Structural Work
Structural work entails the efforts of managers to support policy domains through the
formalization of roles and responsibilities, organizing principles, and allocation of resources that
accommodate new institutional frameworks (Cloutier et al., 2016). A manager’s ability to
dedicate time and resources to supporting the mandates of the CRA through her day-to-day work
is directly linked to the internal structures of the bank and the job duties performed by the banker
who is primarily responsible for the CRA. For most of the bankers interviewed, these structures
and job descriptions were set before they assumed these roles, indicating the importance of
institutionalized embeddedness of existing practices and structures (David et al., 2019; Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). Even where CROs had been able to expand their roles within
their banks with increasing asset sizes, other factors limited their abilities to correspondingly
increase the sizes of their teams or be allocated additional resources.
Staffing and job duty structures are influenced by the organizational culture, which
shapes how roles and responsibilities are allocated and assigned within organizations (BridwellMitchell & Sherer, 2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott 1995; Watkins, 2013). Organizations
are part of the wider social system, the field of organizations who share common norms, where
field-level institutional logics both shape and are shaped by organizational culture (Hinings,
2012). Thus, organizational culture originates within a wider social context where dominant
institutional logics operate. In the banking field, this is manifested in a market-driven logic,
where production roles make money for the bank, driving the profit bottom line, while other
roles are seen as overhead, to maintain compliance or for administrative functions. Yet,
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organizations are not homogeneous. Though reflecting the dominant norms of the organizational
field, multiple logics can co-exist at the organizational level, and actors within organizations
contribute to these subcultures. From a structural perspective, the more symbolic elements of
organizational culture and the institutional logic of the institutional field of banking influence
how CRO job descriptions are written and how job duties are assigned, staffing structures,
resource allocations, and the level of authority that the CRO holds within that structure.
Furthermore, the authority that is given to CROs within banks will affect their capacity to direct
changes in embedded practices and to determine how CRA will be implemented at their banks.
Previous institutional arrangements are deeply embedded, making structural change within
organizations quite challenging (Cloutier et al., 2016). Most notably, the CRO role has emerged
as a compliance role, resulting in commonalities across banking organizations with regards to
their staffing and reporting structures.
Job Responsibilities
A number of structural elements that are pre-established by their official job duties affect
CROs’ abilities to spend substantial time or resources on the CRA, particularly whether or not
their roles are responsible for compliance with CRA specifically, or for a number of banking
regulations. While they may exercise the agency to change pre-existing structures, they may only
be able to chip away slowly at entrenched traditions (Cloutier et al., 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby,
2006; Lawrence et al., 2011). The percentage of a CRO’s job description that is dedicated to
CRA is often correlated with the size of the bank. This study has reinforced that community
banks tend to assign CRA alongside other job duties, while larger banks often have multiple
individuals devoted to the CRA. CROs’ workloads will also influence their ability to devote
significant time to organizing training and programs within the bank that support the mandates of
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the CRA. The literature has shown that these training and socialization programs are critical for
organizations with hybrid institutional logics to develop buy-in among team members (Battilana
& Dorado, 2010).
First, there is a great variety in the job descriptions of CROs. This was directly conveyed
by several of the CROs interviewed in this study, and it was additionally apparent when each
described his or her responsibilities. In general, small community banks only have one employee
with responsibility for the CRA, and this individual is often responsible for other banking
regulations as well, including Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and fair lending
compliance, as well as potentially Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). At these smaller banks, the CRO is
typically a compliance officer. At larger banks, while a position within the compliance
department was still the norm, there was a greater likelihood that the CRO would hold a senior
community affairs or community development role. The primary trend was, the larger the bank,
the more likely the banker was completely focused on CRA, and not on other banking
regulations as well.30
In general, when the CRO wore “many hats,” indicating responsibility for a number of
other regulations for the bank, the CRA was experienced as a greater regulatory burden and
overhead expenditure for the bank. This was normally the case at smaller community banks, but
also was common at large banks under $10 billion in asset size. Without full-time focus, the
CRA could be experienced more as a compliance burden among a banking regulatory structure
that felt threatening to the future of small community banks especially. In fact, the CRA was not
even the primary job duty of many of the CROs at smaller banks who had other responsibilities
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The Interview Respondent Classification Sheet in Appendix 9 lists the interviewees (with pseudonyms). Titles and
states were excluded to protect the confidentiality of the CROs.
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that consumed a significant majority of their time. There was also a distinctive connection to
resources here. For example, CROs in larger banks had more robust resources to comply with
CRA than community banks. Thus, expenditures on CRA felt more out of reach for community
banks.
In many of these cases, the CRO operated as a back-end data analyst, documenting the
loans and the investments that had been performed by the bank, where the CRA typically had not
been front-of-mind when the financial transaction was made. This could feel frustrating and
contribute to feelings of powerlessness for the CRO. They felt that they were not influencing the
direction of CRO performance proactively, but instead acted as an auditor through the data
analysis. In some cases, frustration was not visible, but the structure affected the methods in
which CRA was implemented in the bank. In these cases, it was clear that CRA had been lumped
in with other compliance regulations as a data entry and audit function. For example, several
CROs spoke about their regular tasks for CRA data input and monitoring compliance. Yet CRA
was also meant to spur new and innovative financial products and services.
While generally juggling multiple job responsibilities can be seen as burdensome, there
was one scenario where wearing many hats had empowering effects. This was in the cases where
the CROs maintained lending portfolios of their own. Some of these bankers had gained key
skills in affordable housing and small business lending earlier in their careers. Continuing to
manage these lending portfolios meant that they could directly contribute to CRA performance
metrics actively as opposed to passively. Furthermore, they felt that they earned more respect
from other loan officers when they trained them on CRA, because they understood the nuances
of retail and/or commercial lending. But there were not just relational aspects. From an
institutional logics perspective, bankers that had a lending portfolio (as opposed to being siloed
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in compliance) were driving profit through this job responsibility and thus contributing to not
only CRA metrics, but also the bank’s bottom line. This may have made CRA mandates more
easily reconciled with the market-first institutional logic that influenced the organizational
culture of most of the banks that these CROs worked for (Averch & Johnson, 1962; Evensky,
2015; Kagan et al., 2003; Mill, 1900; Moon, 2010; Palmer et al., 1995; Thomann et al., 2016).
While it may be counter-intuitive that a larger workload would lessen the pressure, this job
combination may be a better fit in smaller banks where employees have to wear multiple hats,
rather than siloing the CRO purely in a compliance office where the CRO does not do any
outreach or contribute to the profit bottom line because the work is mostly audit and data
analysis.
Similarly, where the CRO did not have a lending portfolio, a bank could ensure that CRA
responsibility was embedded into the structure of production roles, e.g., where there were
designated CRA mortgage lenders with special compensation structures that incentivized CRA
lending activity. This also enabled a focus on the public benefits of the CRA and made it easier
to reconcile both the bank’s commercial mission and equitable access. In fact, some of the banks
that pursued this approach were rated as ‘outstanding’ on the CRA exam. This could guard
against some lenders’ desires to earn bonuses from higher dollar mortgage loans. At some
institutions that were solely commission based, a lender may go for a higher dollar loan because
loans to LMI individuals are more time consuming, often requiring credit counseling or other
technical assistance. More promising structures incorporated community development mortgage
originators explicitly. The job duties and compensation structures of other roles in the bank could
also be important, in addition to the role of the CRO.
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While overall workload is also directly tied to whether the CRO can solely focus on CRA
or must also manage compliance with a number of other regulations, the concept of workload has
a number of distinct elements that are tied to the mandates of CRA policies, including the
extensive data requirements of the policies, as well as the expressed ambiguity of the
requirements. The challenges of policy implementation based on overbearing workloads, lack of
resources, and policy ambiguity is well-documented in the previous literature (Lipsky, 1980;
Matland, 1995; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). The documentation and data management requirements
of the CRA are extensive as described by the respondents in this study. If CROs are fortunate
enough to have data analysts on their team, they may have some assistance with this function.
Yet even at the largest banks, it was uncommon to have many analysts in support roles. Getting
other employees of the bank and the nonprofit recipients of CRA loans to submit the
documentation required for CRA can add more workload. Furthermore, complying with these
regulations was specifically tied to the complexity of the data requirements of CRA and the
“massive amount of record keeping” CRA modernization was going to require.
Sometimes the banks could afford software that helped them to streamline data
collection. But in most cases, the data workload was a pressure that kept CROs from doing more
(or any) community outreach work. The discrepancies to address these demands are especially
concerning for the smaller banks that do not have the resources to have community outreach
roles or to hire more than one compliance role, where instead banking compliance is wrapped
into one holistic role. The majority of their time will be spent managing data and documenting
loans that qualify for CRA, as opposed to innovating new programs or spending time developing
and learning from community relationships. Since 1995 regulatory reforms, smaller banks have
qualified for a more streamlined examination focused solely on lending, thus small and large
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banks have different requirements for performance evaluations (Bernanke, 2007). Yet, the
respondents from the smaller banks perceived an outsized regulatory burden as compared to the
resources they could dedicate to CRA.
Additionally, the workload was directly tied to the data-driven nature of the compliance
mandates of the CRA. Software to manage this data could be provided by the federal regulators
to facilitate data sharing and storage by the community banks, given that many of the community
banks could not afford the software that large banks were utilizing. The successful diffusion of
responsibility for CRA seen at some of the larger banks with robust software systems was not
just tied to the existence of a software platform, but also was a result of the leadership
commitment to CRA and the authority that was delegated to the CRA manager to ensure that all
branches contributed to CRA performance. Thus, technology access alone will not be a singular
answer to reconcile the pressures of CRA.
Furthermore, ambiguity often led to extra work due to a lack of understanding around
what should specifically be done to improve community reinvestment. Prior literature has also
found that ambiguity plays a significant role in policy implementation failures (Cloutier et al.,
2016; Matland, 1995; Suddaby & Viale, 2011; Thomann et al., 2016). This theme was
extensively discussed in Part One, and was a recurrent theme here as well. The difficulties
encompassed a need to understand CRA requirements well enough to brief bank leadership and
other team members on it, as well as developing the CRO’s own understanding, especially when
that manager was new to the job. Yet for many bankers, CRA regulations were seen as too
complex, like “reading Greek.”
A key insight from this study is that wearing multiple hats can be managed with attention
to the composition of the total portfolio, and from the institutional logics perspective this will
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require an understanding of the types of institutional pressures faced. In many cases, it is the
nature of the multiple spheres of responsibility that is more important to the reconciliation of
conflicting institutional demands than the extent of the workload. Siloing CRA compliance with
other banking regulations can be problematic because the other regulations are purely
compliance. But CRA is much more than compliance; it requires community outreach and new
product innovation, and it requires capital. Thus, when the multiple hats the CRO wears includes
contributing to both CRA compliance and the financial bottom line, then the pressures of CRA
compliance appear to be more manageable.
Multiple bankers interviewed had become CRO officers because their banks had grown,
increasing the importance of CRA compliance for the bank and necessitating the creation of a
CRA officer position. Nonetheless, most CROs had little ability to influence structural change in
their organizations. This was linked to their authority in the bank as well, which will be explored
in the next section.
Organizational Authority
The authority that the banker holds within the bank will have a significant influence on
their ability to carry out structural work. A CRO’s ability to influence conceptions of the
structural requirements for CRA is of primary importance, and authority in the bank is likely to
be significant in that regard (Kraatz, 2009; Riaz et al., 2011; Rojas, 2010). This is tied to both the
importance of the CRO role for the bank and the reporting structure.
As the CRA has been revised over the years to enhance its regulatory clout, and as some
banks’ asset have grown, necessitating graduation into more rigorous CRA evaluations, CRA
positions have been created at banks. Despite the importance of appropriate structures to
implement policy mandates, structural work is an uphill battle, fighting against powerful
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institutional maintenance forces (Cloutier et al., 2016; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et
al., 2011). Meyer and Rowan (1977) found that new divisions and job roles were reflections of
institutional pressures and Kane (1993) similarly wrote that managers should analyze their staffs’
strengths and weaknesses, hire additional staff if needed, and then organize internal staffing
structures. Yet, few of the CROs in this study conveyed that they had either an ability to shift
CRA responsibilities across team members or to hire new team members. Virtually none of the
CROs who were interviewed had described the freedom to change the size of their staff or core
functions of team members. Thus, their abilities to enact structural change were constrained.
Most of the CROs who were interviewed reported to a senior executive in the bank. This
was indicative of the importance of the CRA role as a compliance mandate for the organization
and reflected the study’s focus on interviewing senior level managers. However, the reporting
structure in the organization did not seem to have a large effect on the actual authority of the
CRO in the bank. Even though both bankers at small community banks and at large banks often
reported to the executive leadership team or one step below, they appeared to lack significant
authority to change course or influence existing structures with regards to CRA compliance in
most cases. While many of the CROs said that they had significant authority for CRA, it became
apparent that this was authority to determine how CRA data was audited and how the
compliance functions would be carried out. It did not mean that they had significant authority to
change the nature of how CRA eligible activities were carried out within the bank. These
decisions were typically made by the executive and production roles in the bank, including
executive leadership and the loan and investment officers.
Very few CROs had full authority to create and execute both the CRA strategy and
activities for the bank. If they did, these CROs could ensure that every bank branch contributed
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to community development performance, and that data analysts could provide support. This
enabled the CRO to confidently meet the requirements of the CRA without the constraints of
existing internal bank structures because the authority had been delegated to change those
structures to ensure high-caliber CRA performance. This was typically not the case for most
CROs, who had to accomplish the goals of the policy mandates with limited resources and
support staff. Skilled navigation of internal structures links to the institutional entrepreneurship
literature, which typically focused on the skills of managers to lead (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein,
1997). However, authority is not necessarily earned based on the leadership skills of the
organizational actor. CRO officer positions in the bank may have been structured in a certain
way prior to commencement of the current CRO, and the institutional logics perspective
enhances our understanding of how difficult it is to change these structures. Furthermore, their
ability to influence bank structures was significantly tied to the executive leadership’s conception
of CRA. This leads us to a discussion of conceptual work.
Conceptual Work
Conceptual work entails the ability of managers to develop shared understandings and
interpretive schemes personally and amongst members of their teams regarding what the
mandates of policies actually mean (Cloutier et al., 2016). To influence behavioral change to
adapt to policy mandates, CROs must determine what they believe is the appropriate way to
carry out the work required. They may have their own reservations about significantly changing
their day-to-day practices. Organizational culture, or the forces that shape and legitimize
behaviors in organizations, will also condition actors’ responses and their ability to influence the
sensemaking of their colleagues and leadership (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Scott 1995; Watkins, 2013).
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Organizational and Leadership Commitment
A highly significant factor for senior managers’ abilities to influence shared norms and
create effective structures for the work required to carry out CRA is the support that they have
from their leadership, an element of organizational culture. Organizational culture is in turn
affected by the institutional logics that organizational leaders reference, most dominantly a
market logic reflective of the banking field. While conceptual work may be effective to shape the
activities in CROs’ immediate departments or for their direct reports, influencing
conceptualizations of CRA outside of those departments necessitates leadership commitment. In
this study, the importance of CRA for organizational leadership was significant. Bank leadership
influenced how CRA compliance was communicated within the bank regarding what all team
members roles would be with regards to the CRA.
Kane (1993) found that when senior officers at a bank were involved with community
development projects, as well as the chief executive officers and the board, the banks were more
successful at profitably serving community development needs. Senior organizational executives
can both significantly constrain or enable managers’ abilities to fulfill commitments to CRA
policies, based on how they conceptualize those policies themselves.
Most importantly, involved leadership will shape team members’ understanding of shared
responsibility for CRA policy mandates. Whose responsibility is the CRA? On one end of the
spectrum, the CROs are fully responsible for compliance. They must scrutinize every loan,
investment, and service activity and document it. They are analysts who must fit existing
activities into CRA exam requirements. On the other end, leadership embraces a distributed
vision of CRA implementation across the organization. Compliance cannot be achieved by the
CRO alone. It is a team effort that necessitates intentionality from every member of the team. In
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this, every branch has goals to hit, and every loan officer must meet metrics. If the bank fails the
CRA exam, it attributable to everyone, not just the CRO alone. This idea that the bank must
create a “culture of compliance” to CRA was highlighted at recent CRA & Fair Lending
Colloquiums (Wolters Kluwer, 2016). This means that CRA is embedded in organizational
culture via widespread acceptance from the entire team, as a business strategy and across all
business units, not just the community development division (Wolters Kluwer, 2016). Thus, the
institutional work perspective further elucidates what practitioners in the community
reinvestment space have recommended regarding the diffusion of CRA responsibility throughout
the bank.
Another aspect of the leadership and organizational commitment to CRA is the CRA
culture of the bank, and specifically the conceptualization of what kind of job roles are needed to
comply with CRA. While a CRO’s own definition of whether or not they are in a compliance or
outreach function is important, the organizational culture around CRA is highly influential
regarding what the CRO is able to accomplish. In most cases, structures of bank departments and
job descriptions were determined long before the CRO came to the bank. These structures were
set in place because of the norms and beliefs surrounding the proper way to comply with the
CRA. At the banking field level, and across organizations, the most common practice is to view
CRA implementation as a compliance function (Wolters Kluwer, 2016).
Team structures and positioning within departments reflect a central vision regarding
whether adherence with the CRA is associated more with compliance or outreach work. It is this
CRA culture in the bank that will influence the creation of bank departments, CRA related job
roles, and assigned duties of CROs. If CRA is viewed in the same category as other banking
regulations, as is the common perception, it is likely to be assigned to the compliance
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department. There, it will be conceptualized as necessitating adherence to mandates, a checklist
of activities and a back-end analytic exercise. If CRA is conceptualized as necessitating
community development, then back-of-the house job responsibilities in analytics are shifted to
front-of-the house outreach activities. The bank will embrace a philosophy that the mandates of
the CRA require intentional community engagement and community development loan
portfolios to enable LMI individuals’ increased capital access. This also modeled by the cohort
of bankers whose leadership enabled them to do outreach work themselves, or to have colleagues
and team members who worked in outreach.
And finally, what is the bank leadership commitment to communities, and to CRA
performance? Not surprisingly, there was not a single CRO interviewed who had anything but
positive things to say about their bank’s commitment to community engagement. Ascertaining
the scale of actual commitment to community was difficult without analysis of additional
variables. However, banks that committed full roles within banking teams to community
development have, through one structural element, demonstrated their commitment to
development, as opposed to purely compliance. Structures are the material embodiments of
symbolic, or conceptual understandings.
Another interesting element was the bank leadership’s commitment to CRA performance.
In virtually every case, the CRA was considered important. Failing a CRA exam would mean
that the bank could not pursue its business goals, such as mergers, acquisitions, or opening new
bank branches, in addition to any negative publicity. But for most of the banks, satisfactory was
good enough. They just wanted to pass the exam to continue business as normal, they weren’t
necessarily interested in exceeding expectations. Thus, it was rare for a CRO to have bank
leadership who desired an outstanding rating. Perhaps it is counterintuitive that leadership
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interest in a higher exam score would not increase pressure on the CRO. However, CROs whose
leadership championed an outstanding rating on the CRA tended to feel supported by bank
leadership who created a positive and shared responsibility around outstanding performance. It
was actually the CROs who wished for an outstanding rating themselves yet did not have the
same support to achieve it from bank leadership, who felt that they should not spend more time
focusing on CRA.
From an institutional logics perspective, the importance that leadership placed on passing
the CRA evaluation could result in enormous pressure for the CRO, especially if the
responsibility for CRA was concentrated primarily with the CRO. While a satisfactory rating was
sufficient for many of the CROs’ senior leaders, it was also recognized that a failing grade would
be detrimental to the business. Passing grades on CRA performance evaluations were considered
essential pre-requisites for the profit and growth strategy of the bank. Though CRA compliance
and financial production were considered to be separate functions, a negative rating could result
in the blockage of merger and acquisition activity. Yet, CROs often had no control over the
actual production roles that contributed to CRA performance, meaning the loan, investment, and
service activities in the banks’ assessment areas. These CROs took on full responsibility for
compliance with the CRA with very little influence over the actual activities performed that
would qualify for CRA. In fact, some of these CROs were not even informed about loans and
investments until after they had been enacted. These CROs were responsible for enacting
regulatory requirements but faced tensions due to the compartmentalization of the compliance
function from the profit centers of the bank. They could not actually drive the financial activities
that would contribute to the financial bottom line of the organization and to CRA performance, a
decoupling of development and market logics.
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The social enterprise literature has found that tensions can arise when a core logic (such
as the market logic for banks) is embedded in the central organization but other logics (such as
development logics) are relegated to the periphery (Besharov & Smith, 2014). Indeed, social
enterprises that have successfully combined market and development logics have created
common organizational identities and balanced elements of both logics rather than
compartmentalizing them into different units (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013).
Organizational leadership decisions, predicated on their conceptions of what various business
functions and regulations will entail, will significantly influence the structures that are created to
manage this work.
CRO’s CRA Worldview
Despite the vital nature of the leadership commitment to CRA, conceptual work
necessarily centers on the primary CRA policy actor in the organization, the CRO. Agency will
be constrained by the dominant institutional logic of the field, and existing structures, as well as
by the conceptual maintenance work of other actors in the organization (Cloutier et al., 2016;
Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Micelotta & Washington, 2013). Yet, it is this manager and their
sensemaking of CRA policies that will be a primary driver of how CRA policies will be carried
out. Though CROs are influenced by their organizations’ cultures and the social constructions of
their identities (which affect the institutional logics that they reference), they exercise bounded
agency within these constructions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2011). A
CRO’s CRA worldview refers to the symbolic understanding of what being a CRO means and
what the CRA policy mandates mean. Does the CRA offer a market opportunity? Is it profitable?
And has the CRA made a difference? Has it actually worked?
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A key interview question asked the bankers who were interviewed for this study if they
measure profitability in their CRA activities. For most, the answer was no, as CRA was viewed
as compliance, a cost center and profit-loss for the bank. Some of the bankers experienced the
tensions of the conceptual work required to implement CRA at high-stress levels. For some,
CRA policy mandates were viewed as entirely incompatible with the commercial mission of the
bank. For example, some CROs felt that the demands of CRA are entirely incompatible with the
financial bottom line of banks. Others felt that safety and soundness of loans, which is directly
tied to overall profitability of banks, is a key tension with the mandates of CRA.
However, for a few of the CROs, CRA was seen as a profitable business opportunity. For
example, some of the CROs felt that if banks were more innovative, they would be able to create
the programs and partnerships to expand access to capital and create new customers for the
banks. More technical assistance could be carried out in order to uplift the financial status of
LMI individuals who could be brought into the banks as customers who would graduate into
bigger loans, such as home mortgages. Thus, individual managers offered a range of views based
on their assessment of whether or not the CRA was seen as profitable. At one extreme, the CRA
is just overhead, while on the other, it is a market opportunity. It might be assumed that the
dominant market logic of the banking field would influence the view of the CRA as a potential
market opportunity, but the relationship is much more complicated than this. Because CRA is
positioned within compliance departments in banks, it is not considered a profit center. While it
may hamper the profitability of the bank if a satisfactory rating is not achieved, compliance roles
are considered overhead for the bank, not loan or investment production. Yet, the profitability of
the bank is at risk because the bank cannot merge or expand if it fails a CRA exam. Thus, the
market logic is referenced by CROs and their organizations with regards to the importance of
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passing a CRA evaluation or where profitability is deemed to be directly impeded by CRA. Yet
with regards to the actual work that is entailed by the CRA, CROs did not tend to reference a
market logic. Instead, they viewed compliance as the primary function of their CRA work. Many
CROs tended to reference more of a bureaucratic logic with their focus on the regulatory aspects
of policies that they are responsible for. This observation complements prior findings in the
literature that multiple logics can exist within organizations (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Besharov & Smith, 2014; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer & Phillips, 2013; Knutsen, 2012;
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991; Pache & Santos, 2013; Rojas, 2010).
As compliance professionals, some CROs may not feel that their disconnect from the
profit centers of the bank is an issue. However, many did experience the frustration of not
contributing to the financial bottom line of the bank because CRA performance was comprised
of those activities. CRA activities, though focused on community development, are primarily
loans and investments at the end of the day, regardless of the profit margin.
On the one hand, this compartmentalization of CRA qualified lending into the
compliance division may have been intended to protect community development lending. LMI
customers will likely be less profitable than higher-income customers. Therefore, CROs who did
not want to concentrate on profitability were partially trying to protect CRA activities from
scrutiny for being less profitable overall by not calculating their profitability. Yet, from an
institutional work perspective, CRA implementation may be enhanced by adopting more of a
blended logic. Blending the market logic and public intent of CRA means that these conflicting
goals can be more seamlessly reconciled. If the CRA is a market opportunity, then it fits within
the business model of a bank. Some of the most passionate CRA advocates believed that CRA
should be central to the bank’s business model. This could be in the form of long-term customer
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growth for the bank, which might necessitate technical assistance activities or investments in
CDFIs or nonprofits that would support the wealth-building activities of LMI customers. These
were not only potential new customers, they were also devoted customers who were more likely
to remain loyal customers of the bank over time.
The question of whether the CRA has made a positive community impact or not is
theorized to be central to a CRO’s role conception. There was a striking difference regarding the
size of the bank and whether or not the CRO felt that the CRA has actually ‘worked.’ Most of the
smaller, community banks, felt that the CRA has made no difference and that banks would have
equally invested in communities without the mandate (thus, it is just regulatory overhead). But
for most of the large banks, the CROs were more positive about the need for CRA and the major
impact it has had on access to capital.
Early on, it had been hypothesized that these views might be linked to the professional
backgrounds of the CROs. It was assumed as more bankers with community development or
nonprofit backgrounds came into the banking field (Chazdon, 1996), that they would internalize
the goals of the CRA as congruous with their previous community development work.
Unexpectedly, none of the bankers in this study came from nonprofit or community development
backgrounds, so this did not turn out to be significant. In fact, almost all of the CROs had spent
practically their entire careers in banking.
Despite not having community development backgrounds, many of the CROs at large
banks were in community development roles. Their stated reasons for becoming CROs were
because they wanted to make an impact on the community. These large banks had the resources
to create roles for CRA that were more directly focused on community outreach, which would
attract individuals with this mentality to the roles. While these staffing arrangements are
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structural in nature, they contribute to conceptual work. The individuals who are hired into
community development roles at the larger banks are likely to believe in the importance of the
CRA (Chazdon, 1996). Thus, they will continue to progress this positive narrative around the
importance of CRA work within their organizations. Community development roles were also
more likely to be held by bankers of color. The next section will explore the influence of race on
the conceptual work of CROs. This construct emerged as more significant during the interviews
than had been expected following the review of the literature.
Race and Ethnicity and Personal Identity
Race and ethnicity of the CRO, a demographic characteristic recorded for each interview
participant, played a significant role in both the likelihood that a CRO was in a community
development role and in perceptions of the merit of the CRA and thus in conceptual work. Race
is also a social construct, and it is a key element of an individual’s personal identity, or the
attributes which define and distinguish individuals (Olson, 2002).
For example, several of the African American and Hispanic CROs each were SVPs or
VPs of community development or community affairs. It is also interesting to note that aside
from one other CRO, only the CROs of color who were interviewed had “community
development” or “community affairs” in their titles at all. Race/ethnicity also appeared to
influence the CRO’s worldview of CRA, both with regards to whether or not it was viewed as
profitable and whether it was perceived to have made a difference.
In fact, the bankers who said that CRA could be profitable, and should be viewed as such,
were also bankers of color. Most of the White bankers shared the belief that CRA activities
would have a long-term positive impact on community growth. This was similar to the shared
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value logic discussed in Part One. Yet, it was the CROs of color who were most comfortable
with articulating a direct profit opportunity with CRA.
Furthermore, the key variable in this study that correlated with whether the CRO felt that
the CRA had made a difference, was also race. This meant that the CRA’s mandates were
perceived to be more consistent with the interpretative scheme of the work that the CROs of
color believed needed to be done by banks. The CRA does not explicitly mention the importance
of race in the statute. However, historically, redlining—the intentional decision not to loan in
certain areas despite creditworthiness— was disproportionately experienced by racial minorities
in blighted neighborhoods, especially in urban areas. Analyses of net worth by race and lending
data have consistently shown that minorities are far behind in access to capital and lending
outcomes. Therefore, it is important to note the implications of the CRA for racial minorities,
who disproportionately fall into the LMI income class that the CRA aimed to help. It was
expected that there might be some perceptible differences in attitudes about the CRA across
races based on prior research (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Watkins-Hayes, 2009), which
led to the collection of data on race in the Demographic Questionnaire. However, the differences
in perception were striking between the few CROs of color and most of the White CROs with
regards to the open-ended question, to what extent has the CRA made a difference?
Individuals who identified as White had a lower estimation of the CRA’s impact on the
activities of their banks with regards to access to capital. However, a multitude of quantitative
studies have found that the CRA has increased lending to LMI communities, particularly for
Black and minority borrowers, even though continued inequities exist today (Avery et al.,1999;
Avery & Bostic, 1996; Bates, 1997; Blanchflower et al., 1998; Campen, 1998; Canner &
Passmore, 1994; Evanoff & Segal, 1996; Haag, 2000; Munnell et al., 1992; Schill & Wachter,
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1994; Squires, 2003; Townes, 2008). How can we explain the majority of White bankers failing
to attribute any increases in lending to LMI and minority populations to the CRA (or even paying
mention of them), in stark contrast to bankers of color? In 1989, Peggy McIntosh wrote, “For me
white privilege has turned out to be an elusive and fugitive subject. The pressure to avoid it is
great, for in facing it I must give up the myth of meritocracy. If these things are true, this is not
such a free country; one’s life is not what one makes it; many doors open for certain people
through no virtues of their own” (McIntosh, 1989). Deep-seated racial inequities in the United
States are reflected in systemic racism, where discrimination has been embedded in American
institutions from the educational system to health care to criminal justice to economic and
financial systems. “Systemic racism is so embedded in our societal interactions that racism has
become normalized and rendered nearly invisible. So invisible that people deny its existence and
instead cast blame on the individual,” when these racial inequities are due to the decades of
disenfranchisement for people of color (Jo Persad, as cited in Slater, 2021). McIntosh’s view
reflects the dominance of a Capitalist institutional logic, where every person purportedly has the
equal opportunity to accumulate wealth through a fair economic system. But McIntosh points to
another reality, where de jure discrimination deeply entrenched inequalities within every
American institution, and the White majority is often blind to the resulting and continued
structural inequities.
White bankers in towns with little racial diversity lacked life experiences that they might
have had if the color of their skin were different, and which may have changed their perceptions
on whether the CRA has made much of an impact on the banking sector. Few of the bankers of
color discussed race at all either, or directly attributed perceptions of CRA to race. However, one
CRO had been the only Black banker in the room the majority of their career, too often feeling
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like the only one to “see” the disparities in capital access or to be willing to speak up about it.
This CRO felt confident that hiring more bankers of color would drive this conversation so that
the issues would actually be talked about. Many times, the CRO had just sat at the table in the
face of blatant issues of capital access, waiting for anyone else to speak up about it—to be an
ally—but no one did. This CRO’s sensemaking of the inequities that still exist today, which
CRA had begun to chip away, was quite different than for most of the White bankers who had
not lived through them.
An examination of racial economic inequalities illustrates why it is impossible to separate
the CRA’s focus on LMI individuals from race or ethnicity. For example, after World War II,
returning White veterans could take advantage of low-cost mortgages or free tuition. Over 1.2
million Black men and women had served. Though the GI bill did not explicitly exclude Blacks
from college tuition or Veterans Affairs (VA) backed mortgages, the implementation by the VA
did (Clyburn & Moulton, 2021). Racist policies of the past directly contributed to the vast
advantage that Whites have in building generational wealth. Today, the racial wealth gap is
evidenced in the fact that the average White family possesses an average net worth of $141,900,
more than ten times the $11,000 average net worth of African-Americans (Jan, 2017; Villanueva,
2021, p. 84). Minority-owned firms are three times more likely than white-owned firms to be
declined loans. Additionally, Black-owned firms obtain an average of only $35,205 of startup
capital during their first year, as compared to an average of $106,720 for white-owned firms
(Villanueva, 2021, p. 84).
The institutional logics perspective sheds some light on these between race differences,
although it also points to further questions that were beyond the scope of this study given that
questions about race were not directly incorporated into the interviews. Within banking, the
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dominant institutional logic is a capitalist, accumulation-driven and profit-first market logic. But
that capitalist “free” market system has significant systemic inequalities for persons of color,
whom have been disadvantaged in a multitude of ways and historically excluded from
benefitting from the capitalist market. Post-emancipation, Black Americans have continued to
face major hurdles particularly tied to generational wealth, especially the lack of inheritance of
either land or wealth that they were previously barred from owning. Continued barriers to access
for a quality education, employment, and housing—often due to the lack of generational
wealth—have crippled minority families’ abilities to accumulate profit under the capitalist
system.
In 1965, in President Lyndon B. Johnson’s commencement address at Howard
University, he said:
You do not wipe away the scars of centuries by saying: ‘now, you are free to go
where you want, do as you desire, and choose the leaders you please.’ You do not
take a man who for years has been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to
the starting line of a race, saying, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and
still justly believe you have been completely fair… (University of Rhode Island,
2017).
This history of race and discrimination in America means that the Capitalist system has
not produced the same financial opportunities for persons of color. Thus, references to a free
market logic may be less dominant for bankers of color. They may not identify with the common
identity expressed by other bankers in the financial industry because the assumptions, practices,
and values of the market logic have not resulted in meritocracy for persons of color, as they have
witnessed in their own life experiences. They are likely more willing to accept intentional
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practices mandated by public policy that conflict with a pure market logic, such as creating
programs that operate at a profit-loss to serve your lowest income customers or locating bank
branches in less profitable LMI communities. And, importantly, they are less likely than White
bankers to voice the perspective that banks would defy this market logic and lend to low-income
customers anyway, without the CRA.
However, it was not that the Black and other minority bankers did not reference market
logics at all. Rather, they referenced more of a “social market” logic, a reference to the countries
of Scandinavia that embrace social welfare and capitalist market economies (Sanandaji, 2021).
These were still bankers. They deeply believed in the need for capital access for socioeconomic
mobility. Thus, they were not trying to operate outside of the financial mainstream. Rather, they
wanted to see the net widen, and they were comfortable for the government to intervene, to
ensure more attention to those who had historically been excluded from capital access. In fact,
they were not just comfortable for the government to intervene, they needed it to. Thus, these
bankers may have referenced a social market logic, which enabled them to more easily reconcile
the institutional demands of the CRA with the other pressures of their work. And while they still
often had internal struggles to promote the CRA within their organizations, they at minimum had
less self-struggle with the mandates of the CRA.
Bankers of color in this study did not simply embrace the public policy goals of the CRA,
but rather, they internalized them as meaningful and righteous systemic work that must be done.
Thus, the conceptual work of bankers of color was aligned with the construction of CRA policies
and the conceptual conflict was minimized in their sensemaking of these mandates. Their
interpretations of the policy mandates were consistent with the work that they believed was the
right thing to do, and they were more likely to be passionate for carrying out the CRA work than
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annoyed at the regulatory burden. Bankers of color, though still experiencing other pressures of
compliance (such as advocating for the CRA within their banks), approached their work with a
philosophical alignment with the policy goals of the CRA that appears to embrace the law and its
intent, and to deeply believe that it has made a difference and is needed. This enabled their
conceptual work to adopt and implement CRA policies.
This theme builds upon important findings in prior literature. For example, BridwellMitchell and Sherer (2017), in their study of educators, found that race was the most significant
factor that accounted for which institutional logic teachers were likely to ascribe to. Teachers of
color were significantly less likely than their White peers to reference market logics. This is
similar to the finding here, which points to bankers of color experiencing less pressure from
regulatory mandates to serve their communities.
Furthermore, in her study of welfare workers, Watkins-Hayes (2009) found that case
managers of color were more likely to recognize institutionalized barriers in access to the
market. This pointed to a distrust of the market logic and supports the notion that both public
service and private sector managers who identify as racial ethnicities other than White, are less
likely to draw on the institutional logic of the pure Capitalist market as a dominant institution. In
practice, this may mean that they experience fewer ideological conflicts with regulatory
mandates that are intended to develop communities, and that may clash with pure market logics.
The idea that race is an important variable in how employees view their work and the
policy mandates that govern their work, is relatively unexplored in the public policy literature
(Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Watkins-Hayes, 2009). Thus, the findings here are of
particular importance across the entire slate of empirical findings in this study. This is especially
true when considering that communities of color are the primary benefactors of CRA policies.
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This study also elaborates important new insights from the previous institutional theory
literature, specifically regarding institutional logic multiplicity and the way in which race
intersects with institutional work. Importantly, managers of color referenced a market logic that
was more aligned with the public sector’s bureaucratic logic, and the development logic, termed
a “social market “logic here.
Operational Work
Operational work involves managers’ efforts to execute initiatives, including programs.
products, and services, that will fulfill the mandates of public policies (Cloutier et al., 2016). It
necessarily will involve frontline professionals, often the loan and investment officers in the case
of a bank, as well as the CRO him or herself driving the strategy. Cloutier et al. (2016) conceived
of operational work as where “the rubber hits the road” in policy implementation (p. 268). As
with other types of work, there are interwoven linkages. Yet, a tangible and direct link between
the market context of communities where CROs lived and worked was influential with regards to
CROs’ operational work. There was some mention of the desire to advocate for policy change to
influence policies to the CROs advantage (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006;
Mahon & McGowan, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Stone, 2012). This was extensively covered in Part
One. There, the focus on influencing CRA policy had largely been around enabling banks to
operate according to their business models. Elements of these findings included market
competition, the changing nature of communities, and at times, community pressure to do more
with CRA. Here, market context will be revisited, but more directly from an institutional work
perspective, and with new insights from the second data set.
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Market Context
CROs experienced community pressures in their operational work to carry out specific
activities required by the CRA, including loans, investments, and service requirements. In fact,
many of the CROs felt that the challenges of their market contexts were the most significant
impediments to do more when it came to compliance with the CRA. This was not because of
community pressure to do more with CRA for most of the bankers, as had been hypothesized,
but rather it was because of a perceived lack of need for CRA activity. Operational work of the
CRO is complex. It is related both to the market area where the bank’s activities are already
concentrated, as well as where the bank could potentially expand.
There were both material and symbolic elements of the market context. The market
context was often experienced as a significant constraint with regards to material elements
required for carrying out the operational work necessitated by CRA mandates. For example,
many of the bankers explained that their assessment areas had very few LMI census tracts. They
simply did not have the LMI population to serve, which did not mean they were not focused on
community reinvestment, it just meant that they believed that there was not a community need.
Symbolically, the market context created unique meaning for many of the CROs; it even
created anxieties regarding how they would carry out their work. For example, for many CROs,
as illustrated in the first data set, a heavy banking regulatory burden worsened a crisis for their
profession. They felt that community banks were already threatened by acquisitions from larger
banks and market competition, and that the overhead for compliance would only worsen the
situation. Reinforcing a finding from the first data set, market competition from unregulated nonbank competitors such as credit unions was seen as a significant threat.
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Anxieties also presented surrounding change in the modern workplace, which was
discussed in the context of CROs’ job duties, but also interfaces with the market context and
operational work. With the data burden of CRA came a significant need to learn new
technologies and software. Being competitive in the bank’s market entailed learning a
burgeoning set of banking policies, new definitions around market assessments, and a
proliferation of market data. Managing this data burden in order to help the bank to succeed on
CRA could feel stifling, leaving little room for innovation. This also meant that the CRO (or
organizational leadership) was likely to perform maintenance work to protect the central
commercial mission of the bank by siloing it from the bureaucratic logic of regulatory
compliance, or audit functions. Back-end data analysts are not actually trying to change anything
about the way the bank is operating. They are looking through the bank activities to determine
where business as usual might check a CRA box. In this regard, a back-end data analyst has not
actually performed any institutional work to change existing practices or to achieve more of the
mandates or incentives of the CRA. Instead, their institutional work is of maintenance, as they
have avoided doing anything more with CRA mandates than the minimum necessary to pass an
evaluation.
This is despite the fact that the CRA specifically recognizes innovative initiatives and
programs. In fact, Weatherly and Lipsky (1977) found that innovative policies are constrained
during implementation by personnel who are trying to manage a multitude of work demands.
Similarly, Blythe, a respondent to the ANPR, had found that “banks trying to meet obscure CRA
objectives are pulled away from innovation that would better serve their customers and
communities.” The data burden and the regulatory ambiguity previously discussed may mean
that banks cannot be “more innovative to address real needs” of LMI communities, as Ron told
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the OCC in his response to the request for ANPR feedback. Thus, the same constraints for
structural work, the bankers’ workloads, also constrained operational work. For example, very
few of the bankers mentioned the need for innovation at all. Yet, making a significant impact on
access to capital necessarily requires new products and services. In other words, it requires
innovation. Furthermore, moving the needle on community development cannot be as simple as
carrying out business as normal and then filling in the corresponding loans for CRA compliance.
An innovative CRA program requires a strategy that changes operational practices regarding
how to better achieve access to capital for historically disadvantaged LMI groups.
Finally, the institutional demands created by local communities was specifically of
interest in R2. However, the vast majority of CROs reported not experiencing any community
pressure, or at least this is what they articulated. Only the CROs in the largest banks mentioned
that they regularly responded to questions from community organizations. Few CROs had ever
even been asked for their public files. It was only at the larger banks that demands were
experienced from large advocacy organizations such as the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition (NCRC). But even for the larger banks, the CROs attempted to have more
collaborative relationships with the NCRC as opposed to conflictual.
Some of the CROs at large banks did have more pressures from community groups than
did the smaller banks, but they also tried to maintain positive and collaborative relationships, and
to use the opportunity to determine which initiatives they should be engaging in. For some of the
CROs, the biggest tension was related to what the bank could and could not do for the
community, especially regarding safety and soundness. Thus, the dominant market logic of the
field again contrasted with community pressures, as the community members did not understand
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that CROs could not lower their banks’ regulated and institutionalized practices around safety
and soundness to lend to individuals with lower credit.
In summary, community pressure as it had originally been conceived was not a highly
significant factor with regards to the capacity of CROs to reconcile the institutional demands of
the CRA at banks under $10 billion in asset size. Rather, for these banks, the primary conflict
was between the conflicting logics of the banker’s employer and the regulators. The way that the
market context intersected with this was more directly tied to both the commercial mission of the
bank and the social mission of the CRA policies rather than a separate pressure. Indeed, the
commercial mission of the bank was constrained by the market context, and the social mission of
the CRA policies could sometimes interfere with that commercial focus by disrupting the bank’s
market. But at the larger banks, community pressure did play a role, and it also was often at odds
with the market logic of the banking field.
Relational Work
The fourth category of institutional work that Cloutier et al. (2016) identified was
relational work. Relational work was the most embedded category and underpinned each of the
other categories of institutional work. This type of work relates to the interpersonal relationships
between managers and the other individuals who will be vital to policy implementation (Cloutier
et al., 2016). For CROs, this includes bank leadership, as well as street-level workers who carry
out the financial activities of the bank that affect CRA ratings, including loan and investment
officers especially, as well as data analysts, community outreach team members (if applicable),
and other colleagues in the bank. It also involves the ability to build trust and collaboration with
members of the community to develop an effective outreach and engagement program for CRA,
but this is only if the bank has a community outreach program at all, and thus is connected to job
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responsibilities of the CRO structurally, as well as to his or her professional identity and selfconceptions.
Relational work affects the capacity of an actor to be successful at all the other types of
work that affect policy implementation. The ability to develop shared conceptual understandings
around ways of working to fulfill CRA mandates necessitates mutual trust and collaboration,
which require “developing personal relations” with others (Cloutier et al., 2016, p. 270).
Relational work was intricately tied to the professional identity of the CRO. The social
construction of an individual’s self-understanding of their role in the workplace, or the beliefs
and attitudes around an employee’s work activities, make up one’s professional identity (Ibarra,
1999). Like personal identity, professional identity influences the way an individual experiences
their work and internalizes organizational culture, including the ways that policies are
understood, and references to the dominant institutional logics in the professional field.
Professional Identity
At a bank, while roles like loan officers are mainly responsible for their own
performance, you have to get buy-in and support from the entire team to be successful in the
CRO role. This takes a certain aptitude for people skills. The perception of one’s professional
self is intricately tied to relationships with others. Relational work is both uniquely tied to the
traits of the individual, yet deeply dependent on one’s interactions with others. Professional
identity necessarily starts from the point of what someone understands his or her role to be, as
well as her aptitude for that role, and whether that role really matters or not. Following
conceptualizations of one’s professional self, then interactions with other professionals follow,
including whether or not you can relate to a colleague’s role and skillsets for such. Professional
interactions such as being able to put yourself in your teammate’s shoes, teamworking, and
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agreeableness are all deeply related to professional identity and will influence relational work.
Finally, one’s gender had a significant effect on professional identity for several bankers,
particularly where being a woman was seen as a career impediment, and CRA roles were an
opportunity for growth.
Professional identity has several key dimensions that affected CROs’ interpretations of
CRA policy mandates and how they collaborated with others to achieve their work aspirations.
The first dimension of CROs’ professional identities was whether they identified as outreach
professionals or compliance professionals. Were their relevant skillsets, and their strengths as
CROs more closely related to knowledge and abilities around compliance work, or around
community engagement? This conceptualization was closely tied to whether they viewed CRA
policy as necessitating data analytics and compliance or audit type functions, or whether they
viewed it as requiring outreach work and linkages with community groups. The concept of
whether CROs felt self-worth in their roles was also closely tied to this. CROs felt that their jobs
mattered for different reasons. In a compliance role, success is measured by ensuring that the
bank data is flawlessly recorded and that all activities that may count are captured. This requires
some relational work, such as ensuring that all service activities are captured and that loans are
properly recorded. But it will not require the type of relational work that seeks to change
behaviors within the bank, to do more with CRA initiatives, for example. It was also notable that
the outreach professionals had distinct overlap with the group of CROs who said that CRA
mattered, that it had made a significant difference for the actions of banks in attention to LMI
populations. Thus, their understanding of the importance of CRA was conceptualized differently
than for the compliance professionals. Conceptual work was intricately linked with relational
work (Cloutier et al., 2016).
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A second key dimension of professional identity was categorized as “professional
interactions.” Several interesting themes emerged in the data. For example, for CROs who had
previously held front-line roles in the bank, they understood the daily challenges of this type of
role. Their ability to influence the activities of these front-line professionals was captured by the
metaphor of walking in someone else’s shoes, and thus understanding what their daily work lives
and job duties are like.
Furthermore, agreeableness and the closely related dimension of teamworking were
found to be significant attributes that influenced the CRO’s ability to achieve other actors’ buy-in
on CRA initiatives. Though this dimension of work has not been explored in the street-level
bureaucracy literature, it has been widely studied within the field of management. Wilmot and
Ones (2022) studied the personality trait of agreeableness and found that it is highly impactful on
real-world job outcomes. Acknowledging the extent to which it has been studied, Wilmot and
Ones summarized 142 meta-analyses regarding personality and job performance, with 275
variables, representing over 1.9 million participants and 3,900 studies (p. 1). This meta-analysis
revealed that agreeableness has a highly desirable effect on many of the metrics that will impact
job performance. They wrote that this personality trait was especially important because it is the
one most associated with building positive relationships. Wilmot and Ones synthesized eight
characteristics of agreeableness. One of the key characteristics was teamworking, or the capacity
to effectively cooperate and coordinate, with others, to accomplish shared and collective aims.
Essentially, agreeableness is the aspect of professional identity that leads to contentment, work
investment, the capacity for successful integration into social rules, relational investment, and
teamworking (Wilmot & Ones, 2022). All of these aspects are highly influential for institutional
work, particularly relational work, and they were evident in the practices that several of the
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CROs prioritized in their work to influence teammates to contribute to CRA work. Thus,
agreeableness contributed directly to the relational work required to implement the policy
mandates of CRA.
Gender and Professional Identity
Lastly, gender was a significant dimension that affected the CROs’ professional identity.
Specifically, gender was tied to the belief that career mobility for women was limited at banks in
production roles. This meant that women would have to be in compliance roles in order to move
up in the bank, as several of the female CROs all experienced. Some women were willing to
speculate that perhaps there is a gendered nature to both compliance and outreach roles (as
opposed to production roles). For example, perceptions exist that women pay attention to detail
and follow the rules, whereas men do not want to do the back-office work. But more
significantly, the career path was more open to them because men did not want to do it, instead
opting for the more lucrative production roles. This has several implications for relational work,
including the possibility that women will go into roles that they are not particularly keen on
because of the mobility potential. There was a certain level of resentment about the compliance
work among some of the women interviewed (though certainly not all), which may affect
attitudes about both one’s work and the CRA policy burden, making the relational work to
implement mandates more challenging. The inequitable access to promotion and opportunity will
also mean that the person most skilled for a certain role within the bank may not do it. However,
this negativity is not necessarily the case for all women, and many of the women in compliance
roles that acknowledged a gender difference were also highly positive about their work. In
general, for the women where career mobility was involved, there was a more negative
dimension of a CRA career path focused on compliance, and a more positive dimension of a
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CRA career path focused on outreach. This connected to one observation that perhaps many
women become CROs because of the public service or social work aspect of it. If this is the case,
then gender is likely to play a role in the reconciliation of institutional demands. Unfortunately,
gender did not factor prominently enough in the data to dissect it in much greater depth than
these initial observations, but it is certainly worthy of further research.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion and Implications
Introduction
Public policies are the institutional mandates of governments to address societal problems
in the public interest (Lassance, 2020). The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was enacted in
the United States to spur banks to innovate products and programs and engage in services to
combat rising socioeconomic inequalities and community disinvestment. Research shows that
CRA has narrowed the gap in access to capital for the LMI communities it has intended to
support (Avery et al.,1999; Avery & Bostic, 1996; Campen, 1998; Evanoff & Segal, 1996; Haag,
2000; Squires, 2003). Yet the original intent of the CRA remains relevant given continued
inequality in America, and particularly the wealth gap between racial minorities and White
families. Access to capital for LMI communities, who are disproportionately communities of
color, remains as important as ever (Bates, 1997; Blanchflower et al., 1998; Canner & Passmore,
1994; Haag, 2000; Munnell et al., 1992; Schill & Wachter, 1994; Slater, 2021; Townes, 2008;
University of Rhode Island, 2017; Villanueva, 2021). Thus, studies on effective implementation
of the CRA are critical as this legislation seeks to close the gap in access to capital.
Following Smith’s (1973) observation that public policy can disrupt institutionalized
norms, community reinvestment policies can be viewed as deliberate attempts to change the
institutional practices of banks. Yet these practices are deeply embedded and resistant to change.
In fact, institutional change can be disruptive even within the public sector. This was evidenced
by public health care managers attempting to internalize and implement public policy reforms as
illustrated in Cloutier et al.’s (2016) study of the institutional work processes of managers in the
Canadian nationalized health care system.
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The institutional logics perspective elucidates the great difficulty of finding common
ground when cross-sector actors reference divergent institutional logics (Battilana & Dorado,
2010; Cloutier et al., 2016; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991; Pache & Santos,
2010; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999). These conflicting logics are evidenced by contradictory norms,
practices, and belief systems. Deep seated institutional beliefs embodied by private sector actors
and evidenced in their daily work activities are challenged by public policies that target change
in business practices. Yet adaptation does take place over time, and managers responsible for
policy mandates do reconcile the institutional pressures, with varying levels of success, of policy
requirements. While elements of entrenched institutions exert powerful maintenance forces,
institutional logics do change over time, driven by sectoral actors, through a variety of microprocesses categorized as institutional work.
All managers responsible for CRA mandates experience job-related pressures, just as any
organizational employee experiences varying levels of work-related pressure. For CRA officers
(CROs), their professional responsibilities are to their organizations, their communities, and to
their regulators. This trifecta of pressures faced in carrying out their work is heightened by their
responsibility to ensure compliance with regulatory policies created by the public sector, and
mandated of the private sector, where these external public interest goals may not align with
internal commercial goals. Being monitored for your performance by itself exerts pressure, but
these tensions are heightened where there are fundamental misalignments in logics between
those under scrutiny and the regulators. How CROs manage these tensions and reconcile the
institutional demands created by the CRA is highly variable when examined at the micro-level.
This study intended to understand the contributing factors for the successful management of
these demands.
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As a study building on extant work on policy implementation, this dissertation has examined
the promise of the blending of institutional logics and institutional work perspectives to explore
the conflict in institutional demands for regulated banks and the senior managers who are
responsible for policy mandates. In addition to the development of institutional theory, the linked
perspectives provide the framework to explain CRA managers’ boundary-spanning role in
creating and sustaining new norms in community reinvestment around the concept of shared
value, which suggests that market-driven activities can provide social benefit (Porter & Kramer,
2011). The study sought to understand how CROs reconcile the institutional demands created by
the CRA. In this regard, it examined in what ways their reactions vary via the institutional logics
perspective, and how their individual attributes, backgrounds, communities, and banks influence
their responses and their institutional work as they reconcile policy demands. These questions
were posed with the underlying motivation of uncovering what works in community
development policy to achieve positive social outcomes. This conclusion will suggest some key
points that could inform both theory development as well as private sector and governmental
practices.
Implications for Theory Development
At the heart of this study is an analysis of conflict in institutional logics and attempts at
reconciliation strategies, analyzed via the lens of institutional work. In the current case, these
intersectoral institutional conflicts and potential response strategies operate at the intersection of
public policy and private business. To demonstrate the potential for conflict, the study employed
the institutional logics perspective, which enriches our dialogue about the social constructions of
norms and practices expressed by the various sectoral actors (Friedland & Alford, 1991;
Lindblom, 1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Thornton et al., 2012).
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Crucially, institutional logics moves away from a focus on unitary organizations operating within
discrete institutional fields. Rather, the perspective can be employed to reorient us to the
institutional work of sectoral actors in their agentic attempts to modify or change institutional
logics over time when confronted with demands that extend beyond institutional maintenance
(Cloutier et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2011; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006). Despite the synergies
of these two perspectives, institutional logics and institutional work are often employed
independently from one another (Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; David et al., 2019; Rojas, 2010).
Thus, the linkage of both perspectives is a significant contribution to institutional theory
development (David et al., 2019).
From the vantage point of both institutional perspectives, we can begin to examine how
dominant institutional norms are embodied by private sector actors in their daily work activities
(such as the all-encompassing market-driven capitalist logic in the United States) yet recognize
that given agency, the market logic is not dominant for all actors even in the same organization
or sector, nor is it referenced by these actors in isolation given their multiple societal roles
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Besharov & Smith, 2014; Canning & O’Dwyer, 2016; Gawer &
Phillips, 2013; Knutsen, 2012; Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991; Pache &
Santos, 2013; Rojas, 2010). Though sensemaking is influenced by the dominant logics of actors’
organizations, value-systems are also shaped by actors’ backgrounds and experiences, which
contribute to their personal identities and affect how they view societal problems, and the public
polices implemented to address them.
In this study, race and ethnicity were found to be particularly influential regarding a
readiness to adopt the norms of community development policies, which was linked to the ways
in which the CROs of color referenced institutional logics, as well as the institutional work that
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they carried out. Race and ethnicity have only minimally been addressed within the policy
implementation literature, where Watkins-Hayes (2009) found that social workers of color were
more likely to recognize systemic economic barriers and to “fundamentally believe in their work
and the mission to improve lives” thus influencing how these workers more successfully
reconciled welfare policy mandates with their work (p.76). Furthermore, Bridwell-Mitchell and
Sherer (2017) found that the race of teachers was the most significant factor to account for
divergent references to institutional logics during policy implementation. Bridwell-Mitchell and
Sherer remarked that this finding is important because it suggest that race, and the life
experiences connected to race, play a more significant role in the interpretations of policy
mandates than the literature has previously recognized. Thus, this study complements and
reinforces this critical observation.
While there is intrinsic value in uncovering theoretical insights to explain empirical
observations, ultimately the public policy field seeks to make a positive societal impact via
findings uncovered through the theoretical lens. The initial practical implications that this study
suggests are offered to the banking sector, and then to the policy regulators, with theory-driven
insights embedded throughout.
Implications for the Banking Community
There are practical implications derived from the theoretical insight that race and
ethnicity and personal identity are significant factors influencing references to institutional logics
and institutional work. The insight indicates that diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) efforts in
organizational hiring will be beneficial in the banking sector and can potentially contribute to
enhanced commitment to CRA policy goals as well. The findings have suggested that personal
identity is significant in the conceptual work of CROs. Thus, if more bankers of color are hired
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and involved in community development practice for banks, this is likely to enhance the
commitment to CRA goals. Banks can address DEI efforts in both their immediate hiring and
their “pipeline” efforts. With regards to long-term prospects for hiring persons of color, banks
also should engage in programs targeted to diversifying the fields of study connected to banking
at secondary and tertiary institutions. For example, banks can support summer bridge programs
for underrepresented youth focused on the finance field, or fund scholarship programs intended
for students who are underrepresented in the finance field. Furthermore, in their service
activities, banks can pursue educational institution engagement focused on financial literacy,
while generating interest in the finance field as a career option.
This study additionally leads to an observation that CROs who believe that they have a
role to play in community development and believe that their work is important and necessary
will more skillfully navigate the institutional demands of public policy. While race was
significant in the conceptualization of the importance of community reinvestment activities,
other factors also were important. Indeed, we should not underestimate the power of positivity
and agreeableness (Wilmot & Ones, 2022). Believing that you are helping people through your
work and that carrying out the mandates of the CRA is the “right thing to do” for the community
to prosper, makes a great difference in the ability to confidently execute those mandates day-today. Embracing this work also means that those activities will be carried out with the intention of
community impact, not simply to fulfill mandates and avoid repercussions of failing CRA
evaluation examinations. Organizations and leadership can address this through the positive
organizational culture that they create at the bank. Siloing the CRO within the compliance
division with other banking regulations and believing that ‘satisfactory is good enough,’ is
unlikely to make CROs feel empowered or supported in their work. Instead, bank leadership
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should embrace a commitment to the goals of the CRA, specifically around capital access and
equity, not just a commitment to their communities and economic development more broadly.
Critically, leadership should diffuse responsibility for the CRA throughout the organization. It
should not be solely the responsibility of the CRO, but instead it is important to recognize and
voice that the CRA is the responsibility of everyone in the bank, from the executive leadership to
the loan officers and investment team.
While commitment to community and a belief that banks are the cornerstones of American
communities is widespread among bankers, at the heart of the CRA is the intention that banks
play a central role in systemic issues of capital access. Rather than servicing only the highest networth individuals, policy makers asked banks to ensure that LMI customers can access capital
and financial tools, including technical assistance, as well as wealth-building products, breaking
the cycle of poverty. This study shows that when these products are considered as part of the
financial strategy of the bank, CRA commitment is enhanced. In fact, several respondents noted
that while profitability may be lower for loans to LMI customers, gains in reputation may
generate favorable long-term benefits for the bank. This finding points to two key
recommendations for banks and especially the most senior staff members who often lack a
complete understanding of CRA requirements. First, it will be valuable to couple the social
mission of CRA with the commercial mission of the bank. Second, it is important to embrace the
community outreach element of CRA work, not just the compliance aspect.
Banks should not silo CRA within the compliance division, but instead, infuse it within
the retail and commercial functions of the bank’s financial production portfolios, considering it a
long-term market opportunity. According to some practitioners and academics, community
investment is a viable market and banks can expect financial return on most CRA loans and
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investments, and it may be beneficial to promote that refrain (Curry, 2017; Kane, 1993;
Perlmeter, 2017). “Bankers who approach the [community development] market with a profit
motive” are likely to be profitable (Kane, 1993, p. 30). This will entail not only considering the
role that all of the production staff play in CRA, but also innovative models such as hiring CROs
who retain lending and investment portfolios, dedicating loan officer roles to affordable housing
and community development and focusing on product innovation to profitably serve LMI
communities and enable access to capital.
Banks and organizational leaders should also pay heed to the experiences of women in
this study. Many had gone into compliance roles because they felt that their career mobility
would have been limited in financial production roles, which they believed were more accessible
for men. While these career limitations led to some frustrations for women who were siloed into
compliance, other women were doing CRA work because of their desire to work in community
outreach. Both of these observations suggest that banks should focus on the cross-collaboration
opportunities between CRA, community outreach, and financial production functions. This may
enable more career mobility for women who support the commercial mission of the bank, as well
as engage them in the community outreach work that many women expressed interest and skill
in.
Additionally, banks should continue to focus on the benefits of cross-sector partnerships
that capitalize on the strengths of each sector. Cross-sector partnerships between the public and
private sector have emerged as some of the most promising institutional arrangements to advance
sustainable development goals (Glasbergen, 2007; Gray, 2007). Community banks are wellsuited to interpret the credit needs of the local market, as well as determine the appropriate
product and service offerings that are financially viable within the local market context.
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However, they may not have the community development or technical assistance expertise of
nonprofits and CDFIs who regularly serve LMI populations. Additionally, as larger banks have
become more regional and national, the need for partnerships with community groups who can
provide technical assistance becomes increasingly vital for these organizations as well (NCRC,
2007).
With regards to the community outreach element of CRA, this study showed that treating the
CRA as compliance is likely to lead to limited change in bank activities, although the bank may
still be able to achieve a minimally passing grade on the CRA evaluation. Siloing CRA in
compliance becomes primarily an exercise in data analysis and documentation, with no real
change in intentional strategic efforts for serving LMI communities. This work is challenging.
LMI individuals often do not meet the credit and underwriting standards of banks, so voicing that
‘we will lend to any LMI person who meets our standards’ is unlikely to move the needle and
truly impact community development. In the field of community development policy, ultimately
the purpose of doing research is so that public policy outcomes can be improved.
Implications for Policy Process Improvements
Given the policy goals, the government should have a vested interest in the successful
implementation of CRA policy. Yet, if the public sector seeks to maximize the private sector’s
impact on communities through the CRA, it should be cognizant of the dominant institutional
logic of the private sector, the market logic, driven by the profit motive. Recall Senator
Proxmire’s plea to bankers to address systemic socioeconomic conditions: “You are the people,
you bankers are the people who can do the job” (United States, 1977, p.329). The federal
government believed that community reinvestment was too big of a job for the government
alone, and that banks were equipped to support community development, effectively outsourcing
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elements of public sector work to the banks via regulatory mandate. Thus, given the
responsibility that is shouldered by banks, the regulators must support and enable their work, as
well as their profitability.
The regulatory agencies are co-implementers of a public mandate on the private sector. Silver
argued that “[t]he genius of CRA is that it is not a top-down mandate by the government”
(Silver, 2017). Rather, it provides processes for dialogue among bankers, community members,
and regulatory agencies on what works in community reinvestment (Silver, 2017). Yet, the
majority of the time, this is not the experience that CROs have voiced in this study. Bankers
often felt that the regulators were adversaries working against them looking for fault and to
penalize them on exams. In order to maximize the potential of banks to improve their
communities, regulators should work as enablers and partners in the community development
enterprise, attempting to understand the key values and practices of the private sector CROs who
implement CRA mandates. There are many challenges to overcome in partnerships that converge
over sectors of society. For this reason, it is vital that partners commit to a continual learning
process, overcome challenges together, learn to work together more effectively, and are oriented
by a problem-solving attitude and long-term commitment to shared societal problems (Austin,
2007). Community development will be more successful if bank regulators and banks
approached their partnerships with the same mentality. Thus, the banking regulators have an
opportunity to be more agreeable as well (Wilmot & Ones, 2022).
Furthermore, community development expertise and research on best practices evolves
over time. Many of the frustrations with CRA policies in this study tied to the belief that the
regulatory mandates need to be modernized to fit with the technology advances of modern
banking, as well as more sophisticated knowledge about sustainable development practices.
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Despite their belief in the importance of the CRA, multiple Black bankers mentioned
opportunities to update and reform CRA for more effective community development, especially
considering the concern that investments of housing in strictly LMI communities would prevent
neighborhood mobility for families of color. Thus, new sustainable development expertise and
projects such as mixed income housing developments are worthy of CRA credit. Research shows
that banks focus on activities that count towards their CRA ratings, “regardless of their impact on
strengthening communities.” This means that viable projects may not be implemented simply
because the CRA ratings will not award sufficient credit (Willis, 2009, p. 63). It is therefore
essential that CRA regulatory policy is written with a focus on what works in sustainable
community development, not simply checking the boxes of regulatory mandates.
The findings of this dissertation also support the claim that the CRA’s community impact
was increased exponentially by the Riegle Act in 1994, which created the CDFI Fund,
principally because it was a market-based solution (CDFI Fund, 2017). It enabled banks to invest
in CDFIs and non-profit institutions who lacked financial capital but had the human capital and
appropriate products to effectively lend and service LMI communities. Thus, it leaned on the
core strengths of the business models of both traditional banks and CDFIs. Though profit
margins may be lower with CDFI investments than with other investment portfolio opportunities,
returns are still viable, and the loss and delinquencies common with LMI borrowers are
mitigated. There is overwhelming evidence that CDFIs, essentially born out of the same capital
access issues that led to the CRA, have been enormous successes. Statistical evidence shows that
they have provided billions in financing with a low loss rate and low delinquencies (Pinsky,
2001). Given the dominance of the profit-first logic of the bankers in this study, the findings
translate to the observation that market solutions that mitigate concerns about safety and
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soundness, such as enhancing opportunities for CDFI investments and the CDFI fund, would be
excellent ways for policy makers to enhance CRA requirements without diverging as far from
dominant norms within the banking sector.
While the institutional logics perspective elucidates why bank/CDFI partnerships are
positioned to be successful, analysis points to additional observations and opportunities for
future research. If CDFIs can develop specialized, grassroots, LMI market expertise and
assistance that a community bank cannot (Lento, 1994; Santiago et. al, 1998), and are more
effective than banks at poverty alleviation (Marsico, 1995), then one might observe that a bank
could avoid hiring staff with specialized community development expertise by investing in
CDFIs or other third-party community development organizations. In fact, Benston (1997)
argued that only financial institutions with relevant expertise in LMI lending should do so, not all
banks. This “outsourcing” of CRA compliance is an interesting direction for future research,
which should focus on what negative aspects there may be for the financial system if this is a
model mode of compliance. For example, does it enable banks to avoid making the needed
systemic changes to their institutionalized practices? If investing in CDFIs avoids the
underwriting guidelines that are often a tension with LMI lending, then working through the
CDFI is, in essence, a middleman to avoid that institutional pressure. To examine this
proposition was beyond the scope of this dissertation but might be a worthwhile topic for future
study.
Either way, the dominance of the market logic for CROs also points to the need to
continue to develop innovative market-based approaches. One potential CRA opportunity, from
a broad policy perspective, may be to align with a parallel market, the impact investment
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sector.31 Impact investing is the financial arena for double or triple bottom line investors, who
seek financial performance along with social and environmental attention (Thornley & Dailey,
2010). The field is built on decades of previous financial sector work in microfinance and
community development (Clarkin & Cangioni, 2016). In 2010, social impact investments were
estimated to reach some $500 billion in market size by 2020 (Moon, 2010, p. 50). As of 2021,
the estimated size of the impact investing market globally according to the Global Impact
Investing Network (GIIN) is $715 billion (Bradford, 2021).
Socially-motivated investors seek to invest in funds that address social issues, but the
investors clearly need to be able to evaluate the impact of their investments, and the balance
between financial and social return. In order to tap into larger sources of investment, there is a
need to create standardized performance assessment so that investors can make decisions based
on a balance of financial and social objectives (Porteous & Narain, 2008). Although the
evaluation exam methodology is standardized across banks, according to size, and across
regulatory agencies so that CRA ratings are comparable, they are only used for regulatory
purposes (Moon, 2010). CRA compliance has not yet led to systematic analysis of outcome data
to improve social outcomes or to be used by investors as investment cues. The CRA data systems
do not aggregate and systemize the data in a way that investors could use it to track social
performance (Porteous & Narain, 2008). Without tracking performance of community loans and
investments in a more systematic way, there is a lost opportunity to better understand what really
works in community development (Thornley & Dailey, 2010). CRA exams continue to focus on
bank activities rather than the impact of these activities (Moon, 2010). Due to the focus on

31

Impact investing refers to investment targeting social and environmental return, such as in the workforce development,
housing, education, or health sectors. Funding is “directly contingent on both delivering and proving impact” (Thornley &
Dailey, 2010, p.3).
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capital flow and types of activities as opposed to outcomes, Moon (2010) argued that we do not
actually know the answer to the question, “to what degree has CRA-motivated lending and
investing successfully improved communities?” (p. 50).
There is an opportunity here for the banking regulators to standardize some of the impact
measurement tools and impact reporting systems to utilize CRA data and ratings to measure
community impact (Moon, 2010). This could potentially provide standardization of social impact
data for investment purposes, enabling banks to better pursue the profit opportunity from socially
responsible investment. Banks regulated by the CRA already have collected a massive amount of
data related to their community development impact. The regulators could play a key role in
providing the tools to aggregate and align this data (Fazili, 2010; Moon, 2010). Many of the
CROs in this study had asked for the regulators to help them meet CRA obligations by providing
them with more transparent benchmarks and publicly available nationwide community
development data. Federal agencies have a large amount of data on community needs, which
could be more consistently provided to banks and utilized (Bull, 2017). The opportunity for
traditional banks to engage more with impact investing is an avenue for future research.
As information providers, the federal regulators can enable better data sharing and
reporting consistency and streamlining so that we can learn what works to move the needle in
community development. Regulatory policies on data collection should coalesce around
measurement of outcomes rather than checklists of quantitative data (Willis, 2009), which simply
feel like a compliance burden. More focus on community impacts would help bankers to feel like
the CRA is contributing to improving community outcomes through expert insights and support,
as opposed to just a tedious data analytics and documentation exercise. Furthermore,
streamlining data collection across the various policies related to fair lending and community
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reinvestment will lessen the costly regulatory burden on banks. This recommendation also
recognizes the specialized community development expertise that already exists in the public
sector but is inaccessible for many community banks who cannot afford community development
divisions or additional outreach staff or data analysts. Furthermore, current performance contexts
do not incorporate formal community needs assessments, which are key to measuring impact and
how well community needs have been served (Silver, 2016). Without a full understanding of
their LMI communities’ primary needs, banks cannot effectively measure or target their
community impact (Choi & Dowling, 2014). Regulators could incentivize banks to be more
responsive to community needs by both empowering them with the data to do so and rewarding
them for providing market context analyses that incorporate both quantitative data and
qualitative information from community members (Silver, 2016).
In fact, CROs experienced market pressures in their operational work to carry out specific
activities required by the CRA in their communities. Many of the CROs felt that the challenges
of their market contexts were the most significant impediments to do more when it came to
compliance with the CRA. This was not because of community pressure from activists to do
more with CRA for most of the bankers (especially the community banks) as had been
hypothesized, but rather it was because of a perceived lack of need for CRA-qualified activity in
regions that they felt were overbanked. The underlying mechanisms and realities on the ground
that contribute to this perception are outside the scope of this study. However, the findings spur
additional questions such as if there is a more systemic issue of potential LMI clients needing
more technical assistance to raise their credit than the bank was able or willing to provide? Or,
was the lack of LMI communities in bank assessment areas more directly related to where banks
had chosen to locate their branches, avoiding LMI census tracts?
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In other words, to what extent is there a mismatch between the need for capital and the
banks’ perceptions that their communities are already well-served? This would be an opportunity
for a future study to consider that takes into account community profiles and census tract income
analyses in cross-section with bank branch locations and assessment areas. The current findings,
however, reinforce the need for policy designers to work in concert with banks to provide better
data regarding where CRA-qualified investments are needed and undercapitalized, and then
provide the credit for banks to invest in those areas. Given the need to align conflicting
institutional logics, CRA regulatory policy agencies should think of the CRA work as a crosssector collaboration with banks and other community-based organizations, where each side
brings strengths to the table in pursuit of community development impact. This may necessitate
market-driven solutions from the banking side, supported by the regulators (Choi & Dowling,
2014; Silver, 2016). Specifically, regulators should continue to incentivize and reward both
innovations in impact investing and cross-sector partnerships between banks and community
development organizations which capitalize on the strengths of each, resulting in greater
community impact and capital flow.
Prior research indicates that there is a strong positive correlation between firms with
strong social performance and financial performance (Simpson & Kohers, 2002; Waddock &
Graves, 1997). If these goals are reconcilable, then disadvantaged members of our communities
will benefit from greater collaboration between banks and the regulatory agencies. These
collaborations should not focus on simply checking the boxes of compliance, or on the volume of
activities. Rather, they must focus on the true impact of these activities on banks’ communities
(Choi & Dowling, 2014). Ultimately, banks will be more effective, have more money to invest,
and make a greater impact in their communities if they are profitable. Thus, government agencies
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and banks alike must focus on initiatives within the financial mainstream, in line with market
opportunities, and focused on the intersection of profit and purpose. It is vital that the facially
irreconcilable policy goals of profit and social performance work together, not at odds. Banks
that fail or shut down branches that are not profitable cannot do anything to help their
communities, regardless of regulatory mandates.
In Closing: On May 20, 2020, the OCC issued a final rule overhauling its regulations for
the CRA following the collection of ANPR feedback letters and comments that were reviewed in
this study and submitted by the subset of bankers who were interviewed. The final rule resulted
in the first major revisions to the CRA regulations in nearly 25 years, and applied only to
national banks, federal savings associations, and insured federal branches because the OCC had
acted alone (Lee, 2020). Ultimately, the FDIC and FRB did not join with the OCC’s CRA rule.
The OCC’s CRA rule revisions were not well-received by the banking community (Ackerman,
2020). Later, the agency announced in July of 2021 that it would rescind the final CRA rule and
collaborate with the FDIC and FRB on any future changes (OCC, 2021). On May 5, 2022, the
three banking agencies issued a joint proposal to revise the CRA regulations and welcomed
comments through August 5, 2022 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2022).
Thus, at the conclusion of this study, future reforms of the CRA are still under debate. This study
has offered numerous insights that could inform future reform efforts.
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Appendix 2. Informed Consent
Research Study Title-- Reconciling Conflicting Logics:
Community Reinvestment Officers at the Intersection of Public Policy and Market Forces
Consent to Participate in a Research Study
Principal Researcher: Meredith Adkins
Faculty Advisor: Margaret Reid
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE
You are invited to participate in a research study about how bank managers interpret and manage
regulatory demands created by the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). You are being asked to
participate in this study because you are employed by a bank and have job responsibilities related
to implementation of the CRA.
WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE RESEARCH STUDY
Who is the Principal Researcher?
Who is the Faculty Advisor?
Meredith Adkins
Dr. Margaret Reid
XXX-XXX-XXXX or mmckee@uark.edu
XXX-XXX-XXXX or mreid@uark.edu
What is the purpose of this research study?
The purpose of this study is to examine how bankers responsible for the Community
Reinvestment Act manage regulatory demands created by the policy, including how they
reconcile pressures from their communities, their regulators, and their employers to support lowto-moderate income clients. I am also interested in how bankers’ reactions to the CRA are
associated with their own backgrounds, and the norms, values and beliefs of professional fields,
which tend to shape a manager’s interpretation of their work.
Who will participate in this study?
Fifty participants are being asked to participate in this study. They are all working professionals
employed by banks in the United States. They hold various titles and roles within the financial
depository institution, but their knowledge and responsibilities for the CRA have been predicted
based on a set of letters concerning CRA policy revisions that were sent to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency in 2018 to 2019. A purposive sample for this study was pulled from
the individuals who wrote these letters. The sample was identified by sorting for variation in
state, size of the bank, and regulator.
What am I being asked to do?
Your participation will require the following: A one hour interview, via a video conferencing
platform (Zoom) or telephone. Following the interview, participation will also include a brief
demographic questionnaire sent in follow up to the interview, which should take approximately
10 minutes.
What are the possible risks or discomforts?
There are no anticipated risks to participating.
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What are the possible benefits of this study?
In addition to the knowledge gained by the study, it may be beneficial for the participant to learn
about how other organizations and CRA officers manage and implement the CRA. Such insights
could be used to best structure job roles and responsibilities, organization structure, onboarding,
training within the organization, or initiatives that could be shared with banking regulators and
other professional networks that offer support on CRA implementation.
How long will the study last?
Interviews for this study will take place over the next 3 months, approximately. Analysis and
writing up the research findings will continue through the rest of 2021 and potentially into early
spring 2022. In total, the study is estimated to take 8-10 months.
Will I receive compensation for my time and inconvenience if I choose to participate in this
study?
No, there will be no compensation for participating in the study.
Will I have to pay for anything?
No, there will be no cost associated with your participation.
What are the options if I do not want to be in the study?
If you do not want to be in this study, you may refuse to participate. Also, you may refuse to
participate at any time during the study. If you withdraw, any information previously shared will
be removed from the study.
How will my confidentiality be protected?
All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by applicable State and
Federal law.
Several steps will be taken to ensure confidentiality. This will include storing interview
recordings and transcriptions in a secure, password protected University of Arkansas private Box
folder. All interview recordings will be deleted after the research has been completed. The
recordings will only be used to review responses to ensure accuracy of transcription.
In the research analysis and reporting of results in the final dissertation, additional steps
will be taken to ensure confidentiality. Your name, location and the name of your employer will
not be utilized directly. Rather, information shared will be reported both in aggregate, and
through the use of generic characteristics about the bank (such as size and region) to protect
anonymity of your responses.
Will I know the results of the study?
At the conclusion of the study you will have the right to request feedback about the results. You
may contact the faculty advisor, Dr. Margaret Reid (XXX-XXX-XXXX or mreid@uark.edu)or
Principal Researcher, Meredith Adkins (XXX-XXX-XXXX or mmckee@uark.edu). You will
receive a copy of this form for your files.
What do I do if I have questions about the research study?
You have the right to contact the Principal Researcher or Faculty Advisor as listed below for any
concerns that you may have.
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Principal Researcher: Meredith Adkins (XXX-XXX-XXXX or mmckee@uark.edu)
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Margaret Reid (XXX-XXX-XXXX or mreid@uark.edu)
You may also contact the University of Arkansas Research Compliance office listed below if you
have questions about your rights as a participant, or to discuss any concerns about, or problems
with the research.
Ro Windwalker, CIP
Institutional Review Board Coordinator
Research Compliance
University of Arkansas
109 MLKG Building
Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201
479-575-2208
irb@uark.edu
I have read the above statement and have been able to ask questions and express concerns, which
have been satisfactorily responded to by the investigator. I understand the purpose of the study as
well as the potential benefits and risks that are involved. I understand that participation is
voluntary. I understand that significant new findings developed during this research will be
shared with the participant. I understand that no rights have been waived by signing the consent
form. I have been given a copy of the consent form.

Signature

Date
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Appendix 3. Email to Potential Participants
Good afternoon Mr./Mrs. [Last Name],
I am a Public Policy PhD candidate completing my dissertation at the University of Arkansas,
Fayetteville. My dissertation project revolves around the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA),
specifically attempting to address the question of how the CRA affects the work and
responsibilities of bankers. I came across your contact information in the public comments
submitted to the OCC after the 2018 Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning CRA
regulatory revisions.
This dissertation, and the corresponding interview questions, are intended to examine how
bankers responsible for the CRA manage regulatory demands created by the policy, including
how you reconcile pressures from the community, your regulator, and your employer to support
low-to-moderate income clients. I am also interested in how bankers’ reactions to the CRA might
be influenced by their backgrounds, and the norms, values and beliefs of professional fields,
which tend to shape a manager’s interpretation of their work.
Specifically, my request is to schedule a one-hour interview with you via Zoom video
conferencing (or telephone if preferred), to discuss your CRA work. I would ask you to complete
a brief demographic questionnaire in follow up to this interview, which would take about 5
minutes to complete. All interview responses will be confidential to the extent allowed by
applicable State and Federal law. Your name, location, and the name of your employer will not
be utilized directly in the dissertation to protect anonymity of your responses.
I would be happy to share the main findings of the research at the conclusion of the project. In
addition to any general knowledge gained, you may be interested to learn more about how other
organizations and CRA officers manage and implement the CRA, including how the work is
structured within organizations and across roles.
I very much appreciate your thoughts about this important topic and ask for scheduling time to
discuss at your convenience. For any further questions, I can be reached at this email, or via
phone at XXX-XXX-XXXX.
Best regards,
Meredith
Meredith Adkins
XXX-XXX-XXXX or mmckee@uark.edu
PhD Candidate, Public Policy- Community Development
University of Arkansas
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Appendix 4. Interview Protocol
Introduction (approx. 5 min)
Thank you for taking this time to talk with me today. As you know, I am a Public Policy PhD
student at the University of Arkansas, and I am working on a dissertation project that
examines how bankers responsible for the Community Reinvestment Act manage regulatory
demands created by the policy, including how you reconcile pressures from the community,
your regulator, and your employer to support low-to-moderate income clients. I am also
interested in how bankers’ reactions to the CRA are associated with their own backgrounds,
and the norms, values and beliefs of professional fields, which tend to shape a manager’s
interpretation of their work.
I am conducting this research because while a lot of researchers have focused on entry-level
workers and public sector implementation of public policies, we know less about how
managers within private sector organizations, such as banks, react to policy pressures and
how they see or interpret their role in shaping public policies.
You have been asked to participate in this interview because of your role in carrying out CRA
policies at your organization. The interview should take about 60 minutes. I’m truly
appreciative of the time you’re taking to speak with me to provide us with insights into the
complexities of your work.
Before we begin, I would like your permission to record the interview. All recordings will be
deleted after the research has been completed. I will only use them to review your responses
to assure accuracy of my transcription. Additionally, all the information you share today will
be fully confidential. I will not use any identifying information that could associate your
name or that of your employer with anything you share today.
Do you have any questions before we get started?
If you agree to these terms, I would appreciate if you could sign the associated form which is
required of all research institutions that conduct research like this.
Interview Question

Probing Question
(as needed)

Conceptual
Constructs

Citations

I’d like to start by learning a little about your personal and professional
background. (approx. 10 min)
1. How did you get into your
a. With which of
References to
(Battilana &
current profession in banking?
the following
institutional
Dorado,
Have you spent significant
professions
logics
2010;
time in a different field?
have you spent
Bridwellthe bulk of your Individual
Mitchell &
career?
attributesSherer, 2017;
(1) Career
personal and
Chazdon,
banker
professional
1996;
(2) Business background
Watkinsfinance
Hayes, 2009)
or other
I.
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private
sector
(3) Public sector
(e.g.
government,
including
regulatory
body)
(4) Nonprofit/
community
development
(5) Other?
2. To what extent do you think
that the CRA has produced
greater bank investment in
local communities than would
otherwise be achieved through
corporate social responsibility
or market demands?

a. Do you feel that
your opinion is
mainstream or
commonly held
by banking
professionals?
Or is it more of
an
unconventional
response?

Interpretations of
policy mandates
and references to
institutional
logics, including
attitude/desire to
work in
community
development,
opinion of the
CRA; and
perceptions about
other community
lending officers
and their
philosophies

(BridwellMitchell &
Sherer, 2017;
Chazdon,
1996;
Cloutier et
al., 2016;
Friedland &
Alford,
1991)

II.
Let’s move into your role as [title] at [name of employer]. (approx. 25 min)
3. Can you tell me about your
Job
(Battilana &
CRA related responsibilities
responsibilities
Dorado,
and what percentage of your
and weight of role 2010;
role is focused on the CRA?
focus on the CRA Chazdon,
and community
1996;
development
Lipsky,
1980)
Features of the
bank- structure of
the role within the
organization,
4. Did you specifically seek out a a. How is the role Individual
(Battilana &
career or role with CRA
aligned with
attributes-prior
Dorado,
your personal
personal and
2010;
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responsibility? Why or why
not?

5. Would you categorize yourself
as a senior leader, middle
manager, or entry-level
manager within this
organization? (If not senior
leader, who do you report to?)
6. Could you describe the
size/responsibilities of the
team working on CRA, and
your role within that team?

career interests
(e.g. regulatory
compliance,
finance, social
impact, etc.)?

a.

a.

b.

7. How do you measure
profitability in your CRA
activities?
▪ In your view, to what
extent do CRA
responsibilities align or
conflict with the
business bottom line,
making a profit?

a.

b.

professional
background:
Social values that
may influence
references to
institutional
logics and
interpretations of
policy mandates

Professional-self
and role
perception
How much
Features of the
authority would bank- structure of
you say that you the role within the
have to
organization;
determine CRA assessment of
policy
decision-making
implementation power and
for your bank?
interactions with
Have the team
colleagues in
size or
organization
responsibilities
changed since
you started your
work here?
Why?
Do you have a
sense of how
this compares to
similarly sized
banks that you
are familiar
with in the state
or nationally?
If pressures to
Conflicting logics
(e.g. market
make a profit
logic)
conflict with
your CRA
responsibilities, Features of the
where are these bank organizational
pressures
characteristics
coming from?
If you’re
spending a lot

BridwellMitchell &
Sherer, 2017;
Chazdon,
1996;
WatkinsHayes, 2009)

(BridwellMitchell &
Sherer, 2017;
Chazdon,
1996;
Cloutier et
al., 2016;
DiMaggio,
1988;
DiMaggio &
Powell,
1983;
Fligstein,
1997)

(Battilana &
Dorado,
2010;
Chazdon,
1996;
DiMaggio &
Powell,
1983;
Friedland &
Alford, 1991;
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of time on
CRA, does that
mean less time
where you
could work on
projects that are
more
profitable?
8. What are some of the major
c. (If time
hurdles you face to increase
availability is a
community investment or to
stated issue).
fulfill other CRA
What would
requirements?
you be able to
For example, are
do if you had
challenges more related to:
more time?
▪ Staffing/time
d. Have these
availability and job role
challenges
demands related to
changed in
your non-CRA work?
recent years?
▪ Safety and soundness
or underwriting
standards?
▪ Profitability of CRA
related investments?
▪ Competition for
community
development loans?
9. I see that your most recent
CRA rating was (X). Is there
pressure within your
organization to raise this
score?

If so, from
whom?

Scott, 1995;
Thomann et
al., 2016)

Features of the
bank - Main
issues faced in
implementation
and strategies to
deal with these
challenges
Conflicting logics

Features of bankAccountability
pressures of the
organization, e.g.
recent CRA
ratings,
commitment of
the organization
to policy and
performance;
assessment of
organizational
commitment to
community
lending

(Chazdon,
1996;
Cloutier et
al., 2016;
Lipsky,
1980;
Matland,
1995;
WatkinsHayes, 2009)

(Battilana &
Dorado,
2010;
BridwellMitchell &
Sherer, 2017;
Chazdon,
1996;
DiMaggio,
1988;
DiMaggio &
Powell,
1983;
Fligstein,
1997; Kraatz,
2009; Riaz et
al., 2011;
Rojas, 2010)
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10. To what degree is your
bank/bank leadership
committed to the goals of the
CRA?

a. Do
compensation
package
structures (for
example base
versus
commission)
deter from
working with
LMI customers?
b. Have you taken
any actions to
gain more buyin on the CRA
from your
leadership or
colleagues?

Features of the
bank organizational
characteristics –
importance of
CRA for
employer

(Battilana &
Dorado,
2010;
BridwellMitchell &
Sherer, 2017;
Chazdon,
1996;
Processes to gain Cloutier et
institutional buy- al., 2016;
in
DiMaggio,
1988;
DiMaggio &
Powell,
1983;
Fligstein,
1997; Kraatz,
2009; Riaz et
al., 2011;
Rojas, 2010)
III.
Let’s move to a question about community responses or pressures to increase
LMI investments. (approx. 5 min)
11. Are there groups or members
a. Where do you
Conflicting logics (Bridwellin your community that are
see most of the Community
Mitchell &
pushing for you to do more
community
profile and
Sherer, 2017
with regards to CRA?
pressures
opinion of
Chazdon,
coming from
community
1996;
(like local
pressures
DiMaggio &
government,
Powell,
community1983;
based
Garrow &
nonprofits,
Grusky,
etc.)?
2012; Scott,
b. What do they
1995)
want you to do?
IV.
I see that your regulator is X (approx. 10 min)
12. To what extent is your
a. Which of these
(Chazdon,
regulatory agency (xx) helpful
resources or
Interpretations of 1996;
with regards to carrying out
services are
policy mandates
Cloutier et
your CRA responsibilities?
most helpful to
al., 2016;
improve your
Conflicting logics Lawrence &
For example, do they
CRA outcomes? Opinion and role Suddaby,
of regulatory
2006)
• provide training,
enforcement
• educational
material,
• webinars,
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•
•

conferences,
or other resources
or assistance to
improve your exam
score or clarify
regulatory policies?
Thank you for the time you spent interviewing with me today. Your insights will be very
helpful to better understand the implementation of CRA policy. In follow-up to today’s
interview, I will send a brief questionnaire to collect several demographic
characteristics. Please complete it and email it back to me at your earliest convenience.
Please remember that all of your personal information will be held in strict confidence.
Thank you again.
Post interview, email a brief
questionnaire
• Current Job title (Please
also send current job
description if possible)
• Gender?
• Race/Ethnicity
o African American
o Indigenous or
Aboriginal
o Asian/
Pacific Islander
o Hispanic
o Multiracial
o Caucasian/White
o Other
• Hometown (city/state)
• Years in community
• Age Group
o 26-44 (Gen
Y/Millennials)
o 45-56 (Gen X)
o 57-75 (Baby
Boomer)
• Number of professional
years in banking
(including the number of
years of the total working
on CRA)_

Individual
attributes-demographic
characteristics
that may
influence
references to
institutional
logics and
interpretations of
policy mandates,
including
race/gender/age,
and years of
experience in this
occupation.

(BridwellMitchell &
Sherer, 2017;
Chazdon,
1996;
WatkinsHayes, 2009)
Age groups
are
developed
from The
Center for
Generational
Kinetics
(2020)

Job title
Hometown (is
there a connection
between banking
in one’s
hometown versus
a transplant?)
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Appendix 5. Demographic Questionnaire
Research Study Title-- Reconciling Conflicting Logics:
Community Reinvestment Officers at the Intersection of Public Policy and Market Forces
Demographic Questionnaire
Principal Researcher: Meredith Adkins (XXX-XXX-XXXX or mmckee@uark.edu)
Faculty Advisor: Dr. Margaret Reid (XXX-XXX-XXXX or mreid@uark.edu)

Name____________________________________________
Employer_________________________________________
Current Job title____________________________________
Gender___________________________________________
Race/Ethnicity
African American
Indigenous or Aboriginal
Asian/Pacifica Islander
Hispanic
Multiracial
Caucasian/White
Other
Hometown (city/state)____________________________________________
Number of years in current community_______________________________
Age Group
26-44 (Gen Y/Millennials)
45-56 (Gen X)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
Number of years with CRA responsibilities: ______________
Number of professional years of experience in banking (including above):________
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Appendix 6. Codebook
Name
Description
Institutional Demands & Conflict Strategies – Data Set 1 Codebook
Institutional logics
Institutional logics are the socially constructed norms and practices
embodied by sectoral actors (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lindblom,
1977; Perry & Rainey, 1988; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999).
Market Logic/ProfitA market logic was reflected in discourse that focused on market
First
opportunities, profit maximization, or the loss of competitive
advantage through regulations that infringed on the free market
(Averch & Johnson, 1962; Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Dahl
& Lindblom, 1953; Epstein et al., 2016; Downs, 1967; Friedland &
Alford, 1991; Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Thomann et al., 2016;
Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Wamsley & Zald, 1973).
Bureaucratic Logic
A bureaucratic logic was reflected in discourse that espoused a need
for regulation, that recognized a need for public benefit programs
(including charitable products and services), and that prioritized
assessment of public outcomes (Atkinson & Stiglitz, 1980; BridwellMitchell & Sherer, 2017; Friedland & Alford, 1991; Lyden, 1975;
Rainey, 1983; Viscussi, et al., 2005; Epstein, et al., 2016).
Development Logic
The development logic is focused on community development and
concerns such as poverty alleviation (Battilana & Dorado, 2010;
Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017; Chazdon, 1996; Knutsen, 2012).
Shared Value

Institutional Conflict

Local Market
Conditions
Inflexibility
Modernization

Shared value was notable for its articulation as a balance between
purpose and profit. This view was reflected in discourse that
recognized market potential through reinvestment in LMI
communities and that saw community development as good for
business (Porter & Kramer, 2011).
Because institutions provide the guiding principles for individuals’
and organizations’ work, give legitimacy to norms and practices, and
govern the distribution of power and resources, their demands create
pressure, particularly at the intersection of divergent sectors where
multiple institutional logics co-exist (Besharov & Smith, 2014;
Kraatz & Block, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977/1991; Oliver, 1991;
Pache & Santos, 2010).
The market of the bank’s assessment areas limits opportunity for
CRA-qualified investments due to forces outside the control of the
bank.
Regulations are not flexible in line with bank’s business model.
Bankers felt that the CRA has not kept up with the times, it’s an
antiquated mandate that doesn’t recognize new technologies and the
prominence of online banking.

379

Ambiguity

Workload &
Resources

Institutional Work

Avoidance

Agenda Denial

Complexity of the
Regulated Profession
Co-Optation

Self-Regulation
Denial that a problem
exists
Stories of Decline –
Narrative plot strategy
Stories of control –
Narrative plot strategy
Villains – Policy
narrative character
Heroes – Policy
narrative character
Compromise

Policy expectations are unclear/significant leeway for interpretation
(Cloutier et al. 2016; Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980;
Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000;
Watkins-Hayes, 2009)
Workers have overbearing workloads and insufficient resources and
the regulatory burden exacerbates (Cloutier et al. 2016; Garrow &
Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980; Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995;
Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000; Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
The deliberate actions of individuals to create, disrupt, or maintain
institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al.,2009;
2011; 2013).
Intentional strategies to maintain existing institutional norms within
the profession, while avoiding the changes that public policy reform
seeks (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Mahon &
McGowan, 1997; Oliver, 1991; Stone, 2012).
Denial that a problem exists (banks already seek to benefit
communities without regulation (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Mahon &
McGowan, 1997).
Professionals paint a picture that their field is too complex to be
regulated because of the expertise required (Cobb & Ross, 1997;
Mahon & McGowan, 1997).
Actors co-opt issue narratives from the opponents and incorporate
them into their own arguments (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Mahon &
McGowan, 1997).
Private regulation. Strategy to pre-empt more stringent regulations
(Gunningham & Rees, 1997; Malhotra et al., 2019)
Policy strategy to avoid more stringent regulation by arguing that no
problems exist that need regulation (Cobb & Ross, 1997; Mahon &
McGowan, 1997).
One of two common plots described by Stone (2012). Spins a tale of
how conditions will get worse if a specific action is taken.
One of two common plots described by Stone (2012). Plots of control
offer hope by implying that certain actions can allow one to reach
previously unattainable goals.
Each policy narrative story contains a structure and components, such
as plots and characters, which can be identified and quantified
(Stone, 2012).
Each policy narrative story contains a structure and components, such
as plots and characters, which can be identified and quantified
(Stone, 2012).
Conflict response strategies of institutional work can also entail
compromise, which entails a blending of qualities between
institutional logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Kraatz & Block, 2008;
Thomann et al., 2016).
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Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies – Data Set 2 Codebook
Organizational
Organizational culture is understood as the forces that shape patterns
Culture
of behavior in organizations, including how behaviors are legitimized
through incentives or sanctions, as well as the collaborative process
of sense-making and shared norms (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer,
2017; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott 1995; Watkins, 2013).
100% CRA
A theme indicating that the CRA banker was solely responsible for
management of CRA responsibilities, as opposed to a variety of
regulatory compliance functions. 100% CRA typically meant that the
banker engaged in community outreach in addition to data analysis.
Many hats
This theme reflects a commonality between CROs who were
responsible for CRA compliance as well as multiple other banking
regulations such as HMDA, BSA, and fair lending compliance. Many
hats often meant that the CRO was a compliance professional and
data analyst , rather than a community outreach professional. Many
hats included the following three sub-codes.
Back-end data
This code refers to CROs who functioned as data analysts, combing
analyst
through existing lending or investment data to identify potential
CRA-qualified bank activities. Back-end data analysts had less
opportunity to influence CRA activities due to the lack of outreach
work and the centralization of job duties within a compliance
function.
Lending portfolio
This subtheme of many hats indicated an investments skillset and job
responsibilities that directly entailed a lending or investments
portfolio, such as affordable housing lending. This finance-based
skillset is substantially different than regulatory compliance or data
analysis.
Regulatory
This subtheme of many hats meant that the banker was often
compliance soup
responsible for multiple banking regulations in addition to CRA. It
indicates that even CRA alone is highly complex to comprehend
given the enormous amount of policy commentary to elaborate the
regulatory requirements. Getting mired in the policy left little time
for outreach or community engagement work.
Workload
Workload was connected to the job duties, including dedication to
CRA or other banking regulations where the latter was a complex
workload.
Managing data
A challenge was voiced regarding collecting, documenting, and
analyzing all of the data connected to CRA performance.
Ambiguity
Policy expectations are unclear/significant leeway for interpretation
(Cloutier et al. 2016; Garrow & Grusky, 2012; Lipsky, 1980;
Marinetto, 2011; Matland, 1995; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000;
Watkins-Hayes, 2009).
Organizational
Ability of the CRO to influence structural requirements of policy
Authority
mandates as well as conceptual ones.
CRO’s CRA
A CRO’s CRA worldview refers to the symbolic understanding of
Worldview
what being a CRO means and what the CRA policy mandates mean.
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CRA is profitable
CRA isn’t
profitable
CRA has made a
difference
CRA hasn’t made a
difference
Personal identity

Race and ethnicity

Gender
Organizational and
leadership
commitment to CRA
Commitment to
CRA performance
Commitment to
community
CRA is everyone’s
responsibility

CRA is your
responsibility

CRA is compliance

CRA necessitates
community outreach

CRA was seen as a market opportunity. For example, investments
and loans generated returns, and new products could be profitable.
CRA was not seen as a market opportunity. It was not incorporated
into profit calculations of the bank.
Response to whether or not CRA has had a greater impact on capital
access than would have already been achieved with the market. This
response is that it has.
Response to whether or not CRA has had a greater impact on capital
access than would have already been achieved with the market. This
response is that it has not.
Personal identity is our individual identity, or those traits or
attributes which are defining or distinguishing about an individual
(Olson, 2002).
Measured via demographic questionnaire. Choices were African
American, Indigenous or Aboriginal, Asian/Pacific Islander,
Hispanic, Multiracial, Caucasian/White and other.
Measured via demographic questionnaire. Was fill in the blank.
A highly significant factor for senior managers’ abilities to influence
shared norms and create effective structures for the work required to
carry out CRA is the support that they have from their leadership, an
element of organizational culture.
Organizational leadership is committed to CRA performance and
seeks an outstanding rating, as opposed to ‘satisfactory is good
enough’
Organizational leadership espouses support for the community more
broadly, such as economic development.
Bank leadership embraces a distributed vision of CRA
implementation across the organization. Compliance cannot be
achieved by the CRO alone. It is a team effort that necessitates
intentionality from every member of the team.
On one end of the spectrum, the CROs are fully responsible for
compliance. They must scrutinize every loan, investment, and service
activity and document it. They are analysts who must fit existing
activities into CRA exam requirements.
If CRA is viewed in the same category as other banking regulations,
as is the common perception, it is likely to be assigned to the
compliance department. There, it will be conceptualized as
necessitating adherence to mandates, a checklist of activities and a
back-end analytic exercise.
If CRA is conceptualized as necessitating community development,
the bank will embrace a philosophy that the mandates of the CRA
require intentional community engagement and community
development loan portfolios to enable LMI individuals’ increased
capital access.
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Community market
context
Decline of the
community bank
Technology changing
the way we work
Innovation &
Intrapreneurship
Professional identity

In their shoes
Teamworking
Agreeableness

Outreach professional
Compliance
Professional

Community in this sense refers to the particular assessment areas
where banks operate, while the market refers to the economic activity
in that area.
Community banks in America are on the decline due to extensive
banking regulations and the overhead cost, as well as the
proliferation of larger banks whose profit model is acquisitions.
Over the decades the work has changed significantly, particularly
moving from push pins on the wall and maps to advanced data
software packages.
Banks are faced with the rapid pace of technological development,
and they keep up with market opportunities by developing new
financial products or services.
Professional identity is understood as one’s professional selfunderstanding based on beliefs, values and experiences (Ibarra, 1999;
Slay & Smith, 2010).
CRO had been in a variety of different roles in the bank and was
internally respected because of an understanding of other’s roles.
The capacity to effectively cooperate and coordinate, with others, to
accomplish shared and collective aims (Wilmot & Ones, 2022).
Agreeableness is the aspect of professional identity that leads to
contentment, work investment, the capacity for successful integration
into social rules, relational investment, and teamworking (Wilmot &
Ones, 2022).
CRO was in the field because of community development. Was apt to
network and engage in community outreach.
CRO was in the field because of regulatory compliance. Was apt to
do data analytics and documentation work.
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Appendix 7. Institutional Demands and Conflict Response Strategies Conceptual Map
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Appendix 8. Contextual Factors and Reconciliation Strategies Conceptual Map
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Appendix 9. Interview Respondent Classification Table

Pseudonym
Michelle
John
Barbara
Robert
Thomas
Jane
Lisa
Leslie
Charles
Kathryn
Melissa
Candice
Anna
Stephanie
Luis
Marshall
Tiffany
Mary
Leah
Rosa
James
Tina/Amanda
Jeffrey

Gender
Female
Male
Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male
Male
Female
Female
Female
Female
Male
Female
Male

Race
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
Asian/Pacific Islander
Caucasian/White
Hispanic
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White
African American
African American
African American
African American
Caucasian/White
Caucasian/White

Age Group
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
26-44 (Gen Y/Millennials)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
45-56 (Gen X)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
45-56 (Gen X)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
45-56 (Gen X)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
26-44 (Gen Y/Millennials)
45-56 (Gen X)
26-44 (Gen Y/Millennials)
26-44 (Gen Y/Millennials)
45-56 (Gen X)
26-44 (Gen Y/Millennials)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)
45-56 (Gen X)
57-75 (Baby Boomer)

Regulator
FDIC
OCC
FDIC
FDIC
OCC
FDIC
FRB
OCC
FDIC
OCC
OCC
FRB
FDIC
OCC
OCC
OCC
FDIC
FRB
FRB
FDIC
FRB
FDIC
FDIC

Bank Size
346-749 Million
346-749 Million
346-749 Million
346-749 Million
346-749 Million
750 Million-1.384 Billion
750 Million-1.384 Billion
750 Million-1.384 Billion
346-749 Million
1.384-9 Billion
10-50 Billion
1.384-9 Billion
1.384-9 Billion
Over 100 Billion
10-50 Billion
1.384-9 Billion
1.384-9 Billion
1.384-9 Billion
Over 100 Billion
10-50 Billion
10-50 Billion
Less than 346 Million
Less than 346 Million

Exam Method
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
INTER SMALL BANK
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
LARGE BANK EXAM
SMALL BANK
SMALL BANK

Rating
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
OUTSTANDING
OUTSTANDING
NEEDS TO IMPROVE
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY
SATISFACTORY

Region
WEST
SOUTH
MIDWEST
MIDWEST
WEST
NORTHEAST
WEST
MIDWEST
MIDWEST
SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH
NORTHEAST
SOUTH
SOUTH
MIDWEST
NORTHEAST
SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH
SOUTH
WEST
NORTHEAST

Seniority
VP
VP
Manager
CEO
Manager
SVP
VP
Manager
Manager
Manager
SVP
SVP
Manager
Manager
SVP
Manager
VP
SVP
VP
Manager
Manager
VP
CEO
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